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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE ROLES OF TURKISH SOCIETY IN THE ALLIANCE OF 
CIVILIZATION IN GERMANY, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 
Mobility across borders in the information, technologies and internet age has 
increased both inter-civilization relations and the interactions among the members 
of these different civilizations more than any time before. As the mobility towards 
continental Europe through migration have started to change the demographic 
balances and as the European Muslims began to be considered as a threat after 
September 11, new debates came along. Islamophobia, xenophobia and anti-
immigrant contexts have developed an exclusion and otherization into a political 
context and pushed the Muslim minorities into introversion and ethnic and 
religious ghettos. Some minority groups otherized and pushed out of system with 
the failure of multiculturalism policies gradually become affected by radical 
ethnic, religious and ideological movements. Reciprocal bias and distinctions in 
European countries threaten the social peace and cause societal tensions; and they 
are being used by nationalist and racist parties to establish a public opinion. The 
starting point of this research is whether the ‘intercultural and inter-civilization 
communications and interactions’ which increased highly in the last decades will 
cause conflict or dialogue?  
The Muslim Turkish migrants living in Europe as settled immigrants have faced 
several different problems since the first years of migration. Problem of 
integration has definitely become one of the most important topics of this struggle 
to be permanent in Europe. The background of criticisms about the minorities, 
including the Turkish migrants, that they could not overcome the integration 
problem, is consisted of the increasing ethnic/cultural ghettos and introversions. 
Muslim minorities include the Turkish society in Europe, which is criticized by 
media and the politicians in terms of integration, are mentioned with violence and 
terror which make difficult the integration process. Within this new integration 
process, during which the incidents of terror have strengthened the concerns 
against Muslims, radical elements began to appear in both societies. The increase 
of excessive and aggressive racism and nationalism with a reactionary or 
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defensive reflex caused societal tensions far from rationality and common sense. 
In many German cities, Turkish houses were set on fire and ‘Turkish döner’ shop 
owners were killed in a series of murders. These events show us where the 
tensions have reached. The question that comes on our minds at this point is what 
kind of a reaction Muslim Turkish society in Europe will give to these bias and 
attacks within the continental Europe which threaten the social peace. The 
reaction of European Turkish society both towards the radical ethnic and religious 
elements within itself and to those racist and far-right elements is the starting 
point of our research. In another word, this study aims to reveal the participatory 
and open to dialogue role of European Turkish society with its internal and 
external dynamics which will make the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ approach 
possible at least in Western societies. Besides, the limited number of research 
conducted whether the European Turkish society has a tendency towards the 
violence-oriented radical groups or not makes this study current and unique. 
In this field study, semi-structured interview and survey methodology, a subfield 
of qualitative research, has been used to collect data. This study was conducted on 
respondents with different socio-economic statuses from Cologne (German and 
Turkish: Köln) in Germany, Brussels in Belgium and Amsterdam in the 
Netherlands where Turkish society live intensely. With the help of a previously 
prepared set of questions, the respondents of interview and survey were asked a 
series of open and close-ended questions. Besides, with the help of semi-
structured interview methodology, the interviewees were selected from prominent 
members of Turkish societies in terms of political, economic and socio-cultural 
indicators. Pre-defined interview and survey questions have been asked with the 
most objective and scientific method possible to the respondents and have been 
recorded to be analyzed later. 
 
Key words:  
The migrants of Turkish origin, Alliance of Civilization, Interfaith and 
intercultural dialogue, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
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RESUMO 
O PAPEL DA MINORIA TURCA NA ALIANÇA DAS CIVILIZAÇÕES, 
NA ALEMANHA, BÉLIGICA E PAÍSES BAIXOS 
 
 
Na era da internet, da informação e das tecnologias, a mobilidade transfronteiriça 
aumentou as relações interculturais e as interações entre os diferentes membros 
desses grupos culturais, como nunca antes. Com as sucessivas ondas de migração 
para a Europa continental a alterar o equilíbrio demográfico, e com os 
Muçulmanos europeus a serem considerados uma ameaça, após os atentados de 11 
de Setembro, começaram a surgir novos temas de debate. A Islamofobia, a 
xenofobia e casos de hostilidade anti imigração levaram essas situações de 
exclusão e alienação para o contexto político, provocando o confinamento das 
minorias muçulmanas em guetos étnicos e religiosos. Alguns grupos minoritários, 
alienados e excluídos do sistema devido ao falhanço das políticas multiculturais, 
foram gradualmente afectados pelos movimentos radicais étnicos, religiosos e 
ideológicos. A discriminação e as diferenciações tendenciosas nos países europeus 
ameaçam a paz social, provocando tensões que servem precisamente os propósitos 
dos partidos nacionalistas e racistas de influenciar a opinião pública. O ponto de 
partida desta pesquisa é questionar se “as interações e comunicações inter-
civilizacionais e interculturais”, que aumentaram drasticamente nas últimas 
décadas, estarão na origem de conflito ou de diálogo?  
Os migrantes turcos muçulmanos instalados na Europa têm enfrentado várias 
situações problemáticas desde os primeiros anos da imigração. Problemas de 
adaptação tornaram-se um dos tópicos mais prementes dessa luta para a 
permanência na Europa. O pano de fundo das críticas às minorias, onde está 
igualmente incluída a minoria turca, consiste na afirmação de que elas não 
conseguem ultrapassar os problemas de adaptação, o que tem levado ao aumento 
de situações de alienação e de confinamento em guetos étnico-culturais. À 
reminiscência dos hábitos da sociedade turca na país de acolhimento, criticados 
pelos media e políticos como estando na base do problema de adaptação, 
acrescentaram-se episódios de violência e terror nas minorias muçulmanas, o que 
tem tornado o processo de adaptação ainda mais difícil. Esses episódios têm 
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consolidado o preconceito antimuçulmano, provocado o surgimento de 
movimentos radicais em ambos grupos sociais. O aumento do racismo e do 
nacionalismo excessivo e agressivo enquanto reflexo defensivo e reactivo, está na 
base de tensões sociais que ultrapassam a razoabilidade e o bom senso. Em várias 
cidades alemãs, residências turcas foram incendiadas e vários proprietários de 
lojas turcas de döner foram assassinados. Esses acontecimentos são reveladores 
do ponto a que chegaram as tensões. A pergunta que surge neste momento é qual 
será a reação do grupo social turco muçulmano instalado na Europa a esses 
ataques e atos discriminatórios que ameaçam a paz social? A reação da minoria 
turca em relação aos elementos radicais étnicos e religiosos, e aos grupos racistas 
de extrema-direita são o ponto de partida da nossa pesquisa. Por outras palavras, 
este estudo tem como objetivo revelar o papel inclusivo e de abertura ao diálogo 
da minoria turca europeia, com as suas dinâmicas internas e externas, que tornarão 
a abordagem da “Aliança das Civilizações” possível, pelo menos na sociedade 
ocidental europeia. Além disso, existe um número limitado de estudos que 
questionam se a minoria turca europeia tem uma tendência para os grupos radicais 
violentos ou não, o que reforça a pertinência e originalidade deste trabalho. 
Neste campo de estudo, entrevistas semiestruturadas e metodologia de pesquisa, 
um subcampo da pesquisa qualitativa, foram usadas para recolher dados. O estudo 
foi realizado com inquiridos de diferentes grupos socioeconómicos de Colónia, na 
Alemanha, Bruxelas na Bélgica e Amsterdão nos Países Baixos, onde existe uma 
maior incidência de minorias turcas. Com a ajuda de um conjunto de perguntas 
previamente elaboradas, foram colocadas uma série de perguntas abertas e 
fechadas aos inquiridos, em entrevistas e inquéritos. Além disso, com a 
metodologia de entrevistas semiestruturadas, os inquiridos foram seleccionados 
entre membros proeminentes de grupos sociais turcos, no que respeita a 
indicadores políticos, económicos e e socioculturais. Entrevistas predefinidas e 
perguntas foram colocadas aos inquiridos com o maior rigor objetivo e científico, 
e foram gravadas para serem mais tarde analisadas.  
Palavras-chave: os migrantes de origem turca, Aliança das Civilizações, diálogo 
intercultural e inter-religioso, Alemanha, Bélgica e Países Baixos. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades, the relations among different civilizations and the interactions 
among the members of these different civilizations have increased as never 
before. In our world, which is considered as a small village, it is foreseen that the 
interaction among people with different cultural codes and values will increase 
more and more. The paradigm that the increasing interaction among different 
beliefs and cultures will eventually cause a conflict is one of the most 
controversial arguments today. According to Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) 
paradigm which depends on conflict, the interaction among different civilizations 
will make the visibility of differences more apparent, strengthen the 
consciousness of civilization in the minds of individuals; and revitalize the 
conflicts and hatreds rooted deep in the history. Huntington gives the immigration 
of North Africans to France and the intolerance and hostility of French people 
towards this migration as an example (Huntington, 2006: 27). In European 
capitals where this religious and cultural discourse began to be accepted, anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim actors of fear politics appeared. The discourse of the 
‘Clash of Civilizations’, which claims that religious and cultural differences 
cannot exist together, turned into a struggle to create a anti-immigrant and anti-
Muslim public opinion within Europe.  
 
Conflicts which gradually increased among the Christian and Muslim populations 
in Eastern Europe and Russia are the most obvious indicator that the ethnic and 
cultural belonging increased and revitalized. The isolation of Turkish and Muslim 
minorities in Bosnia, Albania, Bulgaria and Ukraine with the effect of nationalist 
and conservative parties within these countries confirms the political targets of the 
‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. As S. Huntington (1993, 1996) foresaw, the ‘Clash 
of Civilizations’ thesis is actually exploitation of several concepts (religion, 
culture and civilization) and then made acceptable under a theoretical framework 
as requested by the people who wanted to shape the world. Several political 
leaders, public figures, politicians and researchers affected by the events 
witnessed in Islamic countries and in the Western world have always put the 
threat of Islam and clash of civilizations on the top of the agenda (Esposito, 2002: 
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342). One of the most important arguments of those who try to define the future of 
the world in axis with ‘clash of civilization’ is the separative and instigative role 
of religions. But, it is impossible to foresee whether religions would play a 
separative and instigative, or a soothing and unifying role in terms of conflicts. 
But it can be said that an inter-religious conflict is not considered as a realistic 
fact for the future. One of the main arguments to undermine the expectations for 
conflict is this: with the help of dissemination of education and mass 
communication, understanding the religion by its original sources has increased 
(Bulaç, 2007: 234). The understanding of each other by different civilizations’ 
members, which are originally expected to polarize in terms of religious, ethnic 
and cultural identities, is rapidly increasing in the current information age. 
Therefore, a single civilization experience which ignores the historical conflicts 
and differences is far from determining the mutual relations. As a result of this, 
instead of otherization policies by beliefs, values and identities; unifying policies 
with a focus on common interest have began to become effective. It is obvious 
that common living places for people with different religions and beliefs have 
increased recently as a result of migration. This will help with the improvement of 
a culture of living together and the understanding and acceptance among the 
members of different civilizations will most probably prevent and/or decrease the 
possible conflicts. 
 
According to many Western researchers, Islam and West are always in conflict. 
According to this, Islam is considered as a threat in three different ways; political, 
civil and demographic. Especially the works of Bernard Lewis (1990) ‘The Roots 
of Muslim Age’ and Samuel Huntington’s (1993) the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
article published in Foreign Affairs seem to stiffen the Islamophobia of the West. 
Bernard Lewis’ article handles the clichés of Muslim and Islamic radicalism 
together and explains that the relationship between Islam and West are determined 
by rage, violence and hatred (Esposito, 2002: 352-353). This approach of conflict 
has divided the Western societies into two groups in a short time and considered 
as a proof in Islamic world which shows the real intention of West towards them. 
Besides, some media channels and researchers in the West are in a tendency to 
evaluate Islam as a religion of violence and extremism. These people, who believe 
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in easy clichés and solutions, have considered Islam and Islamic awakening as a 
threat. In other words, these people have considered Islam as a single movement 
and as a historical enemy of the West in terms of belief and context. On the other 
hand, people in the second group who believe in the existence of arguments which 
would strengthen the peace between Islam and West have considered it necessary 
to move beyond simple clichés and prepared images and answers. Contrary to the 
people in the first group who react the conflicts and wars in different parts of the 
world with a cumulative approach, the people in the second group have a more 
universalistic view and they do not evaluate the world with bipolar 
contextualization. In our globalizing and interconnected world, both sides must 
act wisely and overcome the clichés by facing the truth. Today, as political and 
religious factors are becoming more effective, it is a must to consider the common 
interests along with conflicting ones. Even if the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ is an 
open message which legitimizes conflict and war, global threats and wars in the 
future will be the results of economic and other interests instead of a clash of 
civilizations (Esposito, 2002: 371). September 11 terrorist attacks against World 
Trade Center and Pentagon have caused some to warn that a new conflict was 
about to arise between Islam and the Western civilization. The interventions to 
Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11 under the name of war on terror made it 
a must to make a distinction between radical Muslim minorities and the moderate 
Muslim majority within the Western world. In this struggle against the Islamic 
radicalism, it became obvious that the world of Islam was not a single civilization 
and that the Islamic radicalism was not in the essence of it. The most obvious 
proof that Islamic radicalism and religious extremism is not Islamic and humane 
at all is the rejection of it by the majority in the Islamic world. As an indicator of 
this, majority of the Islamic world did not search the reasons of massacre in 
Norway (2011) within the Western religious and cultural codes and emphasized 
the importance of dialogue. Consequently, Western world has to consider Islamic 
world as geography with multiple dimensions; whereas Islamic world has to give 
up seeing the West as a threat. The religious sources and universal humanitarian 
and consensual traditions of both ancient civilizations carry out messages relying 
on dialogue, not conflict. 
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A strategic approach which concentrates on the importance and seriousness of the 
differences among civilizations is one of the main sources of the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ thesis. Approaches that consider the intense Muslim population 
within West as a threat are conflict-based and they show the differences and 
controversies between Western and Islamic civilizations as the sources of this 
conflict. Along with this, the radical acts of marginal groups which are considered 
as a threat to the West, including the adaptation problems of the Muslim groups, 
have brought the conflict paradigm of S. Huntington (1993, 1996) back into the 
agenda. The assumption that Islam does not suit with democracy and modernity 
stems from the paradigm which shows ethnic and religious sensitivities as the 
sources of a possible conflict. The increase of the visibility of Muslim population 
in Western world and the crystallization of a common understanding of 
civilization resulted with the perception of European Muslims as a potential 
internal threat (Esposito, 2002: 372). On contrary to this perception, rise of a 
European Muslim middle class and the tendency of new generations towards 
pluralism are indicators that the above mentioned bias and threats will be null. 
This new generation of European Muslims who defend the values of pluralist 
democracy which is the basis of security, stability and wealth and give importance 
to learn a language, education and participation narrow the effect of radical groups 
within Europe. Public opinion polls indicate that the Sunni Muslim groups do not 
confirm the terrorist attacks in the name of Islam and that they also react to the 
otherization of Muslims because of those terrorist attacks. Therefore, making the 
Western liberal democracy and pluralist lifestyle more apparent within the 
disadvantaged Muslim minorities would contribute a lot to the social coherence 
and cause religious-radical movements to lose their grounds.  
 
As the migration in the past century has started to change the balance within 
Europe; unemployment, political polarization, radicalism and racism 
argumentations have been revitalized. The migration towards continental Europe 
within the last 50 years and the cultural differences of the minorities have become 
the sources of new discussions after September 11 attacks. The rise of racism in 
France, England, Germany, and the Netherlands and other Western European 
countries, Islamophobia and xenophobia have been expressed in more explicit 
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ways. Political statements which rely on ethnic nationalism and religious 
extremism that blame the Muslims as the scapegoats have paved the way to a 
serious xenophobia within Europe. On the other hand, the pressure of majority on 
the minorities in terms of life styles and values will eventually turn the cultures 
into static structures that will never change. Also, the perception of cultural 
transfer as corruption, degeneration and loss of identity by the minority groups 
diminishes the pluralist structure and harmony. In other words, the indifference of 
the minority groups to the language, history and the culture of the society in 
which they live in make the mutual interaction almost impossible. We can 
conclude that as the otherization implemented by the Western society to Muslims 
and other foreigners through Islamophobia and historical bias is wrong; so is the 
introversion and miscommunication of Muslim minorities and foreigners with the 
fear that they will lose their belief and identity. Justice, respect to humanity and 
the supremacy of law are universal values valid for everyone and they are 
indispensable for the wealth and security of every branch of society. Considering 
these universal values as part of a single civilization means to bind those universal 
values. The acceptance, respect and participation of the ethnic and religious 
minorities in the societies they live is the democratic assets of our modern world. 
Any threat on these democratic assets by radical, marginal and nationalist 
elements within Europe and within the minorities makes the pluralist coexistence 
almost impossible. 
 
Concerns produced with the assumption that foreign immigrants within Europe 
could not adapt themselves into the multicultural cities make the intercultural 
interaction almost impossible. Also, the ethnic, religious and cultural minorities 
including the Turkish diaspora in Europe create spatial and cultural ghettos as a 
result of their fear and concerns; which makes the intercultural interaction even 
harder. It is seen that the necessity to live with foreigners has turned into a 
discomfort and uneasiness for some of the Europeans. On the other hand, mass 
communication spread with the help of technological developments and made the 
intercultural dialogue more visible along with the increasing interactions among 
cultures and life styles. In other words, the existence of foreigners and Muslims 
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with different life and dress codes visible in every aspect of social life causes 
many Europeans the perception of ‘lack of space’ or ‘they are being too much’. If 
social exclusion increases for the foreigners and Muslims who have different 
physical features; prejudices, discriminatory behavior and conflicts will be 
indispensable between minorities and host countries (Barutcugil, 2007). But, we 
witness numerous multi-cultural societies in many parts of the world, including 
the Western Europe, with the amazing effect of globalization on social life. In our 
multicultural world, people with different languages, religions, races, habits, 
world views and traditional life styles have to live together, which brings many 
problems on the surface. We need a teaching and education system depending on 
knowledge and understanding to stop bias relying on lack of knowledge and 
wrong information and to prevent the socio-economic exclusion. Development of 
an open and pluralist society model would help to understand and manage the 
differences, which will eventually enhance the socialization. Besides, messages of 
tolerance and understanding by intellectuals, politicians, artists and clerics who 
are considered as role models by the young generations would also contribute a 
lot to the concept of coexistence.  
 
In 1960s and 1970s, the first generation of Turkish immigrants living in Western 
European countries has organized on the basis of economic concerns. Second 
generation, starting from 1980s, had a structure of socio-economic, ideological 
and political organization, mostly affected by Turkey. But, after 1990s, the third 
generation has had a multicultural understanding that emphasizes intercultural 
dialogue, education and capital, diversity, differences and tolerance (Kaya and 
Kentel, 2008: 132). The first generation of Euro-Turks, who were alienated by 
otherization policies and the capitalist system and left by themselves are today 
replaced with peaceful and harmonious new generations. One of the most 
important features of today’s Euro-Turks is their adherence to traditional cultural 
histories, religions and ethnic identities. These connections with their Turkish-
Islamic beliefs and traditions have helped the Euro-Turks to create a network of 
solidarity among them. Besides, these networks helped them to resist the centralist 
understanding as in the cases of assimilation, racism, egoism, isolation, distrust 
and structural exclusion. These features which keep the minority groups and 
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immigrants alive, strong and safe are generally considered as a threat to the 
European life style. According to Moch, immigrants from Arab and Muslim 
countries since 1960s have changed the ethnic and cultural mosaic of the Europe 
(Moch, 2003). But, centuries long local habits, national traditions and religious 
experiences are the factors which keep cultures and civilizations alive. It should 
be foreseen that different cultural and civilization elements are not threat, but 
rather factors that will strengthen the diversity of any cultural mosaic. Along with 
these cultural and traditional values; European values such as freedom, 
democracy, human rights, and supremacy of law and the experiences of pluralist 
society are being accepted and respected by the Euro-Turks (Kaya and Kentel, 
2008: 143). It is thought that the socio-cultural, economic and religious 
organization of Turkish-Islam tradition will eventually prevent assimilation and 
oppression of a cultural identity. This perception which rests on pluralism denies a 
Western-oriented perception of civilization and supports a synthesis with Western 
democratic universal values. 
 
Muslims, including migrants of Turkish origin, are the greatest religious minority 
in Europe, constituting 4.5% of the general European population by 23 million. 
When we think that 8.7% of European population is constituted from immigrants, 
European Muslims are almost half of the all immigrants in Europe. This rate 
increases by family unifications, marriages and converting Muslims (SDE, 2011). 
The Turkish diaspora, on the other hand, is more populated than many European 
countries, with a total of 5.2 million in 27 countries. Approximately 53% of the 
Euro-Turks, one of the largest immigrant groups in Europe, have become the 
citizens of the countries where they are living (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003; TAM, 
2007). On the other hand, 2.4 million out of 4.2 million Muslims in Germany, 
180.000 out of 650.000 Muslims in Belgium and 360.000 out of 1.1 million 
Muslims in The Netherlands are the Turkish migrants (Central Bureau Statistics, 
2013; Pew Research Forum, 2010).
1
  Unofficial numbers indicate that the Muslim 
Turkish society in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands is a total of 3.2 million. 
                                                             
1
 Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life in USA published ‘the Future 
of the Global Muslim Population’, January 2011. For more information, please see: 
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/ 
(10.04.2013). 
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Recent crises such as economic deficit, racism and Islamophobia have caused 
many the Turkish migrants return back to Turkey from European cities. As the 
European cities which receive migration send the similar number of people back, 
we cannot speak of a serious ‘immigration problem’ risk for Western European 
countries. Main problem that should be mentioned at this point is how Europe will 
fill the qualified workforces who return back to their home countries. Even if this 
is known, adaptation problems are always kept on the agenda with artificial 
contexts and political statements. It is of mutual importance for the qualified 
workforce to remain in Europe, as well as the establishment of necessary 
conditions for people from different religions, languages and cultures to live 
together. Instead of the strict immigration and adaptation policies implemented by 
European Union countries, it is almost impossible for the Continent of Europe to 
give up from the ideal of an open unity from different socio-cultural and religious 
groups. The Turkish diaspora, a certain part of the European societies for the last 
50 years have made a great contribution to the European socio-economic, cultural, 
political and religious life. European Turkish society has a rich experience of 
culture and civilization will contribute more to pluralist and democratic culture of 
the countries where they live.   
 
European Turkish society, which tries to protect its own national identity and 
cultural norms; has embraced universal values such as basic rights and freedoms 
protected by Western constitutions, human rights and supremacy of law.  So, the 
close network of relations between the Sunni-Turkish migrants and Christian 
European societies has the dynamics which will make the participant Muslim 
identity possible. This network of relations that depend on mutual respect and 
tolerance will make an understanding, just, humanitarian, adopted and unbiased 
life style in third millennium Europe possible. On the contrary, European nations 
are being effected by some economic and political bias and moving away from 
objectivity. As European religious and cultural groups protect their bias towards 
each other and keep living within their own ghettos, multiculturalism policies are 
highly criticized today. As a series of terrorist attacks which started on September 
11 in New York (2001) and continued with Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004), 
London (2005) and Moscow (2003, 2009) have been conducted by  radical and 
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militant Islamists, the social connections of European Muslims with the societies 
in which they live were seriously eroded. These terrorist attacks have increased 
the xenophobia and made the radical groups use these attacks as their justification 
for anti-immigration. Besides, these attacks have been perceived as a threat to 
Western life style with a certain religious and cultural norm and changed the 
perception of Muslims by their Christian neighbors (Moch, 2003). Also, as Pim 
Fortuyn (2003) and Theo van Gogh (2004) were murdered, the mutual relations 
have become tense around the terms of minaret
2
, headscarf and veil.  On the other 
hand, release of the movie ‘Fitna’, in the Netherlands and other countries, which 
contain insults on Qur’an and Prophet of Islam and the publication of provocative 
and worthless comics about the Prophet of Islam in Denmark, have increased the 
hatred among Muslims all around the world. Radical elements containing 
violence, extremism and hate have disrupted the unity of the majority, meanwhile 
increasing the popularity of extremist right and nationalist front. Along with 
statements which increase the polarization, visual and written media have 
disseminated the perception that system was ‘slang to be swindled’ by immigrants 
and created a xenophobic public opinion. Instead of all these negative acts and 
statements, we can say that a Muslim middle class is arising in Europe; trying to 
obey the laws, learn languages and act for the good of society. So, it is predicted 
that Muslim immigrants, representatives of Islam in the West, will contribute a lot 
to social peace, prosperity and wealth, by protecting their cultures and citizenship 
awareness. 
 
The intense participation of third and fourth generation people of Turkish-origin 
living in Europe to the social, cultural, political and economic activities 
strengthens the ‘intercultural dialogue’ grounds. Civil society organizations and 
religiously oriented movements provide numerous constructive contributions to 
the socio-economic and cultural adaptations of the people within their area of 
effect in EU countries which are living approximately 5 million Turkish Sunni 
Muslims (Yükleyen, 2012). It is foreseen that Turkey’s possible EU membership 
                                                             
2
 With a referendum in Switzerland on November 29, 2009, 57.5% of the people voted 
for the ban of minarets. 400.000 Muslims live in Switzerland, which has a population of 
7.6 million. Banning the religious and conscious freedom in Switzerland, which is ruled 
with direct democracy, caused serious discussions throughout the world.  
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will bring in more interoperability to the democratic reforms in Turkey and 
reinforce the participatory role of the Turkish diaspora within Europe. The Islamic 
identity of European the Turkish diaspora will establish a bridge between the 
West and Turkey, whereas the EU membership of Turkey will extend the life of 
this bridge. The Turkey-skeptics in Europe claim that the membership of a 
Muslim country will eventually diminish Europe’s religious and cultural identity, 
with the excuse of ‘fear of Islam’. On the other hand, the project of ‘Alliance of 
Civilizations’ under the auspices the United Nations (UN) with a co-presidency of 
Turkey and Spain since 2005 brings an understanding of mutual respect among 
different civilizations and cultures. To increase the functionality of ‘Alliance of 
Civilizations’ and make it the most important peace project of 21st century 
depends on more efficient steps directed for action and result and a persistent 
struggle with fanaticism. We believe that the negative atmosphere created by the 
thesis of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ which predicts that all the conflicts in the future 
will be culturally biased can be changed by the concept of ‘Alliance of 
Civilizations’. Actually, the statements of peace and dialogue around the ‘Alliance 
of Civilizations’ project are reactions towards the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. It 
is a must to create an area of application for intercultural and interreligious 
dialogue. We cannot theoretically claim that all the global problems will be solved 
through dialogue, but learning and teaching the coexistence with a practice will be 
the project of the century. 
 
The guest workers of Europe are permanent, and this is a concern for the host 
countries. As the belief that foreigners with different life styles and dress codes 
cannot adopt into the host societies’ living standards increased, the strategic 
importance of ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ raised. The importance of intercultural 
dialogue will be better understood if the connections of 50 million Muslims living 
in the Continent of Europe with their homeland are considered. A possible 
conflict among European Muslims and Christian Western societies will bring two 
ancient civilizations to a confrontation. There are two elements which provoke the 
steps of dialogue: First, Muslim societies show more radical acts after they 
interact with Western societies. And second, there are some structural problems 
such as Islamophobia and xenophobia, along with racism and discrimination. 
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Conservative groups which show harsh reactions to foreigners and especially to 
Muslims with an ethnic and religious reflex must be relieved. On the other hand, 
European centrism must direct towards pluralism and the adaptation of foreigners 
must be provided by ‘social state’ and ‘dialogue’.  First of these two problems 
that Europe must face is the basic problematique of this study. The determination 
of radical elements which contain violence, extremism and hate within the 
Turkish Muslim community by data, the level of those elements and their 
potential threat is analyzed. This study stems from the point that radicalism and 
religious extremism is not limited to a single religion and even that it is not in the 
essence of religion (Esposito, 2002: 28) and focuses on the level of dialogue 
Turkish society has in Europe, instead of a tendency to conflict. The existence of 
the Turkish immigrants in Europe and the possible EU membership of Turkey are 
seen as opportunities which will decrease the tension between Islam and the West 
after September 11. Also, universal values such as democracy, human rights, 
social justice, freedom and supremacy of law are defended by the majority of the 
Turkish society. Therefore, these universal values must rely on mutual 
understanding and respect to contribute the development of permanent and 
constructive relations in the future. It is assumed that modern and participant 
generations which represent the Turkish-Islam tradition could play a very 
important role in the intercultural dialogue in the Western world.    
 
In case of three sample countries
3
 in this study, it is predicted that the European 
Turkish society which gives the utmost importance to mutual respect, tolerance 
and social diversity will play a very important and dynamic role within the 
context of ‘Alliance of Civilizations’. This field study starts with the pre-
acceptance that the European Turkish society is an appropriate sample group 
which is based on cultural pluralism and foresees that the Muslims with a 
Turkish-Islamic tradition will contribute a lot to the development and cultural 
heterogeneity of Western societies. One of the top priorities of this study is to 
feature the role of European Turkish society with its own internal and external 
dynamics which will make the conflicts, bias and polarizations ineffective. 
                                                             
3
 Three Western European countries have been used as a reference in the field study. 
These are Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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Another aim of this study is to understand whether the European Turkish society 
will be a side to any reaction in the current situation where social bonds are 
eradicating, radicalization is increasing and intercultural differences cause many 
problems. 
  
i. Problem Situation 
 
Turkish people living permanently in Europe have struggled with many problems 
since the first years of migration. One of the hardest steps of this struggle is the 
adaptation problems with the Western societies. Increasing ethnic/cultural ghettos 
and criticisms about introversion are at the background of the statements that the 
European Muslims could not overcome the adaptation problems. Especially after 
September 11, Muslims in general and European Turks in specific have 
confronted a more global problem. As politicians and the media started to relate 
Muslims with violence and terror in addition to the permanent problems of 
adaptation, the process of harmonization became even harder.  This new process 
has increased the concerns towards Muslims as a result of the terrorist attacks, and 
new radical elements appeared in both sides. The appearance and increasing 
visibility of an aggressive nationalism which acts by Islamophobia and 
xenophobia has reached to the level of extreme social tensions. The serious arson 
attacks against mosques, the Muslim houses and Islamic centres in most parts of 
Germany and the UK; and also serial killing of 8 Turks in Germany are all 
indicators of the level of threat by racist attacks.  
 
Therefore, the basic problems of the ethnic and religious minorities in Europe, 
including the Turkish society, that stem from being in Europe and from their 
internal problems have become more apparent recently. Especially after 
September 11 (2001) Muslims have been related with violence and terror, which 
forced them to become introversive and ethnic/cultural ghettos. Also, a certain 
group of Turkish immigrants consider communication with the host society as 
corruption and loss of identity, thereby alienating them from the society. On the 
other hand, racist attacks and Islamophobia in European societies threaten the 
social peace, polarizing the society and nourishes fanaticism/radicalism. Ethnic 
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ghettos and introversion push the youth under the effect of fanatic and radical 
Islamists. 
As a result, this study tries to investigate what kind of a reaction or development 
will occur among the Muslims as a response to these problems. In other words, 
the primary problematic of this study is the extent of effect of European Turkish 
society from the internal and external radical elements within and from the 
problems of adaptation. Second, the internal and external dynamics of the 
European Turkish society like civil society tradition, culture of tolerance, 
participatory role, improving socio-economic power, increasing level of 
education, pluralist and democratic society structure, adaptation policies, 
citizenship and social welfare implementations etc. and its role in interreligious 
and intercultural dialogue is the most basic problematic of this study. In other 
words, this study investigates whether the European Turkish society is open to 
ethnic, religious and cultural conflict or dialogue within the Western societies or 
not. 
 
ii. Objective of the Study 
 
This study, which is supported by face-to-face interview and surveys, aims to 
reveal with scientific facts whether the European Turkish society is an appropriate 
sample group for intercultural dialogue or not. In other words, this study aims to 
investigate the level of openness of European Turkish society to dialogues in 
socio-cultural, political, economic and educational areas. This study is important 
in terms of reflecting the opinion of European Turkish society, one side of 
adaptation problem, on intercultural dialogue. It is foreseen that the European 
Turkish society, which represents the rise of a Muslim middle class against the 
European societies which move away from objectivity under the effect of bias and 
political statements, can play the role of a bridge on the grounds of dialogue. 
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iii. Hypothese of the study 
 
Basic hypotheses of this study, which focuses on the role of European Muslim-
Turkish society, one of the largest representatives of Turkish-Islamic civilization 
in the West, in intercultural dialogue are as follows: 
A. Integration and adaptation; 
 Enhancement of rights and responsibilities in terms of equal 
citizenship will ease the adaptation, 
 Civil society organizations with strong social grounds can produce 
projects and contribute to the solution of the problems, 
 In parallel with the increase of wealth and education level in European 
Turkish society, the communication with its environment will be more 
participatory, 
 Active participation of second and third generation of Turkish 
immigrants into socio-cultural, economic and political activities will 
contribute to mutual relations, 
 Peaceful activities of religious groups/communities will contribute to 
intercultural dialogue, 
 Common projects of civil society, scientific and business circles will 
pace the adaptation process, 
B. Identity and culture; 
 Cultural and religious diversity cannot be put as the source of a 
conflict, 
 Immigrants who see cultural trade as corruption and loss of identity 
have a tendency of introversion, 
 The cultural identity of Turkish-Islam cannot be together with 
elements of violence, religious extremism and hate, 
 Turkish-Islam identity can represent the tolerance, intercultural 
dialogue and respect to humanity in Europe, 
C. Conflict or dialogue; 
 The European-Turkish diaspora will have a positive contribution 
on intercultural dialogue and peace, 
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 European Turkish society can play a very important and dynamic 
role in the process of ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ project, 
 European Turkish society has internal and external dynamics 
which will make the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis irrelevant at 
least in Western societies, 
 Intercultural dialogue will help coexistence within a pluralist 
society turn into practice, 
 Islam and Western civilizations should confront the radical 
elements together, 
 Communication of Western societies with people from different 
languages, religions, colors and cultures will contribute a lot to the 
intercultural dialogue, 
 Foreigners are considered as ‘scapegoat’ in all parts of the world in 
terms of economic crisis, 
 Possible membership of Turkey to the EU will strengthen the belief 
in ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ project 
D. Islamophobia, xenophobia and racism; 
 The necessity of a more active struggle with discrimination, 
racism, xenophobia and religious radicalism in Western countries, 
 Discriminative and racist attitudes towards foreigners with 
different life styles and dress codes harms coexistence and social 
communication at extreme levels, 
 European Turks are highly concerned about the harsh adaptation 
policies and extremist right and racist statements in the last years, 
 Struggle with Islamophobia, which polarizes Western societies and 
Muslims, is not seriously taken, 
 Statements of hate in visual and written media increases the 
polarization, 
E. Islamic Radicalism and Religious Extremism; 
 Radical Islamic movements and ideologies are not supported by 
Muslim Turkish society in Europe, 
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 The language of hatred in media and on the streets feed the radical 
elements, 
 Disrespectful acts towards the values and sacred images of a 
religion can be used for propaganda by radical elements, 
 The efforts of radical groups in ethnic/religious ghettos to gain new 
supporters cannot be neglected. 
 
iv. The Structure of the Dissertation 
This field study consists of six (6) different chapters. In the introductory chapter 
of this comprehensive study, the demographic transformation of the European 
Turkish society in the last half century has been considered shortly with a focus 
on the sample countries. The introductory chapter has a general evaluation about 
the study where the aims, importance and hypotheses are mentioned. Also, the 
introduction chapter briefly defines the important concepts of the research and 
informs about the ordered structure. 
The three theoretical frameworks that can explain the contribution of the 
European Turkish society to pluralist life and dialogue in the most objective and 
comprehensible way are evaluated in Chapter 1. These are Social Identity Theory 
(Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987), Social Networks Theory (Felmlee, 2003; Kadushin, 
2004) and Organizational Commitment Theory (Kanter, 1972; Ebaugh, 2010). 
Also, the strong social relations and networks of the European Turkish society at 
local, national and international levels along with their contribution to the 
adaptation and social integrity are considered within the theory of Social Capital 
(Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988). Also, a literature review about the concepts 
and processes such as globalization, modernity, multiculturalism, pluralism, 
religious liberalism, identity conflicts, Islamic fundamentalism and clash of 
civilizations have been conducted. In the last section of Chapter I, the data 
accumulation methodology (semi-structured survey and interview), content of 
survey and interview questions and the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents (sample distribution by city or quota) were also mentioned. 
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In Chapter 2, the half century long development of the migration to the Western 
European countries has been discussed with the help of demographic data 
(generational differences, socio-economic differences, education, choices of 
citizenship and marriage, political participation and civil society organization etc.) 
comprehensively. In Chapter 2, the viewpoints and activities of the Turkish-
Islamic movements have been mentioned in countries where Turkish immigrants 
live intensively to integration, assimilation, radicalism, democratic culture and 
dialogue with host societies. Also, Chapter 2 deals with the radical movements 
that appeared as a result of social and political realities in Turkey, and then 
transferred to Europe. Finally, Chapter 2 mentions the integration of Turkish 
immigrants in the sample countries in terms of multiculturalism, migration and 
integration policies. 
In Chapter 3, the Islamophobia and racist policies of extreme right parties in 
Europe after September 11 terrorist attacks have been discussed specifically with 
the Muslim Turkish society. Chapter 3 also deals with the efforts of certain 
printed and visual media to create a “negative image” by affecting the Western 
public opinion through Islamophobia and xenophobia. Also, the changes caused 
by the interaction and contact with the Western societies on the Sunni-Muslim 
Turkish society have been analyzed by the concepts of globalization, liberalism, 
pluralism and post-modernism. Finally, Chapter 3 deals with the position of Turks 
in Europe in terms of the dilemma of reviving their identity and cultural values 
against globalization or losing those. Again Chapter 3 deals with the historical 
development of the European identity, its effects, European citizenship and the 
identity search of Turks as non-Western “others” in a broader perspective. 
Chapter 4 discusses the risks that threaten the intercultural dialogue and pluralism 
in Europe under main titles. The suggestions for possible solutions to minimize 
these risks are also being discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 objectively analyzes the data acquired from the Turkish participants in 
the sample countries by semi-structured survey and interviews. After conducting 
an analysis of the demographic data of the respondents, the integration of Turkish 
society with the host society in terms of culture and identity is discussed. Third, 
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the level of understanding by the respondents about their individual and social 
rights acquired by democratic citizenship has been analyzed. Fourth, the socio-
cultural integration of European Turkish society and life satisfaction has been 
analyzed by some data. Fifth, the political participation of Turks in the sample 
countries is discussed through some variables (voting rates, party memberships, 
confidence to political institutions, voters’ choices etc.). Sixth, the contributions 
of Turkey originated faith and social based movements to intercultural and 
interreligious dialogue is discussed. Seventh, the role of the Turkish immigrants 
within the host societies in terms of mutual communication, dialogue and 
harmony is discussed. And the final part of Chapter 5 discusses the distant attitude 
of the Turks in Europe towards radical movements both from within and outside 
with some cases.  
Chapter 6 deals with the open and participatory role of the European Turkish 
society, with the necessary internal and external dynamics to adapt the pluralist 
life, in inter-civilization and interreligious dialogue. Also, according to the data 
acquired from the respondents, the results of participatory development of the 
European Turkish society and suggestions for future have also been discussed 
generally. 
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CHAPTER ONE - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY 
1.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
It is predicted that the Turkish diaspora will not take part in any kind of religious, 
ethnic or cultural conflict in Europe; and that it will contribute a lot to coexistence 
thanks to the universal values, dialogue, commitment and social dynamics within 
the Turkish-Islamic culture. We have tried to evaluate three theoretical 
frameworks in our field study, which may explain this prediction most objectively 
and understandable. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987) lights up 
the efforts of the members of disadvantaged groups to develop their social 
relations and to gain a socially accepted social identity.  Social Networks Theory 
(Felmlee, 2003; Kadushin, 2004) explains the participation and adaptation of 
small subgroups into larger ones and global systems with the help of their social 
relations and networks. This theory which can explain this field study 
theoretically is Organizational Commitment Theory (Kanter, 1972; Ebaugh, 
2010) explains the organizational commitment mechanisms which give 
importance to group loyalty and group strategies that motivate the individuals to 
create, grow up and succeed in a social group. 
 
1.1.1. Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
 
Social identity theory is a psychological theory which emphasizes the struggle of 
group members with a low socio-economic status to gain a social identity. It is 
predicted that socio-economically low and disadvantaged group members 
motivate themselves by joining socially active and effective high-status groups. 
For instance, as the socio-economic and political participation of a minority 
groups increases, so does its social relations with the majority group along with its 
representative power (Taylor, 1992). It is predicted that as subgroups have a 
higher level of visibility and representation at local and national levels, they tend 
to have a stronger social identity.  
 
On the other hand, one of the most important aspects which reveals the personal 
efficiency and success of an individual is his ability to be a part of a strong social 
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group. Belonging to a superior group is very important for subgroup members in 
terms of gaining a social identity. Having a superior status and identity has a 
psychological value and emotional importance for the member of a sub group 
(Tajfel, 1978). So, reaching to a more prestigious social status for a member of a 
disadvantaged group has a psychological importance. Social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987) accepts that the members of minority group have the 
motivation to gain a strong social identity and status by improving their social 
relations, despite the fact that they are perceived as unimportant and negative by 
the majority. 
 
This theory claims that sub group members have developed two strategies to gain 
a strong social identity. These are individual mobility strategy and collective 
mobility strategy. Individual mobility strategy explains the strategies implemented 
by the members of disadvantaged groups to enter into popular and respective 
groups by their individual and voluntary efforts. Collective mobility strategy, on 
the other hand, defines the strategies implemented by a sub group to gain more 
efficiency and prestige. The applicability of these two strategies to individuals of 
the minority groups and to ethnic, religious and social movements has been 
proved by many researchers. The existence of hundreds of civil society 
organizations, cultural centers, educational institutions (kindergartens, primary 
schools, high schools, institutes and universities) and media instruments which 
belong to minority groups in many countries, especially in USA, Europe and 
Canada, shed light to these two strategies. Individual sacrifices of minority 
members in terms of fulfilling the personnel and material requirements of these 
institutions can be explained by individual mobility strategies.  Also the efforts of 
subgroup members to reach more members increase the social efficiency and gain 
strength can be explained with collective mobility strategies. If the individuals and 
groups of minorities are being discriminated by the majority, then individuals give 
more importance to intergroup belonging. Minority group members who face 
discrimination adhere themselves deeply into their groups and become a better 
part of it (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000). On the other hand, strong religious, 
ethnic and national identities of minority groups increase the choice of collective 
strategies (Gurin and Townsend, 1986). Determinant group identity within the 
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minority subgroups which is trusted and believed to be strong, has a feature which 
increases the dialogue and harmony in the relations with majority. 
 
To summarize, Social Identity Theory gives us a perspective which emphasizes 
that the European Turkish society, with its identity stemming from Turkish-
Islamic tradition is not far from the Western universal values such as justice, 
respect to human, supremacy of law, democracy and freedom of expression and it 
can easily adapt.  This field study predicts that Turkish-Islamic cultural identity 
will not have any problems in integrating with European identity. It is predicted 
that Turkish-Islamic cultural identity will be a part of ‘multi-identity Europe’ 
approach. Therefore, it is thought that the Muslim Turkish society will contribute 
a lot to the ‘the art of living together’ in Europe when it accepts the libertarian, 
equal and liberal democratic values of the West. 
 
1.1.2. Social Networks Theory 
 
Social Networks Theory (SNT), is a theory that explains the interaction of 
disadvantaged sub-groups by each other and superior groups through social 
relations and networks at different levels. One of the main reasons of individual 
and intergroup interaction is that the relation format relies on individual and group 
interests. The network of mutual relations, constructed at socio-cultural, economic 
and political levels due to individual and social needs turn into more complex 
structures by time (Felmlee, 2003). Social networks born naturally in relation with 
the diversity of needs develop by themselves in time. Close friendship relations do 
not only help the individual to gain a social environment, but also provides the 
individual advantages in case he or she faces discrimination (Jagd, 2004). 
Development of individual and collective relations with members of higher 
groups by the members of lower groups in terms of visibility is because of the 
possible interests behind this motivation. Therefore, the Social Networks Theory 
(SNT) sheds light to disadvantaged minority groups’ effort to gain legitimacy by 
creating strong and permanent institutional social networks in the areas where 
their interests take as a necessity. This network of social relations makes a 
positive contribution to the new immigrants and helps them to leave the feeling of 
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loneliness behind. Social relations network automatically starts the intergroup 
collaboration mechanisms and provides the new arrivals with help in translation, 
official writings and applications. 
    
Along with this, Social Networks Theory (SNT) defines many forms of 
relationship as in family, friendship, working office, school and social class where 
individuals and groups will socialize. This network of diverse relations might 
provide the ground for a unity of beliefs, friendship or relatives group, a 
commercial unity or a social unity (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Intra and extra 
group relations have a dimension of limiting the individual behavior, in addition 
to socializing individuals in different areas. Independent behaviors such as 
individual decisions, applications and setting new goals might end by becoming 
the member of a group. The location of individuals in the relational network and 
the inter group level of pluralism also determine the intensity of independent 
behavior. In this context, we can say that social relations network has a negative 
impact on disadvantaged minority groups. As the members of the minority group 
fulfill all their basic needs within the intergroup social networks, extra group 
interaction remains at minimum levels. These minimized social relations are 
normalized with contacts such as learning a language, getting a job, schooling of 
children and official bureaucratic processes. Today, we can say that except for the 
new immigrants, introversive parallel society is changing. It is predicted that the 
social relations network will be diversified as the individuals who were born, 
educated and work in Europe have become the majority. The network of social 
relations in every aspect of social life is one of the most important elements that 
guide the human life (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988). For minority groups, it is 
predicted that social relations network will vitalize the cultural, economic and 
political organization of that group. 
 
To better understand the social relations in every aspect of life, the concept of 
Social Capital (CP) has to be emphasized (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988). 
According to J.S. Coleman, Social Capital is an approach theorized on a mutual 
benefit of relations among individuals and groups. This theory determines the 
success of individual and collective works which come together on a common 
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benefit. The theory of Social Capital is mostly interested in the success of social 
relations at economic level. At economic level, individual social relations such as 
establishing a business, gaining business experience, career advancement and 
getting the extraordinary knowledge have a mission of flash light. Social 
environments where social capital of groups and individuals are high help the 
establishment of social trust to be much easier (Paxton, 1999: 88-89). On the other 
hand, social capital of organizations or organizational groups provides a chance to 
diversify the activities at the highest levels. Therefore, keeping up a high level 
activity depends on an active interaction at commercial, political and social levels. 
The transformation of social relations of disadvantaged minority groups into a 
permanent and sustainable opportunity relies on the success of social capital. 
 
On the grounds of Social Networks Theory (SNT) and Social Capital (CT), the 
strong social relations and networks of the European Turkish society, 
implemented at local, national and international levels is predicted to contribute to 
adaptation and social coexistence. It is thought that the European Turkish society 
can contribute to intercultural dialogue and gain a participant, organizational and 
high level of life standard with the help of these Social Networks (Jacops, Phalet 
and Swyngedouw, 2004).  It is expected that the civil society organizations and 
religious movements which are the most active a successful members of the 
Turkish diaspora (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003), one of the largest immigrant 
groups in Europe, will serve for social dialogue and peace. 
 
1.1.3. Organizational Commitment Theory (OCT) 
 
Research conducted by Sociologist Rosabeth Kanter on the commitment in 
American societies (Kanter, 1972) is still considered a classic in explaining the 
organizational mechanism which reveals the feeling of commitment in individuals 
(Ebaugh, 2010: 26).  According to Kanter, the feeling of commitment is closely 
related with the success or failure of an individual or collective action which is 
nourished by a belief. Either individual or collective, the success of an action is 
dependent upon the belief of group members and their adherence of the values and 
goals of the act of which they are in. The high level efforts of individuals, their 
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volunteer time and material support can best be explained by the concept of 
‘commitment’. Kanter (1972) was highly concerned with the reason why people 
have a commitment to a group which makes their benefits and the group benefits 
almost inseparable.  According to Kanter, individuals who identify themselves 
with the goals of their group think that they are emotionally nourished with this 
commitment which helps them to express themselves.  People committed with the 
feelings of belonging to a group start to see the success of their group as their own 
success (Ebaugh, 2010).  
 
This study, in terms of ‘Organizational Commitment Theory’, named by the 
American sociologist Rosabeth Kanter (1972), tries to understand the strategies 
implemented by civil society organizations and religious groups of the Turkish 
diaspora to make their own members more participatory and committed. In other 
words, tries to understand the dynamics of tens of thousands voluntary people as 
members of religious and social movements which are practical elements of 
Turkish-Islamic tradition, that motivates them to embrace and like the countries 
where they live, learn their language, history and culture and to understand the 
value of coexistence. In sum, this study analyzes the adaptation of Sunni Muslim 
groups into the Western democratic and plural values without any identity 
erosion. Within this context, the reason of distance of Turkish groups to radical 
movements is also analyzed. 
 
Finally, these three basic theories used in this field study are trying to answer 
these questions; 
 What are the internal and external dynamics that provide the European 
Turkish society to embrace the democratic, pluralist and participant 
universal values of the West by protecting their national identity and 
cultural values in terms of Social Identity Theory? 
 What are the facts which show us that the Turkish-Islamic cultural identity 
does not correlate with radical elements containing violence, extremism 
and hate under the Social Identity Theory framework? 
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 What are the reasons behind the organization of local, national and 
international scaled civil society organizations, cultural centers, thought 
institutes, organizational religious structures and media organs of the 
Muslim-Turkish society, which has been a part of Europe for more than 50 
years? What are the Social Networks Theory mechanisms which explain 
the administration of organizational institutions that become more 
effective in creating a public opinion within Europe? 
 What are the dynamics which provide the European Turkish diaspora the 
motivation to volunteer, support and become a sympathizer of socio-
cultural, religious and educational movements in terms of the 
Organizational Commitment Theory? 
1.2. Literature Riview 
 
Since S. Huntington (1993, 1996) has explained the main conflicts in world 
politics with the paradigm of “Clash of Civilizations”; certain groups have started 
to expect a conflict between the Western and Islam civilizations. The intervention 
of USA to Iraq and Afghanistan after September 11 has been evaluated as the first 
signals of a possible global conflict and struggle by the same groups. Militant 
Islamist Jihadists have legitimized themselves with the economic, political and 
military policies of the West and implemented numerous terrorist attacks by 
exploiting the interventions of Iraq and Afghanistan (Roy, 2005: 161). Historian 
Bernard Lewis (1990: 47-60) and Alain Gresh (2005: 18-19) have indicated 
Islamic fundamentalism and fanaticism as a big threat for the Western civilization.  
The thesis of S. Huntington which says that the future conflicts will be cultural 
has become so popular especially after September 11 and the following terrorist 
attacks. The terror events experienced on September 11 (2001) and after have 
surfaced the centuries long collective concerns about Muslims and Turks in 
Europe. These concerns have become one of the elements after the Cold War to 
perceive Turkey as the new “other” of Europe (Akdemir, 2013: 123). According 
to Fred Halliday (1999: 897-898), the historical fear of Islam in the West has been 
replaced with “anti-Muslim” movements. Therefore, the disaster of September 11 
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has both put the Muslims in Europe into a tougher situation and also challenged 
them with a new fact called Islamophobia, to which they were not prepared 
intellectually at all (Köktaş, 2005: 33). 
After the terrorist attacks, the tendency to equalize Islam and violence has 
increased; and this made it harder to distinguish between the radical minority and 
the Muslim majority within the West. But, as in the past, religious extremism is a 
great threat; and it is not only limited with religion or something in the essence of 
religion (Esposito, 1999: 28). The belief system within the essence of Islam is 
completely contrary to religious extremism and radicalism; but Muslims as a 
whole are named parallel with violence and terror. The monolithic worldview that 
considers all the Muslims as responsible from individual terrorist attacks should 
be deserted. On the other hand, Muslims should also consider the West as 
geography with differences and diversities within itself. Because of the sources 
and real representatives of both ancient civilizations deny violence, persecution 
and conflict (Esposito, 1999: 7-8). Therefore, this study is built upon the idea that 
the modern and participant generations as followers of Turkish-Islam tradition can 
play an important role in the West in terms of building intercultural 
communication and dialogue.  
The background of monotype, individual and fundamentalist ideas in Islam and 
Western civilizations that support conflict is the understanding of a closed society. 
The understanding of a closed society is the biggest barrier for the Western 
society and democracy today. In almost all of the polarizing, radical and racist 
acts we see the trails of the closed society understanding. But, different political 
ideas and ideals can only exist together in a pluralist political culture and in an 
open society. Therefore, the understanding of a multi civilization/cultural and 
open world order must be supported against the closed and monolithic idea of S. 
Huntington that divides the world into two, as Western and non-Western (Şentürk, 
2007: 32-49). Intellectual circles have mentioned that the acquisitions of Islam as 
a result of its historical relations and interactions with other civilizations stem 
from the understanding of “open Islam”. According to these intellectual circles, 
the claim that an open and liberal Islam does not comply with democracy is not a 
27 
 
correct one (Özdalga, 1999). As Islam has recognized different religions in its first 
years, as there are several different sects and orders in Islam and as there are 
different laws for non-Muslims in Islamic societies; we can say that Islam was 
built on democratic pluralism (Akdemir, 1997: 269-272). 
Multiculturalism is a model of thought which operates with the principle of 
cultural pluralism and which is built upon the principles such as freedom, 
tolerance and respect to individual differences. According to Frelas and Elliot 
(1992: 56-59), multiculturalism approves the social approaches that rely on 
ethnic/cultural differences and legitimizes itself by referring to the cultural mosaic 
of the society. Therefore, none of the ethnicities or cultures are superior to other in 
the idea of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism nourishes the tolerance and helps 
the identities build a relationship with mutual understanding and trust. In short, 
multiculturalism approves the unique identities of societies with different 
ethnic/cultural belongings, opens up space for all kinds of cultural identities and 
supports their protection in this area (as cited by Vatandaş, 2002: 19-22). Gerd 
Baumann (2006: 7) defines multiculturalism as a pluralist culture application 
refers to itself and others within itself. Baumann compares multiculturalism with a 
riddle that changes itself according to the meaning given by three different sides: 
ones that believe in a unified national culture, those search their culture in their 
ethnic identities and those who consider their religion as their culture. 
When we look ethnically, we will see that the Muslims in European countries are 
diversified. Therefore, cultural pluralism, dialogue and open mindedness have 
become almost indispensable in Western societies in our age where ethnic and 
cultural diversity has accelerated. Intercultural dialogue is one of the most 
important elements used to turn freedoms, social welfare and tolerance permanent; 
and it has become indispensable for the minorities as a part of the Western 
societies. On the other hand, the understanding by the Western public opinion that 
Islamic radicalism and fanaticism is not widely accepted by the majority of 
Muslims is a result of reference to true information and righteousness. The 
establishment of peace and dialogue on the earth can only be moved forward with 
education, interreligious and intercultural dialogue, democratic citizenship, social 
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organization and pluralism. The common opinion about the harmony between 
Islam and pluralism/secularism/civil society is that there is no contradiction 
between Islam and civil/democratic pluralism (Hefner, 2005: 2-4; Esposito and 
Yilmaz, 2014: 29-33). Therefore, the existence of Muslims in Western societies as 
equal citizens at civil and public spheres contributes to pluralist and democratic 
life. 
According to “new liberalism” interpretation formulized by Paul Berman (2004), 
Islam has to be liberalized and thereby harmonized with the Western norms or the 
liberal values have to be defended against Islamism. New liberalists try to 
determine new models in order to adapt the Muslim immigrants and they foresee 
two types of Muslim images in Western societies. These are the Muslim image 
who accepts the liberal values of the West and internalizes those; and the other 
one is liberalizing the Islam and becoming Western. Both models predicted by the 
new liberalists have inconsistencies. On contrary to the new liberalists who argue 
that Islam can be liberalized and become Western; Tariq Ramadan (2005) argues 
that Islamic religious identity and the visibility of religious practices do not 
consist a barrier for the adaptation of Western liberal values. According to 
Ramadan, ethnic and religious identity is one of the most important belongings for 
the individual and it makes them more consistent, powerful and respectful in 
individual and societal relations. In other words, it is predicted that individuals 
without a national, religious or cultural identity will become more introversive, 
isolated and less self-confident. Tariq Ramadan rejects the new Islamic 
understanding that is predicted by “New liberalism” and advises the Muslims to 
get rid of Arabic and Asian elements within their habits which are not Islamic; 
and to enrich their lives with prayer and spirituality. Therefore, it is an undeniable 
fact that the individuals who see themselves both as Muslim and as Europeans 
will contribute a lot to a pluralist society and to coexistence. 
According to Beyer (1994: 90-92), conservative values such as obliqueness, 
spirituality and difference along with liberal values such as pluralism, earthliness 
and openness present two options in order to re-understand religion in the West. 
On contrary to the liberal understanding where religious life or performance is 
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taken as a base; conservative understanding represents the challenge of tradition 
to novelty and the effort to make religious life more visible (as cited by King, 
1993: 33). According to M. King, the understanding of religious identity protects 
the society and the members of the family against crime, immorality and 
alienation; and it turns the Muslims into stronger and more interactive individuals 
both in their homes and in their work (King, 1993: 33-34). Kaya claims that the 
communities within the “European Turkish minority” that take religion as a 
reference do not clash with modernity and globalization; and argues that Islam 
and existing community tendencies might provide an alternative modernization 
practice. On the other hand, Islam rejects monotypes and monotony, and has 
developed an understanding in all societies that takes individual as the base 
instead of a class or group. Therefore Islam is a religion that takes the right and 
freedom of the individual as the basis and it is open to democracy.  
Western materialist and positivist philosophy effected different societies in the 
West and in Islamic areas; which have gathered around the idea that religion is 
against modernity and progress. Some countries within the Islamic geography 
have assumed that the tendency to religion will decrease as a result of the thesis 
that Islam is against Westernization and development. But time has shown that 
modernity caused the diversification of religion and ideas; instead of 
institutionalizing the separation of f religion and the state. In the postmodern era 
people are not forced by a religion or an ideology and they cannot be influenced 
easily. Today, societies like the American society have helped to collapse the idea 
that religion is against modernity.
4
 Today, on contrary to the fundamentalist and 
extreme interpretation of the religions; the interpretations on human rights, 
pluralism, democracy and modern values gain more supporters. The majority of 
Muslim Turkish society in European countries believes that Islam represents a 
religion with respect to justice, human rights, and freedoms, democratic and 
modern values. 
                                                             
4
 Zaman Newspaper, Şahin Alpay ‘Dinle devleti ayrımadan olmaz’, for more information, 
please see http://www.zaman.com.tr/sahin-alpay/dinle-devleti-ayirmadan-
olmaz_2263027.html (09.12.2014) 
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Today, religion is experienced both in America and in Europe. Religiosity 
continues to become globalized, even though it is understood differently in 
modernized Europe than the America. According to famous sociologist Berger 
(1993), religion has historically played a role of alienation and also integration 
(cited by Coşkun, 2010: 49-66). Recently, as technologic developments and 
supranational movements have accelerated, the inter-connection of religions and 
diversity of identities have increased. A period is experienced where individual 
and societal relations are problematized within the dilemma of conflict and 
dialogue. The increase of transnational migration, multiculturalism and gender 
discrimination appears to cause more argumentations between the public sphere 
and religious life (Casanova, 2006: 7-22). 
1.3. Methodology 
1.3.1. Research Model 
 
In this field study, semi-structured interview and survey technique (Kaptan, 1973; 
Ekiz, 2003) as a part of qualitative research was used and data was collected from 
Turkish people living in Cologne (German and Turkish: Köln), Brussels and 
Amsterdam. The respondents were chosen from different levels of socio-
economic status, demographic features and education levels. It was predicted that 
the independent variables such as demographic features (sex, age, occupation, 
organizational membership etc.) and level of education would contribute a lot to 
the general evaluation. Targets were chosen from age 15 upwards. Two different 
sample models were used in survey and face-to-face techniques. In the first one, 
one-on-one survey was conducted to the family members in a specific dwelling. 
And in the second one, random sampling (Kaptan, 1973) was chosen and random 
respondents were being interviewed indoor and outdoor. Dwelling visits were 
conducted after letting the people living in those addresses know. 
 
Open-ended questions were asked to the interviewees with a pre-prepared set of 
questions (Karasar, 2003). People who were interviewed with a semi-structured 
interview and survey methodology were chosen among the prominent figures of 
Turkish society in terms of socio-cultural, political and economic areas. 
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Interviewees were chosen among the executive board members of Turkish civil 
society organizations, representatives of religious institutions and organizations or 
parliamentary members of different political parties; people who have high levels 
of culture and civil consciousness.   
 
The questions that were asked to the respondents from towns where Turks are 
living intensely were asked by using quota sampling method, and they consist of 
65 open and close-ended questions. Some of the close-ended questions have a 
section below, independent of the choices. Each survey that was conducted, either 
one-on-one or as a group, was predicted total 30-35 minutes. The respondents, 
without mentioning their names, were asked open and close-ended survey 
questions in Turkish. Survey questions aimed to find out the demographic 
features, identity tendencies, religious tendencies and intercultural dialogue and 
roles of European Turks. Therefore the questions developed for survey are 
prepared to measure the roles second, third and fourth generation of European 
Turks can take in terms of ‘Alliance of Civilizations’.  
This study also used current national and international reports, several national 
statistical reports and EU reports as secondary sources both to evaluate the data 
and make objective statements. 
 
1.3.2. Sampling and Universe 
 
Semi-structured interview and survey technique was conducted with Turkish 
people from different socio-economic statuses living in Cologne, Brussels and 
Amsterdam where Turks live intensely. This study was limited to urban and rural 
areas of Cologne, where Turks as the largest ethnic groups in Germany live 
intensely. There are approximately 1 million people living in Cologne, of which 
176.000 are immigrants and 36% of immigrants are Turks. In sum, Cologne was 
selected as a sample because it is believed that this city represents a good research 
universe for Turks living in Germany. Also, Brussels in Belgium is chosen as 
another sample because about 40.000 Turks are living in this town, which is 24% 
of the general Turkish population in Belgium. Amsterdam, on the other hand, has 
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a Turkish population of about 39.000, which makes it another important sample 
for this study.  
  
Urban and quota sampling distribution of the respondents is in parallel with the 
regional distribution of Turks living in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
110 respondents are from Cologne, 40 respondents from Amsterdam and 55 
respondents from Brussels, with a total of 205 respondents in sum. Survey was 
conducted in sample cities’ urban centers between June 2012 and June 2014 via 
face to face interviews. 
 
1.3.3. Collection and Analyze of the Data 
 
Pre-defined interview and survey questions were asked as objective and scientific 
as possible to the respondents and recorded for analyzing. The respondents were 
being told that this research was a scientific study.  Interviews recorded by a voice 
recorder have been reported and evaluated objectively (Yıldırım and Şimşek, 
2008). I have had the chance to stay in the selected cities for some time and had a 
chance to observe. Therefore my approach to analyze and report the data collected 
was not as an exterior observer, but as an interior one who tries to understand the 
respondents’ perception as much as possible. Cross-country differences in terms 
of semi-structured survey and interview data analysis were also evaluated with a 
comparative approach.  The pure information collected by qualitative research 
methodology (Geray, 2004) was transferred to computer and the respondents’ 
answers were analyzed and evaluated with the help of SPSS 15.05. Editing, 
coding and data controls of the data were conducted with a great sensitivity with 
the help of expert academics. 
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CHAPTER TWO - THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN EUROPE 
 
2.1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TURKISH 
COMMUNITY IN EUROPE 
 
Migration is one of the most important concepts of the modern world; and it is the 
name given to the demographic mobility of the agricultural societies which could 
not sufficiently achieve the transition to the sectors based on market economy 
within and outside their borders. Especially after the Industrial Revolution, the 
fast economic growth of the Western European countries increased the 
requirement in labor market. This caused a labor gap and temporary workforce 
agreements were signed with countries outside the Europe to overcome this 
problem. Within the migration movements from 1960s and 1970s from Maghreb 
countries, Turkey, North Africa and even from the Indian subcontinent; the 
Turkey-originated immigrants constitute the largest group. The one-on-one 
confrontation of the European nations with Turks and the interaction of the Turks 
by other nations as immigrants have happened through the immigrant Turkish 
workers who have gone to the Europe under visiting worker status (Manço, 2007). 
Turkish workers’ migration to Europe has started in 1961 with bilateral agreement 
by Federal Germany, and continued in 1964 with another agreement by the 
Netherlands and Belgium; eventually continued until 1973 when the worker 
recruitment ended. From 1973 when the worker recruitment from Turkey stopped; 
until 1990s, Turkish workers did not return Turkey but brought their spouses and 
family members into Germany, thereby received a permanent position. Since 
1990s, the second generations married to “imported” brooms and brides in a 
traditional way and have caused a new migration process (Timmerman, 2006). 
These choices stemmed from traditional and patriarchal family structures have by 
time transformed into more modern, individual and heterogeneous marriage 
choices. Generations born and grown in Europe have started to marry people who 
have grown within the European culture or people who are not of Turkish origin. 
On the other hand, the political turmoil in Turkey during 1990s has caused the 
Kurdish and Alevi citizens to ask for asylum into Western European countries. 
Family unions, marriages from within and outside the country, new births, 
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asylums and illegal immigrants have caused the Turkish diaspora to become the 
largest group of immigrants from outside of Europe. Today, immigrants from 
Turkey in Germany with a population of two million and 700 thousand constitute 
the 75% of the immigrants from outside the European Union and one third of all 
immigrants. The sample group of this study consists of the Turkey originate 
immigrants in the Netherlands with a 370 thousand of population, and they 
constitute 12% of all immigrants. In Belgium, immigrants from Turkey with a 
population of 220 thousand constitute 7% of the all foreigners in Belgium, who 
constitute one fourth of the Belgian population. In Europe, when we include 
Greek citizens (The Turks of Western Thrace), minority Turks from Bulgaria and 
Romania and the Turks of Northern Cyprus, total number of Turks (including 
Kurds) within the European Union is about 5,6 million. On the other hand, in non-
European Union member countries such as Switzerland and Norway, in following 
order 120 thousand and 17 thousand Turkey originated people are living. Among 
the 19 million Muslims living in 28 member countries in European Union, 30% 
are the Turkey originated ones. (P.S. Table 1) Turkey originated ones constitute 
the largest national immigrant group within the European Union (Pew Forum, 
2011; Eurostat, 2013; Statistic Netherlands – CBS, 2013; TGNA-Human Rights 
Investigation Commission, 2009; TAM, 2006). 
Table 1. List of the Muslim and Turkish Population in the European Union 
Member States (EU28) 
 
Country Muslim Population 
2010 Pew Report 
Turkish Population 
(including Kurds) 
Muslim Percentage of 
Total Population (%) 
Austria** 475.000 183.000 5,7 
Belgium*** 638.000 218.832 6 
Bulgaria 1.002.000 588.318 13,4 
Croatia 56.000 2.000 1.3 
South Cyprus* 2.492 2.000 0,3 
Czech Republic 4.000 1.700 0,1 
Denmark*** 226.000 60.181 4,1 
Estonia 2.000 200 0,1 
Finland*** 42.000 6.500 0,8 
France** 4.704.000 611.515 7,5 
Germany 4.119.000 2.700.000 5 
Greece 527.000 150.000 4,7 
Hungary 25.000 1.700 0,3 
Ireland 43.000 3.000 0,9 
Italy*** 1.583.000 19.068 2,6 
Latvia 2.000 142 0,1 
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Lithuania 3.000 35 0,1 
Luxembourg 11.000 450 2,3 
Malta 1.000 53 0,3 
The Netherlands 914.000 370.000 5,5 
Poland 20.000 2.500 0,1 
Portugal 65.000 250 0,6 
Romania 73.000 70.000 0,3 
Slovakia 4.000 150 0,1 
Slovenia 49.000 259 2,4 
Spain 1.021.000 4.000 2,3 
Sweden*** 451.000 100.000 4,9 
United 
Kingdom***5 
2.869.000 500.000 4,6 
Total 18.931.492 5.595.853 3,7 
 
Source 1: Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, the Future of the 
Global Muslim Population, January 2011.
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Source 2: Wikipedia
7
, Eurostat and Turkish Research Centre (Türkiye Araştırmalar 
Merkezi Vakfı – TAM), 2006. 
* Taken from the reports of Greek Cypriot Statistics Office published by Fileleftheros 
Newspaper. For more information, please see; http://www.philenews.com/ (22.05.2014). 
** This is the data acquired from the official address notifications to the Embassies of 
Turkish Republic in the mentioned countries. 
*** The data of the Presidency of Turks Living Abroad and Relative Communities was 
considered. 
The European Turkish community with 5.6 million population in 28 European 
Union member countries currently represents three (3) generations. The “blue 
collar workers” who have arrived in the first years of the migration are mostly 
retired and some of them have returned back to Turkey. The majority of the 
European Turkish community is consisted of second and third generations, which 
keep living in the countries where there were born and grown up. Parallel with the 
socioeconomic developments in Turkey, there is a very low rate of return to the 
homeland and most of the second and third generations do not consider leaving 
                                                             
5
 According to data shared by the Home Office of the United Kingdom in 2011, about 
500 thousand British Turks are living in the United Kingdom. This number is included 
Turkish Cypriots (300 thousand) and the Bulgarian and Romenian Turks and the Iraqi 
Turkmens (50 thousand). Thus, about 150 thousand immigrants of Turkish origin 
(including Kurds) are living in the United Kingdom. For more information, please see 
official website of the Presidency of Turks Living Abroad and Relative Communities; 
http://www.yvdk.gov.tr/ulke-3-birlesik-krallik.html (20.05.2014). 
6
 For more information, please see; 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/jan/28/muslim-population-country-
projection-2030 (21.05.2014). 
7
Wikipedia, ‘Turks in Europe’, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turks_in_Europe 
(20.05.2014). 
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the European countries. Even though the birth rate among the Turkey originate 
people in European Union countries is above the EU average; this rate drops 
swiftly. Therefore, comparing with the high rate of elderly people in EU countries, 
the European Turkish community has a younger population average due to higher 
birth rates. 
 
The workers migration which started with the agreements signed by the Western 
European countries was at first built on “working hard”, “gaining a lot of money” 
and “returning”; which was identified with “blue collar worker” position 
(Abadan-Unat, 1976: 6). But, the next generations have eluded from the concept 
of “blue collar worker” and have directed themselves to numerous occupations, 
mostly led by the service sector. Especially the second and third generations of 
immigrants from Turkey have become active social actors and decision makers 
today, in the fiftieth year of migration. Especially the Turkish immigrants in 
Western and Northern European countries have created their own employment 
areas and have been establishing businesses in various sectors, thereby 
contributing to the economic employment of the countries they are in. Number of 
Turkey originate employers in Belgium is above 4.000. The number of people 
employed in these businesses is more than 14.000. Number of Turkey originate 
employers in the Netherlands is around 13.500. The number of people employed 
in these businesses has reached to 62.000. It is expected that the number of 
Turkey originate employers who contribute a lot to the European economy will 
reach to 120.000 by 2015 in Germany and 160.000 in all EU countries. However, 
even though the rate of unemployment in Belgium is 7%, it is 36% among the 
Turkey originated people. In Germany, the unemployment rate among the Turkey 
originated people is around 30%, as it is 15% in the Netherlands (TAM, 2006; 
Human Rights Investigation Commission, 2009). As a result, Turkish workers 
who have become permanent actors rather than temporary workers have a very 
heterogeneous structure within the scope of socio-cultural, economic, political and 
denominator issues. 
 
Right of citizenship is one of the most important indicators for the minorities in 
Europe in terms of socio-cultural, economic and political participation; and it 
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differs in each country. In countries where double citizenship is not allowed, 
decreases are seen in the number of people who want to become German citizens. 
With legal regulations such as in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden; the rights 
of citizenship were made easier, which caused the right of double citizenship and 
even promoting that has resulted with 60% of EU citizenship among the Turkey 
originated people. This rate is around 35% in Germany, which still has problems 
in accepting the ethnic and religious differences. On the other hand, the right of 
citizenship for Turkish youth who were born and raised in Germany was given in 
2014; and this indicates that the year’s long struggle was accepted politically and 
socially. The “option model” (accepted in 2000) which forced the Germany born 
immigrant originated youth between 18-23 to choose between the Turkish or 
German citizenship has been cancelled with the new law of 2014. With this new 
law, it is predicted that more than 90% of the Turkey originated youth born and 
raised in Germany will take advantage of this right. But, the lack of right of 
double citizenship for everyone is considered as an inadequacy for first and 
second generations of immigrants from Turkey. 
 
Among the Turkey originated people who live in Germany, about 35% have the 
German citizenship. In the Netherlands, 27% of them have Turkish citizenship as 
73% have the Dutch citizenship. Among the Turkish immigrants in Belgium, the 
rate is about 75%. Sweden is the country of which the Turkish immigrants 
received the highest rate of citizenship by about 80%. Approximately 53% of the 
Turkey originated people living in European Union borders have become the 
citizens of the countries they are living in (TAM, 2006; Human Rights 
Investigation Commission, 2009).  
 
Especially in the first half of the migration, marriages of the Turkish immigrants 
with people from their homeland has brought together incompatibilities and 
conflicts between the spouses originating from cultural differences. But, the 
marriage choices of new generations are less traditional than the first generation 
and shaped with a less individualistic worldview. Among the other minorities 
within Europe, immigrants from Turkey are one of the minorities with the least 
rate of marriages with someone except their own ethnic/religious group. In the 
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Netherlands, where harmony is experienced the most, only 10% of the marriages 
were conducted with someone out of their own ethnic group (Avcı, 2005). The 
reasons of the increase in the number of marriages with different ethnic/religious 
origins are the transformation of conservative family structure, consideration of 
cultural harmony, advantages of language and the expansion of individual 
responsibility. For instance, the report of Dutch Statistical Office (CBS, 2006) 
says that 54% of the men from Turkey have married to a Turkish female living in 
the Netherlands as only 27% of them married with a female from Turkey. Same 
report also indicates that the rate of the Turkish immigrant men marrying the 
Dutch origin or other foreign originate women has increased by 10% in recent 
years. These marriage choices indicate that the number of “immigration marriages” 
by people brought from Turkey has severely decreased. 
Participation is one of the most important parameters of adaptation, and it is also a 
prerequisite for someone to feel himself or herself as a citizen. Right of vote in 
local, national and European Union levels which is regulated by the laws is one of 
the most permanent tools for the ethnic/religious minorities to socialize. The 
increasing education level, socio-economic status, citizenship rate and social 
responsibility of the Turkish immigrants in recent years has accelerated the 
participation in decision making processes. The Turkish immigrants are one of the 
most inclined ethnic minorities to participate in decision making processes and 
they have gained many local assembly seats and also became deputies in national 
parliaments and in European Parliament. For instance, there are six the deputies of 
Turkish origin in the Netherlands House of Representatives consisting of 150 
members, 11 deputies from 4 different political parties in German Federal 
Parliament which has 630 members and 6 deputies in Belgian Federal Parliament 
with 150 members. The people of Turkish origin who constitute the largest ethnic 
group Bulgaria have gained 36 seats in the parliament under their political party 
called Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in 2013 national elections for 
the Bulgarian Parliament. Movement for Rights and Freedoms has won 17.27% of 
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the votes for May 2014 the European Parliament elections and has sent 4 
representatives into the European Parliament.
8
 
On the other hand, the European Turkish society has a more common organization 
and socialization network comparing with other minority groups. As awareness 
about organizational participation increases, so did the social visibility and 
socialization of Turkish immigrants. New associations of Turkish origin, they 
appeared in accordance with social and political realities of Turkey since the first 
years of the migration, have become the most important base for the search of 
Turkish immigrants’ identity existence in Europe. Semi and full structured 
organizations as a first step of socialization aiming to come together have 
contributed a lot to the continuity of the relationship network within the European 
Turkish society. As townsman coffeehouses in Turkey had the social function of 
semi-structured societal spaces in traditional societies like Turkey; in European 
countries this function was filled with mosque coffeehouses. The structured and 
formal organization of relationship networks was provided by associations or 
foundations established for this purposes both in Turkey and in Europe (Kurtoğlu, 
2005). Therefore, we can categorize the associations appeared within the Turkey 
axis into three in terms of their organization in Europe; religious/belief based 
associations (including mosque associations), fellow townsmen associations and 
associations with an identity based activity agenda. No detailed analysis is made 
here as the categorical classification of this organization and its activity agenda 
will be evaluated in the next chapter. 
2.2. THE TURKISH ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE  
The birth and development of Islamic movement is directly related with the socio-
economic, political and legal inadequacies and inequities in the countries and 
regions they are. Elements such as poverty, ignorance, class caste, oppression and 
ideological dominance which differ in each society have accelerated the 
development of belief-based movements. Therefore, it can be said that the 
development of civil religious movements can exist within the limits and scope of 
                                                             
8
 Results of the 2014 European Parliament elections are available at http://www.results-
elections2014.eu/en/country-results-bg-2014.html (05.06.2014). 
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existing governments and administrations. In other words, we can easily say that 
the religious movements in some Muslim countries ruled by centralized and 
oppressive regimes could not develop sufficiently. In some Muslim countries 
where civil religious movements could not find a space of freedom, a social order 
which could maintain social pluralism could not be set. As in cases of problematic 
and fragile democracy countries Turkey and Egypt, religion-based movements 
that achieve financial freedom in social services and cooperation have most of the 
time confronted by official state ideology and military bureaucracy. Strong 
political and military authorities in some Muslim countries are using the public 
resources and harm the objectivity, legality and civilized structure of the civil 
movements in accordance with their political and ideological interests. Therefore, 
the official state power that dominates and oppresses a certain ideology, certainly 
prevent the social and religious diversity in Muslim countries.
9
 Along with this, 
radical Islamic movements in Muslim countries and the terrorist activities 
conducted by those have made Islam to be considered by violence and terror 
today. This heavy burden on the shoulders of Islam and believers of this religion 
can only be overcome by a new approach that will show the real face of Islam and 
defend democratic pluralism, human rights, religious and conscience freedom. As 
a result, belief based movements that appeared in Muslim counties and 
contributed to peace and dialogue at global level, and the values they created will 
minimize the uniformity and polarization that modern civilizations will face. 
Islam has brought many different opinions and understandings about the 
individuals and the societies’ religious, economic and social life. Islam has 
brought a civilian religious understanding and consistently emphasized justice, 
consultation and pluralism in order to settle social stability and peace. Therefore, 
the claims in Western thinkers such as Daniel (1987), such as “Islam is not pro-
change, prevents progress, it does not promote development and is a religion of 
                                                             
9
 The definition of “Muslim countries” which is used in many parts of this study is, as 
Weller (2002) defines, the countries of which the government types are not Islamic, but 
of which the population is predominantly Muslim. The definition of “Islamic countries” 
was not preferred as it means that the government type is Islamic. This study also reveals 
some determinations on Islam and Western civilizations; and his definition of “Muslim 
countries” makes it easier to understand the general issue. 
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underdeveloped societies” are considered as one-sided and away from 
sociological religious facts (Okumuş, 2009: 332). Belief based movements that 
refer to Islamic resources which promote progress, science and development will 
definitely contribute to societal change and peace both within the Islamic world 
and outside of it. Also, the developments at international level with the help of 
globalization in the last fifty years have increased the efficiency and roles of civil 
actors in Muslim societies. Ethnic, socio-cultural, religious and political 
movements that do not represent the official ideology and policy of the nation 
states have started to undertake extended roles at national and international levels. 
Civil groups which operate in several areas such as education, aid, environment, 
religion, economy and media are battling local, national or global scale problems 
according to their budget and human resources. These groups play an important 
role in issues where the Turkish immigrants and the ethnic, religious and socio-
cultural movements as their representatives are ineffective with various reasons. 
The forefront methodologies of these civil movements are the feeling of 
responsibility that depends on voluntarism and the low cost workforce 
employment. 
On the other hand, the democratic and free culture of the Europe has increased the 
ability of civil movements that belong to the minority groups’ skills of organizing 
and activity building. In parallel with the expansion of responsibility areas of 
minority originated civil movements; their capacity of activity has also increased 
and local/national governments have started to address them and asked their 
opinion. Today, the religious movements which are Turkey originate establish 
public opinion and play successful roles in effecting the decisions and behavior of 
the countries in which they live. It is seen that the social and religious movements 
can easily mobilize their grounds in terms of public opinion building. One of the 
areas that the Turkish civil movements in Europe are most successful at are the 
activities in socio-cultural and humanitarian aid issues. Organized social and 
religious movements that come from Turkish-Islamic tradition are financially 
supported by many businessmen and private foundations. 
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In this chapter, instead of considering the Turkish-Islamic movements more 
comprehensively; the perceptions of these movements about assimilation, 
radicalism, democracy and coexistence and their activities on these issues will be 
handled. Within this context, the Gülen Movement, which has a global impact area 
with its education and dialogue activities, will first be evaluated in terms of the 
activity agenda it has that is related with the Turkish diaspora in Europe. Secondly, 
the National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş), a political Islamic movement 
based in Turkey, will be evaluated by its activity within Europe. Third, the 
Süleymancı community that emphasizes on the cultivation of moral, educated and 
religious generations based on Qur’an education will be evaluated. This chapter 
will also deal with the Nurcular, known as ‘the Epistles of Light’ in terms of their 
activities with prescripts, consultancy and religious oriented ones. Besides, the 
Turkish Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs Directorate (DITIB) which is 
responsible for the Republic of Turkey’s official religious services in Europe will 
be handled in terms of its activity agenda. Finally, the Alevism, a unique 
interpretation of Islam, will be dealt with in terms of the activities of the 
Federations of Alevi Organizations in Germany (AABF) and Cem Foundation 
(Cem Vakfı). 
2.2.1. THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT (HIZMET MOVEMENT) 
‘Radical Islamism’ that appeared in Islamic societies as a reaction to oppressions 
and attacks on Islam and Muslims and ‘the political Islam’ that was built on anti-
Westernism are criticized by Muslims after a century long process. The rise and 
visibility of more moderate social and religious movements with non-violent 
attitudes against Islamic radicalism show the changing faces of the Islamic 
societies. Against the political Islamism which defines itself with the harsh 
reactions towards West and Westernism, the new generation of Islamic 
movements has a positive attitude towards the universal and Western values such 
as basic rights and freedoms, human rights and supremacy of law. According to 
the American sociologist Helen Rose Ebaugh, one of these new generation 
movements is the Gülen Movement; which has at first grown in Turkey and then 
spread to Europe, Australia, Canada, Africa and United States of America after 
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the dissolution of Soviet Union. The person who inspired this movement is the 
Muslim scholar and retired Imam Fethullah Gülen, who has been living in USA 
since 1999. According to the sociologist Ebaugh the term of “moderate Islam” 10 
which wants to live with people from other beliefs, supports democracy and 
freedom of expression with respect to beliefs and that condemns usage of violence 
in the name of Islam is openly represented by the Gülen Movement (Ebaugh, 
2010: 18-19). The spiritual leader of this organization which is also known as the 
Gülen Movement, Fethullah Gülen, received the education of the Ulama tradition 
that carried the cultural heritage of Islam for centuries and he is  a person who 
witnessed the radical transformations of the modern ages with a deep spiritual and 
social identity. Besides the religious identity of Gülen Movement, when we look 
at the structural characteristics it gained globally, we can say that the movement 
has a very wide socio-cultural identity and vision (Ergene, 2005: 12-17). 
One of the most obvious characteristics that makes Fethullah Gülen distinctive in 
Islam geography is his opinion that building a bridge between Islam world and the 
Western world is a necessity and his permanent activities to achieve this. Gülen 
defends that the intellectual and cultural convergence between the Ottoman 
Empire and the West in nineteenth century (Abu-Rabi and Sevindi, 2008) should 
be continued with modern education and bridges of dialogue. Today, it is an 
indispensable fact that the multi religious, multi linguistic, multi ethnic and 
colorful society model in Europe could only survive with a solid dialogue that 
relies on mutual respect and understanding. At this point, Fethullah Gülen insists 
that building a dialogue worldwide which depends on mutual understanding, 
investigating new ways of dialogue that will reverse the image of Muslims at 
global level, rising new generations that will show the real face of Islam and 
                                                             
10
 Fethullah Gülen does not find it right that his opinions reflected in his speeches to be 
considered as “moderate Islam”. According to Gülen, Islam is by itself a moderate 
religion. On the contrary, New York Times in 2008 has published an article about the 
Gülen schools in Pakistan. In this article it is stated that these schools “with a moderate 
and flexible, and content with existing together by the West” perception, have delivered a 
“moderate Islam” (Ebaugh, 2010: 19-20). Even though Fethullah Gülen does not consider 
it correct that the movement mentioned with his name and his world of ideas named as 
“moderate”, the Western media has already started using this term for him and his 
movement. 
 
44 
 
contacting people all over the world is very important (Abu-Rabi and Sevindi, 
2008). On the other hand, Fethullah Gülen considers education as a process of 
perfection and believes that the ideal type of person can reach to the necessary 
level of maturity only by educating of science, humanity and religion (Aslandoğan 
and Çetin, 2006). According to Gülen, the basic source of all the problems on the 
earth is the human being, and the solutions to these problems can only be possible 
by raising the human beings into the horizon of virtuous person. Therefore, 
building a society with virtuous people and solving the social problems can only 
be possible with education, social and cultural ways (Gülen, 2014). 11  The 
synthesis of the modern values and the moral principles of Islam by the Muslim 
generations who are more visible in Europe today is in parallel with the belief of 
Gülen that religion and science and coexist. 
Fethullah Gülen is the inspiration for the movement that is called by his name and 
also is known as the architect of education and dialogue activities. Gülen 
emphasizes science with a harmony of mind and conscience and a modernization 
which is respectful to the religion; and is considered as one of the religious figures 
who gives the utmost importance to intercultural and interreligious dialogue in 
Islamic world. The Journalists and Writers Foundation (GYV) which is one of the 
institutional structures of the Gülen Movement has conducted meetings in Turkey 
where they brought people representing different styles of idea and life; and those 
are the first important steps in order to establish a common existence and life style 
in Turkey (Ergene, 2005: 49-52). Fethullah Gülen knows that establishing a 
dialogue with other religions and members of those religions has an important 
place in Islam; so he had a meeting with Pope John Paul II in Vatican in February 
1998; trying to turn his opinions into practice. Gülen has shown very harsh 
reaction to September 11 terrorist attacks; and he tries to rebuild the image of 
Islam, which has been harmed by radical Islamists through their terrorist activities 
                                                             
11
 Foundation for Dialogue and Education (Stiftung Dialog und Bildung), which is based 
in Germany has conducted an interview with Fethullah Gülen in April 2014 at his house, 
Pennsylvania, USA. A certain part of the interview questions included the current debates 
in Turkey; but they also contain issues such as the state, secularism, freedom of religion 
and belief, nationalism and Political Islam. For more information, please have a look at: 
http://dialog-und-bildung.de/ (12.05.2014).    
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and also by Western media’s subjective publications; by his personal speeches 
and the activities pursued by his followers in all continents on the axis of socio-
cultural, education and dialogue. Ten days after the September 11 attacks, 
Fethullah Gülen has advertised in the Washington Post, one of the most effective 
newspapers in USA, and condemned terror and terrorism, calling for tolerance 
and dialogue. Gülen has institutionalized the saying ascribed to Islam prophet’s 
son-in-law Ali, “People are either your brothers in religion or your similar in 
creation” with his interreligious and intercultural dialogue activities; and he is 
trying to turn the principles of tolerance, mercy, love and modesty which Islam 
refers in human relations to be livable. 
According to American sociologist Helen R. Ebaugh (2010: 102-104), the people 
who support the Gülen Movement consider their individual aims similar with the 
aims of the movement, and this constitutes the central element of their intra-group 
identity. The individuals who gain a group belonging within the Gülen Movement 
are taking more self sacrificing, devoted and actionary liabilities in order for the 
group to achieve its aims. The direction of social movements such as the Gülen 
Movements to an ideal aim thanks to “intra group belonging”, settles the ground 
for the development of a strong individual feeling of devotion. The open and 
participatory behavior of individuals who are members of movements that give 
importance to intercultural dialogue and communication are stemming from the 
realization of the idealized aims. Individuals, who adapt coexistence by its 
religious, moral and civil sides, are committing their aims with all the liabilities in 
the social movements they belong to. Therefore, the social movements in Europe 
with a minority based ground have an activity agenda which is respectful to 
democracy, human rights and legal norms and it has a great contribution to 
coexistence. 
The activity agenda of Gülen Movement in European countries was shaped with a 
re-adaptation of the education and civil society model in Turkey which had been 
applied for almost forty years. Fethullah Gülen’s thesis that the main problem of 
Turkey and even all of the civilizations is human and human education showed 
itself in Izmir, where he came in March 1966 with official post and became an 
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administrator. He taught one-one-one students with his unique education 
methodology synthesizing mind and conscience, and cultivated the first 
generation who are the teachers and administrators of the worldwide education 
system today (Ergene, 2005: 47). This ideological, philosophical and intellectual 
education understanding of Gülen provided the opening of “Light Houses” where 
university students could stay together. Successful university students coming 
from various towns of Anatolia have had the chance to stay in a warm 
environment; and they learned their religious, national and spiritual values and it 
turned a countrywide project in Turkey by time. Along with the “Light Houses” 
model, dormitories for male and female students with clean and comfortable 
environment and guidance services were opened as well. Numerous successful 
university students who stay in houses and dormitories were supported during 
their education with the scholarships provided by benevolent businessmen. Gülen 
has also encouraged the educator and benevolent businessmen around him to open 
private educational institutions with more quality, success and elite characters 
than the public schools. On the other hand, the exam preparation courses arranged 
for students who wished to attend the prominent universities and high schools 
were spread to all cities and counties by time. 
In the essence of education, dialogue and humanitarian aid activities of Gülen 
Movement in all of the continents are the traces of struggle with three illnesses 
Said Nursi pointed out in his article of March 1909 in the newspaper the Dini 
Ceride. Said Nursi has ranked these illnesses that cover the human body as 
ignorance, poverty and dispute (separation, division) and advised the medications 
of art, skill and unity as the cure of those (Ünal and Williams, 2000). Fethullah 
Gülen has also adopted Said Nursi’s12 model of service to religion and humanity 
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 Said Nursi was born in Bitlis, an eastern town of Turkey, in 1878 and he is the author 
of Epistles of Light, an interpretation of Qur’an. He was exiled to Barla, Isparta because 
of the internal political problems in Turkey and his works written by him in this town for 
23 years starting in 1926 are translated to more than 30 languages today. The main 
subject of Epistles of Light is proving the facts of belief. The Nur Community, as it is 
known in Turkey, is an Islamic movement established by those who have adapted the 
ideas and worldview of Said Nursi in his works. After the death of Said Nursi in 1960, 
The Nur Community was separated into different groups following the different 
tendencies and opinions of his prominent students. Gülen Movement has gained an 
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and his works as a worldview; and he believes that a general operation of 
education and manners where heart, mind and soul are considered together could 
be the solution to many problems including ignorance. 
As Gülen Movement came to the forefront in Turkish public opinion with its 
successful services especially in education; in the Western European countries it 
is more prominent by its activities conducted on education, culture, economic and 
religious spheres where the Turkish society is intensely living. The Gülen 
Movement considers education as the most prominent tool of social change and 
societal regeneration (Fuller, 2008: 116-117). The private school projects that 
began in Turkey in 1980s have first continued in Central Asian countries that got 
separated from the Soviet Union, followed by Balkans, Far East, African and 
European countries. The first private school in Europe was opened in Denmark in 
1993 with the support of Turkey originated local sponsors and then spread to 
many countries in Europe. Today, in more than 10 schools in Denmark; many 
students from many ethnic origins are being educated with the Turkey originate 
children the most (Pörsti, 2013). As in other Western European countries, Gülen 
Movement is the fastest spreading one among the citizens of Turkish origin in 
Germany and has 24 schools recognized by the government, approximately 300 
associations and approximately 150 out-of-school etude and education centers 
(Seufert, 2014: 5). These educational institutions that teach in English, Turkish 
and local languages could get support from almost each of the sections in the 
society because of their success and quality. 
On the other hand, with Germany at the first rank; the etude education centers 
opened in Belgium, the Netherlands, France and other countries of Europe starting 
from 1990s have played important roles in teaching Turkish to the children of 
immigrant families and give support for the school courses. A part of the 
immigrant family kids who have received additional and supportive courses from 
the etude education centers where moral values and physical sciences were taught 
                                                                                                                                                                       
independent momentum than the Nur Community and established its own sphere of action 
and idea (Yavuz, 2004). 
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have achieved to enroll in university in many countries, with Germany coming 
first. Moreover, the children of immigrants who have received education in the 
etude education centers, student houses/dormitories and private schools have 
started to work as educators in the institutes where they were graduated from or 
raised in. 
Fethullah Gülen sees the problem of education and learning as the most important 
problem of the century (Ergene, 2005: 270). According to Prof. Dr. Ori Z. Soltes 
from the Georgetown University, the most important element of the Gülen 
Movement that lives on the ideas and articles of Fethullah Gülen are the 
educational activities they conduct to make devoted and self-sacrificing 
generations to be brought up.
 13
 The most promising characteristic of the 
education mobilization spread among 160 countries of the world today is its 
contribution to the building of world peace. Schools that belong to the Gülen 
Movement have achieved to gather the children of families with different ethnic 
and religious backgrounds under the same roof in many parts of the world, and 
they contribute a lot to social and global peace today. Fethullah Gülen sees the 
21st century as an age of “dialogue of civilizations” and concentrates on 
interreligious and intercultural dialogue which will make S. Huntington’s thesis of 
the “Clash of Civilizations” meaningless. Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıtoprak considers the 
global peace project of Gülen very important and says that Gülen tries to raise a 
generation which will bring the permanent peace with a love for love and hate 
from hatred. 
14
 In 2005, UNESCO Romanian Commission has given Fethullah 
Gülen the “Tolerance and Dialogue Contribution Award” because of his 
                                                             
13
 Dr. Ori Z. Soltes has made a speech in the international symposium named “The 
Hizmet (Gülen) Movement and Peace Building” by Rumi Forum in Washington, USA 
and said that hundred of educational institutions were nourished by the ideals of Fethullah 
Gülen in many countries and continents, from pre-school to the university level. For more 
information, please see; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72eWEsgoGog (11.03.2014). 
 
14
 Dr. Z. Sarıtoprak made a speech in the conference named “Muslim World in Transition: 
Contributions of the Gülen Movement” in London, UK between October 25-27, 2007 
summarizes the peace project of Gülen with words such as “tolerance, interreligious 
dialogue and charitable love”. For more information, please see; 
http://en.fgulen.com/conference-papers/contributions-of-the-gulen-movement/2527-
fethullah-gulen-and-his-global-contribution-to-peace-building0 (12.05.2014). 
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contribution to world peace through education. Also, the ‘Manhae Peace Award’ 
given in South Korea since 1997 was also deemed suitable for Fethullah Gülen in 
2013. 
The qualified, ethical and successful education was aimed for the Turks in Turkey 
in Europe in the private schools, student dormitories, preparation courses and 
other institutions that Gülen inspired have no central organization and official 
structure that administers and controls all of them together. According to 
President of Journalists and Authors Foundation Mustafa Yeşil15 , there is no 
single leadership or a hierarchical structure along with teams and institutions that 
act in the name of that structure within the Gülen Movement. In other words, 
Gülen Movement is organized by the autonomy and energy of local structures that 
operate independently. For instance, each school or institution operates with the 
support from local sponsors in their region. These institutions follow the 
education system of the country in which they operate. The teacher’s staff to be 
employed in the schools bound to the Gülen Movement is chosen among people 
who give importance to moral values, who have the vision of representation and 
who are aware of the ideals of the movement. The most important reason of the 
immigrant originated families’ choice of schools and institutions that belong to 
the Gülen Movement is their desire to grow their children to become ethical, well-
behaved, educated and idealist. French newspaper Le Monde has written on 
November 5, 2006 that the schools which belong to Gülen Movement address the 
education problems of the immigrant children and that they could easily be 
considered as an example by the German schools (Ebaugh, 2010: 20). 
Another featured field of activity of the Gülen Movement in Europe is the visual 
and printed media. Zaman newspaper is published in Turkish in a few regions 
where Turkey originated population is intense, with its head start in 1990 in 
Germany. After a quarter century, daily newspaper Zaman published in Germany 
continues its publication life with approximately 30 thousand circulations, and it 
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 For the interview between the president of the Journalists and Authors Foundation, of 
which the Honorary President is Fethullah Gülen, Mustafa Yeşil and Selin Ongun from 
T24 internet news site in April 2010, please see; http://t24.com.tr/haber/gulen-cemaatine-
ordunun-tamami-degil-icindeki-bir-zumre-karsi,76007 (14.04.2014). 
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is published in Turkish and German. The newspaper has started its country 
editions from 2008 and is published under different names: Zaman Germany 
(daily), Zaman France (weekly), Zaman Belgium (daily), Zaman Netherlands 
(daily), Zaman Scandinavia (weekly) and Zaman Austria (weekly). “Samanyolu 
Broadcasting Group” is one of the biggest private broadcasting groups in Turkey 
and it is bound to the Gülen Movement. This group has a partner broadcasting 
company called “Ebru Europe” and it publishes in Germany using German and 
English languages; as “Samanyolu Europe” uses German and Turkish. On the 
other hand, Kaynak Holding, which was established in 1997 with the advice from 
Gülen makes great contributions to education and culture by its great educational 
publications in Turkish and foreign languages. One of the biggest international 
book, stationery and technology retail chains of Turkey, NT, is operating in 148 
branches in Turkey and in seven different countries such as Germany, the 
Netherlands and Albania. It is predicted that the education, culture, dialogue and 
media activities brought to over 5 million Turkey originated people in Europe will 
play very important roles in terms of educating more pluralist, participant, 
informative and understanding generations. As a result, the Gülen Movement 
invests on culture, education, dialogue and media both within and outside Turkey, 
and is working very hard to establish “islands of peace” in the whole world. 
The Gülen Movement is the biggest social movement in Turkey with a religious 
base (Fuller, 2008) and has been effective even in non-Muslim countries with its 
main axis as Turkish-Islamic identity (Ebaugh, 2010: 75). Today, the basis of 
Gülen Movement’s achievement of becoming a global movement in terms of the 
extensity and efficiency of education and dialogue activities is constituted of 
Gülen’s personal pervasiveness, individual sacrifices of the volunteers, confidence 
of financial supporters and advices of Islam and Prophet. Its openness to the 
democracy culture, its rejection of politicizing the religion, its dialogue with non-
Muslims and its contribution for the adaptation of immigrants from Turkey have 
great importance in turning the Gülen Movement into a global actor in USA, 
Canada and Europe. Especially, one of the most important results of dialogue 
activities intensive in America and Europe are the dialogue trips conducted with 
foreigners met and a dialogue established into Turkey. Those people who have a 
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chance to see Turkey, the people of Turkish origin, culture and its hospitability 
have a positive change in their perception of Islam, Muslims and the Eastern 
culture. When we consider the participation of thousands of people into these 
dialogue trips, the contribution to dialogue and coexistence between the members 
of Islam and Western civilization could be understood easier. On the other hand, 
the network of social relations among different circles inspired by the ideas of 
Fethullah Glen has opened the way for economic cooperation thanks to the 
connections of educational institutions within and outside the country. The 
Confederation of Business and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) is known with 
its close relations by the Gülen Movement, and is building business connections 
in Asia and Africa with the small and middle sized capital owners under its roof. 
These business connections and agreements are moved to further levels with the 
local connections and consultancy of the Turkish education institutions that have 
been operating in those countries for tens of years. 
Gülen Movement has made progress in unifying tradition with modernity, and is 
organized through social solidarity networks in European countries where Turkey 
originated families are intense. Through the local social networks established by 
each country within itself, socio-cultural, education, economic and humanitarian 
aid activities are being organized. This tradition of philanthropy fed by the Islam-
Turkish culture has been turned into practice with building of schools, dormitories, 
hospitals, universities and cultural centers by rich and also by giving humanitarian 
aid and scholarship to poor students. Another feature of the Gülen Movement that 
makes it different is that the humanitarian aid organization is not only limited with 
Turks or Muslims. In other words, the humanitarian aid organizations are 
sustained in any part of the world regardless of language, religion, race or gender. 
According to Dr. Amir Hussain
16
, the most important characteristic of the Gülen 
Movement that will make it special is the importance given to the interreligious 
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 The series of publications named “Intellectuals Tell the Hizmet (Gülen) Movement” 
was published in Zaman newspaper in July 2014. Prof. Dr. Amir Hussain has also 
mentioned his opinions about the Hizmet Movement and he is teaching on contemporary 
Islamic societies at Loyola Marymount University. For more information, please see; 
http://spectramedia.tv/2014/03/27/amir-hussain/ (22.03.2014). 
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dialogue and the amazing studies and projects conducted about that. The 
international civil society movement that organizes the humanitarian aid activities 
of the Gülen Movement worldwide, ‘Is There Anybody Out There Association’ 
(Kimse Yok Mu Derneği),17 also conducts partnership projects with the Turkey 
originated local education, dialogue and aid associations in European countries. 
As Fethullah Gülen has showed his base the exact ways to operate ‘the generosity 
and philanthropy institution’ that stems from religious and cultural tradition 
increases the intra-group motivation and devotion. Intra group solidarity networks 
and devotion also increases the number, efficiency and quality of activities in 
many areas. On the other hand, realization of the projects in the activity agenda 
and the sharing of the projects by the local public, financers coming first, through 
the communication channels make the movement legal and visible. In Gülen 
Movement, where local elements and individual initiatives have an important 
place, we see a decentralized structure and governance type (Ebaugh, 2010: 96-
124). Therefore, the transformation of the social responsibility that relies on 
religious, national and socio-cultural values into a worldview is the most 
permanent element that strengthens the social ground of Gülen Movement. 
More than 10 years have passed after September 11, which caused fear and hatred 
among many people. This fear and anxiety have caused a type of behavior that 
contains intolerant, closed and hateful elements towards Islam and the Muslims 
living in European countries. Within this atmosphere of fear and anxiety, the 
understanding and tolerance based peace works and discourses of Fethullah Gülen 
which are based on tolerance, understanding and dialogue have caused a new hope 
and expectation in the Islamic world. Fethullah Gülen said: “A terrorist cannot be 
a Muslim. And a Muslim cannot be a terrorist. A Muslim can only be the indicator 
of peace, comfort and abundance” right after September 11 and it has been 
considered as the most courageous and concise expression of the religious 
understanding in the essence of Islam. The Gülen Movement has made an effort 
of rejecting all types of extremism and violence and by thinking that these 
concepts do not match with the real message of Islam, tried to spread tolerance 
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 For more information about ‘Is There Anybody Out There Association’ (Kimse Yok Mu 
Derneği), please see; http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/?lang=en (16.05.2014). 
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among religious communities (Fuller, 2008: 116-117). Prof. Ides Nicaise from 
Leuven University in Belgium says about Gülen Movement: 
“Another characteristics of the Gülen Movement is the effort it spends for 
peace…As  Belgium, we need this movement. It is not only because I 
think that the foreign  students should have a better education, but mostly 
that I think about the attacks in  Norway on July 22…Ten years have 
passed after September 11. Many Westerners  could still not get rid of 
this nightmare. Fear and hatred have a deep place in many of  them. 
According to me Gülen is the opposite pole of this picture of fear. This is 
what  he said: “Terror can in no way be used in the name of Islam or in 
order to achieve a  target of Islam. A terrorist cannot be a Muslim, and 
a Muslim cannot be a terrorist. A  Muslim can only be the indicator of 
peace, comfort and abundance.” Yes, according  to Holy Qur’an, killing 
a person for no reason is a crime committed towards the  humanity.” (De 
Morgen, 2012). 
 
September 11 attacks, one of the most tragic and important events of 21
st
 century, 
can be considered as the beginning of a new era both for Muslims and the non-
Muslims. We can either call the conflicts going on in Middle East, Africa and 
Ukraine as clash of civilizations, or war against terrorism; but it is certain that the 
international society needs common sense and mutual understanding. At this point, 
the prominent and respectful Islamic scholars and intellectuals’ steps taken with 
calls for common sense and dialogue are of crucial importance. Prof. Jill Carroll, 
the Director of Rice University Center for Research and Development of 
Religious Tolerance has considered Fethullah Gülen as an example in her book 
“Dialogue of Civilizations”, because of his most comprehensive support on 
dialogue and mutual understanding. According to Carroll, Gülen pursues his 
career as an inspiration for people inside and outside of Turkey with his scholar 
and intellectual identity, and he has been defending the dialogue as a necessary 
requirement in the modern world. Gülen says that democracy, as one of the 
environments where dialogue can be cultivated without problems, is not 
incompatible with Islam and he also claims that Islam can also develop 
democracy in many ways (Carroll, 2007: 39). Carroll, in the chapter “on ideal 
person” in his book “Alliance of Civilizations” draws attention that Gülen’s books 
did not make any call for action in political and administrative terms to raise 
individuals with high virtues and to bring an age where the ideal person should be 
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raised in. On the contrary Gülen emphasizes that only by making a worldview that 
is characterized by peace, knowledge, spirituality, tolerance and love dominant 
will the earth become a place to live and to become sustainable (Carroll, 2007: 83). 
In short, Gülen thinks that the ideal society could only be formed by ideal 
generations; and the ideal generations can only be formed by informed, mannered 
and ethical individuals. 
The movement has the most followers in Turkey and grows with the 
encouragement of Fethullah Gülen, who is considered as a modern role model; 
and the movement has a social and spiritual side. According to Gülen, in our 
recent era, where populist contexts and mass propaganda are very popular, the 
investment done on individual is the world’s most important and indispensable 
investment. Today, the Gülen Movement has moved beyond the Turkish borders 
and investing on education and intercultural dialogue in more than 160 countries 
of the world with its cultural norms and values; encouraging the students for 
universal humanitarian values, tolerance and dialogue. The Gülen Movement 
(Hizmet Movement) gathers Muslims, Christians, Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba and Ibus 
in Nigeria; Muslim Bosnians, Christian Serbs and Croats in Bosnia Herzegovina; 
Kurds, Sunnis, Shiite, Arabs, Turkmens and Assyrians in North Iraq; Moro 
Muslims and Christians in the Philippines; Chams Muslims and Buddhist Khmers 
in Cambodia and Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; and the activities 
of education and dialogue have a function of facilitating the peace.
18
  On the other 
hand, the Turkish Cultural Centers that belong to the Gülen Movement are 
contributing to the internal peace by bringing Muslims and non-Muslims together 
through different activities. Dr. Yasien Mohamed is South African Arabic and 
Islamic Philosophy Lecturer and at a conference he attended
19
, he stated that the 
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 Mehmet Kalyoncu has made a presentation in the conference named ‘Muslim World in 
Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement’ where he identified the example of 
Mardin in which different ethnic and religious groups exist, and the contribution of the 
Gülen schools to the social peace. For more information, please see; 
http://en.fgulen.com/conference-papers/contributions-of-the-gulen-movement/2525-
civilian-response-to-ethno-religious-terrorism (12.05.2014).  
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 Dr. Yasien Mohamad has made a presentation in the conference named ‘Muslim World 
in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement’ and said that international Star High 
School in Cape Town, South Sfrica sample shows the contribution Gülen Movement 
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students enrolled in the Turkish schools of South Africa have become more 
constructive and successful individuals in the social life comparing with the 
students who are enrolled in other schools. İbrahim Keleş has conducted a 
research on Sebat Education Institutions operating in Kyrgyzstan and are bound to 
the Hizmet Movement  has determined that the students graduate from the Turkish 
schools give more importance to the feelings of responsibility, respect, tolerance, 
cooperation and loyalty comparing with the students graduated from public 
schools.
20
  According to sociologist Dr. Semiha Topal, the Afghan Turk-Girl High 
Schools operating in Afghanistan where 38% of the school-aged children (mostly 
girls) could not attend school; have increased the hopes and expectations on future 
for the female students and their families.
21
 Utrecht University Lecturer Prof. Dr. 
Martin van Bruinessen has prepared the report named “Fethullah Gülen 
Movement in the Netherlands” per request from the Dutch Ministry of Adaptation. 
The report has emphasized that the group named as the Fethullah Gülen 
Movement has been one of the groups which adapted into the Netherlands easily 
and the institutions of this group have contributed the most. 
Gülen Movement has received several criticisms inside and outside of Turkey 
after it appeared on global public opinion. The reason why this study also 
                                                                                                                                                                       
made to the moral values and internal peace. For more information, please see; 
http://en.fgulen.com/conference-papers/contributions-of-the-gulen-movement/2522-the-
educational-philosophy-of-fethullah-gulen-and-its-application-in-south-africa 
(12.05.2014). 
 
20
 İbrahim Keleş has made a presentation in the conference named ‘Muslim World in 
Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement’ and submitted his ideas on the effects 
of education institutions which are bound to the Gülen Movement in Kyrgyzstan. For 
more information, please see; http://en.fgulen.com/conference-papers/contributions-of-
the-gulen-movement/2467-contributions-of-the-gulen-schools-in-kyrgyzstan 
(13.05.2014). 
 
21
The Women Platform of Journalists and Authors Foundation has organized a panel with 
Peace Islands Institute (PII) and Afghanistan Permanent Mission in the United Nations 
named “Girls’ Education in Afghanistan: Achievements and Challenges” in New York on 
March 18, 2014. Dr. Semiha Topal has attended the panel with a presentation named 
“Afghan-Turk Colleges and their effect on the Education of Female Students in 
Afghanistan” saying that the Turkish schools have had great sympathy from the Afghan 
public during the hard times of conflict and the families have sent their daughters to the 
Turkish-Afghan schools with full confidence. For more information, please see; 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPaGWcT4ndU (15.05.2014). 
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mentions the criticisms about these groups is to emphasize the neutrality of the 
study and to indicate that all parts of the society do not support the existing 
movements. A certain part of criticisms about the Gülen Movement are mostly 
stemming from religious communities and political Islamists, followed by secular 
and socialist circles. Political Islamists relate the worldwide growth of Gülen 
Movement with the global powers and blame the movement as being a part of the 
Western powers. Same circles also criticize the Gülen Movement with claims 
such as acquiring the state through education, raising an ideological generation, 
harming the essence of Islam by secular and mixed education and falsifying the 
religion through dialogue. Secular, communist and socialist circles criticize the 
Gülen Movement by blaming it of raising a religious generation, building an 
Islamic state, threatening the secular system and trying to conquer the state. The 
point of criticisms outside the Turkey on Gülen Movement is the drawbacks on 
institutional and financial transparency and the position of women within the 
movement. 
It will be better understood when some points in here are underlined, that the 
majority of Turkish public opinion consider these claims as biased. These points 
are the accelerating growth of the Gülen Movement both inside and outside 
Turkey, the high rate of students in the educational institutions that belong to 
Gülen Movement, acceptance of steps of dialogue by many sides and the 
permission given to the participants to criticize openly and transparently in 
international conferences and activities. Prof. Dr. H.Rose Ebaugh from the 
Houston University has published a book named “Gülen Movement” and she has 
indicated that she did not see any proof about the claims that the movement 
intended to take over the Turkish government or to build an Islamic state instead 
of the secular one (Ebaugh, 2010: 168-169). On the other hand, the former vice 
director of the CIA, Graham Fuller (2008) considers the Gülen Movement as a 
social one, rather than a political movement. According to Fuller, the aim of 
Gülen Movement is to change the thoughts and hearts of the people with a moral 
and scientific education towards more tolerance, social responsibility and 
modernization. The impression we have from the respondents among the 
European Turkish society in this sample group who are also the members of the 
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Gülen Movement is that the criticisms coming both inside and outside of Turkey 
are originated from less information, ideological and biased attitudes, fear and 
lack of sufficient promotion.  
As a result, the mission of Gülen Movement to raise modern, secular and ethical 
generations is decreasing the effectiveness of radical and violent religious 
organizations in Turkey and in Europe. Today, Turkey is the geographically 
closest country to the European continent and it is presumed that the millions of 
the Turkish diaspora in European countries will play the leading role in 
intercultural tolerance and dialogue. The Turkish originated Islamic activist 
movements such as the Gülen Movement, which have established economic, 
commercial, cultural and social networks in many countries of Europe, will 
contribute to a new cultural understanding in Europe which depends on pluralism. 
The reason of mentioning the Gülen Movement more than the others in this study 
is that this movement contributes more to adaptation and communication with its 
efficient activities on education and interreligious and intercultural interaction. 
This study considers the “alliance of civilizations” more realistic and applicable 
rather than “clash of civilizations” in terms of the European Turkish society. In 
other words, it is believed that the Turkish society in Western European countries 
can establish a bridge of dialogue between the Islam and Western civilizations. 
Even though there is a vast literature on the integration and participation of the 
Turkish society in the West, the number of studies on its historical mission of 
building friendship bridges between East and West are very low. Therefore we 
hope that this study will fill an important gap in its area of study. 
2.2.2. MİLİ GÖRÜŞ AND OTHER TURKISH ISLAMIC 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The Turkish society which tries to survive in Europe within a permanent and 
settled order has been reshaping with the existence of movements with religious 
references. Belief based movements are keeping their grounds safe, live and 
strong against the centralized understandings such as assimilation, racism, 
loneliness, distrust and structural exclusion and they have a very solid support. 
The belief based movements can easily direct their followers to education, 
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political participation, solidarity and dialogue; and they have an important 
position which the Western countries address. Religious and non-religious 
movements which are Turkey originated seem to have the internal dynamics 
which will contribute the development of pluralist society model in Europe and to 
ease the adaptation of immigrants. 
The sensitivities such as culture, identity, religion and language which were 
ignored in the first years of migration in European countries have become the 
steam engine of organization once settled down. Starting from 1973, when the 
worker recruitment into Europe has stopped, the Turkish society was organized by 
“fellow townsmen associations” and “mosque associations”, and has started to 
appear in a wide scale. Different group and community belongings appeared in 
European countries, and those were mostly affected by the political and 
ideological separation in Turkey. Therefore, the belief based movements have 
organized in Europe since the first years of the migration and they appeared in 
accordance with the social and political realities of Turkey. One of these 
movements is the National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş) which has been 
organized in Europe since 1976, and which is one of the most important 
representatives of political Islam. First a short introduction to the development 
and organization of political Islam in Turkey will be given and then the activity 
agenda of the National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş) in Europe will be 
evaluated. 
The rise of political Islam in Turkey since 1980s cannot be analyzed by ignoring 
the concept of globalization. This is because political Islam is a movement that 
accompanies the socio-economic dimensions of globalization in both positive and 
negative dimensions. The rise of political Islam can also be read as the visibility 
of Muslim identity and its derivatives in the daily life practices. The religious 
understanding of the fundamentalist, anti-Western, introversive and traditional 
political movements rejects modernity and democracy. According to Gülalp (2003: 
12-14) political Islam is one of the political movements that execute the political 
opposition against the new world order. Movement of Political Islam is a political 
and ideological one that played a role to find solutions about the political and 
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cultural problems of the New World Order
22
 by using the post-modernist and 
critical statements. On the other hand, postmodernism has either consciously or 
unconsciously played an important role in expanding the discursive area of 
political Islam. As a practical result of the change process in the world after 
September 11, Islamic movements have lost their power and started to put effort 
on articulate into the liberal discourse (Gülenç, 2011: 128-136). The entrance of 
Western secular worldview into the Islamic societies through a colonialist channel 
and the perception of this process as a threat by the Islamic societies have made it 
imperative for the political Islamists to develop a unique position. Islamists have 
believed that it was useless to reject modernity, and they predicted to include 
modernization into the general principles of Islam, in other words, Islamic 
modernism (Şen, 2007: 240). Political Islam was nourished by the criticism of 
modern West and it is the definition of the conservative groups in the Turkish 
society with an ideological identity, who were excluded during the modernization 
process. Political Islamist movements have put a distance between themselves and 
the conservative and religious masses who live their religion out of the political 
area, and to communities and orders; and they have developed a style of action 
and idea focused on gaining the authority. 
The National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş) was shaped in person of Prof. Dr. 
Necmettin Erbakan, who is the most known figure of Political Islam in recent 
Turkish history, is represented by Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi/SP) in Turkish 
politics today. The National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş) has taken political 
Islam as a reference after September 12, 1980 military coup and has taken place in 
political arena with the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi/RP). The Welfare Party (RP) 
was the first party in December 1995 elections, but was closed within the shaky 
and argumentative atmosphere of Turkey (1998) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet 
Partisi/FP) was established instead. The excessive sensitivities of the Turkish 
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 World has entered a new phase starting from 1980s. American President George Bush 
stated that their aim was to build a the “New World Order” in January 1991 when the 
First Gulf war started and it is the best indicator that officially shows the established 
world order is seriously changing. The “New World Order” is the name of a new era in 
which the Cold war has ended and a new unipolar world is valid, along with the efforts to 
establish the neo-liberal policies dominant (Gülenç, 2011: 122).  
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Army and the judicial circles on the principle of secular state have resulted with 
the shutdown of the Virtue Party in 2001. Effective and innovative figures of 
political Islam who were stressed with these closure cases have established a new 
political party and defined their position in political array as conservative 
democrats. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AK 
Party) established by these groups in 2001 have been ruling the country since the 
2002 elections, three terms in a row. The AK Party has separated itself from the 
National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş) and gained important successes in 
politics; which caused some shifts in the base of the National Viewpoint 
Movement in Europe and Turkey. The competition between Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi/SP) which represents the National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş) and 
the AK Party has affected the membership activation in almost all organs of the 
European organization. The choice of the masses that support the mosque 
associations, humanitarian aid activities and other multi directional campaigns of 
the Milli Görüş Organization to vote for AK Party leave the organizations in a 
dilemma. On the other hand, the Turkish Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs 
Directorate (DITIB) which has more systematically operated the mosque 
associations required for religious needs and which have gained a consistent pace 
has decreased the efficiency of Milli Görüş in the recent years. Another reason 
effecting the member activation of Milli Görüş Organization is the economic loss 
caused by the Islamic holdings close to this organization towards their members 
(Perşembe, 2005: 279). 
The Islamic Community Milli Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli 
Görüş/IGMG)23  has its center in Germany and has been serving in religious, 
social and cultural fields to Turkey originated Muslims since the first years of the 
migration. Milli Görüş Organization, with 514 mosque associations, aid 
organizations, language and cultural centers within Europe is one of the biggest 
ones of the civil Islamic organizations (Yurdakul and Yükleyen, 2009: 218). The 
Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG) was officially established in Cologne, 
Germany in 1976 and is conducting several religious, moral and socio-cultural 
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 For more information, please see official website of IGMG; http://www.igmg.org/ 
(13.05.2014). 
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activities such as Hajj and Umrah organizations, aid campaign, funeral services, 
humanitarian aid campaigns, language courses and periodic publications. Milli 
Görüş (National Viewpoint) Movement also controls the Turkey centered daily 
Milli Gazete with a daily circulation of 25 thousand and the TV5 channel on cable. 
Milli Görüş Organization has a monthly journal named Milli Gorus Perspective24 
published in Germany (Michaletos, 2012). Many Milli Görüş members have 
joined the political organization of AK Party since 2002 and have taken part in the 
political organization of AK Party in Europe, UETD.  
Milli Görüş Organization is a political Islamic movement known with its anti-
Westernism and has been classified as “Islamist extremist group” in the report 
prepared by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior in 2005 and in 2010 (Tol, 
2008: 1). The report has stated that the Milli Görüş Organization has “been 
working to establish and Islamist environment in Germany and to encourage the 
expansion of this environment”. The German Federal Ministry of Interior has 
considered the Milli Görüş Organization as a threat for the German democracy 
and thinks that Milli Görüş (National Viewpoint) Movement, as a part of political 
Islam, prevents the integration of immigrants into the German society. One of the 
biggest reasons of this negative perception is the extensive religious content of 
Milli Görüş Organization’s activities and the Islamic education given to the youth. 
Another reason is the anti-Semitism in printed and visual media which are close to 
Milli Görüş (Schiffauer, 2004; Bodemann, 2004). On the other hand, many 
politicians and academicians in Germany consider the declaration of Milli Görüş 
Organization as hostile to democracy as unjust. Therefore, it is very hard to say 
that the Milli Görüş, which is organized through mosque associations in Germany 
with its 30 thousand active members, has the excessive radical tendencies. Milli 
Görüş has adopted the democratic politics in its political struggle within Turkey 
and has never been within a struggle that feeds from political violence.  
The report of Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Muslim Networks and 
Movements in Western Europe”25 claimed that the Milli Görüş group and other 
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 For more information about Milli Gorus Perspective magazine, please see; 
http://www.perspektif.eu/ (25.05.2014). 
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 For more information about the report, please see; 
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prominent Muslim groups in Europe were in a loose relationship with Egyptian 
Muslim Brothers organization. Even though the Turkey originated Milli Görüş 
(National Viewpoint) Movement and Pakistan centered Cemaat-i İslami have the 
same political Islamist worldview, they have never been involved in any kind of 
establishment which will threaten the public order. One of the issues that the 
European intelligence services are most sensitive about after September 11 (2001) 
is the propaganda conducted by radical Islamists in some mosques and similar 
locations, and the money they collect under the name of donations. The claims 
such as the transfer of these material aids collected in some mosques to the armed 
groups in Middle East, especially Hamas, has been researched with a great 
sensitivity. Within this context, the humanitarian aid organization named 
Internationale Humanitare Hilfsorganisation e.V. (IHH Germany) was banned in 
Germany due to the reason of the donations it made to the militant Islamic group 
of Palestine, Hamas. Turkey based IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation (which 
denies its relationship with the IHH banned in Germany) has organized a 
humanitarian aid fleet from Turkey to Gaza Bank in May 2010 (Michaletos, 2012). 
But this fleet which carried humanitarian aid was stopped in the international 
waters by Israel and 9 volunteers were murdered in the clashes, of which 8 were 
Turkish. Israel has officially apologized from Turkey 3 years later and accepted to 
pay compensation to the families of those who have lost their lives. But this event 
seems to have long term effect on the historical route and intensity of Turkish-
Israeli relations. As a result, the future of Milli Görüş Organization which wants 
to expand its activity agenda in the Western European countries will be shaped by 
the distance it will have with the radical groups. 
The Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) is a political organization and 
was established in Cologne, Germany in 2004, which was organized in a very 
short time within the countries where Turks live intensively. UETD is the 
unofficial organization of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in 
Europe, and it aims to increase the socio-economic and political levels of the 
Turks in Europe.
26
  UETD defines its aim of establishment in Europe as the 
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26The president of UETD, Süleyman Çelik said that the organization of which he is the 
63 
 
upgrade of social statuses of Turkey originated citizens in Europe and to conduct 
political lobbying. UETD focuses on two main issues such as the “European 
Turkish society” and “Turkey-EU Relations”, and it also aims to reveal the 
potential of the Turkish society which has a population of more than 5 million and 
to spread the life with a double culture. UETD wants to ease the adaptation of 
Turkey originated people in multicultural and multi identity European societies, to 
stand against assimilation and to maximize the international relations. UETD aims 
to attempt for the acceptance of Islam as an official religion in European countries 
and makes a great effort to widespread Turkish as the second language in schools. 
UETD demands for equal opportunity in political participation and sectoral 
employment; along with its requests such as education in native language and 
respect for beliefs and values.
27
 UETD is becoming an effective lobby 
organization in Europe, where civil society organizations take different missions 
in different areas; and is organizing argumentation programs, academic activities 
and television programs to increase the political participation of Turkey originated 
citizens. 
The Turkish Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs Directorate (DITIB) is an 
institutional structure bound to the Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious 
Affairs and it operates in many countries of Europe through the official religious 
officials authorized by the government of Turkish Republic. DITIB has started its 
operations in Berlin in 1982 and had a central organization in Cologne in 1984 
(Şen, 1995: 88) and has institutionalized the religious services started by the first-
generation of the migrant workers. Cologne is the fourth biggest city in Germany 
and the biggest city of Rheine-Westphalia State with 120 thousand Muslims, and 
is also the first city where the Turkey originated belief based groups have first 
organized. DITIB Central Mosque and Cultural Center
28
 is planned to be opened 
in 2014 and it is expected to provide richness to the socio-cultural life of city, 
along with satisfying the need of prayer by the Muslim community. DITIB
29
 is the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
president is a socio-cultural and political movement, in the interview gave in May 2014. 
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 For more information about UETD Berlin, please see; http://www.uetd-berlin.org/ 
(21.05.2014). 
28
 For more information, please see; http://www.zentralmoschee-koeln.de/ (11.05.2014). 
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 For more information about DITIB, please see; 
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umbrella organization of 896 mosque associations in Germany today and it has an 
institutional responsibility of facilitating the places where Muslims will pray, 
contributes to the adaptation, operates in socio-cultural fields and gives 
importance to communication with the host society. 
Mosque associations bound to the Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious 
Affairs are the most extensive, systematic and organized Islamic organization in 
Germany and many European countries; and they contribute a lot for bringing the 
Turkey originated people together, make them cooperate and help each other. One 
of these organizations is the Netherland Religious Foundation (Islamitische 
Stichting Nederland/ISN), and it was established in 1982, continuing to provide 
religious services with 142 mosque associations in the Netherlands. In the 
Netherlands, there are approximately 1 million Muslims and 400 thousand Turkey 
originated and Islamitische Stichting Nederland (ISN) is contributing to social 
integration with Qur’an courses, religious education, funeral services, socio-
cultural organizations for adaptation and Hajj/Umrah organizations. Another 
organization named Belgium Religious Foundation (Diyanet van Belgie)
30
 is 
established in 1982 and serving today with its 67 mosque associations in religious, 
social and cultural fields. 
Another civil Islamic group organized since the first years of migration through 
mosque associations with social networks based on voluntarism in many countries 
with Germany as the leading country; is the group known as the Students of 
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (Süleymancı movement). The group has opened its first 
permanent center in Cologne in 1973 with the name Islamic Cultural Center and 
had a central organization in 1980 with the name Union of Islamic Cultural 
Centers (VIKZ); and it is conducting activities to keep the Turkish-Islam cultural 
identity alive and to teach religion to the new generations. Currently it has 
approximately 300 mosque associations and branches in Germany, and the 
properties belong to VIKZ. 
31
 On the other hand, 125 mosque associations and 
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branches operate in countries such as the Netherlands, France, Belgium, England 
and Denmark where the Turkish minority is living intensely (Perşembe, 2005: 
279). VIKZ relies on none of the political opinions and ideologies in Turkey, and 
the material needs of mosque associations and student dormitories are paid by the 
fees from members. 
Among the main aims of Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ) are to fulfill 
the needs of prayer for the Muslim-Turkish society in Europe, take care of the 
funeral services, giving religious education and organizing multi-sided courses. It 
is one of the groups that is open to coming together with the non-Muslim 
majorities and establish dialogue in societies where Muslims live. VIKZ brings 
together people from many sections of the society such as local municipalities, 
police force and politicians in places where mosque associations exist; and 
contributes a lot to mutual dialogue. 
One of the most important social Islamic movements in Turkey is the Risale-i Nur 
(the Epistles of Light) Movement(s). Since the first years of the Republic (1923), 
Said Nursi (1878-1960) has considered the renovation and rebuilding of the 
Turkish society with moral values as the most important thing and he is the 
spiritual leader of the Risale-i Nur Movement which is shaped around ‘the Epistles 
of Light’ written by himself as an explanation of the Qur’an. After the death of 
Said Nursi, the Risale-i Nur Movement was separated into different branches 
named as New Asia (Yeni Asya), New Generation (Yeni Nesil), Readers 
(Okuyucular) and the Scribes (Yazıcılar). The Risale-i Nur Movement and the 
groups within it have organized as the Medrese-i Nuriyes (places where religious 
conversations and discussions are conducted) after the death of Said Nursi both in 
Turkey and in Europe; and they have tried to take place within the European 
Turkish society in many European countries via religious conferences and talks. 
The institutional structure that conducts activities such as the translation of ‘the 
Epistles of Light’ into many languages along with German, publishing journals 
and opening new the Medrese-i Nuriyes where religious talks are being made is 
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the association called Islamischen Gemeinschaft Jamaat un-Nur. The number of 
the Medrese-i Nuriyes where educated youth who understand the Epistles of Light 
and interpret those in accordance with the current circumstances give Islamic and 
moral courses, is more than 50 in Germany today. 
The Turkish Federation, organized within Europe under the name of Federation 
of Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations (Föderation der Türkisch-
Demokratischen Idealistenvereine), was established in 1978 in Germany and 
defined an identity politics on Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Federation has 
organized under the name of European Turkish Confederation in 2007 with the 
participation of 7 federations from 7 different countries. The European Turkish 
Confederation aims to contribute the education, social and cultural development 
of the people of Turkish origin and to conduct activities to solve their problems in 
the countries they are living in, with the adaptation problem coming in the first 
place.
32
 
The European Turkish Confederation is institutionally connected to the 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and its ground organization the Ülkü 
Ocakları (Hearth of the Ideal Foundation of Education and Culture) within the 
Turkish political life and is organizing Europe-wide activities, salon programs and 
visits that will strengthen the national and religious sentiments of the Turkish 
youth. Another nationalist group is the European Union of Turkish-Islamic 
Cultural Associations (ATIB/Union der Türkisch-İslamischen Kulturvereinein 
Europa e.V),
33
 which was established in Germany in 1987. ATIB aims to conserve 
the cultural identity of the Turks in Europe, to live in harmony with the local-
pluralist society and to become an educated and participant society with socio-
economic power. Another Turkish nationalist movement organized in Europe is 
the European Nizam-ı Alem Federation; its new name as the Turkish Cultural 
Organizations in Europe (ATB)
34
 is a civil society organization which was 
                                                             
32
 The numerical and institutional information about the Federation of Democratic 
Idealist Turkish Associations were taken from the official website of German Turkish 
Federation. For more information, please see; http://www.turkfederasyon.com/index.php 
(12.04.2014). 
33
 Fore more information about ATIB, see; http://www.atib.org/de/ (15.04.2014) 
34
 Fore more information about ATB, see; http://www.atb-europa.com/ (15.04.2014). 
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established in 1994. ATIB is the European organization of Great Union Party 
(Büyük Birlik Partisi/BBP) which interprets the Turkish-Islam synthesis in a very 
successful way; and it is an umbrella organization established to provide the 
possibility and the ground for Turkish citizens in Europe to sustain and continue 
their cultural identities and beliefs. 
One of the cultural belief groups in Anatolia where different beliefs and cultures 
lived together for centuries, the Alevis are one of the cultural belief groups. The 
Alevism is constructed on identity politics both in Turkey and Europe, and is a 
social movement that struggles to make its unique religious and cultural diversity 
to be recognized and to be accepted as a cultural richness. The Alevi community 
is known as the Alevism in the Islamic tradition and is connected to a heterodox 
belief system as a religious and cultural group; and it has been very well 
organized in Germany since the first years of the migration and gained important 
privileges and rights before the state. Only one of those rights is the possibility for 
the Alevi children to have courses in Germany by which they can learn their own 
religious and cultural values. Besides, even though Germany did not recognize 
Islam as an official religion; it has recognized the Alevism represented by the 
Federations of Alevi Organizations in Germany (AABF) in the status of belief.
35
 
Since the first years of the Republic, the Alevis were under political and economic 
oppression in Turkey, which caused them immigrate to Europe with large 
numbers in the first years of migration. Many the Alevi organizations have started 
to organize in Europe since 1980s and they have united under the roof of the 
European Confederations of Alevi Associations (AABK) in 2002 to strengthen the 
institutional power (Coşan-Eke and Özkan, 2014: 55-66). The Federations of 
Alevi Organizations in Germany (AABF) is a belief based organization that was 
established to protect and develop the cultural, belief and philosophical values of 
the Alevis in Germany. According to Lemmen (2001: 97), the Alevi Unions were 
established in Germany in 1991 and started to a centralized organization from 
1995 onwards. AABF is represented with the 130 local branches throughout 
Germany and approximately 100 thousand registered members to these local 
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branches (Perşembe, 2005: 383). 150 out of 250 the Alevi cultural centers 
operating in Europe under the roof of AABK are in Germany. AABF is a belief 
institution before the German state and is legally representing the Alevis in 
official state celebrations, receptions and various platforms.
 36
  Other the Alevi 
groups which are not under the AABK roof are the European Cem Foundation 
(Avrupa Cem Vakfı) and the Union of Islamic Alevis of Germany which was 
established in 2009. Also, the Journal of Voice of Alevis published in three 
different languages with the aim of transferring the Alevi belief and culture to the 
new generations; and a television channel named Yol TV also serve the Alevis in 
Europe. 
On the other hand, religious and social movements which appeared with Turkey-
centric characteristics since the first years of the migration are not open to 
dialogue among themselves in accordance with the diversity of their world views. 
The weak network of social relations among the Turkey originated civil society 
organizations in Europe stems from the effort of each group to build their base, 
volunteers and sympathizers built with an intra-group identity. The global success 
of the civil society organizations in terms of guiding their own base and 
volunteers into certain targets and ideals also causes class distinctions at societal 
level. For example, Turkish nationalism is reacted by the Islamist political 
movements and is considered by those as an ideology that eradicates the Ummah 
(Ümmet) understanding of the Muslim societies and devastates the unifying role 
of Islam within the society.  Another example is the distance set by the Gülen 
Movement to belief based organizations such as VIKZ, IGMG and even DITIB 
that is official religious representative of the Turkish Republic. The Gülen 
Movement’s perception of itself as different from these groups concurs with its 
structural attitude towards the politicization of religion and its education method 
of raising virtuous generations through secular education (Seufert, 2014: 20). But, 
as the masses that support the Gülen Movement enter into the mosques that 
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belong to other groups without any hesitation clearly indicates that they are open 
to social compromise. 
We can say that the belief based organizations, of which we could not give more 
details about their activities and contribution to dialogue in this chapter, do not 
tend to radical organizations both in Turkey and in Europe, and that they keep a 
distance between themselves and the radical attitudes and actions. On contrary to 
the radical tendencies; we can easily say that these movements have contributed to 
the socio-economic, cultural and political participation and social adaptation of 
Turkey originated new generations in Europe. On the basis of Social Networks 
Theory (SNT) and Social Capital (SC), the civil movements of the European 
Turkish society with religious orbit, contribute a lot to social adaptation and 
reconciliation through their strong social relations and networks. Also, on the 
basis of Organizational Commitment Theory (OCT), the religious and social 
movements in Europe which are the practices of Turkish-Islamic tradition have 
the internal dynamics which will provide the people who support them to adapt 
and like the countries where they live in; to learn its language, history and culture 
and to understand the value of coexistence. 
2.3. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS RADICALISM IN THE TURKISH 
COMMUNITY 
Radicalism is the oppression of traditional religious values and the defense of 
them with a conservative, intolerant and dogmatic attitude against the modern life 
style (Hoffman and Graham, 2006: 396). Radicalism appeared as a reaction to 
modern ideas, ideologies and life style and it is nourished from the lack of socio-
economic and political justice during the modernization process. Therefore, in the 
modernization process where individual, social and geographical inequalities 
appeared, the establishment of balances of power with an unjust style has caused 
the establishment of radical tendencies. Religious radicalism was in the beginning 
an innocent reaction towards the modern life style and by time it reached to a 
point of arguing that religion has to cover every part of the daily life (Ercins, 2009: 
654-662). Many Muslim countries that were ruled by the Western countries’ 
hegemony for long years, were ruled by new kingdoms and military governance 
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with the help of imported secular law and government systems. Political Islamists 
have confronted the secular life style and the modernity which forces this life 
style and they have become the effective schools for Muslim societies to be ruled 
by Islamic legal norms and economic and political independence struggle (Kirman, 
2008: 283-284). Political Islamists have believed that a political struggle was 
necessary against the traditional understanding of colonialism, and the radical 
tendencies among them are the stemming point of religious radicalism. Therefore, 
religious radicalism strongly rejects the social, economic and cultural changes that 
make effort in terms of modernity. The stemming point of the religious radicalism 
in Islam geography is mostly the reactionary movements appeared against the 
Western imperialism. The target of these Islamic movements is to facilitate a state 
system which will totally be re-designed with Islamic and traditional moral values. 
Therefore the religious radical movements have downsized Islam into a political 
ideology. 
The diversity in the religious life witnessed as a result of the amazing effect of 
modernity on Islam world since the beginning of 19
th
 century has shifted to a 
different direction with ideological attributes such as radical Islamism, Islamic 
fundamentalism and political Islam. So called innovative and reformist tendencies 
appeared in Islamic world with the help of globalization to find solutions for 
socio-cultural, economic and political problems is the stemming point of political 
Islam. Today, mainstream movements such as Kharijism, militant Salafism, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Wahabism are different versions of Islamic radicalism 
(Bodur, 2004, 2005). Radical Islamic movements have carefully applied the 
stages of propaganda, establishing a ground and administrative/bureaucratic 
organization in order to achieve their aim of building an Islamic state. Radical 
Islamic movements have reinterpreted the verses of Qur’an and the words of 
Prophet to show the legitimacy of the method they chose to the public opinion 
(Uslu, 2007). As globalization has been identified with capitalism and the 
Americanization of life styles; Islamization is considered as a global threat to the 
civilization (Göle, 2010). As Europe gives a great importance to Islam, there is a 
severe discontent from the scary image of the radical groups of which the 
visibility increases. It is of a great concern that the radical elements of Islam will 
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degenerate the democratic values and national cultures of the Western civilization. 
The large groups of people with this concern are considering Islam as a threat that 
should be isolated from the society or at least something to be kept under control. 
A very tiny group have a more sensitive and positive attitude about the acceptance 
of Islam and giving it some eases in practice (Rath, Groenendijk and Penninx, 
2005: 80). 
When considering the efficiency of radical tendencies on the European Turkish 
society, it should be an inadequate evaluation to think of those as independent 
from the developments in Turkey and in global level. Any idea, ideology and 
ideological context in Turkey is moved to the European countries with the 
continuing migrations and interactions at every level. The most important 
example of this is the effective organization of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK), established in Turkey in 1970s, in Europe at macro and micro levels and 
in cultural, economical and political areas. Since the first years of migration, 
Kurdish people who have come to Europe, especially to Germany and Sweden as 
political refugees after 1980 military coup have constituted a great potential for 
the PKK (Kurubaş, 2004; Kurubaş, 2013). Another recent example about this 
issue is the support given to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also called 
ISIL) terrorists, who fight against Bashar Assad regime in Syria and against 
central Iraqi government, by radical Muslims in different parts of the world with 
different ethnic identities. According to the reports of intelligence organizations, 
many radicals of Turkey origin came from the European countries have joined the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. The case of support which 
is defined with thousands of people to the Turkish Hezbollah and ISIS, radical 
Islamists, clearly indicates the peril of this situation. These two cases indicate that 
all radical movements that appeared within the European Turkish society or 
carried from Turkey to Europe, happen in accordance with the social and political 
realities in Turkey. 
Groups that represent the radical and extreme side of political Islam see the 
current social structure as an opposition to themselves and they reject to cope with 
the system. Among the radical Islamist organizations that are against the 
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constitutional order of the national governments in Europe and Turkey, with a will 
to establish the Shariah law are the Turkish Hezbollah (Party of God), The Union 
of Islamic Associations and Communities (ICCB/Kaplancılar), Hizbüttahrir El-
İslami, Tevhid-Salam (Kudüs Ordusu-Jerusalem Army), IBDA-C (Islamic Great 
East Raiders-Front) and Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, leftist radical groups such 
as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C or Dev-Sol), 
Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), the Turkish Communist Party 
(TKP/TIKKO) and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) still use violence with 
their cell type structures (Bal, 2006; Ozeren and Cinoğlu, 2006: 155-164). 
There are approximately one million of the Turkish citizens with Kurdish origin in 
Europe. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) is very effectively organized 
among the Kurdish originated diaspora in Europe, and has been supported by a 
group of European politicians and governments which have openly stood against 
Turkey. But, as PKK has applied violence in such ways to threaten the public 
order and got involved in criminal issues; which made the European government 
anxious. Radical activities conducted under the name “Kurdishness” are supported 
by illegally collected money. PKK and its political wing ERNK aim to establish an 
independent Marxist-Leninist state in Turkey and in Northern Iraq, are among the 
banned organizations in Germany since 1993. In spite of the ban, this ethnic 
radical group is being organized under different names and still operates several 
associations and federations. The Confederation of Kurdish Associations in 
Europe (Kon-Kurd) is the upper organization of 11 federations in Europe with its 
center located in Belgium, indicates the expansion of the Kurdish diaspora’s 
organizational network. But, the steps taken by the Kurdish political movement in 
Turkey for normalization and the legal and political steps officially taken in order 
to stop terror have narrowed the maneuver area of the conflict supporters. Besides, 
PKK cannot collect donations as easier as before in European capitals and also it 
is considered as a threat to national security; which have caused the 
transformation in the diaspora of Kurdish political movement. 
‘The Kurdishness’ movement had credits before the European public opinion and 
governments as a “nation which had been crushed in Turkey and which is still 
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being crushed”; has started to lose its credibility with the violent demonstrations 
and the democratic developments in Turkey. This movement was for long years 
hid behind the different political and economic benefits of Germany; and it 
threatens the social and welfare state through trade of heroine, human trafficking 
and illicit money, strengthens the social polarization through ethnic nationalism. 
The generations who were born and raised in Europe do not approve radicalism 
and they reject to join the dogmatic Kurdish ideology and becoming politicized. 
Also, the recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey, support of democratic 
reforms in Turkey by laws and the enabling of the peace have decreased the 
support of Kurds living in Europe to radical organizations like PKK. Leftist 
organizations like PKK and Iran originated radical Islamic organizations such as 
Hezbollah cannot be effective on the Sunni-Muslim Turkish and Kurdish identity 
anymore, and this is another indicator of normalization. As a result, the Kurdish 
diaspora, which was known as a suppressed and excluded community in European 
public opinion, is transforming within itself by the change of generations and its 
develops more communication with Turk originated immigrants, therefore turning 
into a role open to adaptation. 
Religion based radical groups that appeared in Turkey after 1979 the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran aim to redesign the secular and democratic Turkish Republic 
according to the Islamic Shariah. These radical Islamist groups were affected from 
Islamic revolution of Iran and they preferred to execute all types of struggles to 
achieve their aim, including violence. One of these radical organizations, Tevhid-
Salam has found ground in Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey and it was 
established to create an Islamic state in the Republic of Turkey, similar to Iran 
after 1979 Islamic revolution of Iran (Dilmaç, 1997; Orttung and Makarychev, 
2006: 148-149). This radical organization named Tevhid-Salam has been 
confirmed as a terrorist organization by the highest court of Turkish judiciary 
system, Supreme Court, in 2002, 2006 and 2014. The most important message 
delivered by religious radical organizations such as Iran guided Tevhid-Salam and 
the Turkish Hezbollah to their bases; many democratic Muslim countries 
including Turkey are not “Islamic, and also called Darul-Islam”, but “non-Islamic, 
and also called Darul-Harb” countries. These radical groups claim that Muslim 
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countries are not the lands of Islam, and they use this type of religious discourses 
to legitimize their ideological expressions. Therefore the Islamist groups re-
interpret the religious concepts according to their ideological tendencies, 
legitimizing violence and achieved to guide their followers in the way they wished 
(Çakıcıoğlu, 2007: 55). Radical Islamic groups have secularized Islam as a result 
of politicization of religion or placing the politics into the religious terminology. 
As the Western imported systems could not solve the economic and social 
inequalities in Muslim countries, religion based post-modernist opinions have 
started to appear. To facilitate the welfare state, radical groups have defended that 
it was necessary to establish the order of Shariah, and to achieve it they made up 
religious references for terror to provide the new governmental order (Cirhinlioğlu 
and Bulut, 2010: 304).  
Another radical Islamist group known as ICCB-Kaplancılar was established in 
Germany in 1983 by Cemalettin Kaplan. Cemalettin Kaplan has separated himself 
from the Milli Görüş Organization under the name ‘Tebliğciler’ and established 
the Union of Islamic Associations and Communities in 1985. The reason of his 
separation from Milli Görüş is the difference of opinion in the method of serving 
the Islam. On contrary to the understanding of political Islam by Milli Görüş, 
which says that building a political party would serve Islam, ICCB-Kaplancılar 
have predicted to establish a caliphate in accordance with the Islamic law. 
ICCB-Kaplancılar movement, which aims to establish governments referring 
Islamic legal norms in Turkey and the world and to bring the caliphate back, has 
lost its effect after their founder Cemalettin Kaplan passed away in 1995. His son 
Metin Kaplan took his place, but was sentenced to death with the accusation of 
giving an order of death about one of his rivals in 1997. Interior Ministry of 
Germany has officially banned the Union of Islamic Associations and 
Communities (ICCB) in 2001, which is also known as Kaplancılar. One of the 
main reasons of the ban of ICCB-Kaplancılar in Germany is to provoke its own 
members against Turkey which has a secular and democratic government, and to 
try establishing a parallel religious state by completely ignoring the German 
constitution. Radical groups with religious references such as the Turkish 
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Hezbollah and ICCB-Kaplancılar are mostly benefiting from the conflict between 
Palestine and Israel, an issue which the Turkish people are very sensitive about. 
As the origin of Palestinian nationalism is Zionism (Smooha and Hanf, 1992: 34), 
the origin of radical religious groups is the colonialism of the West and the 
massacres conducted by Israel to Palestinians.  
Another main source of which the radical elements within the European Turkish 
society are nourished from is the existence of radical right and racist reflexes 
within the host countries. As the Muslims in Europe localize and become 
European, native Europeans tend more to the rightist polices (KAM, 2012). 
Native Europeans distinguish themselves from the Muslims and they exclude the 
Muslims who try to be like them more recently. The prejudices and fears that 
threaten the peace and cause social tensions in Continental Europe are used by 
racist rightist parties to create a public opinion. The political systems and recent 
political histories of the European countries also play an important role in the 
otherization policies of extreme rightist parties (Stokes, 2009). The distinction 
done by extreme rightist parties as “you” and “us” and the otherization of Muslim 
identity, prompt many closed and fanatic groups to extreme radical tendencies. 
The claim of Bernard Lewis (1996: 52-63) and Gilles Kepel (1994: 194) that 
“liberal democracy is not only incompatible with radical Islam, but also 
incompatible with the essence of Islam itself” increases singly the religious 
fanaticism and extremism among Muslims (Gerges, 1999). But, the liberal 
democratic values represented by West today are contradictory with the 
applications in the constitutions of these countries in terms of basic rights and 
freedoms, along with the exclusionist, separatist and otherizing policies. Therefore, 
along with the perception of radical Islamic groups as threat in the West, the 
Muslims are also considered as potential dangers within Europe, which causes 
both parties to move opposite sides. This polarization is nourished from mutual 
biases, and its turns the Muslims in Europe into people more bound to their 
traditions, religions and national identities. But, on the other hand, this 
polarization also forms a basis within the European societies for the establishment 
of spatial and cultural ghettoes and the development of a life style that equals with 
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the concept of “parallel society”. This kind of a life style nourishes religious and 
fanaticism and radicalism. 
Therefore, the exclusion of Muslim minorities who could be the participant actors 
of interreligious and intercultural dialogue in the West by otherizing practices 
spoils the social stability. The minority groups relocate themselves in accordance 
with the perspectives, perceptions and reactions of the other side, which causes 
them to become psychologically introvert and refrain from active dialogue. Both 
sides have to take liabilities in order to see the immigrants as a cultural diversity 
instead of a threat. The historical hostilities and religious fanaticism have eroded 
the individual and societal relations; and those can only be reconstructed as both 
the European societies and European Muslims take the full responsibility. This 
responsibility necessitates the institutional structures which will conduct works 
with the highest self devotion and the manpower with high intellectual equipment. 
Muslims are a part of the demographic structure of Europe and their contribution 
to social change and progress differs according to the differences in religious 
understanding. The existence of ethnic and religious groups which are open to 
education, science, coexistence and dialogue is the biggest obstacle in front of 
radicalism. A great majority of the Turkish diaspora, which is a part of European 
cultural mosaic, think that Islam does not prevent science, education and 
development. A great majority of the Turkish diaspora thinks that Islam has an 
approach of peace and tolerance towards other religions and cultures; and they 
keep themselves distant from radicalism and radical groups that consider violence 
and extremism as the aim of religion. Religious people in Turkey and in diaspora 
have adapted the democratic politics and never stood together with a struggle 
relies on violence. Political Islamists, who have preferred peaceful and 
reconciliatory methods in political struggle have remained as distant as possible 
from radical Islamist fractions. 
The Turkish diaspora in Europe also struggles with the religious, ethnic and 
cultural fanaticism through the social networks it has established within itself. The 
religious and social movements with Turkey originated bases in Europe and the 
civil society organizations have played permanent and active roles in the 
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development of social harmony, coexistence and mutual understanding. 
Especially the religious communities have developed many preventive alternative 
projects in terms of drugs and alcohol addiction of the young generations and 
disgraceful offenses. Also, tolerance and dialogue centers were established in 
many capitals of Europe, laying the foundation of coexistence. As a result, this 
study predicts that Islam, with tolerance, peace and unity in its essence cannot be 
a threat for the West; and it can even prevent the fanaticism and radicalism to find 
grounds in Europe. Again, this study believes that the Turkish-Islamic tradition 
has the dynamics to prevent the extremism and fanaticism among the Turkey 
originated people in Europe. The intergenerational change in the European 
Turkish society has increased the commitment to democratic and universal values 
and disabled the radical and extremist tendencies. Therefore, the pluralist societies 
of Europe should consider this change very carefully and develop an intercultural 
dialogue among different cultures. Besides, West should continue hosting all 
different cultures within itself without any fear and prejudices. Also, Muslims 
should get rid of the understanding that sees all the innovations from West as a 
tool of exploitation. And the Western societies should stop considering the attacks 
of radical Islamist groups as something coordinated with all of the Muslims. 
2.4. INTEGRATION OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN EUROPE  
Integration is a concept used to define the adaptation of minority groups into the 
social life and public rules of the host countries. It is sometimes related with the 
concept of “assimilation”, but it originally means protecting its own existence 
while participating in the experience of a pluralist society. Therefore integration is 
a process that appears by the development of approaches between the host 
societies and minorities within the framework of mutual understanding, good will 
and responsibility (Perşembe, 2005: 274-275). The pluralist approach of migrated 
countries and the internal dynamics of the European minority groups affect the 
adaptation process. In other words, the own structural differences of the 
immigrants (e.g. democratic understanding, urban culture, education, socio-
economic status and language) might sometimes contribute a lot to adaptation, but 
sometimes it might be a factor that makes the adaptation harder. These structural 
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characteristics of the immigrants are either there or gained later, and they have a 
huge impact on adaptation as well the adaptation policies of host countries and the 
positive/negative speeches of the politicians. 
There are two different integration models applied in Western European countries, 
which became the immigrant countries in the last century. One of these models is 
most visible in France, and we can call it as secular and republican assimilation 
model. It severely rejects the public sphere appearance of any ethnic, religious, 
philosophical, social and political characteristics as it requires all the individuals 
in the public sphere to be one. The French model of assimilation which nourishes 
from republicanism and secularism, relies on an abstract understanding of public 
sphere in which the individuals eluded from all kinds of cultural and social 
belongings will be included (Benichou, 2006: 83-84). The Anglo-Saxon 
integration model applied in England and the Netherlands, on contrary with the 
secular and republican assimilation model of France, is also called as multicultural 
integration model and presumes that immigrants conserve their linguistic, cultural 
and social differences and have equal economic, social and political rights with 
the local people. But, especially after the September 11 attacks, many European 
countries, with the Netherlands as the leading country, have started to pursue 
transformed and limiting migration and integration policies. 
The theoretical approach developed against the foreigners coming out of Europe 
based on assimilation defines the melt of immigrants with equal rights and 
statuses in the dominant cultural pot and gaining a new cultural identity (Jackson 
and Penrose, 1994). Canadian model, on contrary with the assimilation based 
theoretical approach in France and Germany, is a model that protects the cultural 
identities of the minority groups. In Quebec, one of the ten states of Canada, the 
official language is French and the differences such as cultural identity are 
protected within the country; and those cases indicate that adaptation can happen 
without assimilation (Lucassen, 2005). Europe has different experiences of 
migration than USA and Canada, and follows a more hasty and inexperienced 
structure. The weak socio-economic, education and occupational competencies of 
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the immigrants that came from third world countries after the end of Second 
World War made the adaptation process even harder.  
The multicultural society is a society where many societies with different cultures 
and origins live together. There is an understanding of tolerance which relies on 
respect to the socio-cultural existence of the immigrants in the multicultural 
society model (Canatan, 1990: 94-99). According to Williams (2003), the way to 
get rid of the nationalist discourses that claim numerous cultures and identities 
cannot coexist, is to give different identities, cultures and nations more political 
and social rights and not to ignore the forceful assimilation and denial (cited by 
Ongur, 2011: 60). According to J. Habermas (2005: 2-3), in an individual-based 
liberal democracy, the melting of the citizenship and majority culture results with 
an understanding of civil rights which is apathetic to cultural differences. This 
causes discrimination against different cultures and life styles, and also makes it 
difficult to prevent the possible conflicts between the cultures. Therefore, if a just 
and tolerant approach on the perception of multiculturalism is required, the 
recognition of an individual’s cultural difference and identity must be given more 
importance (Gündoğdu, 2008: 74). 
As the nations which constitute America call themselves as “Americans”, it is 
expected from the minorities in Europe to call themselves as “Dutch” or 
“European”. Even the lift of borders with Schengen regulation did not make the 
individuals of the member states to call themselves as “European”. A German, 
above all, is a German first, and then European. In such a case, the expectations 
from the foreigners to call themselves as “European” or “French” and to forget 
their national cultures and identities is an unjust and unequal approach. The 
concept of “European Islam” which could be in harmony with Western 
democracy and norms is a type of formalism and perception building. Europe has 
a multicultural geography, and it should leave aside the traditional conservatism it 
has, accepting that the minorities also have an identity and culture just like 
themselves. According to Bernard Lewis (2002) multiculturalism defines the idea 
that the direction of European centered education and culture should also rely on 
numerous cultures. 
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It is very early to determine that the immigrants from Turkey could not adapt into 
the social and public system of the countries which they live in (Kaya, 2005). 
Since the first years of the migration the plans built upon working, earning money 
and returning back have delayed learning language, participation and adaptation. 
The first generation of immigrants with low education levels and socio-economic 
statuses had to struggle with inequality of opportunity they faced in employment, 
education and public sphere. The first generation of immigrants has followed 
traditional behavior against globalization and modernity, and they had problems 
to help their children have a civilized, efficient and balanced vision. Therefore, the 
problems of the immigrants from Turkey have sides that look at themselves and 
the sides that look at the host societies. First generations had to move to the city 
centers of modern world without having a chance to internalize the minimum 
requirements of urban culture such as coexistence, a culture of democracy and 
citizenship. First generations had a problem of incompatibility with the host 
societies which have internalized the urban culture for long years already; thereby 
they abstracted themselves from the spatial area, alienated themselves and lost the 
urban belonging. As they moved far away from the public sphere, the first 
generations have socialized among themselves through “fellow townsmen 
associations” and “mosque associations”. Immigrants from Turkey have 
developed traditional defense mechanisms against social alienation and it was 
very hard for them to build more comprehensive, modern and unifying 
institutional structures for the second and third generations following them. 
Children of first generations remained between two different cultures at home and 
at school, and had a lack of confidence because of linguistic incompetency (Kaya, 
2000: 120-121). The first generations which could not internalize the urban values 
and shareholding, have directed themselves to spatial and cultural ghettoes as a 
result of socio-economic obligation. 
Some of the problems faced by immigrants from Turkey are; xenophobia, racism, 
discrimination, unemployment, inequality in education and the unjust legal 
regulations. All of the foreigners, including the immigrants from Turkey, and their 
demographic existence in European countries is considered as one of the reasons 
of high unemployment. The traditional socio-cultural structure of ethnic and 
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religious minorities caused the appearance of problems such as racism, 
xenophobia and social exclusion in Western societies. Some countries have 
developed new policies and precautions on migration and adaptation to cope with 
these problems. Western countries have tried to provide the active participation of 
minority groups into job market and social life, and also tried to prevent the 
creation of “unequal” population zones in terms of rights and freedoms (Koca, 
2002). Some other European countries have made it difficult for the minorities to 
populate through family reunions and marriage. Immigrants from Turkey are 
struggling with problems such as racism, Islamophobia and discrimination; and 
they have remained hesitant to cope or resist the new life styles brought by 
globalization. Second and third generations who were born and raised in the West 
have weaker relations with their homelands and original cultures as a result of 
globalization (Roy, 2013: 51). During the process of socialization, on contrary 
with the first generations who have confronted problems such as unemployment, 
language, biases and xenophobia; the most important integration problem of the 
next generations are the discriminations they face in terms of education and job 
opportunities, and the cultural degeneration and loss of identity.  
A certain part of Muslims with different dress codes prefer to live within the 
society without the need to hide their religions and cultures. Another part of them 
refrain from being visible and prefer to delay the practices that belong to religion 
and culture. Certain parts of the people who delay the religious and cultural 
practices prefer to socialize, while putting a distance to their cultural identities. 
There are certain differences among the Muslim groups in terms of using and 
executing religious symbols such as headscarf, veil, traditional clothes and beard. 
The religious symbols which are more visible for Muslim women are perceived in 
different ways among the European societies. For instance, it is thought that the 
women dressed in accordance with Islamic rules are considered as people who do 
not drink alcohol, eat pork or adapt with the host society. On the other hand, it is 
thought that women with modern clothing have adapted the host society and 
Western norms more (White, 1997: 759). These two perceptions have rights and 
wrongs within themselves. In other words, a woman with headscarf can both be 
very successful in public sphere and live the requirements of her religion. This is 
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vice versa. The difference in these perceptions indicates that the general opinion 
of the Western societies about Muslims is shaped upon the physical characteristics 
of some Muslims which are prominent with religious symbols and the discourses 
of visual and printed media. 
To protect and sustain their religious and cultural identities, Muslims in Europe 
have had to deal with many struggles. On top of the problems is the process of 
institutionalization by the mosque associations. Purchase of a land to build a 
mosque or purchasing the ownership of a building necessitates a serious amount 
of cash. Along with the problems of finding an appropriate place for the mosque 
and purchase of it, the persuasion of neighborhood requires and extra effort. Even 
though they are persuaded, with the direction of extreme rightist and radical 
groups, the protests and violent actions are also parts of this though process. In 
Germany, where Islam is still not recognized as an official religion, mosques are 
not as elegant as churches and synagogues belong to Catholic, Protestant and 
Jewish communities which are recognized as official religions. On the other hand, 
the physical attacks on mosques and protests harm social reconciliation and unity. 
Besides, the ban on headscarf in France along with the ban on teachers in 
Germany is another area that makes the adaptation tougher. 
According to Thranhardt (1999), the Dutch governments are developing equal 
citizenship policies by expanding the political rights to increase the participation 
of immigrants into political life. The Netherlands is accepted as a country which is 
tolerant to multiculturalism, pluralism and diversity. The liberal implementations 
that ease the acquisition of citizenship have caused 70% of the Turkish 
immigrants to become the citizens of the Netherlands. In Belgium, this rate is 
almost 75% (Bocker, 2004: 4-5). As the citizenship rates of Turkish immigrants in 
the Netherlands is high, so is their political participation. Another positive 
reflection for the Turkish community in the Netherlands in terms of high political 
participation is the increasing feeling of confidence towards political institutions 
and the politics itself. According to Fennema and Tillie (2000), the current 
transparent political system in the Netherlands increase the confidence of 
minorities towards political parties, government institutions and local politics 
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along with strengthening the feeling of belonging. The Turkish immigrants are 
showing more interest to local news and policies, thanks to the transparent 
political system of the Netherlands (Tol, 2012: 306). The increasing interest of the 
Turkish immigrants towards the socio-economic and political spheres of the 
societies they live in indicate that they have maximized their feelings of belonging 
and shows to the Dutch public opinion that the Turks are also stakeholders. 
There is no sustained and institutionalized understanding of pluralism in Germany. 
Even though there are strong anti-discrimination laws, the foreigners in Germany 
(especially the Muslims) always face verbal and physical attacks, violence and 
discrimination. The ethno-centric citizenship policies of Germany have caused 
very serious divisions and polarizations between the host society and the 
immigrants. The ethno-centrist citizenship policies have limited the access of 
Turkish society, the most intense group of immigrants, to the professional 
occupations in the public sector, with education as the forefront one (Koopmans, 
1999: 627-648). Therefore, as the second and third generations who were born 
and raised in Germany did not have any German citizenship or equal citizenship 
rights until the recent years have established the ground for the creation of spatial 
and cultural ghettoes within itself. In short, a certain part of the Turks in Germany 
who are not interested enough in socio-cultural and political adaptation have 
separated themselves from the majority of the society with the effect of 
discrimination and preferred to live in their own settlements.  
According to Esser (2000: 56-66), social integration appears in four different 
dimensions. These are acculturation, socio-economic-political location, 
interaction and identity. Esser also mentioned that integration appears in four 
different ways in accordance with the realization form of these four dimensions. 
These are segregation where adaptation to the ethnic culture is dominant; 
assimilation where adaptation to the new culture is dominant; multiple integration 
where there is adaptation to both cultures and marginalization where both cultures 
are rejected (cited by Şahin, 2010: 107). In a study conducted by Şahin (2010: 
124-125) in two cities of Germany, Frankfurt and Duisburg, the social integration 
of the Turkish immigrants was evaluated in terms of acculturation by taking the 
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inter-generational differences into consideration. According to the results of this 
study, the Turkish immigrants have high rates of continuation of the Turkish 
culture, adapting the Turkish identity and the level of communicating with Turks; 
and this is followed by adapting the German culture, communicating with the 
Germans and adapting the German identity at lower levels. On the other hand, the 
results of same research indicates that the level of adapting the Turkish culture 
decreases as generations increase; and that the level of adapting German culture 
increases as generations increase 
We can say that racism has increasingly been effective on the European public 
opinion. The belief that foreigners and especially the Muslims are genetically 
unsuccessful and they have adaptation problems increases in German public 
opinion. In a research published on “Die Zeit”, a German weekly newspaper with 
the signature of Detlef Pollack, it is stated that 50 percent of people in Portugal, 
the Netherlands, France and Denmark have positive opinions about Muslims, as in 
the regions of Western Germany this rate is 34, followed by 26 percent in Eastern 
Germany. Besides, 2/5 of the Western states and half of the Eastern states’ 
citizens in Germany believe that Germany is threatened by foreign cultures. 
According to the results of the same study, 70 percent of the Germans consider 
cultural diversity as the reason of many problems, compared with 59 percent of 
the French.
37
 
When it is considered that pluralism, ethnic and religious diversity will become 
the most important values of Europe in the future, multicultural and liberal 
integration policies must be applied to the Muslims in Europe. The principle of 
social state should uncompromisingly be followed in order to help Muslims see 
themselves as first class citizens in safety and security. Second important point 
that should be implied in here is that the immigrants should also leave their small 
ghettoes and get rid of unbiased fears. Immigrants should expand the tradition of 
self criticism and take their share from the polarization within the society. 
Immigrants should see the police, state and judicial branches of the countries 
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als-andere-Europaeer.html (21.05.2014).   
85 
 
where they live in as institutions that serve them in order to take where they 
belong for granted. 
It is true that the integration case we see is not a successful one. But, there is no 
consensus about the concept of successful integration. The adaptation of an 
understanding of “living together model” based on cultural pluralism, open 
society model and opportunity equality will turn the expected dynamism from this 
harmony in European societies into life. Moving from this, the tough test of 
Europe as a unity of values with Muslims and the foreigners will be one of the 
most important issues of the 21st century. If the mutual fear is ended and a culture 
of coexistence is developed, a historical opportunity will appear both for the 
European and the world history. The peaceful coexistence of identities classified 
as “European” and “other” will contribute to democratic and liberal future of 
Europe. Moving from the principle of “immunity of person’s honor”, racism as a 
democracy problem of Europe should be heavily struggled with. Muslims who do 
not want to be otherized through the “Muslim identity” must show the real face of 
Islam by dialogue and informing. It is the Muslims who will inspire those people 
who see Islam as terror and distrust Muslims by trust, tolerance and dialogue. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  ISLAM IN EUROPE: GLOBALIZATION, 
IDENTITY AND CULTURE 
3.1. ISLAMOPHOBIA: BEING A MUSLIM IN EUROPE 
 
The word Islamophobia consists of the combination of ‘Islam’ and “phobos” in 
Greek. Islamophobia as a concept defines the whole set on prejudices towards 
Islam and discrimination towards Muslims in all units of daily life in the West  
(Bloul, 2008: 10-11). A British Think-Tank called Runnymede Trust has 
published the report named “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All” in 1997. In 
this report, where Islamophobia was used as a concept for the first time, it has 
been mentioned that an anti-Islamic prejudice dominates the problems Muslim 
face in the West. It is also mentioned that Islamophobia and anti-Islamism had 
existed since a very long time in the Western societies, and it reached to excessive 
and radical points in the last quarter of twentieth century.38 The report defined 
Islamophobia as “an unbiased hostility towards Islam” and it has also been 
emphasized that Islamophobia is a type of anti-Semitism (Canatan, 2007: 23). 
According to Aliboni, Islamophobia is defined as an expression of fear and 
hostility towards Islam, and is a reflecting expression of intolerance of the citizens 
of one country to the people who migrate into that country, from a broader 
spectrum (cited by Yılmaz, 2008: 86). From another point of view, the term of 
“Islamophobia” expresses the fear, hesitation and escape from Muslims and the 
Islam with no biased reason (Hıdır, 2007: 83). 
 
First elements effective in the formation of the concept of Islam in Europe are the 
fears and concerns coming deep from the history. When we look from the 
historical perspective, the perception of Islam and Muslim in Europe has been 
formed around the discourse which has been used to legitimize the intense wars 
(the Crusades). Another process which shaped the concept of Islam and Muslim in 
the West are the Orientalist studies which have been carried out for the last two 
centuries under the name of “East” studies. The perception of Islam and Muslim 
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today is shaped by the historical trails of the past, new global connotations which 
construct the mental background of “East” studies and the demographic visibility 
within Europe. Global events such as September 11, terrorist attacks in some 
European capitals and the cartoon crisis have revoked the fear of Islam in the 
collective memory of the West. Therefore, the demographic change in Europe and 
the adaptation problems of Muslim minorities in Europe are on the top of the 
agenda which shape the perception of Islam and Muslim in Western societies 
most recently. 
 
Catholic Church played an important role in the shape of images of Muslim and 
Islam in the middle Ages. The definition of Muslims as heretic societies to be 
struggled against has become the first negative start in the collective conscience of 
the West. The rule of Arab Andalusia in Spain and the existence of Ottomans 
within the borders of Europe for long years have kept the perception of invaders 
considering Islam and Muslims in the minds of Westerners as a myth always alive. 
With the Industrial Revolution, Muslims have been subjected to an otherization 
where Islam is symbolized under Orientalism in the Enlightenment Europe. 
Orientalist thinkers like Gustave von Grunebaum (1909-1972) have defined Islam 
as a monolithic, uniform, violent and despot, strict and closed belief system (Said, 
1981). The biased information gathering about “Islam” and “East” has been 
shaped by the Orientalist perception developed within the context of elite, 
deterministic and obstructive Western criteria. According to Orientalists, “East” 
represents reactionism, bigotry, radicalism and violence; while West represents 
development, progress, change and freedoms. In a way, “East” and “West” 
represent two different universes that live on contrary positions as a whole. 
Therefore, an image of Islam loaded by the perception of “East” was tried to be 
constructed for two centuries and that became successful to a certain extent. 
According to Lueg and Hippler (2002), Islam was degraded to a monolithic and 
fundamentalist simplicity and shown as a threat to the West (cited by Budak, 2008: 
55). Orientals understanding which sees Islam as a fundamentalist threat sees the 
religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism as a part of their cultural 
identities. The reason of constructing a threatening image of Islam in the West is 
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the idea that speculative fears legitimize the socio-cultural, political and economic 
interests of the West. 
 
Our old world, which has been a cradle for thousands of civilizations is full with 
painful experiences about living together with the “other” since the first man and 
first prophet, Adam. Almost in all centuries, there have been cruel wars, 
genocides and oppressions in the struggle between the “settled ones” and the 
“others”. The victims who first come to mind as a case of the struggle between the 
“settled ones” and the “others” are the Muslims and Jews in Andalusia Spain and 
Jews in Hitler’s Germany. Many adjustments on the struggle with Anti-Semitism 
have been conducted in the Continental Europe after the greatest genocide of 20
th
 
century. In spite of all the precautions taken; the attack to a Jewish school in 
France (2012), serial murders in Germany which are recorded as the “Doner 
Killings” (2000-2006) and the slaughters in Norway (2011) indicate that the 
victims have been diversified. The religious and ethnic diversity of the victims 
also indicate that the real reason of the terror is not religion, but that it is a 
combination of political, economic and psychological factors (Cirhinlioğlu and 
Bulut, 2010: 319). Therefore, it is a necessity to put a political and social stance 
forward in terms of struggling against “Islamophobia” and “xenophobia” within 
Europe, similar with the struggle against anti-Semitism. 
 
Violations of human rights and democracy in some Muslim countries because of 
the existence of authoritarian regimes cause prejudices towards all the Muslims in 
the West. Iran’s Islamic Revolution (1979), caused the resurrection of biases and 
racist attitudes against Islam in the West (Canatan, 2007: 45). Historian Bernard 
Lewis (1990: 47-60) and Alan Gresh (2005: 18-19) have shown the Islamic 
fundamentalism and fanaticism as enormous threats for Western civilization. 
Today, radical Islamic fundamentalism and fanaticism threaten Muslims as well 
as the Western societies. According to Fred Halliday (1999: 897-898) the 
historical fear of Islam in the West, Islamophobia is replaced with “anti-Muslim” 
feelings today. Radical Islamic fundamentalism which motivates the Western 
societies with a concern and fear reflects the lives of European Muslims as 
“otherization” and “exclusion”. Muslims who have been otherized and excluded 
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get more isolated from the society and become more radicalized. The analyses 
show that social exclusion and otherization pushes the Muslims into ghettos and 
introversion. Ethnic ghettos and introversion have defined the national and 
religious identities but it does not show us that these groups are under the 
influence of radical Islam (Şen, 2006: 127-128). Ghettos and the reality of a 
parallel society of which the relations are limited with the majority of the society 
is a problem that should be faced and these are the social strata where extremism 
might get stronger. 
 
The real expression of Islamophobia, which has deep roots in the Continental 
Europe, happened after the September 11 attacks. A process where fear of Islam 
has transformed into an anti-Islamism after the Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004) 
and London (2005) attacks and where Islam began to be mentioned by terror and 
violence in Europe (SDE, 2011). The Center of Turkish Studies (TAM) from 
Essen University has implemented a project in 2005 to observe the changes in the 
perception of Islam in Germany after the terrorist attacks of September 11. 
Samples were chosen from the official speeches in the Federal German Parliament 
and the unofficial discourses of the most efficient cultural and political magazine 
of Germany, der Spiegel and Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ), one of the 
most read newspapers in Germany. This study compared the official speeches in 
the Federal German Parliament in two terms; first one is between September 11 
2000 - September 11, 2001 and the second one is between September 29, 2003 and 
September 29, 2004. According to this, in the first period before September 11 the 
speeches which have indicated Muslims as terrorists are 5.8%, in the second period 
which is 2 years after September 11 this rate has risen to 10,5%. Again, the 
speeches which consider Islam as a threat in the first period were 3.3%, and this 
rate increased to 7,7% in the second period. Speeches about the incoherency of 
Islam with West were 1,5% in the first period, and this rate increased to 5,5% in 
the second period. This table revealed by the official statement clearly shows that 
there is a negative change in the perception of Islam after September 11. On the 
other hand, a serious increase has been observed in the unofficial statements of two 
giant media organs. According to this, “Muslims as terrorist” theme by der Spiegel 
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before September 11 was 26,4%, and this rate increased to 31,3% after September 
11. The same rates in WAZ have increased from 19,4% to 22,5% and the 
insistence to identify the Muslims as a terrorist continued. References to Islamic 
danger have increased from 20,6% to 37,7% in WAZ; and from 26,4 % to 33,5% 
in der Spiegel. Contrary to official statements in the Federal Germany Parliament 
and the unofficial statements in two media organs; the statements in favor of 
Muslims have almost decreased by half after the events of September 11 (Halm et. 
al. 2007; cited by Budak, 2008: 43-45). 
  
One of the facts which disseminated the concept of “internal threat” and caused 
discussions about “respect to freedoms and to the sacred” globally is the cartoon 
crisis in Denmark. Cartoons, which were published in Jyllands-Posten newspaper 
of Denmark in 2005 and then were published in numerous newspapers and 
magazines, are drawings which associate the Prophet of Islam with violence. 12 
cartoons of the Prophet of Islam were selected through a competition and 
published in Jyllands-Posten newspaper on September 30, 2005 Sunday under the 
name “Faces of Mohammad”. Reactions towards these cartoons in Muslim 
countries were violent and helped to reinforce the clichés about the incoherency of 
Islam with the Western values (Budak, 2008: 49). Western media has identified the 
violence against cartoons in Muslim countries with Islam and have tried to show 
religious fundamentalism and fanaticism as elements that belong to the essence of 
Islam. But, radicalism and fanaticism may appear in many ideologies and 
worldviews, with reference to violence. The cartoon scenarios structured on 
proving the thesis of “Muslims are violent and intolerant people”, have always 
been witnessed in different models and in different periods. These plays are staged 
almost in every period and they cause the desired reactions in Western public 
opinion, as well as the reactions in Islamic countries which sometimes result with 
violence. A research39 indicates that 60% of the Americans, 67% of the French, 62% 
of the Germans, 59% of the British and 53% of the Spanish consider Muslims as 
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intolerant because of the Cartoon crisis (Canatan, 2007: 45-47). The respect 
shown by Western countries to the freedom of thought and expression sometimes 
might push the limits of others’ value systems, as in the cartoon crisis. It is an 
example of intolerance to criticize the just reactions of people –as long as they do 
not resort to violence- whose value limits are pushed. It is an undisputable fact 
that as long as we have respect to other people and their values, then we will have 
the right to be respected. 
 
Historical and cultural prejudices that constitute the unseen face of Islamophobia 
have been reawakened by different levels of provocations and agitations 
especially in the post September 11 period. Behind the provocations and 
agitations such as Indian originated British citizen Salman Rushdie’s novel named 
“the Satanic Verses” (1988), movie named “Submission” (2004) which has been 
issued in the Netherlands and insulted Islam, cartoon crisis in Denmark (2005), 
the attempt of the American reverend Terry Jones to burn the Qur’an (2010) and 
the movie “the Innocence of the Muslims” (2012) issued in USA which insulted 
Muslims and the prophet of Islam is the aim to identify Muslims and Islam with 
violence and hatred. The understanding of democracy which convicted anti-
Semitism, one of the worst parts of the European history, implies the concepts of 
freedom of thought and expression when it is about Islam and Muslims; and this is 
another epiphany of double standard. Therefore, it is compulsory to accept 
Islamophobia as a hate crime and crime against humanity just like anti-Semitism 
in the West and the legal adjustments to be conducted immediately. 
 
Discussions about religious fundamentalism and extremism have received a 
new dimension after the July 2011 Norway attacks. Serial killings committed 
by nationalist and radical Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo and the Island of 
Utoya, have been recorded as the greatest mass murder since World War II in 
Norway. The slaughter of youth who were members of the Norwegian Labor 
Party (Ap) on the Island of Utoya was perceived as a threat to the texture of 
Norwegian and the European society. The possibility of turning Breivik’s anti 
immigrant and anti Islam statements into an anti-immigrant reaction in Europe 
has surfaced new fears. The tradition of taking the Muslims responsible for 
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every problem in Europe and the humiliation of Muslims has become a 
widespread problem in Europe. Some radical and marginal political parties 
within Europe have chosen to use these current events for their own interests 
and gained important victories.40 On the other hand, discussions about struggle 
with racism/nationalism were witnessed in European Council and in the 
authorized organs of the member countries after the slaughters in Norway.  
Extremist right parties point the foreigners who do not compromise to 
integration as the reason of polarization; meanwhile foreigners think that the 
reason of polarization is the inadequacy of legal codifications about radicalism 
and racism. As the visibility of foreigners and Muslims as stakeholders of the 
societies in Europe increase, the distinctive and exclusionary reactions increase. 
Whatever the case is, it is not an acceptable to identify Islam with terror and 
violence. It should be known that every religion, ideology or culture can easily 
find volunteers to use in terrorist activities.  
 
The increase of racism and the decrease in the tolerance level to 
multiculturalism since Muslims have been considered as a security threat in 
Europe makes it hard to live together. Especially the high rate of votes that 
extremist right parties in Europe have increased in the last years is the result of 
a reaction towards pluralism and diversities. Extreme right parties in Europe 
seek support with their political statements such as the end of multiculturalism, 
Islamophobia and xenophobia. The concern of keeping Europe as an island of 
wealth after September 11 is one of the main reasons of the effectiveness of 
extreme right in internal and external affair (Leiken, 2004). As Cecilia 
Malmström, the internal affairs member of the European Commission 
mentioned, “The EU has never before seen so many far-right parties in elected 
bodies since the Second World War… In many countries, xenophobia, populism 
and racism are on the rise”.41 The biases and fears especially encouraged by 
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 Yanarışık, Oğuzhan (2011), ‘Geliyorum Diyen Felaket: Norveç Katliamı’, Radikal 
Newspaper. For more information, please see; 
http://akademikperspektif.com/2011/07/26/geliyorum-diyen-felaket-norvec-katliami/ 
(23.12.2013). 
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 Nielsen, Nikolaj (2013), ‘Growing racism spurs rise in extremist parties, commission 
says’, EU Observer, available at http://euobserver.com/justice/120905 (05.01.2014). 
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printed and visual media and extreme-right politicians threaten the social peace 
in the Continental Europe. Radical and racist parties which could not develop 
policies in the context of human rights, freedoms and universal legal values are 
trying to establish a public opinion based on xenophobia, Islamophobia and 
concerns for social security. Hostility towards Islam and Muslims which has 
deep historical roots in the West, especially reached the peak point after 
September 11 terrorist attacks. The fact that the radical group that committed 
the September 11 terrorist attacks was Muslims, caused the Muslims to be 
considered as a more problematic group comparing with other immigrants, 
therefore the widespread of Islamophobia. Terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) 
and in London (2005) have put the Muslims as the focus point of fear and 
concerns in Europe (Yılmaz, 2008: 82). The atmosphere of fear and hatred 
which reached to the level of threat for Europe’s future and internal peace, is 
becoming more contradictory every day with the narrow-minded and 
exclusionist statements of some irresponsible politicians. 
 
Great changes have been witnessed in the Continental Europe after World War 
II with the effect of immigrations, especially in terms of socio-economic, 
cultural and religious diversity. One of the most visible sides of this 
demographic diversity, Muslims, began to be perceived as the “others” in 
continental Europe and polarized every day, which brought new concerns 
together. Especially the public opinion polls conducted after September 11 in 
Europe indicates that the number of people who considered Muslims as a 
threat to social security in Europe increased. One of the ideas which created 
this perception of threat in the minds of Westerners is the evaluation of 
Muslims through exotically Eastern historical images. Western societies, 
which evaluate East through the Crusades in the middle Ages and as a “the 
Trojan horse” reached into the Europe, consider Muslims as a threat, either 
voluntarily or non-voluntarily (Ramadan, 2005). Today, Muslims are not only 
considered as “external enemy”, but also as an “internal enemy” (Canatan, 
2007: 53-57). The terrorist attacks Al-Qaeda arranged in cities like Istanbul 
(2003), Madrid (2004) and London (2005), have strengthened the feeling that 
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there was a contradiction with the “the enemy within”42 in the collective sub 
consciousness (Göle, 2010:22). Even though most of the Muslims have 
become the citizens of the countries where they live, these fears and concerns 
are still alive in the minds of the Westerners. 
 
On the other hand, following and opening of the files for the members of some 
Muslim religious/ethnic groups and their members through the “threat within” 
concept carries the radical tendencies within the minorities to extreme and 
dangerous ends. In the strengthening of these radical tendencies in Europe, 
Muslim minorities also have a great responsibility along with the anti-
democratic implementations that have been widespread after September 11. 
Within the process of socialization; generations grew up with unemployment, 
biases and xenophobia are stuck between the European modernity and 
conservative attitudes. These generations could not create a healthy culture and 
belonging to identity, and referring the Islamic identity because of their 
concern that their own cultural identity will melt and disappear within the 
Western culture. A certain part of the Muslim minority groups who have 
isolated themselves from the dominant society become the fanatics of radical 
organizations in ethnic/religious ghettos where they live introversively with 
distrust and ambiguity. 
  
One of the groups that is affected mostly from the anti-Islam movements and 
racism that is rising in Europe is with no doubt the Muslim Turkish society. 
Dangerous movements such as anti-Islamism, xenophobia and racism have deep 
roots in European history which would affect the rhythm and flow of daily life. 
The great military power, different cultural identity and religious understanding of 
the Ottomans in the period of establishment and rise, made them to be perceived 
as a military, cultural and religious threat in the eyes of Westerners. In the socio-
economic equation and the global terror events today; Islam, Muslims and Turks 
have become the focus of fear, threat and otherness for some sections of the 
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 The Economist used the term “the enemy within” for the first time in the article named 
“Muslim Extremism in Europe’ written after July 2005 London attacks. For more 
information, please see; http://www.economist.com/node/4174260 (19.11.2013). 
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European Union (Akdemir, 2013: 20). The half century long existence of the 
European Turkish society in Europe, who are considered as the new 
representatives of the Ottoman Empire seems to awakened the fictional fears in 
the history. Islam is considered as one of the most determinant characteristics of 
the national identity of European Turkish society. The words said by the Serbian 
General Ratko Mladic who committed genocide on Bosnian Muslims show the 
discontent from the Turkish identity; “It is time to revenge Muslims in the name of 
rebellion against Turks”.43  More dangerous than this statement is the disregard 
and irresponsibility of the European countries when the Serbian army was 
executing an ethnic cleansing operation44 towards Muslim Bosnians and Croatians 
in the middle of Europe (Göle, 2010: 18). The conservative and otherizing 
perception which sees the Muslim-Turkish minority as the continuation of the 
Ottoman Empire, and the understanding which identifies the Turkish identity with 
Islam directly feed the adversary against Turks in Europe. 
 
The Turkish origin immigrants, who are approximately five million today, have 
become one of the main targets of the anti-Islam and anti-foreigner polarization in 
Europe today (Yanarışık, 2013: 2913-14). The global terror events began with 
September 11 (2001) have directly affected the daily life of the European public 
and increased the discriminative attitudes and criticism towards the Muslim 
minorities living in Europe. As the statements which related the terrorist attacks 
with Islam have increased the attacks on mosques, associations and businesses, 
destruction of Muslim cemeteries, assaulting to houses and businesses and 
threaten people seriously.45
 Arson attack of the houses of Turks in Mölln (1992), 
                                                             
43
 ‘Srebrenica, a Cry from the Grave ’, directed by Leslie Woolhead explains the 
Srebrenica slaughter. This documentary was published in 1999, received awards in four 
film festivals and used to illuminate the war crimes by the court in The Hague, the 
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 Appeal Office of International Criminal Court has officially accepted that the slaughter 
of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, 1995 is genocide. This ethnic genocide, where 
approximately 8.000 Muslim adult and children were killed by Serbian forces, has been 
recorded as the worst slaughter in Europe after World War II (Göle, 2010: 19) 
45
 The report of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), Human Rights Investigation 
Commission Presidency’s “Racist and Xenophonic Actions in Europe Towards the 
People from Turkey” includes the data and evaluation of 2013. For more information, 
please see;   
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Solingen (1993) and Ludwigshafen (2008) and slaughter of people living inside 
including children and women and the bombing of a street in Cologne where 
Turks were living intensely (2004) reveal the dimensions of the physical attacks 
alone. According to the data of Berlin based Amadeu-Antonio Trust, 182 people 
lost their lives because of the extreme right terror in Germany since 1990. 46 
Murdering of 8 Turks, 1 Greek and 1 German police by radical nationalist Neo-
Nazis reveals the terrible situation. More desperately, there are very serious findings 
which show the close relations between Neo-Nazi terrorist groups and the German 
deep state structures (Yanarışık, 2013: 2915). Today, the discrimination towards 
“others” in many European countries, with Germany on the top is considered as an 
ordinary thing. Most visible side of this is the existence of extreme right parties in 
the parliaments with their discriminative and racist policies. With the polarizing 
statements of the representatives of racist parties, European public opinion is getting 
used to this situation and “others” are continued to be disregarded.  
 
Respect, inclusion and protection of all ethnic and religious elements in the 
21
st
 century Europe are the irrevocable acquisitions of the democratic 
standards we have reached. A group of Western intellectuals and politicians 
who consider Muslims as a part of Western cultural mosaic and take an 
objective approach to the adaptation problems of foreigners contribute to the 
proliferation and development of a culture of tolerance in Europe. It is for the 
interest of everyone if Westerners and Muslims who believe in basic values, 
freedoms and democratic law norms could establish a livable world in Europe. 
Constitutions of many European countries and European Court of Human 
Rights have assured the foreigners against discrimination in terms of basic 
human rights and religious freedoms. It is an undisputable fact that Muslims 
and non-Muslims are living peacefully and in trust within Europe, thanks to 
these assured basic rights and freedoms (Ramadan, 2005: 175-179). But we 
can’t say that the constitutional rights protected by laws are internalized by the public 
religious or religious diversities which are also considered as constitutional rights and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/docs/2014/yabanci_dusmanligi_iceren_ey
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Ntvmsnbc, available at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25298399/ (14.09.2013). 
97 
 
to struggle against discrimination, racism and Islamophobia are required. Today, 
some members of the European Union still do not recognize Islam as a religion. on 
the other hand, we cannot really say that the constitutional rights and freedoms are 
internalized and embraced by Muslims. As becoming a European citizen does not 
constitute a situation against Islam; it is not something against the norms and 
constitutional principles of the West when Muslims want to keep their Islamic 
identities secure. 
 
3.2. ANTI-ISLAM AND MUSLIM PREJUDICE IN THE WESTERN 
MEDIA 
 
The rapidly developing mass communication tools in parallel with the 
technological developments have become the fastest and practical 
communication devices today. One of the most important functions of mass 
communication is its role in transferring the news and information correctly and 
objectively to the society (Büyükbaykal, 2004: 44). Freedom of information and 
expression is considered as the base of pluralist societies and it is extended in 
many countries with democratic and legal reforms. In spite of the pluralist 
reforms, all the different parts of the societies (ethnic, religious or cultural 
groups) today and the information or wrong ideas about their life styles are left 
to the initiative of mass communication devices. The economic and financial 
relation of the media as trade corporations in free competition with pressure and 
interest groups brings some problems together. Media organs under the 
monopoly of certain pressure groups may conduct untrue, subjective or deficient 
news. The occasional news in media organs about ethnic and religious 
minorities depending on wrong assumptions and prejudices harms the cultural 
diversity. Within the concept of social state, legal authorities, national and 
international organizations and press occupational chambers should bring more 
transparent and applicable sanctions that would protect the individual and the 
public interest into existence. Providing realistic information about ethnic and 
religious minorities against the misleading information and cliché perceptions is 
a necessity of press ethics. Therefore, the opinions of the representatives and 
experts of minorities should be allowed more intensely in the media to help the 
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minorities overcome their disadvantages and at least have a chance to express 
them. 
  
Today, 8.7% of the general population of Europe consists of foreigners who came 
out of Europe. According to the recent statistics, the rate of unemployment in 
European Union member countries has exceeded the limit of 10% (Eurostat, 2014). 
The concerns about future are constantly increasing in the European societies due to 
the effects of the recent global economic crises. The religious and cultural 
visibilities of the foreigners with different life and clothing styles make the 
European societies think that their life style is under threat. Printed and visual media 
do not fulfill the calming and entrusting role expected from it, but establishes an 
“empire of fear” by conducting subjective publications. News which claim that 
foreigners are using all the rights given to them by social state and use illegal ways 
to receive rent/unemployment aid are constantly published in the mainstream media. 
Also the Western media is in close cooperation with the racist and conservative 
political parties which try to receive more public support in its race to create a 
“negative image”. Shameful crimes conducted by foreigners are given more 
importance by the Western media and more news about criminal events in which 
foreigners are involved can be seen. 
 
Adjectives such as “primitive”, “violence”, “fundamentalist”, “authoritarian” and 
“backward” are constantly used before and after the word of Islam in Western 
media and prejudices about the Muslims are constructed in the public opinion. In 
some media organizations which inform the public opinion in a wrong way; 
concepts of democracy, freedom of thought and tolerance are always considered as 
values unique for the Western societies (Çarhoğlu, 2007: 209-211). Media sector, as 
a part of the capitalist market economy, seems to neglect the foreigners who don’t 
have the socio-economic capabilities. In social media, news and videos which will 
increase the hatred, racism and xenophobia are often shared. Most popular social 
sharing sites on the Internet; Facebook, Twitter, MySpace and YouTube are used 
more by radical and extremist groups (The Report of the Group of Eminent Persons 
of the Council of Europe, 2011). The otherizing and polarizing publications by the 
Western media against Muslims after the September 11 attacks do not abide by the 
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principles of responsible broadcasting. The interview given by the president of 
Belgian extreme-right party the Vlaams Belang (VB), Filip Dewinter to the so-
called liberal newspaper of Israel, Ha’aretz summarizes the final point in 
xenophobia. Dewinter said “Islam is now No.1 enemy not only of Europe, but of 
the entire of free world…There are already 25-30 million Muslims on Europe’s 
soil and this becomes a threat. It is a real Trojan horse” 47  and played his 
polarizing role. According to Armstrong (2004), religious fundamentalism is often 
used in Western media as a term referring to Islam. But, religious fundamentalism 
is a global reality which could not be defined only with a single religion (cited by 
Budak, 2008: 58). Therefore, this can be considered as another “Islamization cry” 
which is a part of an engineering of putting the Muslims and Islam into a negative 
connotation, conducted by the Western media.  
 
In Western public opinion, artificial agenda have been created by media which 
build the polarization of “we and others” in a hidden way on the collective minds 
and daily life. These artificial agendas created through instrumentalized fears can 
cause decisions against freedoms, such as the ban of minarets in mosques by a 
referendum in Switzerland. Minarets are the structures which make the mosques, 
which is the common prayer area for Muslims, visible in the streets and where 
prayers are being read five times a day, have been made materials of these artificial 
agendas through this “perception of fear”. Even though minaret is not a religious 
necessity for the mosques, this ban is a clear indicator of Europe’s backwardness 
about religious and conscience freedom. On the other hand, the movie “Fitna” 
(2008) which contains insult to Qur’an, holy book of Islam, and to the Prophet of 
Islam was exculpated by the Dutch courts. In September 2005, a conservative right 
press organ in Denmark, a newspaper called Jyllands-Posten has published 
irrespective and provocative cartoons about the Prophet of Islam. 150 innocent 
people have lost their lives during the protests against these cartoons occurred in 
Middle East and South Asia. The embassies of Denmark were attacked in the 
capitols where violent protests got intense and the Danish flag was burned down 
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(Brun and Hersh, 2008). But the administrative and judicial authorities of Denmark 
have considered these cartoons within the scope of “freedom of thought” and 
rejected the legal appeals to stop the publication. It seems that the concept “respect 
for the sacred” has been taken out of the literature and was replaced by “respect for 
sacred freedoms”. One of the most important steps which keep individuals and 
societies together and facilitate the mutual understanding is the respect to different 
life styles and sacred things. As the fears which stem from religious and cultural 
differences cannot be overcome, Islamophobia is improving in the West today and 
anti-Westernism in Islam world is getting stronger every day. It is very important to 
use the religious freedoms and freedom of expression, both in media and in front of 
the public opinion, in a very sensual and careful way. It is a prerequisite for the 
multicultural and multi-religious Western societies do have respect the sacred stuff 
and the cultural values and condemn the race/religion exploiters. 
   
Official and unofficial studies about the perception of Muslims and foreigners in 
European societies reveal very bleak results. Traditional manners and customs such 
as honor killings, terrorist incidents, intra-family violence, female circumcision, 
multiple marriages, violence on the streets, ethnic/cultural ghettos and a scarf 
named ‘burqa’ that shape the perception of Muslims in European public opinion are 
used very often by the media. But, in reality, terror is strictly forbidden in Islam and 
all types of violence and cruelty towards life, good, family, women, kids and elderly 
people is prohibited. In Qur’an, it is mentioned that killing a person is like killing all 
the humanity. In spite of this the nationalist and conservative politicians along with 
irresponsible media employees present these generalizations as a reality, which are 
far away from picturing the majority of the Muslim society. According to Şen 
(2006), the most important reason why this unreal situation appeared is the 
continuation of adaptation problem by Muslims. Even though the foreigners from 
Eastern European countries also have adaptation problems about education, 
unemployment and social security; Muslims and Turks are more prominent. After 
the attacks of September 11 New York (2001), Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004) and 
London (2005), the delusional propaganda about Muslims in the Western media and 
disinformation strengthened the hand of radical Islamists and European radical 
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racists. As Islam and terror are displayed together on the media screen very often, 
this causes a great disappointment for the Muslims who condemn terror. 
 
The usage of Islam and terror next to each other with indiscretion increases the 
prejudices against the Muslims. The single civilization single culture, single 
civilization and single idea projected for the Continental Europe contains an action 
which would eliminate the cultural differences, pluralism and creativity. It is 
understood that the monotypic religious/cultural model in Europe cannot be forced 
upon Muslims or non-European foreigners. Therefore, Europe needs a pluralist 
society model where all cultures can survive together, instead of a centralized and 
monotypic cultural model. Nevertheless, media as one of the most effective centers 
of power to carry the news and information into larger platforms imposes its own 
image of Islam on the masses and tries to create a global public opinion in the West. 
Edward W. Said’s evaluation on his work named “Covering Islam”, how the image 
of Islam was created in the global public opinion is very important; “What I say is 
that the negative images on Islam are not basically about Islam itself, but basically 
ideas of the effective people in a certain society about Islam. These people want to 
impose their own image of Islam and that is the reason why their images are more 
relevant and on the agenda than the others.” (Said, 2000: 124) Today, one of the 
main factors that make the integration of Muslim minorities with the local 
majorities very hard is the “operation of images” as mentioned above. The model of 
“living together” should be internalized by European Union, European nations and 
media to reach a society based on cultural pluralism, open society and equality of 
opportunities. 
 
3.3. TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN THE TURKISH SOCIETY 
 
The basic problematique of this title is the perception of modernization, culture of 
democracy and liberal thought which are disseminating with the help of globalization, 
by Muslims in general and the European Turkish society in particular. It is no doubt 
that each civilization and society has a unique characteristic and historical past 
produced by time. The perception of culture of democracy, modernization and 
liberalism within the globalization process is highly related with the social character 
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and historical background of Muslims and Turks in the West who are coming from a 
Sunni tradition. 
 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the invasion of the Ottoman lands by 
Western allies and the colonization of these lands in the second half of the same 
century have created a reaction against West and the Western values. Therefore, the 
movements of democratization and modernization in the West after World War II 
have been suspiciously considered by the Muslim societies. The perception of the 
West-centered modernization the societies except it as underdeveloped, not modern 
and societies that need to be transformed is an ideological and ethno centrist approach. 
Therefore the Western arrogant, homogeneous and imperialist understanding of 
modernity since the second half of the twentieth century could not find any support in 
the Islam world except for some intellectual circles. Economic and political 
modernization had an enormous effect throughout the world after globalization, 
although it was not very effective in the Islamic world. One of the reasons of this is the 
strength of traditionalist conservative perception’s historical and religious rhetoric and 
the self-definition of the political Islam against the West. Of course the traditional 
Islamist or the political Islamist perceptions are not the sole responsible of this 
situation. The ego of the West and its distrusted foreign policy has disabled the 
modernization process in Islamic societies. Therefore, as globalization is considered as 
the bearer of Western values and culture, the effect of modernization in Muslim 
societies was not as it was projected to be. But still, some societies have achieved to 
modernize by protecting their traditionality. Türkdoğan (1995: 247) exemplifies the 
Asia Pacific countries with Islamic identities, such as Japan and Malaysia, have 
protected their traditional societal structures and achieved modernity in a greater extent. 
 
Societies are in a constant socio-economic and cultural process of change. But 
modernization is a wide spectrum social and cultural transformation process that aims 
to deliver any society to a modernized and progressive modernization perception. 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, the most powerful representative of the modernity theory, 
defines modernity as a change in the social, economic and political systems 
developed in Western Europe and North America (cited by Türkdoğan, 1995: 242). 
One of the most important social reflexes modernity confronted is the conservatism 
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which has a suspicious attitude towards progress and development. Conservatism 
implies tradition against change wants to sustain the previous traditions and 
institutions and attributes sacredness with traditions (Yılmaz, 2003: 94-95). One of 
the most important reasons of conservatism’s cautious and even negative attitude 
towards change and modernity is the tradition. There are two important reference 
points in the roots of conservatism’s adherence for tradition. First of these is the 
relation between tradition and religion. And second one is the importance given to 
the knowledge which is acquired by beliefs and experiences, which are beyond the 
limited human mind. The most important factor of the rejection of abstract mind by 
the conservatives is their care for information gathered through experience. 
According to Vincent (1992: 73), the reason why conservative idea, which defends 
traditions and habits against the Enlightenment philosophy, is the idea that the 
starting point of human action is not the theoretical mind, but traditions, prejudices 
and habits. The concept of prejudice as mentioned here is not an irrational behavior 
but pre information created by the distillation of experience acquired through 
generations (Akıncı, 2009: 141-143). So, in response to the change and progress 
together with globalization which is run by Western originated modernization; 
conservatism showed a conscious and traditionalist counter approach. 
 
Modernization is also considered as the abandonment of Middle Ages’ mentality; 
and considered as “Westernization” and “Modernization” in non-Western countries. 
As the positivist and rational ideas along with the secular understandings in the 
historical development of modernity could not be understood by the non-Western 
societies, this process has been experienced in a very argumentative line. The 
existence of positivist movements which began by Enlightenment, the exclusion of the 
holy word against science, and the comprehension of rational values instead of 
religious and ethical ones have negatively affected the modernization trend in Muslim 
societies (Aydın, 2000: 87-95). On the other hand, according to İnalcık (2007) 
modernization is not a compulsory Westernization. Today we witness that the Muslim 
societies (e.g. Arabs) are reject for Westernization, but they are trying to adapt 
themselves into modernity. Westernization, as a concept of relocating itself with a 
West centered civilization and cultural understanding has been responded with 
reaction in many Muslim countries. First of all Christianity is at the historical 
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background of the Western culture. But, according to Islamic traditionalists, Islamic 
science is different from modern science in terms of its nature and essence. Therefore, 
traditional Islamists are against modernization. They operate the methodology of 
Qur’an in response to the equivalency of modernization with Westernization 
(Türkdoğan, 1995: 243). 
 
Liberal thought, one of the basic trivets of globalization after the Cold War, was not as 
criticized as modernity in the Muslim societies. Liberal thought in Muslim world had 
more supporters in the intellectual circles, comparing with modernity. Concept of 
“Liberal Islam” in Muslim societies as a response to the understanding of Liberalism 
in Western societies became apparent. The reason why this concept became so popular 
is to show the liberal approach of Islam in fields such as democracy, politics, public 
sphere, human rights, women’s rights and freedoms etc. Nevertheless, the claims that 
liberalism is a modern and Western originated concept and does not fit the Islamic 
traditions caused the criticism of “liberal Islam” by many sections of the society 
(Kurzman, 2002: 233-244). In response to these criticisms, intellectual circles have 
mentioned that the acquisitions of Islam in result of its relations with other civilizations 
and through its historical interactions are because of its understanding called “open 
Islam”. According to those intellectual circles, the claim that an open and liberal Islam 
does not suit with democracy is not a valid evaluation (Özdalga, 1999). The 
recognition of different religions in the first years of Islam, existence of numerous 
different sects and orders within Islam and the implementation of Christian and/or 
non-Muslim societies’ own laws during the reign of Islam are the indicators that Islam 
was built on democratic pluralism (Akdemir, 1997: 269-272).  
 
As dominant civilizations and cultures consider their social models as the most ideal 
approach, other cultures and identities are pushed into different pursuits. The 
apprehension and internalization of the multicultural and multi identity pluralist 
society project by the West will determine the future of Europe and the minorities. 
The claim of a possible clash of civilizations and cultures in the West indicates that 
the understanding of multiculturalism and pluralism could not overcome the 
problems yet. But, a pluralist world order is needed in the eve of third millennium, 
which will prevent the intra- and inter-civilization conflicts turn into social clashes. 
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According to Şentürk, a multilayered thought named “open science” must be 
placed instead of the single layered “closed science” which is also called as 
positivism in the recent age. Approach of “open science” is the base for a pluralist 
political culture and “open society” (Şentürk, 2007: 42). These pluralist approaches 
prevent the transformation of different ideals and ideas into political and social 
struggles and conflicts. Different political ideas and ideals will have a chance of 
coexistence thanks to open society. The reason why civilizations and cultures 
consider their own societal models as the most ideal approach stems from their 
traditionalist and closed characteristics. The background of mono typist, monolithic 
and fundamentalist ideas in Islam and Western civilizations is consisted of the 
closed society understanding. Closed society is the biggest obstacle for Western 
civilization and democracy today. Understanding of closed society has deep impacts 
on polarizing, radical and racist actions. In response to Harvard Professor S. 
Huntington’s closed and monolithic idea which divides the world into two sections 
such as Western and non-Western; an understanding of multi-cultural civilization 
and open world order must be supported as witnessed in the history. Ibn Khaldun’s 
understanding of civilization48 must replace Huntington’s (Şentürk, 2007: 32-49).  
 
Religion and religious traditions in the West have played an important role in 
preventing, delaying or providing the transitions to democracy. Religion has a 
function of slowing the social change, but it also has a function of keeping the 
society together against the fragmentations which might occur during social 
changes and societal differentiations. The approaches which claim that religion is an 
obstacle for change and progress are not as relevant as before in the social sciences. 
New approaches on this area indicate that religion does not prevent progress, but 
has a functionality of reinforcing those (Okumuş, 2009: 330-331). According to 
Lipset (1994), best example for the reinforcement of change for democratization is 
Protestantism. Chile and Peru are two examples where Protestantism developed 
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 According to the Muslim intellectual Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) who was raised in a 
multi civilizational culture, conflicts among civilizations do not stem from different 
values and cultures. Conflicts among civilizations stem from the attempt of one 
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very close relations with democracy and where religion was very reinforcing in the 
progress. The reflection of religion’s role to provide the social integrity in Islam is 
the social dimension of Tevhid (Unity), in other words, unity of society. Looking 
from this perspective, social unity and integrity is one of the prerequisites of Islam 
(Okumuş, 2009: 330-331). Therefore, as the religion of Islam is built upon the 
“Tevhid principle”, it is interested in the whole life of society and person. “Tevhid 
principle” also regulates the otherworldly life of the individual (Arslanel, 2006: 
121-122). Besides, Islam does not welcome monotypic and monotonous life. 
Islam has developed an understanding which takes the individual as the base 
instead of a caste of class or a specific community. Therefore Islam is a religion 
which predicates on individual’s rights and freedoms, and is open to democracy.  
 
It is very important to understand the attitude of Sunni- Muslim Turkish society 
who has been living in Europe for more than half a century towards modernity 
and also objectively analyze the process in Turkey in the last decades. The process 
of “modernization” and “Westernization” in Turkey began in the nineteenth 
century when the military, economic and political reforms in Ottoman state got 
intense. One of these reform movements, Tanzimat period has shaped the Turkish 
modernization around three different ideologies of pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism 
and pro-Westernism (Safa, 1997: 27-65). The new vision Turkey under the 
direction of Atatürk principles and reforms during the Republic had two basic 
projects. First of those is the positivist social project which denies the past and 
takes progress as reference; and the second one is a social project which positions 
itself against the compelling positivist ideas of the West (İrem, 1997: 90-91). On 
the other hand, there are three approaches towards modernity in Turkey. First one 
is the traditional attitude that rejects modernity. Second one is the pan-
Turkish/pan-Islamist attitude that defends to acquire the positive sides of the 
Western culture such as its science and technology, but leaving other parts aside. 
Third one is the radical attitude which prefers to receive all the modern inputs of 
the West, no matter what. In sum, the idea of modernization has been a huge 
argument in the Turkish society with no standards reached yet (Karakaş, 1998: 
1697).  
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The determinant role of religion, tradition and modernity between the generations 
of European Turkish society is interchanging. The first generation Turkish 
immigrants give a great importance to Islam and Islamic traditions in their daily 
lives. The first generation of Turkish immigrants did not participate to the societal 
and social life in the countries where they lived; and they show more conservative 
and introversive tendencies. But their conservative and religious tendencies do not 
turn into fundamental religious and radical Islamic understandings. The 
generations born and raised in Europe have a tendency to use the religious 
traditions and modern values together in their own cultural identities. In other 
words, new generations cope with their own cultural codes and the democratic, 
liberal and modern norms of the West when they establish their own cultural 
identities (Kaya, 1999: 43).  
 
The most obvious result of contact and cultural interaction with the Western 
societies for the immigrants is the change in the meaning and importance of 
religion. According to Beyer (1994: 90-92), conservative values such as 
otherworldliness, closeness and differences along with liberal values such as 
pluralism, worldliness and openness provide two important options to re-
understanding of the religion in the West. On contrary to the liberal understanding 
where performance is taken as a base, conservative understanding represents the 
challenge of tradition to novelty and the effort to make the religious life more 
visible (cited by King, 1993: 33). According to M. King the understanding of 
religious identity which protects the society and family members against crime, 
corruption and alienation turns Muslims into individuals open for interaction both 
in house and in their business life (King, 1993: 33-34). According to Berger, who 
has a conservative and traditionalist stance against modernity (1979: 101-112), 
individualism and secularization are only two of the dilemmas of modernity. 
Berger also believes that the uncertainty and distrust that modernity caused in the 
sphere of religion cannot be filled with secular systems or public institutions. 
Kaya (2004) claims that the communities which take religion as a reference within 
the “European Turkish minority” do not conflict with modernity and globalization; 
and says that Islam and current moderate communitarian tendencies can provide 
an alternative modernity practice. 
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According to Smith (1992) and Share (1996), Europeanization is the name given 
to the transition from a stage where economic unity and integrity is completed, to 
a political stage where creating a common identity is being targeted. The aim of 
creating a common identity seems to have lost its chance of success with the rise 
of nationalist sentiments against globalization. National identities show different 
types of reactions against globalization. The rise of extreme-right and nationalist 
political parties in Europe can be explained by this defensive reflex of the national 
identities towards the global understandings. The project of EU, which began with 
the attempt of several politicians and political scientists, has turned into a political 
identity, but it seems to lack the public support to achieve its targets of European 
identity, European values and Europeanism (Ongur, 2009: 250-252). Therefore, it 
would be a mistake to expect the European immigrants’ internalization of 
Europeanization, as it is not internalized even by the member states and the 
masses within those. 
 
Globalization has brought a new cultural understanding which is called multi-
culturalism, that challenges most of the traditional and nation-state sovereign 
cultures. Globalization has also made the East-West discussions of Orientalism 
meaningless. Orientalism has been grounding a very deep feeling of “otherness” 
towards foreign cultures since 17
th
 century. With the appearance of globalization 
and the multicultural politics, alienation was imported to all societies and “otherness” 
was petted. With the collapse of communism, Islam started to represent the danger 
which communist threat had before. But Islam is becoming an “internal” part of the 
Western world –as it was before- on a daily basis. If Islam has a function of 
challenging the Western political system, this challenge occurs from within the 
Western societies themselves. Countries such as England, the Netherlands and 
Germany had to accept the birth of a civil society at different levels. Globalization 
adds a series of traditions to each society by causing the diversification and complexity 
of the cultures (Turner, 2003: 173).  
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3.4. GLOBALIZATION, IDENTITY AND CULTURE IN EUROPE 
 
Since the world became a little village with Globalization, the interaction of different 
cultures and identities has increased as never before. As new actors started to be on the 
stage with the increase of a global scale of movements, they have also started to 
increase their influence areas and representative power. The intensity and prevalence 
of the global relations are transforming and homogenizing the local cultures, in other 
words, pushing those into a disorder. The problem of co-existence of different 
civilizations and cultures in a tolerant environment is the threshold of the level of 
civilization where humanity has reached. Civilization is an order of belief and norms; 
and it provides the cultural belongings within it to change under certain conditions, but 
sometimes it stands against those changes. What kind of a struggle for existence is 
given by the European Turkish society in the West, where different cultures and 
beliefs try to live in a harmony? How are the socio-cultural dimensions of the 
transformation of European Turkish society, as one of the most important 
representatives of Islam in West, within itself? How does the Turkish identity position 
itself in the West where conflicts are based on identity and religious differences? 
Answers of these questions were looked for under two titles; first one considers the 
stance of Turks in Europe on the dilemma of cherishing and losing their own culture 
and cultural values in our current world where cultural change and progress is 
experienced unbelievably fast. Second title considers the historical development of 
European identity, its effect and affections, European citizenship, identity search of 
Muslims as non-Western “others” and the identity search of the Turkish society in 
Europe. 
 
3.4.1. The Turkish Culture towards Cultural Globalization  
 
The English Anthropologist Edward B. Tylor (1832-1917) defines culture as “that 
complex whole which includes the knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by mean as member of society” in his 
work named Primitive Culture, published in 1871 (cited by Güvenç, 1985: 22). 
Calvin Wells (1972: 37-39) considers culture as “the richness of human life” and 
defines it as the accumulation of behavior types and information transferred 
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among generations. Perceptions, habits and daily practices that become the life 
style of individuals and societies by time are constructed upon the cultural 
environment. Hall (1994: 207) emphasizes the cultural diversity shaped by 
different life styles by saying “Western Europe does not consist of a single society, 
single culture or a single ethnicity. All of the modern societies has a cultural 
hybridism” (cited by Yağbasan, 2008: 318).  
 
The Turkish Language Association defines culture as “the whole of the tools used 
to create and transfer all material and non-material values established 
throughout the social development process to the next generations, also showing 
the dimensions of man’s sovereignty on his social environment”. Culture is an 
attitude, whereas civilization is be able to know and to do (Turhan, 1987: 37). 
Culture prepares the grounds of the civilization by its own motives and continues 
its existence with the help of mature and self standing civilization. 
 
Cultural colors and identities struggle for survival in the process of globalization, 
but are headed to change and even destruction. According to Smith (2002: 5-6), in 
the process of globalization where cultures are forced to change, contrasting local 
differences are emphasized and old cultures are being transformed. When local 
and national cultures are under the one-sided effect of dominant cultures, they 
create a reactionary reflex. Local cultures, in response to homogenization and 
hybridization moves of global culture wither cope with the change or withdraw 
themselves to prevent any cultural conflicts or identity crises. 
 
Globalization is the dissemination of political, social, economic and cultural 
values along with the acquisitions around these values, across the national borders. 
According to Tomlinson (2004: 37-38) globalization is the name of Western 
dissemination of their victory worldwide with a new method after the Cold War 
period. In this case, international capital rules over the world and monopolizes 
(cited by Sezgin, 2009: 258).  According to Kongar (2001), globalization has 
three dimensions; political, economic and cultural. The political dimension of the 
globalization is defined by the American guidance of world politics as the 
economic dimension is defined by the dominance of international capital 
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worldwide. Standardization and homogenization of the world culture represents 
the cultural dimension of globalization. 
 
One of the most discussed issues in social sciences is the question f how the 
Western civilization’s cultural and ideological oppression on other civilizations 
will shape the world cultures within the process of globalization? Will the 
“intercultural/religious and inter- civilization communications”, becoming more 
apparent with the increase of technology and communication, cause conflict or 
dialogue? This chapter emphasizes the ethnic, religious and cultural 
transformation and progress of European Muslims, and specifically the Muslim 
Sunni-Turkish society in the process of globalization. Francis Fukuyama (1989), 
in his famous work “the End of History”, claimed that ideological conflicts have 
ended with the end of Cold War and all the nations of the world have to adhere 
the Western liberal and democratic system. The reason why Huntington’s (1993) 
conflict based paradigm is more criticized and discussed rather than Fukuyama’s 
claim, is that it sheds light on already happening socio-cultural and political 
movements. September 11 New York attacks, followed by Istanbul, Madrid, 
London and Moscow bombings have revealed the aforementioned “concept of 
conflict”. Another process which turned the “concept of conflict” into a more 
functional fact is the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan after 2000, and the 
developments occurred in different countries after these occupations. The mass 
street movements named as “the Arab Spring” and considered as a kind of 
“democratization and freedom” struggle of Arab societies, have brought new 
uncertainties together (Gülenç, 2011: 134). According to Muhammed Umara, the 
process of globalization was activated after West lost its credibility on Islam 
societies. Umara says that globalization was imposed without any use of force 
and the cultural texture was tried to be defected. European culture was imposed 
under the framework of “cultural exchange” and Western civilization became 
universalized comparing with the other cultures (Umara, 2006: 35-42). With the 
elimination of bipolar world order, the expectations and concerns about the 
possible conflicts and struggles between the West and Islam in many areas are 
still considerable. 
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The role of Muslims within the Western civilization and their self-definition in 
terms of identity, culture and belonging is a highly wondered issue in our 
globalized world. The day by day visible existence of Muslims in North America 
and Europe demographically has brought many discussions together. On one 
hand, the increasing number of mosques in European capitals is being used as a 
tool for referendums and the existence of Muslims is shown as a threat. On the 
other hand, the new demographic situation and the adaptation problems of 
Muslims in European capitals are shown as threats to Western cultural identity. 
Today, Islam is the biggest minority religion in Europe, whereas Muslims are the 
second biggest ethnic group (Klausen, 2008: 25). Therefore the dimensions of 
physical proximity and communication of two ancient civilizations exhibit an 
importance in terms of economic, political and sociological results of 
globalization. Political participation, basic rights and freedoms, supremacy of law, 
free market economy and democratic politics are only a few economic and 
political results of the globalization. This chapter will discuss the effect of 
sociological results of globalization on the European Turkish society. 
 
The outstanding sociological results of globalization are individualism, 
modernity, cultural and societal diversity and the intensification of civil society 
organizations. Civilizations get in contact with other civilization and culture from 
time to time and improve themselves by acquiring new cultural richness’s. 
Civilization of Islam has internalized the acquisitions in trade, science, 
bureaucracy, mysticism, philosophy, pluralist society, tolerance and coexistence 
through its contacts with Ancient Greek, Indian, Chinese and Western 
civilizations within the last fourteen centuries. In certain periods of this journey, 
Arab and Turks who represented the Islamic civilization have fought with the 
representatives of Western civilization. Many of the arguments between East and 
West refer to those wars and imply why those two great civilizations cannot 
collide in political, economic and socio-cultural contexts. But, in the last century, 
even the Protestant countries have declared war on each other. These wars have 
ended and today they have friendly relations along with political, economic and 
socio-cultural integration. Therefore, evaluating the past hostilities by using the 
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concept of “religion” and polarizing the Muslims and Westerners is not a 
constructive attitude at all. 
 
The relations within themselves and the relation with the host societies of the 
ethnic and religious minority groups in the West are determined by religion and 
culture. National/ethnic culture and Islamic culture are still the most determinant 
two factors for Muslim societies in building individual and societal relations. But, 
the national/ethnic and religious culture which shape the behavior of Muslims is 
in interaction with the Western culture and changing every day. The cultural 
values, consumption habits and the traditional manners and customs of the 
European Turkish society are in a constant change. Families from Turkey, who 
reflect their traditional social relations into their daily lives, are still affected from 
the traditional values and religious patterns within and without the family 
relations. Age of marriage, marriage choices, birth rates, extramarital 
relationships, divorce rates and especially the dressing code of women diversify 
according to the traditional and modern cultural understandings of the 
immigrants from Turkey. For instance, the marriage choice which is known as 
“imported brides and grooms” has changed during the following years of the 
immigration and was replaced with marriages with people who also live in 
Europe and have the same ethnic origin. New generations witness an increase in 
marriages with spouses from different origins. As a result, the social, cultural, 
economic and public visibility of the immigrants from Turkey has increased in 
accordance with the change in their educational and social-occupational statuses, 
and this visibility has shaped their free choices. 
 
Islam is a “minority religion” in Europe. Muslims have a status of minority not 
only in number, but also in terms of their social and economic positions. This 
“backward” social position and minority status of Muslims cause Islam to be 
perceived as a “backwards religion”. In addition with the external perceptions, 
the culture shock Muslims experience in the countries they migrate to causes 
them to hold on their cultures and traditions and become more introversive 
(Canatan, 2005: 69-76). On the other hand, the post modernization of the culture 
has caused the questioning of the religion at daily level. Western culture of 
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consumption corrodes the bases of traditional life styles and decomposes the 
traditional religious practices at the level of customs (Turner, 2003: 273-274). 
Religion, which helps the individual to gain a philosophy of life, has lost its 
mission of establishing the bases of personal relations in social life with 
modernization (Kula, 2001). Even though the concept of religion has lost its 
importance in terms of collective belonging with modernization, Islam still has a 
very important place in the lives of the immigrants from Turkey. The 
organization of different religious congregations within the European Turkish 
society under diverse names and expansion of their activities to fulfill the 
religious needs are indicators of the central position of Islam in the society. Tarıq 
Ramadan (2005: 249-251) thinks that religious identity as one of the most 
important belongings which define an individual, will vitalize the psychological 
and national sentiments. Therefore, individuals who consider themselves both as 
Muslims and Europeans will undoubtedly contribute a lot to coexistence within a 
pluralist society.  
 
One of the areas where globalization had an enormous effect on has been the language, 
which transfers the cultural accumulation among generations and provides mutual 
communication. Native language (Turkish or Kurdish) preferred in intra-family 
relations and media following remained at very low levels in terms of education, 
reading and research for the new generations. The failure of young generations in their 
native languages in the era of communication and information brought together the 
problem of intergenerational transfer and protection of settled cultural values. On the 
other hand, individuals who want to be disposed of the social pressures stretch some 
cultural codes and step out of strict traditional rules. Cultural norms are re-interpreted 
in the construction of individual freedom spheres and the fulfillment of social 
requirements such as marriage, business life and public relations. 
 
The deliberative ignorance and the ‘othering’ of the European Turkish society and its 
culture by the host societies in Europe indicate another dimension of assimilation. The 
protection of the life styles, consumption cultures and cultural identities of the 
immigrants from Turkey and their continuation of intra-group integration caused them 
to be named and criticized as “parallel society” and “ghetto society” in Germany. 
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According to Bennet (1993: 23-24), sentimental traumas that appear as a result of 
oppressions on individuals and groups end with the rejection of culture and values 
depended on the own. These conscious oppressions and exclusions transform the new 
generations to individuals who are ashamed of their past as a result of a suspicion on 
their national historical, cultural and religious values. It is thought that the generations 
snapped off their original cultures, identities and history will adapt more into the host 
societies. But, when the individuals start to draw away from their own cultural values, 
they face with the concept of “other” and start to feel themselves closer to “other”, 
rather than “own” (Çakır, 2010: 81). Individuals who draw away from their own 
values will begin to criticize and blemish anything that has a national characteristic, in 
order to get accepted by the dominant majority or the host society. 
 
The submission of different cultures under the cultural hegemony of Western centered 
(Euro-American) system within the historical process called “globalization” appears as 
a “danger of mono types” (Sarwy, 2010). The “European Turkish minority” is a 
mosaic consisted of different ethnic and cultural communities. There are ‘the Alevi’ 
and ‘Sunni’ differences in terms of religious belongings. Therefore, the separation of 
Muslims from Turkey into categorical groups appeared as a ideological and 
administrative method within the Western culture. For instance, the separation of 
the Turkish diaspora in Germany into ethnic, religious and ideological 
associations is a conscious policy conducted through pluralist and democratic 
approaches. However, instead of categorized alienation and separation of the 
European Turkish society, if the integrity and commonality of this society was 
provided, adaptation could be much easier (Çakır, 2010: 83). Generations in 
reconciliation with their past live their customs, manners and national cultures 
by internalizing those and can transfer the tolerance and understanding which 
are the prerequisites of coexistence. The protection of cultural identity, 
improvement of their culture and the realization of their differences by the 
ethnic/cultural minorities as a part of European mosaic is the most popular 
argumentation of the last decade. Protecting their own colors and cultural 
inheritance in the age of globalization (global homogenization and 
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standardization) is one of the hardest challenges for ethnic/religious 
minorities. 
 
According to Canatan (1990), first generations of the migration have reacted 
to the cultures of the societies of which they are in by two ways. According to 
this, first group have alienated themselves with their own culture and mixed 
into the dominant culture; whereas the second group struggled to have a 
position in the society by protecting their own cultural values and ident ities. 
The ones in the first group had an inferiority complex that stemmed from 
seeing their own society as “backwards” comparing with the Western society. 
The cultural terrorism stems from assimilation policies of the Western society 
on ethnic groups has a very effective role in the creation of this complex. As 
concepts of exclusion, assimilation and labialization force some groups to 
harmonize with the dominant culture, they also urged other groups to resist 
and become aware about protecting and sustaining their own cultural 
existence (Canatan, 1990: 41). The existence of the groups which aim to resist 
the dominant culture of the West cannot be denied; but the claim that this 
resistance prevents development and improvement determines the limits of 
cultural nationalism. The commonly accepted attitude during the first periods 
of diaspora was the transfer of language, religion, national history, manners 
and customs to the new generations. First generations which are alienated to 
the society they live in, could not analyze the current changes and lived with a 
constant paranoia in terms of sustaining their own national values and 
identities. First generations have refrained from communication and 
interaction due to distrust, and could not improve their creativity because of 
inferiority feelings they had.  
 
Factors such as unemployment, discrimination and the individualistic social life in 
the Western societies push the second generations aside from the general public. 
The reason why the members of this generation prefer an unordered life can be 
named as the generation and culture clashes along with the inequality of 
opportunities (Canatan, 1990: 42). New generations, those experience a conflict and 
contradiction between two cultures and life styles, also live a culture shock due to 
117 
 
the increase in social pressures. According to a field a study conducted in Germany, 
new generations have a lower level of sustaining the Turkish culture, whereas 
sustaining the German culture has a higher level comparing with the old generations 
(Şahin, 2010: 119). Because of the dynamic feature of culture, the cultural identities 
of the European Turkish minority had shown variability of improvement by time. 
Second and third generations from Turkey, even though it differs according to the 
countries they are in, are trying to protect their cultural identities without losing 
their ties with homeland. Especially the generations who are born and raised in 
Europe gain new cultural identities with the help of education and socialization. The 
Turkish society, in which the traditional paternalist family structure changed and a 
free and more participant relationship started to become dominant, especially the 
intra family and social roles of women have changed. Especially the second and 
third generations of Turkish origin immigrant women have reshaped their own 
ethnic, religious, political and cultural identities in a way to accommodate with the 
host country’s social, economic, political and cultural structure. 
 
All religions and their universal messages contain that the common good of 
mankind is based on “tolerance”, “dialogue” and “reconciliation”. Civilizations 
which have been shaped in accordance with great religions and their universal 
messages have survived centuries with the help of the contact they had along with 
the material and cultural acquisitions of other cultures. According to Bernard Lewis, 
European civilization has never been a civilization which is particular to Europe. 
Many cultures and civilizations, including the European culture have enriched 
themselves with the contribution and effect of previous cultures (Lewis, 2002). 
Therefore, civilizations with a tendency and interest into the differences got rid of 
introversion because of the cultural exchange and continued their existence. 
Mankind has collected all the values it produced throughout centuries in the 
common pool of humanity, and the civilizations were built upon these common 
values. Globalization process has a great function in integrating different societies 
and cultures.49 Globalization can also be used as the material for conflict between 
                                                             
49
 Çaha, Ömer (2002), ‘Medeniyetlerin Buluşmasında Dinlerin Rolü’ (The Role of 
Religions on Alliance of Civilization), Zaman Newspaper Archive, for more information, 
please see; http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/05/13/yorumlar/default.htm (13.01.2014). 
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different cultures and religions. Along with globalization, Islam and Western 
civilizations have entered into a new phase in terms of conflict axis among the 
religious and cultural differences. 
 
Globalization paved the way for ethnic, religious and cultural differences of 
Western and Islam civilizations to interact very close. In both civilizations, there are 
groups which consider the differences as richness and those that consider the 
differences as threat. In the future when the process of globalization will become 
more eminent, it is obvious that the radical elements will more often engage in 
actions and statements of hatred, rage and violence. But the long-term continuation 
and attractiveness of ethno-cultural and religious radical elements that polarize the 
societies is almost impossible. Because it is not possible for any society to 
develop healthy relations within an atmosphere where hatred, anger and violence 
predominate. No one will desire to live in a society where economic and political 
stability and welfare is missing. The important thing here is to save the religious 
and moral understandings from being a tool of conflict and struggle. The human 
centered religious understandings in the essence of Islam and Western 
civilizations should struggle the fanaticism which is strengthening by conflict and 
violence. Dialogue among the members of religions and cultures as a global peace 
project will turn the twenty first century as a period of wealth and coexistence. 
 
3.4.2. Identity, Conflict and Cooperation in Europe 
 
Identity, in its general meaning, can be defined as the interpretation of the 
individual and the group’s existence and the positioning of one’s self. With his 
identity, an individual makes his feature, personality and subjective reality 
cognoscible for himself and for others (Perşembe, 2005: 273). Identity is a social 
fact and it is the common name of visualizing and classifying all differences of the 
human beings. Anyone can have multiple identities at the same time; those 
identities can be sexual, religious, ethnic, geographical or national and they can 
exist on the same individual. These identities might be classified as upper and 
lower identities in terms of importance. Location mobilities and immigration can 
also cause a change of identity (Burçoğlu, 2004: 10-11). 
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According to Kılıçbay (2003: 155-156), identity defines a belonging and a 
similarity, which can be seen in its linguistic roots. Each identity is positioned 
according to the other and created as such. Therefore, the constructions of larger 
identities such as “nation” or “ummah” are done in terms of a differentiation from 
other “nations and ummah”. Identity is both a product of institutionalization of 
similar features and also a product of exclusion by “others”. Therefore, what 
defines an ethnic group or identity from the perspective of other groups is the 
social border put into the middle (Marley and Robbins, 1997: 74). According to 
Assman (2001: 135), identity is a concept which defines plurality and contains 
other identities as well (cited by Tatar, 2012: 93).  
 
Globalization is one of the concepts which appeared in the last quarter of 
twentieth century and which are referred to describe the great scale changes. 
Common point of pro-globalization views is the prediction that this process will 
bring development, welfare and progress for all the societies and mankind. 
Globalization symbolizes the “progress of humanity into the next stage” with its 
positive implication on disseminating humanitarian values such as democracy, peace 
and freedom. Another prediction of the pro-globalization group is the possibility that 
globalization might provide a chance for minorities, religious groups and identities 
under pressure to become free improve themselves and open a dialogue with other 
groups. Common point of the groups with a negative attitude towards globalization is 
the idea that globalization is a political project which gives the developed and rich 
countries, multinational companies and grand capital groups a chance to consider the 
world as an unlimited and market and an area of exploitation. Common point of the 
critics is that globalization representing the unipolar world, American hegemony and 
the ideological dominance of liberalism. Another approach ignores the positive and 
negative sides developed by the previous approaches and defines globalization as a 
process containing opportunities and risks, with negative and positive features 
together (Şen, 2008: 136-141). 
 
The historical existence of identities is parallel to the existence of societies and 
civilizations. Identities need “other” identities to protect their own dynamism, as it 
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defines itself according to “other” identity or identities. The relations or struggles of 
different ethnic/religious groups with one another determine the limits of national 
identities. A national identity defines itself according to the threat of “other” and tries 
to secure itself by having close ties with stronger identities. The most obvious 
example of this is the relocation of some ex-socialist Eastern European countries’ 
cultural identities to a democratic and liberal axis by becoming members of the 
European Union. European civilization is based on values produced by Christianity, 
the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the Industrial 
Revolution. But, the external role in the establishment of European civilization and 
identity was played by Islam and Muslims who were defined as the “others”. 
Historical clash between Christianity and Islam played a very important role in the 
appearance of European identity and creation of a unique worldview (Bozkurt, 2001: 
13.14). During the Crusades, Western civilization learned the morals of trade from 
the Islam civilization; whereas the Andalusia experience on the Iberian Peninsula 
contributed a lot to the European civilization with its enormous accumulation of 
science, philosophy, culture and art (Alsayyad and Castells, 2004). Finally, centuries 
long struggles and relations between Islam and Western civilizations have played an 
important role as an external factor in the creation of a cultural identity in Europe. 
  
Even though the inter-civilization wars and conflicts do not rest upon “religious” 
reasons alone, religion has always had an important place in determining the 
cultural relations in every period. The doctrine of Christianity, which began with the 
acceptance of Roman Empire as an official religion and increased its effect in the 
different periods of history, has played a very important role in the establishment of 
old Europe’s cultural identity. On the other hand, the perception of the Muslim 
world during the Middle Ages as a source of threat and “other” can be counted as 
another determinant factor in the creation of European identity and culture. “East” 
has been redefined by the West for the last two centuries and it had a function like a 
mirror for the West where Western world looked at and justified all its cultural 
values accordingly (Said, 1979). Especially since 1989, religion has played an ever 
increasing role of conflict in European politics and societies. According to Spohn 
(2009: 358-359), there are three reasons for this; the reunification of the Europe 
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after the collapse of communism, transformation of the European societies into 
multicultural and multi-religious structures with the help of international migration 
and the experience of the globalization process where religions have witnessed a 
very intense interaction. 
 
The threats that lasted for centuries and the devastation twentieth century brought 
by wars have paced the creation of European identity with the compulsion of unity. 
Crusades which have been launched to get the Holy Land back from the hands of 
Muslims, have a very important role in the identification of Europe with 
Christianity from tenth to eighteenth centuries (Burçoğlu, 2004: 11-12). After the 
expeditions to the east have ended, Europeans had to gather around another ideal. 
This unifying function was conducted by secularization and the “nation-state” in the 
modern era of Europe as the Catholic Church was weakened (Saybaşılı, 2000). 
According to Jansen (1999: 27-36), Europe did not have a serious division within 
itself and responded well to the challenge of communism, therefore created a very 
good model and unity (cited by Dinç, 2011: 42). According to Habermas (2004: 
302), Europe’s feature being an area of peace and welfare is the clearest indicator 
that European identity is shaping. Finally, despite all the devastating wars and 
clashes of religion and sects; Europeanization can still have a unifying role if the 
member countries consider this with great care and exercise peaceful policies 
towards the “others” (Burçoğlu, 2004: 17). 
When “Europe” and “European” identity is thought historically, it can be 
explained with a state tradition and elite culture, rather than a civil society 
tradition (Delanty, 1995). European identity is a tendency above the national 
identities and it rises above the “things” shared all around Europe. The 
historical heritage and social, cultural and political values shared all around 
Europe are the elements that create the European identity in spite of the 
diversity within Europe. The factors that shape the historical heritage in 
Europe are Christianity, Enlightenment, democracy and the supremacy of law. 
The political name of the league of these values is European Union and its 
cornerstones are (liberal) democracy, (capitalist) market economy and 
(Kant)’s philosophical opinion (Dinç, 2011: 35). 
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The understanding of “unity-in-diversity” defended by W. Kymlicka (1995) 
suits the “Europe” and “European” identity, which is constructed, changing 
and improving (Kaya and Şahin, 2007). The model “unity-in-diversity” 
predicts that the European identity might appear with the help of increasing 
civil, political and cultural exchanges and cooperation’s. The main question 
here is what kind of stance the “Europe” and “European” identity will have 
towards the cultural, ethnic and religious identities within itself. The common 
point of the critics of this model is that stability will be neglected in an 
environment of change and that cultural diversity might harm belongings 
(Dinç, 2011: 44-45). In other words, the harm given by cultural diversity to 
belongings might mean the disappearance of the values which consist 
different ethnic/religious minorities by time. There are two ways for cultures 
that belong to minority or majority communities in Europe to live together. 
First of them is the experience of a process in which cultural and identity 
exchanges are closed, which stems from the static structure of Europe. 
“Europeanism” or “Westernism” means single civilization, single culture and 
single identity; and it refers to a process where the elements of other 
civilizations are excluded. The best example for this traditional closed 
approach of the West is its failure to keep the religious together in the middle  
Ages. Second way is the experience of a process which is open to cultural and 
identity exchanges, which stems from the dynamic structure of the liberal 
Europe (Kaya and Şahin, 2007). If the second process could be experienced 
without any intercultural or inter-identity conflicts and turns into a synthesis, 
this will determine the future of Europe. 
 
The idea of European citizenship is based on realizing the aims of creating a 
European consciousness and an identity. With the Maastricht Agreement (1993), 
the policy of European citizenship has been accepted as the most important step to 
create a European identity. With the Amsterdam Agreement (1997), the principle 
of equality among the European citizens was adopted. But in Europe, where 
millions of immigrants as ethnic and religious minorities live, the scope and 
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structure of the European citizenship has turned into a more complicated one. 
Latest polls show that only a small amount of the public consider themselves as 
“European”, and this disrupts the strategies of creating a common identity 
(Altınbaş, 2009: 98). The low support levels for European citizenship principle in 
the European public opinion, the low level of participation to the European 
Parliament elections and the successful results extreme-rightist parties acquire in 
the elections indicate the suspicions in the adaptation of European Union policies. 
Finally, it is an indispensable fact that the adherence for national identities is still 
strong and this effects the creation of a European identity and citizenship in 
negative ways. 
 
Among the three dimensions of the concept of citizenship; rights, participation 
and belonging; the last one seems to be missing about the European citizenship. 
According to Ollikainen (2000), identity belonging, one of the concepts of 
belonging is far away to integrate with the European citizenship. It can be seen 
that the equation of coexistence of national citizenship and the European 
citizenship is full with several conflicts and conceptual misjudgments. The 
Maastricht Agreement’s rejection in Denmark with a referendum and slightly 
acceptance in France; and the withdrawal of Nice and Lisbon Agreements after 
the first public poll in Ireland show us that the European public opinion is not 
ready for the integration as a whole (Waever, 1995: 389-431). European public 
opinion will only accept the integration whenever they are convinced that their 
national identities are not under threat (Altınbaş, 2009: 101-107). If the European 
citizenship is going to be the product of a long and consistent process, this product 
will only be able to grow up within the integrative and decisive atmosphere of 
European Union. 
 
The projects of European identity and citizenship, which is tried to be pushed 
from top to below, be far away to give the desired results for the foreigners who 
are considered as “others”. But, still, there is the joy of receiving a permanent 
citizen identity instead of a temporary immigrant one. Muslims living in Europe 
do define themselves as European day by day. Double or hybrid identities are 
appearing and they become very widespread (Okumuş, 2007: 142). But on the 
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other hand, the exclusion of foreigners with different ethnic and religious 
identities within Europe and rejection of them as Europeans points out another 
dilemma. According to Gellner (1994: 42-43), to become a part of a Western 
modern society, that society’s “high culture”, which is transferred from one 
generation to another, should be acquired.  
 
European Union and the continent of Europe, which is moving forward to become 
the greatest economic and political union in the world, are experiencing the most 
prosper and peaceful days of the last century. The human force brought from the 
developing countries since the beginning of the second half of 20
th
 century have 
been employed in unqualified jobs in Western European countries. But the 
technological developments by time have minimized the need for unqualified 
workers and pushed the “second/third generation of foreign work force” which 
could not improve itself into an unduly competition. This unduly competition 
between the “national workforce” and “foreign workforce” has polarized the 
sides and has created a psychology of introversive identity. Sides have developed 
a kind of defense mechanism and became more connected to their traditions, 
religions and national identities. 
 
According to Rattansi (1997: 50-51), the encounters between the “West” and the 
“others” have been determinant in defining the self in accordance with the other 
for both sides. According to Morley and Robins (1997: 43), the old fashioned 
exclusive principles have continued to operate in the “new Europe” and the 
European identity continued to be built depending on extra-Europeans or anti-
Europeans. Europe is the one which is located against the “other”. Western world, 
while creating its own identity, has put diversity in the roots of its existence. 
European identity has turned the diversities into otherness to prove and sustain its 
accuracy (cited by Tatar, 2012: 100). According to Jackson and Penrose (1994), 
the melting of the “others” who are subject to the same law norms within the 
nation-state systematique and survive in the secular state structure within the 
nation-state system by time, their loss of identity and gaining new identities is 
another example of assimilation (cited by Kaya, 2008: 157). According to this 
assimilative approach, the ethnic minority identity will become a part of the 
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dominant national identity and will have a full adaptation into the new identity. 
On the other hand, the “European Islam” project built upon the idea of melting 
down the “others”, in another word, Muslims within the dominant culture, is a 
result of perceiving the differences as a ground of conflict (Subaşı, 2005: 42-44). 
 
Islam is one of the main variables in terms of the social relations between the 
Muslim immigrant societies who are trying to be permanent for the last fifty years, 
and the host societies. According to German sociologist Thomä-Venske (1981: 4-5), 
the feeling of belonging by immigrants in the multicultural European societies has a 
very remarkable importance to provide socialization and mutual harmony. One of 
the important questions at this point is whether the reactions towards the cultures of 
the host societies effective in the increase of Islamic belonging or not. Another 
question is about the distance taken by the sides on harmony and adaptation and its 
role in the shaping of the Islamic belonging feeling. Immigrants from third world 
countries have a tendency of returning to the sacred during the modernization 
process, by reinventing nationalism, religion and religious values. In the 
societies which have a non-Western experience, religion becomes more 
prominent in terms of an identity (Taştan, 2002: 121). In the following years 
of Turkish workers’ migration, the increasing embracement of religious 
symbols was seen as a way to culturally cope with social intolerance, 
exclusion and loneliness (Karakaşoğlu-Aydın, 1999: 65-66). The social 
exclusion immigrants are exposed to because of the difference of status 
directed them to an organization which is mosque-centered and provided a 
ground of intra-group coherence. Religion and the religious symbols have 
made it possible to satisfy the feelings of isolation and worldliness, thereby 
preventing the immigrants to be exposed to a culture shock (Abadan-Unat, 
1976: 204-205). 
 
In the fiftieth year of the immigration, the Turkish diaspora is in the middle of 
process which witness identity erosion between the national culture and the 
Western culture. The Turkish immigrants, who are left in the middle of two 
identities, are in search of a religious identity which will improve the feeling 
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of trust in them and keep them alive (Taştan, 1996: 17). Islam, as an 
indispensable part of the Turkish identity, is one of the most important tools 
which will guide the life of the Turkish immigrants in old Europe. Religious 
movements are one of the most organized solidarity networks of the European 
Turkish diaspora have diversity within them and carry out religious, cultural 
and social organization on a wide scale. On the one side of this large scale, 
there are religious organizations which are peaceful and in harmony with the 
current social structure; and the organizations that rely on radical Islamist 
interpretation on the other side (Atacan, 1993: 26). Radical Islamist 
movements, which could be tended for violence, are not accepted by the 
majority of the Turkish diaspora (Perşembe, 2005: 284). Sunni Turkish-
Islamic tradition, or in other words, the Anatolian Islam does not constitute 
any threat to the democratic values or social and societal life.  
 
According to Schiffauer (2009: 200), Islamic religious community and the 
German society in Germany are not in a relationship which complete each 
other, but rather in a controversy towards each other. Individuals who cannot 
clarify their social position in the equation of this controversy consider the 
religious communities as a safe haven and as an element of balance towards 
the secular society. Islamic culture and identity, which is perceived as a threat 
to the European life style and model in Europe has become a symbol today 
which is used by many Muslims with no hesitations at all. Muslim minorities 
in Europe engage with belongings such as culture, identity, religion, ethnicity 
and traditions to cope with the challenges and to avoid the fabricated radical 
abbreviations. Some strategic tools developed through religious and ethnic 
identity belongings are used to struggle racism and discrimination. Minority 
groups which act with the exclusion psychology give more importance to the 
concepts like intra-group solidarity, adherence and traditional belongings. A 
group of Muslims, who think that they protect themselves by remaining 
outside the shiny, live and immoral city life, consider themselves as disposed 
of the cultural corruption. On the other hand, the need by ethnic/religious 
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groups to protect their essence and the cultural identities does not mean that 
they do not wish to live together with the host society.  
 
Right wing politicians in Europe keep ignoring the Muslims in their countries 
and claim that Western religious values are very important for the “European 
identity”. The number of people who believe that Islam threatens the cultural 
identities of Europe increases gradually. Elements like culture and identity are 
now seen as the determinant factors which create a distinction in the creation 
of the concept of “foreigner”. Foreigners constitute a fear for the society of 
which they are in, not because their cultures are not known, but also that they 
could change the known culture and alienate it too (Yılmaz, 2008: 27). On the 
other hand, the concern as Islam one of the most important threats to 
multiculturalism is increasing gradually in the West. The immigrants from 
Turkey, who are under the shadow of the fundamentalist movements and 
radical actions in the West, are experiencing the problem of lack of self-
expression. The immigrants from Turkey think that the images of Islam and 
Muslim in the Western media and on the streets of Europe do not represent 
them. They want the different interpretations of Islam by Anatolian Islam, the 
Alevism and Sufism to be featured. The number of people who define 
themselves as German/Belgian/Dutch Muslim Turk increases every day. The 
immigrants from Turkey, who care about the citizenship of the country where 
they live and give importance to active political participation, believe that the 
cultural identity of Islam is not a threat to the Western values. They are in an 
effort to articulate with the West by their identities, voices, colors, aesthetical 
values, priorities, in sum by their life styles. Finally, it is a possibility to 
develop the culture of coexistence that depends on pluralism in Europe, where 
the Muslim and European identities are the closest to each other physically. To 
seize this historical opportunity, a sample coexistence model should 
immediately be developed where different identities and cultures complete and 
have respect to each other. 
  
“European identity” is the result of a series of ideas to create a complete integrity 
within a Western imaginary world. There is no common cultural identity model 
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for the definition of Muslim communities in the West and their inclusion to the 
general whole. But, the diversity Muslims have created in Europe, as a single fact, 
makes it harder for them to be defined as a single group. Muslims are represented 
by different ethnic or sectarian groups in Europe today. Muslim population either 
comes from the history of Western imperialism or their existence in Europe is 
only limited by the workers’ immigration. The religious belonging, cultural-ethnic 
references and the diversity of adaptation processes of the immigrant communities 
like the Turkish diaspora which have reached to third and fourth generations, 
produce interfered identity presentations (Subaşı, 2005: 46-62). In the following 
years of the migration, the immigrant groups needed a cultural identity to struggle 
with unequal opportunities, discrimination and social marginality (Abadan-Unat, 
2002: 182-183). Intercultural interaction that appeared more in the second and 
third generations constitute the starting point of the identity problems. The Sunni-
Muslim Turkish diaspora is one of the minorities that experience the 
ethnic/religious identity crises in the most obvious way. This is because the 
multiplicity that can be seen in terms of identities by the European Turkish society, 
in parallel with its ethnic, sectarian, socio-cultural and regional diversity.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EXPERIENCE OF CO-EXISTENCE IN EUROPE 
 
Being an immigrant is pictured as follows in the novel of Kiran Desai (2010), 
“The Inheritance of Loss”; “Immigration is getting used not to be touched, and 
within this context, being alone among the crowd, to be humiliated and to get 
away from humanitarian relations”. In the last years, the multiculturalism policies 
in many EU countries have been criticized by the liberal fractions. The focus of 
these criticisms is the minorities who live in Europe without interacting each other 
and the host societies. The piling up of different religious and cultural groups in 
separate ghettos without interacting each other has exploited the multiculturalism 
policies directed towards “living together”. According to Kadıoğlu (2011), 
diversity prevented freedoms in Europe. Diversity collected under the umbrella of 
multiculturalists’ policies was so exaggerated, so the basic freedoms were left 
aside. Communities with no interaction in a multicultural environment and 
parallel lives where identity rights became very important have been established.50  
  
The Report prepared in 2011 by the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of 
the Europe with the name “Living Together: Combining Diversity and Freedom in 
21
st
 Century Europe”51 refers to “living together” and puts “combining diversity 
and freedom” as a target. The report also mentions the increasing importance of 
coexistence of diversity and basic rights. It has been advised that the struggle with 
racism, discrimination and hatred in European countries should be legalized, and 
not threaten the freedom of expression. In spite of this, racism and discrimination 
raises and even getting normal in Europe today. The public support to extreme 
right and radical parties increases and its sphere is disseminating. To struggle with 
the possible societal polarizations and splits, the statement of “living together” 
which emphasizes the basic rights should be featured. The report mentions eight 
                                                             
50
 Neşe Düzel, who is writer in Taraf newspaper, made an interview with Prof. Dr. Ayşe 
Kadıoğlu on May 2011. Kadıoğlu is member of the Group of Eminent Persons of the 
Council of the Europe. For more information about the interview, please see; 
http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/nese-duzel/ayse-kadioglu-burkayi-yasaklamak-
tehlikelidir/16155/   (05.10.2013) 
51
 For more information about the report its title ‘Living Together – Combining Diversity 
and Freedom in 21
st
 - Century Europe’, please see: http://www.coe.int/t/policy-
planning/GEP/translations/Report_GEP_Turkish.pdf  (05.10.2013) 
130 
 
risks that threaten the universal values. These are; widespread intolerance, 
discrimination, xenophobia, rising interest towards populist parties, parallel 
societies, radical Islamism, loss of democratic freedoms, existence of a population 
with no rights and the possible conflict between “freedom of expression” and the 
“religious freedom”. Main reasons behind these risks are listed as the financial 
crises in old Europe, insecurity that stems from welfare loss, misperception of 
immigration, the patterns and prejudices created against the minorities in media 
and public opinion and the lack of leaders (The Report of the Council of Europe, 
2011). This section of the study will deal with the risks that threaten the 
intercultural dialogue and coexistence in Europe in five separate titles. The 
suggestions for the solutions to minimize the risks that threaten the coexistence will be 
discussed in the end of chapter. While considering these risks and solutions, unofficial 
national and international reports will also be considered and analyzed. 
 
4.1. ON THE PROBLEMS OF LIVING TOGETHER (CO-EXİSTENCE) 
 
The traditional threats in Europe have been replaced by newly defined threats 
such as “Islam, foreigners, immigrants, ghettos, mosques and minarets, Gypsies 
and radicals”. Foreigners are defined as “Others inside us who threaten our 
national integrity” and they are continued to be polarized by the statements of 
crime, violence and terror (Kaya and Şahin, 2007). But it is an inevitable necessity 
for nation states to rule the ethnic and religious minorities within them and the 
differences by tolerance and in accordance with the principles of justice and 
equality. When we look at the events in Ukraine today, the strategic importance of 
peaceful management of differences will be better understood. The risk of 
transforming the individual resistance to the other into a societal resistance is 
relevant for every multicultural nation state. Struggle with xenophobia, which has 
a risk to turn into a societal resistance, is under the liability of the political 
authorities. Determination of the social reflexes that could be shown to “others” 
by whom the same apartment or same street is shared, executing the preventive 
measures and the taming of the parties are among the main responsibilities of 
political authorities. Wise politicians, intellectuals and media have to take 
responsibility to stand against the conservative political parties and their speakers 
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who use the language of hatred towards the other within. According to Kaya and 
Şahin (2007), determinant elements can take responsibility of convincing the 
public opinion and create a peaceful and multicultural platform. Will Christian 
West and Islam be able to succeed living together and become a tolerant society in 
Europe, despite the mutual historical imaginations in the subconscious? We 
predict that the answer of this question will be “yes”, because the Muslims of 
Europe are more European than ever and they are very optimistic about harmony. 
But this answer of “yes” will only be relevant if some current and future 
conditions will be met. Some of these conditions are the development of mutual 
tolerance, leaving the ego centrist world view aside and placing the understanding 
that “we are all children of Adam and Eve”. Within the framework of these 
evaluations, the risks which threaten the social pluralism, multiculturalism and 
living together will be analyzed under separate titles. Also, the second part of this 
chapter contains constructive advices about the individual, institutional and social 
liabilities to minimize those risks that threaten living together. 
 
4.1.1. Lack of Trust and Closed Communication 
 
European countries have started to lose their competitive power and dynamism as a 
result of the global financial crises, and they also face problems such as an increase in 
elderly population and a decline in fertility rate. The inadequate number of population 
in business life increases the burden of social security and carries the risks which will 
cause political, economic and social instabilities. The Continent of Europe might be 
obliged to accept immigrants from developing countries again to continue its strategic 
importance and to close the employment gap in the first half of this century. Along 
with this prediction, the problems of current immigrants such as adaptation, social 
welfare, unemployment and radical fanaticism make this situation even more complex. 
It is possible, within the democratic lines, any possible immigration to Europe to be 
limited, prevented or guided to the required areas by national and international laws. 
But there is a definite uncertainty about the adaptation, employment and welfare of the 
immigrants living in European capitals and suburbs. Therefore, the political, judicial 
and legal authorities of the Europe have to face these problems and produce results 
before they turn into chronically cases. The reason why the immigrants return back to 
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their countries in the last ten years is the basic problems that cannot be solved in 
Europe. On the other hand, the perception of “differences and diversities” and “the 
different” through the window of fear make the situation even more inextricable. 
Friendships, neighborhood and affinity are the types of relations that were harmed by 
capitalism and globalization; and the minorities were also affected from this intolerant 
situation. The common point indicated by the political leaders who have developed a 
challenging attitude towards “multiculturalism” policies and statements is the self 
isolation of the immigrants from the society and living in ethnic and religious ghettos. 
The reflexes of the minorities to protect and sustain their traditions as they are being 
otherized by the host societies just because they are foreigners, is at the focus of critics 
today. But, the ghettoization of the minorities is not the sole point to criticize. The 
reasons why the minority communities decided to isolate themselves should be 
analyzed as well. 
 
The philosophy and message of all ancient traditions, religions and cultures is the love 
and affection to the mankind. In the sacred texts and the prophets’ statements of holy 
religions and beliefs, no distinctions have been made among the people in terms of 
religion, language, race, sect or classes. The way to establish peace and friendship in 
this century, as in every century, passes through love and affection. That is the reason 
why peace, democracy, human rights and freedoms and supremacy of law as 
indicated in European Agreement on Human Rights are accepted as universal 
values. The intolerance, discrimination and the exclusion of “other” that appeared in 
Europe, cradle of these universal values, in the last decade threatens the social peace. 
Suspending the universial principals that add spirit and dynamism to the European 
Union’s construction is against firstly to the “EU criteria” and “European values”. 
The stereotype and prejudices towards the foreigners in Europe carry out risks 
which would cause deep polarizations and social explosion. 
 
Many national and international polling agencies have reached the conclusion that 
an increase of negative ideas and attitudes in Europe against Muslims, Jews and 
Gypsies is persistent. It can be said that the perception of Islam as a local, extreme, 
conflictual and undemocratic religion caused shaping of the negative attitude 
towards Muslims in European societies. The terror events which happened in 
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different parts of the world have also played an important role in the strengthening 
of this perception. Unfortunately, a widely participate and common message of 
peace indicating that these terrorist attacks were conducted by radical elements and 
condemning those attacks with the justification of Islam as a religion of peace could 
not be prepared. A peace declaration in which all the leaders of Islamic countries 
and the clergy condemn terrorist attacks might amend the misperceptions in the 
Western world. Condemnations and peace messages were very limited except for a 
few Islamic thinkers; and the negative images and perceptions about Islam in the 
European public opinion were not fixed yet. Another reason why individual and 
common peace messages about this subject could not take place in Europe is the 
biased and unfair publication policy of the Western media. One of the most 
important reasons of the rise of anti-Semitism is the fact of Jewish ownership of the 
finance sector in the world. So, majority thinks that Jews are responsible for the 
global financial crises. According to the results of a worldwide study conducted by 
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), one of the most effective Jewish organizations in 
the world, Anti-Semitism is 69% in Turkey and Greece, 56% in Iran and 26% 
worldwide.52 
 
The principle of “accepting everyone in their own position” is one of the basic 
universal and humanitarian values, but it is not digested and accepted as needed to 
be in today’s world. Basic human values such as the fact that a piece of bread could 
remain in esophagus and cause choking are not internalized and accepted by the 
societies. The statement of “tolerance for everybody” is accepted as a principle, but 
in practice it is applied very rare or expected from the other side. “Living together” 
is accepted as an open society model, but the differences and different things are not 
tolerated. These contradictions appear more on the grounds where economic, 
political and socio-cultural problems are very intense. On such grounds where 
ambiguities are intense, the different parts of the society are perceived as potential 
threats in terms of security and social welfare. According to German sociologist 
Ulrich Beck, the ambiguities of Western modernization in social psychology have 
                                                             
52
 The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) released the results of a worldwide poll on Anti-
Semitism on May 13
th
, 2014. For more information please see; http://global100.adl.org/ 
(20.05.2014). 
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left the individuals and societies defenseless against the risks and dangers. With 
modernization, people have declared their independence, but in the same time they 
were deprived of social solidarity networks such as family and friendship which 
protected them. With the loss of social solidarity networks, people became more 
isolated (Beck, 1992). The ambiguities in internal politics, and risks such as the 
problem of immigrants and social inequality in the West are felt almost all parts of 
the life. The expectations of the European societies, which struggle with these 
structural problems, for a safe world purged from risks and dangers are increasing 
every day. Therefore, a common mind, solidarity and multi dimensional preventions 
are needed in the West to overcome those dangers and risks. In other words, the 
establishment of strong humane relations to bring the differences together depends 
on the reconstruction of love, respect and a moral understanding open to dialogue 
again. 
 
We can clearly say that today the lack of trust between the foreigners and the host 
societies in Europe has harmed the pluralist texture of the society. The need for a 
common mind of accepting “everyone within their own status by ignoring their 
religion, language, color, world view or social status” which will wipe out the 
mutual lack of trust is increasing every day. Transparency and open communication 
channels are very important to build mutual trust in the long term. Otherwise, the 
biases that need a long-term approach could not be overcome with short term and 
symbolic references (Yükleyen, 2007: 278). It should always be kept in mind that 
foreigners, especially the Muslims with different life styles and customs will 
contribute a lot to the welfare and cultural prosperity of the countries. 
 
4.1.2. The Rise of Radicalism and Racism in Europe 
 
The number of circles that perceive foreigners and Muslims with different physical 
characteristics as a threat to their own life styles, social security and job opportunities 
are increasing very fast in Europe. Especially the conservative and nationalist groups 
that perceive foreigners with different living and clothing styles as a threat are 
showing active defensive reflexes. On the top of active defense tools by these groups 
is supporting the conservative and racist right parties in local and national elections. 
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The reflex of defending “national and local”, has increased the prestige and chairs of 
the right radical political sides.  It seems that the most important problem the 
European political tradition will have to cope with in the near future is going to be 
the increasing power of radical and racist parties. These radical statements are 
nourished with a defensive reflex that can be summarized as “exclusion of non-
local and non-nationals” against the “national and local”. And this caused a 
divide within the European societies. On contrary to extreme right and racist 
political parties that consider foreigners as responsible for the economic crisis; 
social democrats and liberals are acting cautious and trying to remain neutral. As 
radical and racist statements increase the tension, social democrat and liberal 
parties had to review their political attitudes. Yet, in European democracies which 
are defined upon human rights, freedoms and pluralism; social democrats and 
liberals that claim ethnic and religious minorities have a place within, should 
protect their own policies. All the political movements against radical and racist 
policies and statements should stop competing with each other and insist on basic 
rights and freedoms.  
 
Basic universal principles such as equality, freedom, justice and tolerance can only 
survive and be sustained in a society where “other” is tolerated. These basic 
universal values which have existed in many European countries have been the 
assurance for minorities to protect and sustain their own culture and identity. 
Unfortunately, nowadays the statements of closed society that reject cultural, 
ethnic and religious diversities are being supported by more people. The public 
support for extreme right policies which are built upon national and ethnic 
identity/culture and support socio-economic, political and social security policies 
based on those, is increasing every day. We witness that extreme right parties have 
started to become more visible in Western Europe since 2000, even building 
coalitions with centrist right and left parties. The coalitions built by social 
democrat and leftist parties, which have supported the pluralist society models in 
the past, indicates the point of the political atmosphere. For instance, the Party for 
Freedoms (PVV) in the Netherlands, an anti-foreigner and anti-Islam political 
party, was a partner of the coalition, and gained 15.5% of the votes in 2010 
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elections. Finally, the same political party had 13.2% of the votes in 2014 
European Parliament elections, and this is not surprising for anyone. After the 
murders of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo van Gogh (2004) in the Netherlands, 
public support for anti-foreigners and anti-Islam political parties has increased 
gradually. The murder of Theo van Gogh by a Moroccan immigrant who was 
under the effect of radical Islamic movements was perceived as an indicator by the 
Dutch public opinion that Muslims could not adapt to the society yet. The reactions 
towards Bouyeri and the radical elements on which he was grown up have turned into 
the reactions towards the government, criticizing that the government showed too 
much tolerance and understanding towards the immigrants. After these two events, 
the number of people who have taken the warnings and criticisms of Dutch politicians 
and media on the adaptation of Muslims have increased (Hajer and Uitermark, 2008). 
The negative perception of foreigners in the Netherlands was channeled to the 
Muslim immigrants after these two events. 
 
Table 2. Results of the Far-Right Parties in the 2014 European Parliament 
Elections 
Countries The Far-Right Parties European Parliament (22-25 
May, 2014) 
United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) 
%26,77 
Denmark Danish People’s Party (DF) %26,6 
France National Front (FN) %24,95 
Austria Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) %19,72 
Hungary Jobbik Party %14,6 
The Netherlands Party of Freedom (PVV) %13,32 
Finland True Finns (PS) %12,9 
Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) %9,7 
Greece Golden Dawn (XA) %9,38 
Germany Alternative for Germany (AfD) %7 
Belgium Vlaams Belang Party %4,14 
      Source: TNS/Scytl in cooperation with the European Parliament, 2014 
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The Eighth European Parliament elections that were held in 28 members of the 
European Union on May 22-25, 2014 witnessed the rise of anti-EU and anti-
foreigner extreme right parties. The votes indicated on Table 2 which shows the 
rise of extreme right and racist, anti-European Union political parties in the 
European Parliament elections also goes in parallel with the rise of discrimination 
and exclusion in Europe. The reason of a low level of participation which is even 
below 50% in the elections of European Parliament is the lack of European Union 
in meeting the expectations and the disappointment of people who were deprived 
from social rights. The financial crisis of 2008 is the turning point for the rise of 
extreme right in Europe, but these results cannot only be defined by financial 
crises. Xenophobia, anti-Islam, anti-EU and nationalist statements are used by 
extreme right political parties as a propaganda tool. J.M. Le Pen, the leader of the 
National Front (FN) in France has defined Muslims and foreigners as invaders 
who have taken the jobs of the real French people. Le Pen suggested that all 
Muslim foreigners should be expelled from the country as a solution for 
unemployment (Michalak and Saeed, 2004). In European democracies where 
human rights and freedoms are guaranteed, the existence of a mental structure 
which rests on hatred and hostility harms the culture of living together.  
 
On the other hand, the effort of many extreme right parties to tell about the fear of 
Islam and foreigners to the public by using racist and nationalist figures harms the 
social communication. Ban on veil and headscarf, of which France leads, is 
polarizing the social layers and forces a group of Muslims to live in ghettos within 
the same city. The National Front (FN) in France has used the slogan of “No to 
Islamism” for 2010 local elections. In the brochure that was printed with this 
slogan, a woman in veil and a map of France painted with the Algerian flag and 
filled with minarets were used as a way to increase the votes through the image of 
Islam. In the elections for Berlin State Parliament in Germany, extreme right 
the National Democratic Party of German (NPD) has prepared banners and 
posters that contain xenophobia and hostility to Islam. One of the election 
brochures had a drawing of a woman in veil, a man with turban and a black 
person sitting on a flying carpet with writing “Have a Good Flight Home 
(Guten Heimflug)”. In another banner a mosque was drawn into a red circle and 
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crossed out with a red line. Under this brochure, they wrote “Vote for Thilo’s 
Theses”, referring to the Social Democrat Party of Germany (SPD) members 
Thilo Sarazzin’s53 criticism of the Muslim immigrants.54 
The terrorist attacks that happened on September 11 in New York and 
continued in some capitals in Europe and then in Moscow have devastated the 
societies in Western world and created a fearful environment. The terrorist 
organization Al-Qaeda bombed Neva Shalom and Beth Israel synagogues in 
Istanbul on November 15, 2003 and by targeting the religious places, proved 
that terror has no religion at all. The reason of global terrorism choosing Turkey 
as a local action area is the perception of Turkey as a country which could wipe 
out the clash of civilizations between Islam and the West (Göle, 2010: 79). The 
management of the terrorist activities which threaten the peace and security of 
Muslim, Jewish and Christian communities under the “Islamic terror” cannot be 
defined with good will. The interpretation of terror as a part of Islam creates a 
psychological pressure on the Muslims. It is obvious that majority of Muslims 
reject and criticize the radical and militant Islam in different parts of the world. 
It is also obvious that the radical and militant groups which criticize West and 
the Western values and call for “jihad” against the West are causing fears and 
concerns in the Western society. But Muslims are not a side and source of these 
fears and concerns. As terror has no religion, each type of terror is not religious. 
It has to be understood that the groups which have a security risk both in and out of 
                                                             
53
 Economist Thilo Sarrazin, a member of German Central Bank executive board has 
developed a racist statement by saying that “Muslims have collapsed and downgraded 
Germany”. Sarrazin also claimed that the foreigners who came by migration are not smart 
enough because of their different races.  On the other hand Sarrazin defined the high rate 
in immigrant fertility as a risk for the future of the country. After these racist and 
nationalist statements, the polls in Germany showed that 18% of the Germans wanted to 
see Sarrazin as the future prime minister of the country. Sarrazin’s book 
“Germany Destroys Itself”  has become one of the most popular books in 
Germany since World War II.   
EurActiv – EU News and Politics Portal (2011), “Norveç’teki Saldırıların Ardından 
Sarrazin’in ‘Almanya Kendini Yok Ediyor’ Kitabı Tartışılıyor”, 
http://www.euractiv.com.tr/abnin-gelecegi/article/norvecteki-saldirilarin-ardindan-
sarrazinin-almanya-kendiniyok-ediyor-kitabi-tartisiliyor-020144 (19.03.2014). 
54
 ‘Almanya’da aşırı sağcı partiden yabancı düşmanı seçim kampanyası’, Hürriyet 
Newspaper, for more information, please see; 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/18441977.asp (13.02.2014). 
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Europe are not the Muslims, but the terrorists (Ross, 2004: 3). On the other hand, it 
should always be kept in mind that terrorism as one of the most dangerous problems 
today is also a threat for Islam and the real Muslims. It is known that the radical 
Islamic organizations that kill innocent people and Muslims in various parts of the 
world including Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; harm the image of Islam at enormous 
levels. Therefore, radical Islamic terror has an important role on the basis of biases 
that threaten the coexistence and social relations in Europe where millions of 
Muslims are living. Terrorist groups that claim to defend Islam and rights of 
Muslims are the main sources of fear and concerns towards Islam in the West. Civil 
society organizations, churches, Islamic organizations, people and politicians 
considered as a role model by the young generations must immediately support the 
efforts to wipe out those fears and concerns in Europe. 
The Continent of Europe has left the turbulent era in the first half of last century 
behind and showed remarkable improvements in areas such as participatory 
democracy, human rights, social security and free market economy. As the most 
peaceful and prosper period of the European history is witnessed, the increasing 
treat of potential racism has reached to the levels to disrupt the peace and prosper of 
the continent. Especially the boom in racist violent attacks after September 11 has 
stranded the European Union and its members who advocate the basic rights and 
freedoms (Yılmaz, 2008: 43). Even though the scientific studies and official reports 
explain the reasons behind the racism under a couple of titles, problem is deeper 
and more complicated. The increasing numbers of foreigners in Europe, the 
adaptation problems, reducing job opportunities and the psychological subconscious 
reflexes developed through national/religious identity have started to change the 
perception of foreigners. The existence and adaptation problems of ethnic and 
religious groups that became more visible along with the economic crises witnessed 
are criticized by extreme rights and conservative groups in the hardest way possible. 
Certain groups accept the criticisms of anti-Islam and anti-immigrant parties at 
higher levels. One of the most important factors that affected the behavior of voters 
is the negative propaganda conducted through xenophobia (Nonneman, 2007). The 
unknown cultures, religions, languages and habits of the foreigners who come from 
distant parts of the world and start to share the the welfare of the European countries, 
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pass through the tolerance test of the Western people (Ireland, 2004). It should be 
known that organized political movements which are against Islam and immigrants 
display an intolerant European picture to the world. It should also be known that 
immigrants always contribute a lot to the prosperity and cultural well being of the 
country they live in.  
 
By mentioning some of the evaluations about the psychological progress of 
extreme right, conservative and racist tendencies that develop policies through 
national identity, religion and social class; we can understand the new face of 
racism in a better way. The borders of the countries determined in accordance 
with the historical development in the nation-states have been considered as 
identical with the borders of individuals and groups at psychological levels. This 
subconscious reflex has interestingly contributed to the development of a stronger 
individual and national identity (Volkan, 1988: 128-129). European integration 
which defends political and economic unity threatens the emotional reflex and the 
meaning attributed to national borders in the sub consciousness of individuals and 
groups psychologically. These anti-feelings which are revealed by emotional 
reflexes strengthen the national group identity in masses and nourish nationalism, 
even racism. Old Europe has created the individual and group identities based on 
democracy and human rights through long-lasting struggles and wars. The risk of 
losing the free individual and group identity acquired by the foreigners who did 
not complete the required transformation yet, creates a psychological concern. 
Another reason of the nationalist tendencies in Europe is to force the target groups 
give up their own identities and absorb the European one, as in the period of 
colonialism. Finally, the ideal of creating religious, cultural, social and political 
homogeneous societies in old Europe grounds nationalism and racism today. 
 
It is obvious that racism is one of the biggest risks which threaten living together 
and pluralist society in Europe. Racism, as one of the ideological tools of nation-
states which appeared after the French Revolution, is a recent global problem 
witnessed in several regions of the world. Robert Maier (2002: 91) aligns the 
elements which directly affect racism and which are dependent to each other, 
under three separate headings. First of them is the rapid transformation of the 
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social structure which deeply affected the social dependence in societies. Second 
one is the division within societies such as rich-poor and employed-unemployed. 
And the third one is the failure of the nation-state to provide justice (cited by 
Yılmaz, 2008: 31). Masses affected from the ambiguities stem from 
unemployment and economic stagnation, increasingly support the racist and 
xenophobic statements of populist politicians. The efficacy and competency of 
national governments and European Union in terms of struggling the racism and 
xenophobia are not enough to meet the requirements. Also, we cannot say that the 
adaptation policies and approaches appropriate with the pluralist structure of the 
societies are in a level to make cultural interaction possible yet. 
 
The regular and perfectionist understanding of the European culture have a hard, 
intolerant and nationalist attitude towards the irregular and unsteady foreign 
characters. European people have achieved to integrate urbanization and urban 
culture with the public sphere and they highly criticize the non-Western 
Asian/African life styles sustained in the public sphere in a very harsh way. A 
certain part of the foreigners who could not internalize the determined rules of the 
public sphere, withdraw themselves into their own borders and refrain 
communication. Those foreigners who consider the public and social spheres as 
threat to their own life style, national culture and religious values can easily move 
away from those and become fanatics of radical religious and ideological structures. 
These networks of relations which are far away from communication with outside 
have no efforts or aims about living together at all. Discrimination, racism and 
xenophobia which nourish these unhealthy networks of relations are other obstacles 
for normalization. Radical elements at the opposite sides are actually sides which 
complete each other. 
 
4.1.3. Unilateralism of Basic Rights and Freedoms 
 
The liberalization of the multicultural and pluralist societies in Europe and 
helping them acquire a more participatory ground will only be possible by 
eliminating the distinctions on religion, language, culture and ethnicity. 
Discrimination which caused the alienation and isolation of ethno-cultural and 
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religious minorities in Europe is completely against the democratic and liberal 
basic rights and freedoms. In spite of these basic universal values, discriminations 
are made in various fields such as education, health and social services in Europe. 
Foreigners can usually have jobs as cashiers, security guard or cleaners which are 
basically low level income groups and as workers in the service sector. An unjust 
evaluation is made in job applications by considering the independent variables 
such as ethnic identity and religious affiliation. Relating the high unemployment 
rate among foreigners with the inequalities and discriminations in reaching the job 
opportunities will be a deficient evaluation. Most of the foreigners coming from 
Africa, Northern Iraq and Africa are unsuccessful in the jobs that require work 
experience and specialization. Those foreigners who cannot seize the opportunity 
in the jobs that require specializations usually establish their own businesses. For 
instance, the immigrants of Turkish origin have opened pizza, doner kebab 
restaurants in many countries of Europe, and brought a new cuisine culture into 
the European cuisine. As for the new generations, the employment is mostly in 
jobs that require information, technology and expertise. 
 
On the other hand, another reason why foreigners live in ghettos is the inadequacy 
of physical space which obliges them to live in houses with bad condition. 
Because the foreigners are exposed to illegal discriminative and racist treatments 
in cluster and private housing sectors and could not own houses in new 
settlements. In Northern Scandinavian countries prefer ground houses to avoid 
this discriminative treatment. It is also seen that the house owners are being 
oppressed about the rental of their houses not to rent their houses to foreigners. 
This discriminative attitude caused many negative results, but a positive result has 
been the acquisition of more houses by foreigners. 
 
Today, many EU countries still do not recognize Islam as a religion. Some 
countries recognize Islam, but it is forbidden for some religious liabilities such as 
the veil to be used in public space. Again, the ban on the full-faced veil and the 
burqa because of “safety precaution” in some countries and the fines applied is 
another antidemocratic implementation. “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union” has assured that all children have the right to be educated 
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according to their own religious beliefs. Same statement also indicates that 
cultural, religious and linguistic diversities will be respected. On contrary to these 
basic principles, the accumulation of immigrant children in certain schools 
disproportionally is against the equal opportunities. Low quality education and 
high level of violence in schools where immigrant children are the majority is a 
result of his unjust policy. Some countries’ employment of religious teachers to 
provide the Muslim kids with the basic Islamic knowledge should be taken as an 
example by other countries. On the other hand, a certain part of foreign students 
are directed to low level vocational schools with the request of their teachers, and 
their families are not aware of that. Finally, unilateral, unjust and racist attitudes 
in the education of children, the next generations of Europe, should be avoided.  
 
Salman Rushdie’s fourth novel the “Satanic Verses” was published in 1988, in 
2004 Theo van Gogh’s movie named the “Submission” which had the Muslim 
women as a subject, publication of cartoons in 2005 which insulted the Prophet of 
Islam in 2005 in a newspaper of Denmark and the movie in America (2012) with 
the name the “Innocence of Muslims” which insulted the Prophet of Islam and the 
Muslims have all caused the discussion of the limits of freedom of thought. In all 
of these provocations and agitations listed above chronologically, disrespectful 
defamations about Islam and its prophet were done and religious sacred were 
insulted. Muslim world showed an excessive and unlimited reaction to these 
insults and tens of innocent people have died during the protests. Producer of the 
movie the “Submission”, Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Moroccan Muslim 
in Amsterdam. Most distressing side of the events that began in many Muslim 
countries, including Egypt and Libya, after the movie the “Innocence of Muslims”, 
is the murder of American ambassador in Libya. The aggressive and provocative 
initiatives are evaluated within the scope of basic rights assured by the Article 1o 
of European Agreement on Human Rights which is about “freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion”. It can be seen that “respect to the sacred” principle has a 
different meaning and evaluation both for Islam and the Western world. But, 
reconciliation is needed to clarify the contradiction between “freedom of thought” 
and “freedom of defamation” and to draw the lines of freedom. The reconciliation 
is needed because of the aggressive initiatives behind the name of freedom of 
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expression which aim to polarize and hostile nations each other. The 
reconciliation is needed, because there are provocative actions which agitate the 
streets in the name of respect to the sacred and which cause the deaths of people. 
 
There is an urban legend in some European countries that the social rights such as 
unemployment aid, early retirement and rental aid are being abused by the 
foreigners. But the official researches indicate that the social aids provided by the 
state are abused by all sections of the society. Also, numerous bureaucratic 
obstacles are faced with the foreigners in terms of determining the validity of 
social aid demands. This is another reflection of unequal opportunities. It is a 
serious human rights and inequality problem that the foreigners who appeal to the 
judges could not find any justice about this issue. Justice is for everyone and no 
discrimination should be made. Individuals who do not trust justice and law 
isolate themselves from the society and become alienated. The unjust and 
discriminative policies conducted by social security and justice systems towards 
the foreigners harm the tractability of the state and push the masses to radical 
tendencies. On the other hand, the rights such as double citizenship and social 
security rights provided to the foreigners in some countries have disturbed some 
groups. In some European countries, groups who have lost some social 
opportunities like unemployment insurance after some new regulations have 
considered the foreigners responsible and started to see them as a “burden” on the 
social system (Yılmaz, 2008: 78). Positive discrimination towards some 
minorities have been criticized by extreme right parties and defined as 
discrimination towards the Europeans themselves (Vural, 2005: 196-199). 
 
The search for justice by foreigners who have been subjected to racist physical 
attacks and verbal insults in Europe are remaining inconclusive. On the contrary, 
cases where foreigners are blamed end very fast with rapid and effective 
interrogations and the appeals are carried to the courts immediately. Bad and 
arbitrary treatments of the security forces, long lasting and unhealthy custodies, 
unjust arrests and humiliating behaviors push the individuals outside the system 
and into the web of radical organizations. Many European Union members have 
immediately passed the laws which limit the protection of human rights after the 
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attacks of September 11 and to the European capitals. After September 11 attacks 
Muslims have been considered as “security problem” in America and Europe and 
faced with serious pressures that limit civil rights. 21
st
 century Europe which 
refers to basic rights and freedoms has started to implement policies that limited 
the civil rights and laws that possess the security forces with unlimited authorities. 
This caused a problem for the EU in the eyes of world public opinion. On the 
other hand, as social services take the Muslim kids who are victims of violence 
from their families, this causes many family tragedies and affects the psychology 
of the kids very deep. Giving a Muslim child to a non-Muslim family is not an 
implementation to be explained by social security principle. Finally, the 
distinctive implementation of basic rights and freedoms for natives and for 
foreigners is against the democratic legal norms. 
 
The just demands of minorities are evaluated as “search for justice and equality” 
by the Western countries (Kymlicka, 1995). These just demands do not constitute 
any threat to the social security and democratic identity of the West. According to 
Kymlicka, who thinks that search of justice will naturally be preferred over the 
security concerns; “search for justice and equality” is parallel to the diversity 
statements of Europe. Demands of collective rights are very important for 
minority groups, as they can reach the individual freedoms through those. 
Kymlicka (1995) defines the protection of minority rights by nation states as 
“unity-in-diversity”. Brian Barry (2001) warns Kymlicka about this and 
emphasizes the negative results of providing privileged and special “group rights” 
to minorities. Barry (2991) proposes a model which emphasizes individual rights 
rather than “privileged group rights”, and he calls it “unity-over-diversity” (cited 
by Kaya and Şahin, 2007). Democratic search of rights by minorities, whether 
individual or collective, will contribute to the protection of cultural diversity and 
the interaction among cultures.  
 
4.1.4. Security Walls of Open Societies 
 
Narrow urban areas where ethnic, religious and cultural visions became mono typed, 
are one of the most obvious proofs that the “multiculturalism” policies in Europe 
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have become dysfunctional. Narrow urban ghettos where intra-group relations 
network is very intense are the side areas where the need for housing is easily 
fulfilled, where relations between families and friends are experienced more 
intensely and where the traditional consumption needs are easily met. The problem 
of finding an appropriate housing in city centers, problem of school registration and 
other socio economic problems force ethnic and religious groups to live in ghettos 
which are also called as “parallel regions”. As the national borders of the EU 
countries are lifted by the Schengen, new walls are built around the ghettos by 
exclusion and otherization. The minority groups who live in these narrow areas 
where housing and education qualities are low, are considered as the biggest obstacle 
in front of living together in Europe. The reasons that force the homogenization of 
certain ethnic/religious groups in certain regions are exclusion/divergence from the 
host society, radicalization and socio-economic isolation. The report published by 
the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of the Europe (2011: 22) warned 
that socio-economic unjust treatments might push the people living in ghettos to 
discontent and loneliness. The report also emphasized those individuals who 
could not have a more qualitative comfort of life, education and services can 
become aggressive and that may cause a radicalization in the individuals.  
 
In a report prepared by the Statistic Netherlands (CBS, 2008: 9), it was 
emphasized that the chances of encounter between the foreigners who are 
intensifying on housing, business and education and the Dutch are decreasing. 
According to Canatan (2011: 18-21), we can talk about the concept of 
ghettoization is the spatial intensification of ethnic groups limit their social 
relations and decrease/diminish the chances for them to encounter the members of 
the host society. Either with the own will of the minority groups or with a 
deliberative otherization by the majority, ethnic and socioeconomic intensification 
in specific regions clearly define ghettoization. Lack of mutual communication 
and information has a big role in the accumulation of ethnic and religious 
minorities in the specific regions of open societies. Distinctive statements and 
actions used by extreme right and conservative policies to separate the societies 
build high walls between the foreigners and the host societies. Efforts of just and 
moral politicians are unfortunately not enough to pass through these high walls. 
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Robert Maier (2002) handles the starting points of negative perceptions which 
cause immigrants to isolate themselves from the society as problematic groups. 
First of all is the exploitation of the problems that stem from migration and 
immigrants by the nationalist and xenophobic political parties. Second one is the 
strict policies of traditional democratic parties on migration and immigrants and 
the recognition of the problems caused by foreigners directly by the governments. 
And the third one is the exclusion of “other” by the direct results of European 
integration in economic, political and socio-cultural areas. According to Yılmaz 
(2008: 107-108), R. Maier claims that Europe is either directly or indirectly 
isolating the “other” from the society by using either one of these three points, in 
short that Europe is promoting racism. On the other hand the biased and 
polarizing publications by local, national and international media increase the 
range of polarizations. Some manners not approved by Islam and the majority of 
Muslims – violence to women, honor killing, terror etc.- are used as exaggerated 
in the Western media, increasing the biases and hatred. That news must be 
announced along with correct information and expert views to the public. Creating 
a perception by attributing some unpleasant manners and traditions to Muslims 
and Islam means the misguidance of the public opinion.  
As the communist threat was ended with the downfall of the Berlin Wall (German: 
Berliner Mauer), the remembrance of Europe’s geographical, cultural and religious 
borders to differentiate and protect Europe from Islam, brings the question whether 
a new “wall” is built in Europe or not. Europe constructs itself not only by 
remembering its past, but also by forgetting it. The downfall of the Berlin Wall 
made it possible to remember the common history and identities; but ignoring the 
“others” and leaving them behind the walls indicates the role of a selective memory 
(Göle, 2010: 40-41). “Others” are in the focus of fear within the society they are living 
because either their cultures are unknown or the possibility of their culture to change 
and alienate the majority culture (Master and Le Roy, 2000: 425). “Others” do not 
prefer to live in ghettos because they consider themselves superior or more skilled than 
the majority of the society. Those people who have worked under the hardest 
conditions and contributed to the economic development and progress of the countries 
where they live prefer ghettos as a result of discrimination based on ethnic origins. 
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“Others” have been left alone, isolated and considered as a separate part of the society 
both in demographic and cultural ways. The irony of famous Swiss author Max Frisch 
in 1966, “We called for workers, but it was human beings who came”, displays the 
neglecting of humanitarian and social dimension of the migration. The mechanical 
worker-human-commodity understanding of the official authorities has deprived the 
immigrants from the basic legal assurances, aside with any efforts to strengthen their 
social position and provide social participation (Canatan, 1990: 56-75). The revolts 
began in the back streets and suburbs of Paris in October 2005 had no religious or 
ethnic motivations, but those were reactions of the people who were living behind the 
walls and whose existence was almost forgotten. Immigrant children were forgotten at 
schools, cultural identities were ignored on the streets, an upper identity was forced for 
adaptation, compromises in public sphere were requested and the others were 
considered as “second class”. There is a need of more responsible, just and common 
understanding that rests on humanitarian relations; instead of forgetting, compulsory 
and patronizing. This common understanding will accept “everyone in his or her own 
position” and its implementation will decrease the social divisions and polarizations on 
individual, societal and political grounds. 
 
4.1.5. Return to Traditional Fears in Europe 
 
In response to extremist and radical tendencies in Islamic world which try to 
construct a base by using anti-Western; another coalition of anti-Islam and 
struggle with radicalism is trying to be built in the West. The “communist threat” 
has left its place to the “threat of Islam” in the Western bloc after the end of the 
Cold War. As Islam has been shown as the enemy of Western culture and values, 
“Islamic fundamentalism” has been put on the target as a threat to the West 
(Çarhoğlu, 2007: 207-213.) A group of politicians, administrators and media 
organs   see Islam as a threat and guide the public opinion accordingly, thereby 
provide the Islamic fundamentalism to gain more supporters. On the other hand, 
some centers which have defined their sides in accordance with the “Clash of 
Civilizations” thesis which rests upon a critical view towards Islamic civilization and 
conflict, written by Harvard University Professor Samuel Huntington in 1993 and 
published in the Foreign Affairs, have declared war on Muslims and their diversities 
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within Europe. After the end of the Cold War, nations in old Europe with an aim of 
becoming a welfare and social state have defined themselves through some fears and 
concerns. These definitions with a tendency of ideological and structural introversion 
in the Western European countries have become more visible after the September 11 
attacks, followed by attacks in European capitals. Already existing fears and concerns 
have become more intensive in European countries where Muslim minorities live, 
after September 11. Western world has created a line of defense and a new 
“psychological reflex” appeared which suspended the multiculturalists policies, 
became introversive and alienating. European public began to be more concerned with 
the fluctuations and fragility of the global markets, and started to develop a racist and 
xenophobia against the immigrant workers whom they thought are taking the job 
opportunities they have (Yılmaz, 2008: 75).  
 
Since 1990s when the European integration accelerated; identity problems, stance 
against expansion, social exclusion and the concerns created about the sharing of 
the welfare have been the factors that strengthened the extreme right parties and 
groups. According to the analysis of Strategic Thinking Institute’s analysis of 
2011; extreme right groups have claimed that the integration projects weakened 
the nation-state structure and they increased their votes and public support 
accordingly (İnanç and Çetin, 2011). The racist, discriminative and exclusive 
statements and implications conducted through xenophobia in Europe threaten the 
basic right s and freedoms, before anything else. The reports of human rights 
organizations emphasize that the immigrants and asylums in European countries 
have been violated and maltreated with the excuse of a threat of terror. After the 
Madrid (2004) and London (2005) terror attacks, very strict safety precautions 
against Muslims have been taken and they have been interrogated undeservedly, 
just like the September 11 (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Extreme right parties 
which are against Islam and foreigners have used these terrorist attacks in their 
election campaigns and blamed the immigrants for threatening the safety and 
economic welfare of the EU citizens. Extreme nationalist parties are the architects 
of anti-immigrant policies and they have blamed the immigrants to cause an 
increase in the crime rates within the EU societies. These extreme right and racist 
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political parties aim to expand their social bases and are committing a “hate crime” 
in their societies by creating hatred and otherization with a focus on fear.  
 
The accumulation of an approximate of 20% of the votes by extreme right and 
racist parties in the general elections of last five years has made the European 
political life to be reshaped. These new racist tendencies, aiming to create religious, 
cultural, social and political homogeneous societies are of great concern for the 
ethnic and religious minorities (Laquer, 2003: 176). According to a research 
conducted, the number of neo-Nazi which was about 2.200 in 2000s, have reached 
to 5.600 in ten years. This number gives us a hint about the expansion of social and 
political bases of racist ideas. The Holocaust which happened in the near history of 
Germany causes the official authorities and public opinion in Europe to be more 
careful and precautious towards extreme right and nationalist groups. But the arson 
of the houses of foreigners and murdering by the neo-Nazis makes it a necessity to 
be more careful and attentive. The Party for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders, who 
is one of the leaders of anti-Islam movement in Europe, has helped the 
establishment of the minority government in the Netherlands with the external 
support. Extreme right political parties such as the Progress Party in Norway, the 
Danish People’s Party (DF) in Denmark and the Sweden Democrats (SD) in 
Sweden have increased their votes and became members of the Parliaments, which 
are clear indicators that a very threatening atmosphere is being experienced (İnanç 
and Çetin, 2011; Vural, 2005). On the other hand, the resistance and social reactions 
against the construction of mosques in Europe is an expression of deep traditional 
fears. The carton crisis in Denmark (2005), ban on minarets in Switzerland (2009) 
and the burial of a pig under a mosque in 2011 along with the arson of mosques in 
many countries are the indicators of return to traditional fears in Europe. 
 
We can say that the national concerns raised after the end of the Cold War in 
Europe have become deepened with the fear and concern after September 11 
terrorist attacks. The global terror attacks spread to European capitals after 
September 11 caused the worldwide spread of fear of Islam and opened a new 
area of struggle for the foreigners, who already had a tough harmonization process. 
Another challenge is the fear that the national security will be put in front of 
151 
 
freedoms and democratic acquisitions and the struggle is against Western nation 
states and European Union. It seems that anti-immigration, anti-Islam and anti-
European Union (EU) have become more visible with the return of traditional 
fears. Reciprocal distrust, radicalism and racism, violation of rights, limitation of 
freedoms and the traditional fears are the problems at the focal point of social 
concerns in 21
st
 century Europe. European immigrants and executives who will 
challenge these problems and concerns with responsibility will take better steps into 
the future. 
 
4.2. FROM CONFLICT TO DIALOGUE IN EUROPE 
 
In our current world where globalization is still on a pace and the communication 
technologies do not have any boundaries, the need for the existence of an agreeable 
and conciliatory dialogue and environment among civilizations, nations, cultures and 
people is increasing gradually. An understanding of open society should be validated 
with an idea of multi civilization, multiculturalism and multi religiosity instead of the 
closed understanding which divides the world into two separate blocs, Western and 
non-Western. The population movements directed from Anatolia, cradle of many 
civilizations and cultures, towards Europe could play a historical role in the vitalizing 
of cultural relations. Today, it is possible for differences to live together in peace in a 
Europe where civilizations, religions and cultures collide and become neighbors. This 
study, on contrary with the thesis of clash of civilizations which has well-known 
defenders such as S. Huntington and Bernard Lewis, does not accept the thesis that 
differences will cause conflict. This study defends the idea, similar with Richard 
Bulliet’s (2007) approach, that religions cannot be used as tools of conflict and that 
two ancient civilizations (Islam and Christianity) which existed together throughout 
the history can live together today, too. This chapter makes assumptions through the 
existence of European Muslims, in particular the European Turkish society in West; 
and tries to prove that differences can live together by the positive approaches 
summarized under four general titles. 
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4.2.1. The Self-Criticism of the Past and Constructing of the Future 
 
Muslims and Buddhists in the Southeast Asian countries, Jews and Muslims in the 
Palestine, Muslims and Christians in the Central Africa; along with Muslims in 
the Middle East among themselves and Christians in Ukraine between themselves 
keep on killing each other as the world watches. Whatever the starting point of 
religions and beliefs are, power relations and benefits might capture the masses 
and leaders tragically.55 Differences about religion, language, race and color have 
been the sources of hostility throughout the history. Until the French Revolution 
in 1789, the conflict stemmed from differences was basically around religious and 
sectarian issues. Nationalism began to be crystallized after the French Revolution 
and ethnic differences were added into the image of “other” along with religious 
and sectarian ones. Different ethnic groups that share the same religious belief 
have started to justify their supremacy on the “other” to their cultural values 
brought by racist and ethnic roots (Öktem, 2010: 63-64). According to Bulliet 
(2007: 23), what prevents us to imagine a Muslim-Christian civilization is the 
historical statement relies on fourteen century long fear and argumentation and the 
widespread belief in the West that there is something “wrong” with the Islam. But 
when we look as a whole and with a historical perspective, we can see that the 
thing unite the worlds of Islam and Christianity are much more than the things 
that separate them. 
 
Western modernization project based on secular mind and science has at first 
created an enormous philosophical/mental pressure on Eastern societies, and in 
particular the Muslim societies through the Orientalism. The presentation of non-
Western societies as barbarian tribes by using Western oriented classical 
modernity methodologies, and putting them as ignorant societies that need to be 
“civilized” have created the ground of justification for the West to expand 
globally (Nişancı and Çaylak, 2010: 225-226).  West considers its own historical 
                                                             
55
 Alan Strathern from Oxford University who investigated the massacres and genocide in 
Myanmar and Sri Lanka wrote how the Buddhist doctrine turned into a language of 
violence. The title of the article which is published at BBC TURKISH is “Why do 
Buddhists Kill Muslims?” For more information, please see; 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25440010/ (15.08.2013). 
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past and cultural identity as “universal and unique” and therefore tried to establish 
its sovereignty on other civilizations and cultures of the world. Mono typist 
understanding of sovereignty and relation brings civilizations against each other 
with an attitude far from dialogue and open to conflict. According to Samuel 
Huntington (1996), the universalism claim of the West is the starting point for the 
conflicts with other civilizations- especially Islam and Chinese civilizations. 
Huntington (1996) also correlated Islamic radicalism with the current nature of 
the Islamic culture. But, this generalizing conclusion of Huntington is beyond the 
Islamic fundamentalism and directed to the Islam itself. Neither Islam not the 
Western world are unique by themselves. As the history of Islam clearly indicates, 
the mainstream Islam has always rejected or pushed to the edges the radicals and 
extremists in law and religiosity (Esposito, 2003: 157-159). Dr. Hursid Ahmed 
from Pakistan aligns the factors that obstruct the relations between Western and 
Islamic civilizations as imperialism, economic exploitation, education and cultural 
dominance of the West, abuse by Christianity and attack on Islam (Ahmed, 2011: 
19-25). According to Roger Garaudy (2013: 152) the Western sciences today are 
dominated by positivism, as the Western humanitarian relations are dominated by 
individualism. Western culture considers West as the center. West considers itself 
as the only center of historical breakthroughs and the sole creator of values; 
therefore cannot imagine a separate progress model different than its own.  
 
The trails of the Islam image of Europeans have on their minds have continued 
until today, even though centuries passed. The mass communication devices in 
West and East continue to define the Islamic movements and new establishments 
in the Islamic world as extremism, backwards, fanaticism and terror (Zakzuk, 
2006: 87). The dissemination of administrative, cultural and religious effects of 
Islam to wide areas has always been a concern for Europe. In spite of the amazing 
developments Islam civilization experienced in certain periods, many authors in 
the West have mentioned the scientific, cultural and administrative developments 
in Islam very rarely. Therefore the Orientalism accepted Islam as a constant 
element of agitation and became an ecole which tries all the possible ways to 
struggle with it (Said, 1998: 112). Still, many Western originated researchers have 
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showed efforts to overcome that negative image, but these scientific studies did 
not do enough to delete the image constructed in the minds of the people for 
centuries. The importance of building relationships based on mutual tolerance and 
respect between the Islamic world and Western civilization increases gradually to 
self criticize the past and build a common future. It is a must to build peace and 
stability through a common mind of all sides in the current period when all mutual 
interests are interconnected. 
 
The Japanese origin American Francis Fukuyama claimed in his article published 
in the National Interest in 1989 named as “The End of History?” that the Western 
liberalism has gained its biggest victory after the collapse of communism. 
According to F. Fukuyama, who also has been a consultant for the American 
presidents about the national security, Western liberalism has obtained a constant 
and perpetual dominance on all social ideas and philosophies on the world after 
the end of communism. Fukuyama’s contradictory opinion takes the methodology 
of “conflict” as the basic in relations with the “others”. This opinion is based on 
conflict and struggle, and takes the “Western civilization model” which limits the 
living area of weak civilizations and cultures, into the center. Samuel Huntington 
(1993, 1996) has already mentioned in his work named the “Clash of Civilizations” 
that Western civilization will involve in a struggle with other civilizations, and 
especially Islam. Huntington proposed the unification of the own civilization and 
the dominance of non-Western civilizations to be eradicated. In other words, 
author gives the hints about how to diminish the non-Western civilizations in the 
future through “inter-civilizational clashes”. Olivier Roy (2013: 21-22) 
summarized this situation as “Islam never determines the clashes by its own, even 
though it is claimed that Muslims are involved in a majority of modern clashes”. 
If we look at the history, we will see that none of the civilizations had the 
opportunity to dominate the world by its own. Many civilizations throughout the 
history had huge effects on the world as a result of interrelations of many cultures; 
humanity always had multiple civilizations within a certain period. 
 
The Western Civilization has witnessed numerous regional and internal wars, as in 
the “Hundred Years Wars”. But the same the Western Civilization also has 
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achieved great revolutions such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the 
Industrial Revolution. And the same the Western Civilization hosted many new 
developments such as democracy, liberalism, capitalism and modernism which 
have affected the nations of the world. After World War II, Muslims have migrated 
to the old Europe to fulfill the gap of workers. The migration of Arabs, Asians and 
Turkish Muslims to Europe is a huge religious and ethnic mobility, not as big as the 
Migration of Tribes, and its effect will be understood throughout the time. The 
approach based on conflict, which is emphasized by Bernard Lewis (1990) and 
Samuel P. Huntington (1993) with a Western centered view has reached to a new 
dimension with the settlement of millions of Muslims to the West. The single 
civilization role laid on the West and the perception that non-Western civilizations 
are simple actors, are changing every day. The rise of a Muslim middle class in 
Europe and the interaction of the representatives of two ancient civilizations 
necessitate new sociological analyses. One of these analyses is the prediction of a 
pluralist social life in the West, and especially in Europe, which will keep different 
religions and civilizations, different culture and identities together. 
 
European politicians, intellectuals and civil society organizations started to 
determine new models for the adaptation of the Muslim immigrants. According to 
the interpretation by “neo-liberalism” which is formulated by Paul Berman (2004), 
Islam has to be liberalized and tailored with the Western norms or the liberal values 
should be defended against Islamism. According to neoliberals the conflict will not 
be between Islamic and Western civilizations; but between Islamism 56  and the 
liberal values of Europe (Bekaroğlu, 2009: 48). The adaptation model of neoliberals 
predicts two images of Muslims; a Muslim image that accepts the Western liberal 
values and internalizes them and the other one is liberalizing Islam and becoming 
Western. Both models proposed by the neoliberals have inconsistencies. Tarig 
Ramadan (2005), as a response to the neo-liberalists who claim that Islam could 
become Westernized by liberalizing, claims that the Islamic religious identity and 
the visibility of religious practices do not prevent the adaptation of Western liberal 
                                                             
56
 “Islamism” is an ideology nourishes by certain religious principles, but it does not 
follow an aim to construct an Islamic state, and an ideology that aims to develop an 
alternative identity to the national identity which is based on race-ethnicity (Çınar, 2005). 
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values. According to Ramadan, ethnic and religious identity is one of the most 
important belongings that define an individual; and makes the individual more 
consistent, powerful and respectful in individual and societal relations. In other 
words, it is predicted that individuals without national, religious or cultural identities 
will be more isolated, introversion and have lack of confidence. Against the “neo-
liberal” circles Tariq Ramadan gives two important advises to the Western Muslims. 
First, that they should get rid of the Arabic/Asian elements which do not have any 
Islamic roots; and second, that they should enrich their lives with belief, prayer and 
spirituality. 
 
As a result, many politicians, academicians and think tanks in the Western world have 
a distant relation with the approaches that predict a conflict both in short and long 
term. The number of people who consider the universal humanitarian values and 
cultural life styles based on ideology/belief among different civilizations as richness 
are increasing. The oppression of different ethnic and religious communities within 
the borders of another civilization is against the universal and humanitarian values. 
Therefore, Western and Islamic civilizations have generally followed the line 
“respect for differences”, instead of “conflict”, and rejected to be subject to a 
dominant civilization. For instance, Islam has accepted “pluralist philosophy” as a 
universal value and rejected the idea of a single civilization. Umara (2006: 71) 
presents the “dialogue of civilizations at common points, and without revealing the 
differences and conflictual points” as a pluralist and normative model. Today, 
monasteries, synagogues and mosques standing all around the world are clear 
indicators of the protection of differences. In short, the “philosophy of dialogue” 
should be made dominant instead of “conflict” considering the relations of different 
civilizations with one another in our world, which has become a global village. 
 
4.2.2. Culture of Mutual Understanding and Tolerance  
 
The problem of intolerance to the “other” is the problem that lies beneath defining 
the self according to the other side, considering his ideas as the sole truth and being 
close to everybody else. For instance, a statement that indicates non-Westerners have 
no place in Europe is the construction of a closed self. Such a construction of the self 
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does not go along with the open society model of Europe or the multiculturalism. 
The center of intolerance in Europe in the relations with “other” is the philosophy of 
the closed self. Building of a social tolerance by the natives and “others” through 
pluralist thought will help the European progress. But the majority culture will be 
more determinative in this case. Majority gives three different reactions to the 
“other”; assimilation, exclusion and tolerance. Assimilation and exclusion are the 
reflections of a self closed to cultural diversity and the ideal of a homogeneous 
society (Gündoğdu, 2008: 75-77). 
Cultural identities, more or less, are the main part of everybody’s individual identity as 
well as part of the individual’s self respect. The lack of self confidence and self respect 
that will appear as a result of despise of minority’s collective cultural identity by t 
majority, makes it harder for them to participate the society in a healthy way. 
Therefore, the understanding of tolerance needed in individual and social relations 
must be based on the idea of justice. In a multicultural democratic society, the pre 
condition to live in peace with “others” is the tolerance based on the idea of justice and 
respect for the other side (Gündoğu, 2008: 78-79). Today the multinational, 
multicultural and multi-identity Europe needs the mutual tolerance, dialogue and 
solidarity more than ever. In spite of all the misunderstandings, polarizations and 
conflict of interests from the past; the chance to carry Europe into a more prosper and 
habitable place depends on mutual understanding, recognition and dialogue. Therefore, 
it is obvious that the prerequisite of living together with the “other” in multicultural 
liberal democracies is the “mutual tolerance”. On the other hand, ethnic and religious 
minorities also have responsibility to disseminate the tolerance. So, living in peace 
with all the sections of the society depends on the just mutual recognition of the sides 
and the accomplishment of the basics of communicative rationality. 
 
4.2.3. Permanent Actors of Living Together in Europe 
 
As the borders between Islam and the West are diminishing in the globalized 
world, it becomes harder to define Islam and Islamic world as a unique 
structure. Different ethnic/religious and cultural societies which have been 
integrated have also become a part of Western societ ies’ texture as citizens, 
occupation groups or next door neighbors. Today there are numerous Muslims 
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in Western societies who are either third or fourth generation of citizens; who 
are parts of the societies at least like an American or a European (Esposito, 
2003: 173-174). Famous historian Arnold Toynbee (1991: 78-79) said that the 
Eastern societies cultures have a very important humanitarian mission to 
provide a global world peace and a sustainable reconciliation (cited by Nişancı 
and Çaylak, 2010: 230-231). Islamic civilization, as the oldest one among 
Eastern civilizations and cultures, has a historical heritage to take 
responsibility in the construction of new millennium. The most important 
features which will contribute to the birth of a civilization are social, cultural 
and religious factors. Religion as a social concept has had an effect in every 
civilization so far. To overcome the global problems our world is facing and to 
provide the world peace, Islamic civilization is in a position to contribute a lot 
in terms of its historical past and the current location. Therefore, modern world 
should see that cherishing the differences and others, along with protection of 
the rights are in the base of Islam (Akdoğan, 2009: 133-148). As it can be seen 
in Andalusia and Ottoman experiences, Islamic civilization is an “open 
civilization”, as it accepts the right of existence for other civilizations. Today, 
Islam, as the religion with strong spiritual and moral codes, is the religion that 
spreads most rapidly in the West. Also, Westernization, because of its strong 
military, technological and economic sides, within the Islam world also 
continues rapidly (Şentürk, 2006: 92-119). 
  
The project of the “Alliance of Civilizations” is a step for dialogue put into 
practice through a protocol signed between the governments of Spain and 
Turkey, which received the support of more than hundred members of the 
United Nations. In the background of this peace project implemented by the 
leaders of both countries lays the belief that a world which is idealized with 
the peace in the future is possible. The key to this peaceful world is dialogue 
with mutual respect. Representatives of two ancient civilizations (Islam and 
Christianity) have had a positive stance towards the improvement of mutual 
dialogue. Of course, the understanding of the concept of “dialogue” by the 
representatives of these two great civilizations will be different. If the parties 
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start to act with a feeling of historical, religious, linguistic or cultural 
superiority towards the other will make the dialogue unsuccessful.  
 
The nationalist traditions and homogeneous cultural structures of civilizations 
which have been lasting for centuries cause the steps of dialogue to pursue very 
slowly. As the parties put their own identity and culture into the center with a 
defensive reflex, the persuasiveness of the dialogue process is damaged. A 
pluralist mentality focusing on mutual construction and sharing of the world 
would make the alliance of civilizations, which is a global vision of peace, more 
meaningful. From this point of view, what is really needed is not to bring all 
civilizations under an organization; but to guide the humanity to understanding, 
peace, solidarity and sharing. The report “Islam and the West: Annual Report on 
the State of Dialogue” issued by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in January 
2008 addresses the interaction between Islam and the West. It was advised in the 
report to take careful strategic, political and economic steps in order to minimize 
the tensions and conflicts in different regions of the world. The report also 
emphasized the importance of dialogue in the creation of peace and locating 
mutual respect and sustainable understanding. 
 
Individuals, ethnic/religious groups, official and unofficial institutions, civil 
society organizations, governments, religious institutions and leaders who are the 
parties of intercultural communication and dialogue in Europe, interact with each 
other at different levels and approaches. Minority based civil society 
organizations in Europe are becoming stronger with their increasing numbers; 
thereby have a voice in the decision making mechanisms of local, national and 
European Union institutions. The institutions that try to create a common 
understanding about “participation” and “equal rights” in the public opinion 
have started to communicate with local civil society organizations related with 
their issues, cooperate with them and produce common projects. Civil society 
dialogue between foreign originate civil society organizations and local 
institutions will obviously contribute to living together. Within this context, the 
cultural centers, kindergartens and formal educational institutions, centers of 
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dialogue and student dormitories can be counted as the permanent actors of the 
culture of living together. 
 
The development of the culture of coexistence in societies is a social 
responsibility that should be covered from the beginning of school years. “Peace 
Pedagogy Courses”, advised by UNESCO to be implemented especially in the 
areas of conflict is an exemplary implementation to achieve a culture of 
coexistence. The culture of coexistence gained by the new generations at school 
has a value to create peace in families, nations, civilizations and the humanity. 
The most important point to be emphasized in here is that the culture of 
coexistence is not a draft work to be presented for a national or international 
project competition. On the contrary, culture of coexistence is social responsibility 
mission which is tested, applied and the results are seen.  This responsibility is a 
culture of reconciliation which should be covered from kindergarten to the 
university.  
 
One of the areas in Europe where intercultural interaction is very high is the area 
of social movements which have enormous followers within ethnic and religious 
minorities. Religious and non-religious social movements that follow a collective 
action strategy are interacting both within themselves and with their environment. 
Movements that spread the collective action space to all parts of the society can 
create a public opinion and addressed at national level. For example, religious 
minorities have more solidarity networks among themselves with the sense of 
community and coexistence in the Christian countries. At the same time, the 
religious institutions, are important parts of intercultural dialogue organizations, 
continue play a key role in the integration of new immigrants (Vilaça, 2014: 103-
105). On the contrary, religious and social movements that limit their activity 
areas only with those who have the same ethnic/religious belonging do not seem 
to have an activity agenda which will contribute the communication and 
interaction with the host societies. Religious and social movements which are 
organized within them serve in different areas to their societies to have the 
necessary public support and financial competencies. Social movements that 
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interact with the host society are more open to socialization that will prevent the 
radical elements to find roots. 
The term “alliance of civilization” used in this study does not mean the project 
started between the governments of Turkey and Spain; what it means is the role of 
European Turkish society in the inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue. Today, 
the European countries that represent the Western civilization are hosting millions 
of Muslims who represent the Islamic civilization. Therefore, the Continent of 
Europe is the place where the representatives of these ancient civilizations interact 
at the highest level on earth today. This physical proximity in the Continent of 
Europe causes a mutual fusion, also the recall of the concepts of Muslim and 
immigrant together (Roy, 2003: 51). This study predicts that the immigrants of 
Turkish origin who represent the civilization of Islam in the pluralist, 
multicultural and democratic societies of Europe, will contribute to the 
intercultural dialogue. The social bonds realized by the European Turkish society 
in the last fifty years are assumed to build bridges of dialogue between the two 
civilizations. 
 
4.2.4. Suggestions to Living Together in Europe 
 
Theses that identify the Western culture and values with democracy and that 
centralize the West in inter-civilizational dialogue cannot contribute to the peace. 
An understanding which sees the Islamic civilization as a side of conflict and 
polarization will only reinforce conflict. Therefore inter-civilizational and 
intercultural dialogue could only be provided by a democratic understanding 
where different civilizations and cultures have an equal saying (Nişancı and 
Çaylak, 2010: 230-231). According to Dr. Hursid Ahmed from Pakistan (2011: 
51-52), the common point of any cooperation between Islam and the West will 
only be achieved by considering Western and Islam cultures together and equally. 
This can only be achieved by remaining distant to prejudices in Western sciences. 
European countries that consider Islam as a threat to their national security should 
immediately leave the security context and move to the context of justice when 
dealing with the minority demands (Kaya, 2004).  
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The Continental Europe is one of the most democratic, safe and welfare places on 
the earth today, despite its inadequacies. The freedom of religion and conscience, 
cultural diversity, civil society, basic human rights and social rights are the 
acquisitions which should be taken further, thereby opening the gates of 
coexistence. It is mentioned that the socio-economic prosperity has individualized 
the European societies, minimized communication and caused isolations. To 
minimize these individual and societal risks; friendship, kinship, neighborliness 
and social relations should be revitalized. To struggle with this social illness at 
individual and society levels, briefings should be conducted and level of 
consciousness should be increased. Individuals without a relation with their own 
families, relatives or neighbors cannot be expected to communicate with people 
with other ethnic/religious belongings. Therefore, this unhealthy communication 
culture should immediately be left and culture of coexistence should be digested. 
Some of the individual and societal responsibilities to gain and sustain culture of 
coexistence are summarized below. These suggestions are listed in accordance 
with the 2011 report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe. 
 
A.  For Minorities: 
- For the continuation of social peace, maximizing the adherence of minorities 
to laws and regulations ,  
- Help them gain a consciousness of citizenship to know individual and social 
rights and to defend them, 
- Disseminating the mutual love and respect which is important in the 
development of individual relations, Helping them to conduct house and 
workplace visits to develop friendship and neighborhood relations, 
- Executing cohesive programs to disseminate the awareness of cultural and 
religious diversity in the host society, 
- Improving the dialogue by organizing food workshops that introduce the 
Turkish/Anatolian cuisine and taste, 
- Informing the new generations about norms and values, the constructive 
elements of pluralist societies by families and educators, 
- Bringing in the language competency to people from all age groups, 
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- Providing the participation of immigrant families into school councils to 
increase their communication with the school and with their children, 
- Civil society organizations of the minorities should conduct social projects 
which would prevent disintegration within themselves and among the social 
groups, 
- Ethnic/religious movements should motivate their grounds and the public 
opinion at local and national levels to accept intercultural dialogue and culture of 
coexistence, 
- Individuals should be encouraged to actively participate in socio-cultural 
areas, sports, music, special talents and politics at local and national levels, 
- A sincere and pro-dialogue statement should be developed against the clichés 
and traditional fears about Islam and Muslims in Western societies, 
- All the sections of a society should not be blamed for concepts such as 
discrimination, racism and xenophobia defended by a radical minority, 
- Concepts of culture of coexistence and intercultural dialogue should be 
placed on a conceptual framework which will be accepted by all parts of the 
society, 
- Taxpaying culture, one of the most important liabilities of a social state, 
should be taught starting from young ages, 
- Strategic precautions should be taken to fight with radicalism which appears 
as a result of erosion of social bonds with the host society, 
- The inciting opinions of the Islam about coexistence, abiding the ruels and 
public participations should be mentioned by religious authorities very often, 
- Dissemination of liberal and modern views of ethnic/religious minority origin 
role models within the society. 
 
B .  For Host Countries;  
 
- Refraining from discrimination, racism, intolerance, inequality and torture 
towards ethnic and religious minorities that harm their trust to the government and 
to the system, 
-  Host societies should be more positive towards the immigrants to improve the 
social relations, 
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-  Acting understanding, sincere, just, tolerant and humanitarian in relations 
with the immigrants, 
-  Equal use of all services by all parts of the society, 
-  Taking the strategic precautions in private and public spheres to provide equal 
opportunities, 
-  Expanding the rights and liabilities of minorities with a disadvantageous 
position, 
-  Being more sensitive and tolerant about the respect for the sacred to which 
Muslim minorities are very careful about, 
-   Printed and visual media should stop trying to establish a negative image for 
the ethnic and religious minorities, 
-  Problems of minorities should take place in the media morally, 
-  Efficient struggle with hate crimes in social media, 
- Refraining from hate speeches which will polarize ethnic and religious 
minorities, 
-  Providing equal opportunities for the students from disadvantaged immigrant 
groups in terms of language, adaptation and social relations, 
-  Just, transparent and equal adaptation policies for ethnic and religious 
minorities, 
-  Dissemination of intercultural education to help society obtain a culture of 
coexistence in early ages, 
-  Dissemination of projects containing sports, music, photography, art and 
painting to create awareness in intercultural dialogue, 
-  Removing the obstacles for Turkey’s EU membership and improvement of 
mutual relations, 
 
4.3. INTEGRATION POLICIES AND THE DILEMMA OF 
MULTICULTURALISM 
 
The migration movements in the last quarter of the twentieth century have 
gained new dimensions with the effects of political, social, religious,  cultural 
and economic variables. It is seen that the European Union members do not 
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have a unique and static policy and application towards “immigrants” and 
“foreigners”; they carry the accumulations of historical and social experiences 
of the countries; and have the flexibility to be re-arranged according to the new 
conditions of the world (Küçükcan, 2008). In this section, which covers the 
migration and immigration policies of the European Union with reference to 
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium are analyzed. 
4.3.1. Integration Policies in Europe 
 
The Western European countries have witnessed enormous migrations since the 
World War II, and they have tried to solve complicated problems with “strict 
migration and immigration policies”. These policies nourish the xenophobia 
statements and ideologies of racism and discrimination in these countries. With 
these “tough” immigration policies implemented in Western European countries 
immigrants are tend to be shown as sources of “threat”, “ fear” and “crime” 
(Güllüpınar, 2014: 2). For instance Germany as a country of immigrants- even 
though it does not accept this- is trying to control the flow of immigrants by 
building separate immigrant categories and statuses. The implementation of 
“short-term accommodation” policy of Germany towards the immigrants from 
third world countries is lengthened only if the immigrants have the socio-
economic competency. As shown with this implementation, the way to have 
extended rights and real citizenship in EU countries is only possible by having 
economic welfare. On the other hand, the residence statuses and the features of 
the society to which they belong for the disadvantageous individuals in the 
society are only a few of the barriers in front of becoming a real citizen. Turks in 
Germany, are otherized by being called “other” and “foreigner”, suffer from the 
lack of social acceptance in social and public spheres. We can even say that the 
new generations who were born, raised and educated in Germany are exposed to 
institutional discrimination. But, immigrants at this level are citizens of the 
European Union now. 
 
Some disadvantageous groups within the European Turkish society which could 
not socialize and resist to isolation have remained excluded from social life and 
have a tendency to radicalization. Structural problems in the immigration policies 
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of Germany nourish the radicalism and extremist tendencies. Therefore, 
establishment of laws which cover all social, economic and public spheres, 
including education and work market, which are also against discrimination is one 
of the most important liabilities (Güllüpınar, 2014: 12-13). According to Brian 
Barry (1999), theory of multicultural citizenship stems from a liberal 
understanding that predicts the role of the state at a minimum level. The 
positioning of ethnic, religious and cultural groups within the majority as 
“national minorities” by the state itself limits the definition of multiculturalism.  
 
Governments have understood that the immigrants are staying in their 
countries and developed three types of policies towards them. These are 
policies based on assimilation, pluralist policies and harmony-based policies. 
The Netherlands gives importance to the understanding of social state and 
therefore has applied harmony based or pluralist policies. Just like the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom has also supported pluralist and harmony based 
policies which gave an opportunity to protect and institutionalize the 
diversities (ethnicity, religion, language, culture and identity). On the other 
hand, countries like Germany and France have followed policies based on 
assimilation, which is not pluralist and liberal (Canatan, 1990: 56-75). 
Immigrant policies have been revised after September 11 attacks and the 
cartoon crisis; and they are trying to be balanced with nationalist tendencies 
such as racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. 
 
The Christian Democratic Union of Germany, which is conservative and led by 
Angela Merkel, supports conservative policies constructed on national and 
cultural unity. Social Democrats and Liberal Parties defend the idea that ethnic, 
religious and cultural differences could live under the social and political 
union together; on contrary with the conservative parties that reject cultural, 
religious and ethnic diversity. The idea of “Europe” on which Social 
Democrats and liberals have agreed upon rests on principles such as diversity, 
cultural differences, common future, democracy, human rights and secularism 
(Kaya, 2004). These parties also think that foreigners do not constitute a threat 
to the social and welfare state. On the other hand, the Party for Freedoms 
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(PVV) of radical and racist Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and the Vlaams 
Blok (the Vlaams Belang) in Belgium claim that Muslims are not integrated 
into the society, thereby rejecting the multiculturalism adaptation policies. The 
Vlaams Belang (VB) has showed the existence of Muslims as a threat for the 
future of European values after September 11 (Vural, 2005). Geert Wilders’ 
anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant policies have found more support in the public 
after the murder of Dutch producer and director Theo van Gogh by a Moroccan 
Muslim. Propositions for taking special taxes from women with veil and the 
ban of Qur’an in the Netherlands are only a few of Geert Wilders’ racist and 
discriminative policies. 
 
Strategy of the “War on Terrorism” in USA and Europe after September 11 
brought together very important axis shifts in immigrant policies. Precautions 
and strategies were focused on an understanding which considered the 
immigrants, especially the Muslims as a potential threat. According to Fekete 
(2004), racism has been increasing gradually in the last years and is spreading 
to settled Muslim groups. Therefore, fear of Islam, xenophobia and the 
othering harm the policies of multiculturalism in Europe. The economic 
concerns within the European Union also have an enormous effect on anti-
immigrant ideas and policies. The most important tool to overcome these 
prejudices towards the foreigners will be a consistent adaptation policy and 
disciplined political ideas (Yılmaz, 2008: 213-219). 
 
With the immigration policy accepted in Germany in 2007; right of double 
citizenship was abolished and making a language and citizenship examination as a 
prerequisite for family reunion is perceived as a return to assimilation policies. On 
the other hand, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands could easily become citizens 
when compared with Germany; and therefore they evaluate the opportunities within 
the country more efficiently and rapidly. Besides, as the policies against discrimination 
in the Netherlands could be operated, ethnic solidarity among Turks, at least 
economically, is less. The structural state organization in Germany has created a 
negative effect for the perception of immigrants by the host society. The Turkish 
society, exposed to negative discrimination, has become introversive and created their 
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own spaces with a defensive reflex (Tol, 2012: 308-309). In the Netherlands, where 
important steps in terms of multiculturalism and integration have been taken, changing 
of some regulations and limitation of some rights about immigrants is very threatening. 
The ban of usage of Turkish in Germany and the Netherlands and the exclusion of 
Turkish courses from compulsory or credit course groups cause reactions among the 
immigrants (Şahin, 2010: 105). 
 
The structural problems of the European Union and its member countries along 
with global financial crises make the European expansion uncertain. Even though 
the membership processes of Eastern European and Balkan countries are new, 
Turkey’s marathon on membership has been going on for 25 years. The 
uncertainty of the finish line of this long marathon makes Turkey and the public 
opinion within more suspicious, also decreasing the belief to the union itself. The 
increasing dynamism of Turkish economy, geopolitical importance of the country 
between two continents, its secure energy corridors and the young population 
provide wonderful opportunities to the European Union, once it becomes a 
member. But it is understood that the European Union is not ready for a Muslim 
country and its political efficacy with 75 million of population. Also, the 
backward steps on human rights, democracy, law, freedom of thought and press 
in Turkey seem to interrupt the membership process. Foreign Affairs 
Commission of the European Union has explained on March 3, 2014 that Turkey 
was moving away from the criteria of European Union. 
 
4.3.2. Return from the Policy of Multiculturalism in Europe 
 
Multiculturalism is a model of thinking that works together with cultural pluralism 
and which is built upon principles such as freedom, tolerance and respect to 
individual differences. According to Frelas (1992: 56-59), multiculturalism 
approves the social approaches based on ethnic/cultural differences and legitimizes 
itself by cross-referencing the cultural mosaic of the society. Therefore, none of the 
ethnicities or cultures is superior to the other one and each life style is equal with 
one another in the idea of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism nourishes the tolerance 
among groups and helps the identities to improve with trust and understand each 
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other better. In short, multiculturalism is a model which approves the groups with 
different ethnic and religious belongings to protect their original identities, opens a 
living space for all types of cultural identities and supports them to protect their 
existence within this space (cited by Vatandaş, 2002: 19-22). Gerd Baumann (2007: 
7) describes multiculturalism, which changes according to the person who describes 
it, as a pluralist cultural implementation within itself which is attributed to him and 
to the others. Baumann compares multiculturalism with a puzzle that changes 
within it; as it has three different meanings by three different sides. These are the 
ones who believe in a singularized national culture, those who search for their 
cultures in their ethnic identities and those who consider their religions as their 
cultures. Another view considers multiculturalism as a philosophical stance that 
predicts the reflection of all the differences that belong to pluralist societies into the 
public sphere (Banks and Banks, 2010). 
 
First constructive step in the development of multiculturalism in old Europe has 
been the recognition of ethnic, religious and cultural minorities. Europe in 1990s, 
when the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union dissolved and European integration 
accelerated, also represents a process where minorities were also include into the 
concept of citizenship (Gülalp, 2006). The newest actor of multiculturalism 
implementations in Europe is the European Union itself (Ongur, 2011: 70). Western 
European countries did not want to consider themselves under the status of 
“immigrant country” for a long time; and when they finally accepted the 
permanence of the immigrants, they have started to state themselves as 
“multicultural society”. The Netherlands is at the top of this list. But, the current 
social and cultural realities of the Western countries are far away from the meaning 
of multicultural society paradigm. One of the most important political obstacles for 
the establishment of a multicultural society in Europe is the minority policies 
specifically followed by these countries. European governments today are 
developing special policies to assimilate the immigrant cultures, rather than actively 
supporting those as part of the pluralist approach. The philosophical stemming point 
of Europe’s minority-based minority policy is ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is 
putting the national culture at the center and judgment of the world outside in terms 
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of values and the norms of this culture. When we evaluate the minority politics of 
Sweden and the Netherlands, the closest countries to the pluralist societal model, 
with a criticism; we will see that even those countries pursue an assimilations policy 
(Canatan, 1990: 94-99). 
  
Two giants of Europe, England and Germany, have blamed the multiculturalism 
policies as unsuccessful after the 2008 global financial crisis. Also, many 
European countries such as France, the Netherlands and Denmark have criticized 
the multiculturalism policies. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany and leader 
of the Christian-Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) stated that building a 
multicultural society in her country has failed. Angela Merkel claimed that “… 
this multicultural approach, saying that we simply live side by side and happily 
with each other has failed, utterly failed” and said that “the immigrants have to 
adapt more into the society” (Yanarışık, 2013: 2915). The most important ground 
of those who criticize multiculturalism is the polarization among the groups of 
society and the dissemination of parallel societies which are not in a 
communication with each other. Ethnic and religious minorities which have 
different living cultures and identities prefer to live in their ghettos, which 
increases the gap with the majority, and causes a great concern for politicians and 
social scientists. Especially after September 11 and the terrorist attacks in 
European capitals, the possibility of the radical elements in distant ghettos to gain 
more support has caused great concerns. The thesis that says “multiculturalism 
politics provides vast freedoms to ethnic and religious minorities to live their 
culture freely” is in the middle of the arguments. Multiculturalism is making the 
ethnic, religious, economic and cultural differences at every level of life visible. 
And, again, multiculturalism does not accept the intervention of states over the 
sections of society. The basic argument is about the perception of multiculturalism 
as an inapplicable subject by the politicians, who rather prefer to construct a 
strengthened national identity. A dominant, hegemonic and monolithic European 
culture will harm cultural differences and eliminate the pluralist society model.  
 
It is claimed that millions of Muslims in many EU members’ countries have 
showed a cultural resistance towards the expectations of host societies. 
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European multiculturalism does not consider Muslims as a separate minority 
group and provides nothing but the basic human rights (Ongur, 2011: 76-77). 
The discrimination of the European Muslims was not limited with the social 
space and carried to the political one, whatever it is called Islamophobia, 
xenophobia or racism (Wendy and Schoonenboom, 2004). His existence of a 
national, nationalist and imperious state power as the decisive authority for a 
pluralist and multicultural life and minority rights contains certain limitations within 
itself. Multiculturalism policies conducted by states in old Europe represent to give 
up limited rights to limited minorities for now. For instance, countries such as 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Britain enforce unilateral and binding 
agreements to immigrants and residents (Geddes, 2003-2005). Germany and the 
Netherlands have been implementing dishonorable examinations to the family 
members of the minorities who live in their countries and to the new comers 
(Etzioni, 2007). The Government of French implements racist policies towards the 
Maghreb/African originate immigrants and deport a dozen of Roma (Gypsy) 
citizens from France. It seems that the Western politicians who have affected the 
masses by their nationalist and conservative steps are in more efficient positions 
than the technocrats who have designed multiculturalism. It can undoubtedly be 
accepted that the expansion of universal human rights policies including the 
minority rights and accepting that as universal value after World War II is an 
achievement of the multiculturalism in Europe. But the weakness of the societies 
who have learned to live together in a tolerant, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and 
multi-religious environment in old Europe is a clear indicator of the point 
multiculturalism reached so far (Ongur, 2011: 76-79). 
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CHAPTER FIVE - ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS & RESULTS OF THE 
INQUIRY AND EVALUATION 
5.1. Demographic Profile of the Sample 
The city based or quota sample distribution of the respondents whom the survey 
will be conducted to is in parallel with the regional distribution of the Turks living 
in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. The field research was conducted by 
205 Turkey origin respondents in Cologne, Brussels and Amsterdam; 110 of them 
from Cologne (approximately %53 of all respondents) in Germany, 55 from 
Brussels (approximately %27 of all respondents) in Belgium and 40 from 
Amsterdam (approximately %20 of all respondents) in the Netherlands. Therefore, 
before conducting the survey, urban and rural areas where Turks are intensely 
living have been taken into consideration and a quota sampling has been prepared 
(See Table 3). The quota sampling application in order to represent the Turkish 
community in the selected regions; some basic variables such as gender, age, 
educational level, socio-economic status and generational differences were 
considered. 
Table 3. The Sample Distribution of the Respondents by Countries&Cities 
 
Country&C
ity  
The 
Respondents 
 % of all 
Repondents 
Population 
of Turks in 
the 
Selected 
Cities 
Population of 
Turks in the 
Selected 
Contries 
 
Cologne in 
Germany 
110 53 64.592 2.700.000 
Amsterdam 
in the 
Netherlands 
40 20 38.339 370.000 
Brussels in 
Belgium 
55 27 40.000 218.832 
Total 205 100 372.714 3.288.832 
Source: Statistic Netherlands, January 2008 and Consulate General of Turkey in 
Cologne, 2012. 
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According to the data, by January 1, 2013 Germany is the country where most of 
the foreigners are living among the 27 European Union countries (7.7 million 
persons). And the largest ethnic minority group in Germany is the German Turks 
(2.7 million persons). Cologne is one of the largest cities of North Rhine-
Westphalia and there is a number of 64.592 Turkey originated people living in 
(1.1 million Turks are living in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany). Cologne has 
the most intense Turkish population of North Rhine-Westphalia where one third 
of Turks in Germany are living (Eurostat, 2013; Consulate General of Turkey in 
Cologne, 2012). Therefore the city of Cologne constitutes an important population 
in this study with its characteristic of representing the Turks. The reason why 
Brussels in Belgium is chosen as a sample is that the 18% of the total Turkish 
population in the country are living within this area. Another population of the 
sample group, Amsterdam is home to 10% of Turkish population in the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, this study has carefully gathered information 
from all ethnic and religious groups of Turkey (Turks, Kurds, Sunni and the Alevi 
etc.). 
Table 4. Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents 
 a b  c  d  e Total 
f % f % f %  f % f  % f % 
Gender 109 53 96 47 - -  - - -  - 205 100.0 
Age - - 109 53 82 40  14 7 -  - 205 100.0 
Level of 
Education 
1 0.5 16 8 54 26  98 48 36  17.5 205 100.0 
Citizenship 69 33 57 28 79 39  - - -  - 205 100.0 
Gender:       a – Male / b – Female 
Age:             a - Less than 18 age / b - 19-35 / c - 36-50 / d - 51-65 / e - Over 65 
Level of Education:      a – No Education / b – Elementary School / c – High and 
Technical High School / d- Undergraduate and bachelor’s degree / e – Master and 
PhD 
Citizenship: a – Only Turkey / b – Only Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands /         
c -  Dual citizenship  
 
174 
 
Variables used to determine the changing location of ethnic/religious groups by 
country are education, position in business, income, property, ethnic and religious 
identity, political participation, social relations, gender roles and spouse choices 
(Crul and Heering, 2008: 22). In the countries that establish the sample group of 
this study (Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands), the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents are shown in Table 4. According to the data 
acquired from the respondents, 53% of the respondents (109 people) are male and 
47% the respondents (96 people) are female. Again, 53% of the respondents (109 
people) are aged 19-35 years, as 40% (82 people) are aged 36-50 years and 7% 
(14 people) are aged 51-65 years. On the other hand, 8% of the respondents (16 
people) have primary or secondary school degrees, as 26% (54 people) have high 
school or occupational high school degrees, 48% (98 people) have college or 
university degrees, and 18% (36 people) have master’s and doctoral degrees or 
still enrolled. 33% of the respondents (69 people) are only the citizens of Turkey, 
as 28% (57 people) are only German/Belgian/Dutch citizenship and 39% (79 
people) have dual citizenship (See Table 4). 
Figure 1. Socio-economic Status of the Respondents (%) 
 
5% 
8% 
57% 
16% 
6% 
8% 
Less than 500 Euro  
500-1.000 Euro  
1.000-2.000 
2.000-3.000  
3.000-4.000 
Over 4.000 
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Socio-economical status is another demographic characteristic, and in this study it 
is not evaluated by the occupations of the respondents but with their monthly 
incomes. According to this, approximately 5% of the respondents (8 people) earn 
below 500 Euros, 8% (11 people) earn between 500-1.000 Euros, 57% (81 people) 
earn between 1.000-2.000 Euros, 16% (23 people) between 2.000-3.000 Euros, 6% 
(8 people) between 3.000-4.000 Euros and 8% (11 people) 4.000 Euros and more 
(See Figure 1). The results of different categorical income distribution show that 
only 63% (130 people) of the respondents are working at any job that would bring 
income. 37% (75 people) of the respondents are not working due to reasons such 
as retirement, being a housewife, disability, studentship or unemployment (See 
Table 6). On the other hand, 32% of all the respondents (66 people) receive social 
aid from the government as 68% (139 people) does not receive any social aid at 
all. 
Table 5. Important Reasons of the Non-working Respondents 
 Respondents 
(Frekans) 
 % of Non-
working 
Respondent
s 
Unemployment 17 23 
Retired 7 9 
Housewife 17 23 
On maternity leave 1 1 
Full-time student 29 39 
Long-term disabled 4 5 
Total 75 100.0 
 
According to the data in Table 5, which basically indicates the reasons why 
people are not unemployed, 23% of the respondents (17 people) can’t find a job, 9% 
(7 people) are retired, 23% (17 people) are housewives, 1% (1 person) is at 
maternity leave, 39% (29 people) are students and 5% (4 people) are disabled. It is 
worrying that the problem of unemployment as in not finding a job is very high 
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among the minority groups. When we look at the distribution between countries 
among the respondents, we see that the rate of unemployment in Germany is 
higher than the rates in other two countries. Today, in Germany, where Turks 
have the highest level of intensity, the rates of unemployment among the Turkish 
immigrants are twice as more than the unemployment within the rest of society. 
The most important factors effective on the high rates of people living with 
unemployment and social aids are inadequacy of occupational training, keeping 
up with the social aids, narrow employment and inequalities in opportunities. The 
Turkish immigrants have difficulties in finding jobs within the sectors such as 
industry and high technology on which the German economy rests and their 
occupational training standards should be increased. On the other hand, women’s 
responsibility of housework and childcare creates another risk group outside the 
working environment. Besides the harsh economic conditions, the inequalities in 
the opportunities for the immigrants increase the risk groups pushed out of the 
system. 
Table 6. Other Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents 
 a b  c  d  e Total 
f % f % f %  f % f  % f % 
Marriage 
Status 
115 56 53 26 6 3  23 11 3  1 205 100.0 
Have a child 113 55 92 45 - -  - - -  - 205 100.0 
Have a job 130 63 75 37 - -  - - -  - 205 100.0 
Spoken 
language at 
home 
76 37 1 0.5 0 0  2 1 126  61.5 205 100.0 
Level of 
langauge of 
the host 
country 
114 56 64 31 23 11  4 2 -  - 205 100.0 
Dwelling 
house 
76 37 11
3 
55 13 6  3 1 -  - 205 100.0 
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Marriage Status: a – Married / b – Single / c – Widowed / d – Divorced / e – 
Engaged /  
Have a child:       a – Yes / b – No 
Have a job:          a – Yes (working) / b – No (not working) 
Spoken language at home: a – Only native language / b – Only Germany / c – 
Only French or Dutch (Belgian) / d – Only Dutch / e – Both native language and 
second foreign language  
Level of langauge of the host country: a - Advanced level / b - Intermediate 
level / c – Basic level / d -  No language of the host country  
Dwelling house: a – Landlord / b – Tenant / c – Municipal owned house/ d – 
Corporate owned house 
 
A series of findings about the demographic characteristics of the respondents from 
the sampling countries (Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands) are listed in 
Table 6. According to the data acquired, 56% of the respondents (115 people) are 
married, 26% (53 people) are single, 3% (6 people) are widowed, 11% (23 people) 
are divorced and 1% (3 people) are engaged. 55% of the respondents (113 people) 
have at least one child and 45% (92 people) have declared they do not have any 
child. On the other hand, 37% (76 people) of the respondents say that they only 
speak their native language (Turkish, Kurdish etc.) in the house; and 62% (126 
people) indicated that they speak both their native language and a second one. An 
important portion of the respondents prefer to speak their native language and the 
language of the country they are living in (German, French or Dutch); which 
shows that they want to remember their native language and also desire 
localization. 
Besides, 56% of the respondents (114 people) speak the language of the country 
they are living in at an advanced level, 31% (64 people) at intermediate level, 11% 
(23 people) at basic level and 2% (4 people) not at all. One of the most important 
indicators that the Turks in Western European countries are permanent is their 
desire to have property. 37% of the respondents (76 people) have their own house 
and 55% (113 people) are tenants (See Table 6). According to the report of 
Turkey Research Center (TAM, 2006) named “Turkish Population in the 
Netherlands and EU Countries, Household Data and the Economic Power of 
Entrepreneurs” among the 93.600 Turkish household in the Netherlands, 17.000 
of them own a house. This is approximately 20% of the Turkish household in the 
Netherlands. When we look at the demographic data about the respondents, we 
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can easily say that the Turkish society in the Western Europe has an increase in 
the socio-economic level, language capabilities and localization as an important 
indicator of socialization. On the other hand, the fact that the language spoken 
within the household is preferred to be the language of the country they are living 
in indicates that the young generations are familiar with the local language and 
also setting a distance with their native language. 
Table 7. How many years you lived in Germany/Belgium/the Netherlands? 
 
Time Period  Respondent 
(Frekans) 
 % of all 
Respondent
s 
Less the 5 years 20 10 
6-15 years 49 24 
16-30 years 43 21 
Over 31 years 31 15 
Born in Germany/Belgium/the 
Netherlands 
62 30 
Total 205 100.0 
 
The period of stay by ethnic/religious minorities in host countries are important 
indicators in terms of socio-cultural interaction, socialization, participation and 
living together. For instance, an important portion of Turks in Germany were born 
in Germany or have been living in Germany for a long time; which increases 
being settled down and localization. According to the report published by German 
Statistical Office and the Foundation for the Turkish Research Center (TAM) in 
2008; there are 3 million Turks in Germany and 1 million 522 thousand of those 
have come from Turkey, whereas 1 million 433 thousand of them were born in 
Germany (Özcan, 2011). 10% of the respondents of this study (20 people) have 
been living in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands for 5 years. 24% (49 people) 
have been living in these countries since 15 years and 21% (43 people) since 30 
years. 30% (62 people) were born in the countries they live in (See Table 5). On 
the other hand, 42% of all the respondents (86 people) have declared that they 
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have migrated to Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands through family union or 
marriage. Again, 11% (23 people) of all respondents migrated for work, 15% (30 
people) for education and 2% (4 people) for political reasons. 
On the other hand, the replies of married, widowed or divorced respondents (144 
people/ approximately 70% of the respondents) on the question how they made 
their choice of marriage gives important hints on inter generational changes and 
socio-economic factors. According to this, 55% of the married, widowed or 
divorced respondents (79 people) have married with a Turkey originated 
man/woman in Turkey, 38% (55 people) have married with a Turkey originated 
man/woman in Germany/the Netherlands/Belgium and 7% (10 people) have 
married with a non-Turk. We can say that there are three types of marriages in 
Western European countries where Turks are intensely living. First one of them is 
the spouses as “imported brides and grooms” brought from Turkey. Another 
marriage choice that has been increasing in the recent years is the marriage 
conducted with people in Western Europe who are from same ethnic origin. Third 
type is the type of marriage conducted with people who are not from Turkey. This 
data indicates that the youth from Turkey usually prefer to marry with people 
from same ethnic/religious origins. Another important point about the marriages 
with people from same religious and ethnic groups is that the majority prefers to 
marry with people who were born and raised in Europe rather than Turkey. Most 
important reason of this is the new immigration laws in Europe which made 
imported brides and grooms from Turkey almost impossible (age, education and 
linguistic obligations). Another reason is the linguistic and cultural alienation of 
the spouses from Turkey into the social and public harmony of the host country. 
Still, the prejudices and the reactions of conservative families towards the young 
women/men who could not act according to the Turkish-Islamic culture cause the 
marriages from Turkey. 
5.2. Identity, Acculturation and Adaptation 
‘The theory of social identity’ defines the motivation of socio-economically 
disadvantaged groups members’ gaining a social identity and status as a result of 
theie relations with the social environment (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Evaluating 
180 
 
the cultural identity transformation of the European Turkish society within the 
fifty years long migration process within the boundaries of “social identity theory” 
gives us important hints. The limits of interaction between the Turkish immigrants 
and mainstream culture have changed within the scope of socio-economic status 
and education level of Turks and with its relation to the Turkish cultural identity. 
According to a study conducted on the social integration of the Turkish society in 
Germany, there is a positive relationship between adapting the German culture 
and variable of education, occupation and income. On contrary, there is a positive 
relationship between sustaining the Turkish culture and adopting the Turkish 
identity, communicating with the Turks. On the other hand, there is a negative 
relationship between sustaining the Turkish culture and education; but a positive 
one with occupation. In other words, as the level of education increases and that 
there is an occupation, the level of sustaining Turkish culture (Şahin, 2010: 115-
116). 
The diversity in the sustainability of Turkish culture or adaptation of German 
culture indicates us that there is a fact of a hybrid culture. Also, the identity 
pressures of the majority causes the immigrants to become introversive and 
establish parallel life standards away from the centers along with this, immigrants 
refuse the cultural codes of the country they are living in and put forth their own 
identities; which causes a conflict of identities sometimes as the immigrants insist 
on protecting their own culture. In spite of the conflicts with mainstream cultural 
identity, the borders of interaction enhance and new existences appear that do not 
exclude each other, but also do not look like each other. This binary identity 
which appears as the Turkish-German hybrid identity is an indispensable result of 
fifty years long immigration process (Cengiz, 2010: 188-192). On the other hand, 
religion, which appeared in the first years of the migration with its function of 
socialization, can be an identity tool and shelter for immigrants who feel 
themselves excluded and discriminated. For the Turks living in Germany, religion 
transforms into an European Islam form, sometimes open to dialogue and 
sometimes more secularized. But for a more general and intensive population, 
religion continues to be considered as a tool of definition that has become 
integrated with identity within its folkloric and traditional characteristics, and that 
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eventually completes it (Çelik, 2008: 141-142). Our study, which handled the 
Turkey originated immigrants’ problem of religion, identity and culture and their 
struggle to survive with these social facts comparatively on the selected sample, 
has revealed important results. 
Table 8. The Opinions of the Respondents about Sense of Belonging 
 Respondents 
(Frekans) 
 % of all 
Respondent
s 
Turks, Kurds and other ethnic 
identities 
75 37 
Muslim 145 71 
Turkish (country belonging) 99 48 
European 44 21 
German/Belgian/Dutch 62 30 
Other 17 8 
 
The self-definition of the respondents has been analyzed through identity 
belonging in Table 8. Respondents were asked to define three (3) belongings that 
they felt close to. 71% of the respondents (145 people) called themselves as 
Muslim, 48% (99 people) as from Turkey, and 37% (75 people) called themselves 
either as Turkish, Kurdish and other ethnic identities. The rate of people who have 
defined themselves with European identity is 21% (44 people) and the rate who 
defines themselves with their German/Belgian/Dutch identity is 30% (62 people). 
The data indicates that the people from Turkey define themselves by being from 
Turkey and their ethnic belongings, starting with being Muslim. Also, the 
respondents were asked to define three (3) political views they considered as 
closest to themselves. According to this; respondents have called themselves as 
conservative (34% / 70 people), democrat (34% / 70 people) and social democrat 
(27% / 56 people). Also, 21% (44 people) called themselves as nationalist, 23% 
(48 people) as religious and 11% (22 people) as Islamist. This data reveals that the 
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Turks living in all three countries define themselves first with religious identity, 
then ethnic identity and finally with the country they are living in. On the other 
hand, 
The proportional minority of the people who define themselves through the 
“Europeanness” identity indicates the “Europeanness” identity is not being 
developed sufficiently in both the Turkish community and the majority 
communities. The “European citizenship” and “Europeanness” ideas as a social 
and political project did not yet start to be fruitful for the European Turkish 
society. But, the reconstruction of a definition of Europe relying on cultural 
diversity and a European identity will provide the European Turkish society and 
other minorities to be participant dynamic actors. 
The socio-economic level of the respondents and inter-generational differences 
are determinant in the analysis of political opinions and definition of identity 
belongings. Among the respondents who are below the middle income level and 
who have an economic freedom that rests on labor; we see ethnic and religious 
belongings like Turkish/Kurdish/Turkish or Muslim/the Alevi, along with 
conservatism and religious worldviews. On the other hand, it is understood that 
the respondents with middle or above income levels have a worldview in which 
they live Islam only with cultural norms and share a democrat and liberal stance. 
As we see that more than half of the respondents calling they as conservative, 
democrat or liberal; it becomes clear that the traditional Turkish Muslim identity 
is still carried on. Contrary with the decrease of ethnic and religious awareness 
among the respondents with high socio-economic and education levels, we also 
see an increase in the internalization of Western democracy and modern life style. 
In terms of another determinant factor, inter generational differences, the identity 
belongings and political worldviews of the respondents differ. Strong level of 
identification with the religious identity which is seen in first and second 
generations has lost its effect on generations born and raised in Europe. Even 
though the young generations also put forward their religious identities, they do 
not seem enthusiastic about exercising the necessities and practices of religion. 
Along with this, young generations have turned into groups of people who can 
183 
 
follow the socio-cultural and political developments both in their countries and 
the countries they live in, supra-national people (Kaya, 2011). We can also say 
that until the end of 1990s, the first and second generations of immigrants were 
shaped by the dominant political and ideological discourse of Turkey and have set 
forth a cultural Islam dependent on their economic concerns. None the less, third 
and fourth generations have developed a cosmopolitan identity that adopts cultural 
diversity and tolerance on differences as a principle. A field study named “Euro-
Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union?” which 
was conducted in 2003 and 2004 with 1.065 respondents from Germany, gives 
important hints about the identity belongings. According to this field study, 
German-Turks seem to have developed cosmopolitan, hybrid, global and sensitive 
identities which redefine Europeanizes and open to change. Compared with the 
Turks in France, Turks in Germany are more adaptive into the social, political and 
cultural climate of the country they are living in, using the devices of 
globalization in a better way and have the power and courage to shape the 
geography of Germany (Kaya and Kentel, 2005). 
The answers given by the respondents to the question “How important are the 
responsibilities and liabilities enforced by Islam on Muslims important for you?” 
were by 62% (127 people) “very important”, by 25% (52 people) “important”, by 
7% (14 people) “a bit important” and by 6% (12 people) “not important at all”. 61% 
(67 people) of the male respondents (109 people) thought that Islam had an 
important place in their life; whereas 63% (60 people) of the female respondents 
(96 people) had the same opinion. On the other hand, about 64% (70 people) of 
the respondents aged 19-35 years (109 people) and 62% (51 people) of the 
respondents aged 36-50 years (82 people) have indicated that Islam has a “very 
important” place in their life. When we evaluate the respondents according to their 
income, we see that 64% (64 people) of those with around 2.000 Euros of income 
(100 people) think that Islam has a “very important” place in their life. On the 
other hand, 43% (18 people) of those with at least 2.000 Euros income (42 people) 
think that Islam has a “very important” place in their lives. Results indicate that 
the perception of religious identity among the first and second generation 
immigrants from Turkey is stronger comparing with the new generations. Main 
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factor why religious identity is more apparent in the second generation is the 
negative reactions and statements towards Muslims. Many people of Turkish 
origin, who consider the main responsibilities of Islam as a part of their religious 
identity, think that religious belonging will revive the psychological and 
nationalist sentiments. It is thought that the individuals who do not fulfill their 
religious responsibilities will have problems in defining themselves at national, 
religious and cultural meanings; which will eventually turn them into introversive, 
isolated and lack-of-confident people. On the other hand, the religious identity 
feeling of the Turkish immigrants seems more apparent than the religious 
belonging of host societies. The identity based search of existence of the Turkish 
immigrants keep the public opinion busy in the Western societies, with Germany 
on the front. Different religious sects of the Turkish immigrants get involved 
during their identity based existence makes the host societies think that the Turks 
could not reach to social consonance (Perşembe, 2005: 284). 
When we look at the differences of the countries in terms of religious belonging, 
we see that the Turks in Germany have a more traditional, nationalist and 
conservative view comparing with the Turks in Belgium and the Netherlands. In 
other words, the long lasting traditional and conservative German politics has 
caused the Turks in Germany to follow more traditional, communitarian, religious 
and ethnic identities, which is understandable (Kaya and Kentel, 2005). Generally, 
as in Turkey, we can see a fragmented and diversified religious identity belonging 
and worldview within the European Turkish society. Especially the majorities of 
which the first generations are a part of refer to traditional Turkish-Muslim 
identity; the generations who were born and educated in Europe have a more 
cosmopolitan and “European” identity. The ties of the first generations and the 
socio-economically upper groups with their homeland and the consciousness of 
religious belonging are weakening every day. In short, the European Turkish 
society is wandering around in search for an Eastern, Western and religious 
Muslim identity. This search is open to change and development, which are the 
dynamics of new globalized world order. 
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The EU candidacy of Turkey and the arguments of parallel societies in the ghettos 
cause the feeling of loss of geographical and cultural boundaries within the 
European collective consciousness. Possible existence of Turkey within the EU 
and the current existence of Muslims within the European ghettos bring down the 
feeling of “being home” in the sub consciousness of the Europeans (Göle, 2010: 
15-22). Even though sharing the same place with Muslims who have religious and 
cultural differences is a very important issue for the Westerners, Turks in Europe 
support Turkey’s European Union membership. 54% of the respondents (110 
people) support Turkey’s European Union membership, and 46% (95 people) are 
against it. The respondents think that with the European Union membership, 
Turkey will be closer to them in terms of distance and that the membership will 
make great contributions both to themselves and to Turkey. The hope and 
expectation that Turkey’s European Union membership will change the 
disadvantageous position of the European Turkish society is another reason that 
increases the support. The point that the people who oppose Turkey’s European 
Union membership come together are the idea that the dominant culture will 
eventually weaken the community which is distant to the secular and modern life 
style of the West. Another reason for their opposition is the expected increase in 
racism and xenophobia as a result of the new masses that will move into Europe 
after membership. 
On the other hand, according to the results of the study “Euroskepticism in Turkey” 
conducted by Hakan Yılmaz in 2003; approximately 60% of the respondents think 
that dual standards are applied for Turkey, that Turkey is kept busy and is not 
considered as a part of Europe. The question of “Do you think that our national 
independence and sovereignty will be in danger if we become a member of the 
European Union?” is answered by 44% “Yes” and 42% “No”. Another question 
was “Do you think that the European Union was built on Christian values?” was 
answered by 55% “Yes” and 30% “No”. According to Yılmaz, issues such as 
Cyprus, anti-Turkey policies of France because of the Armenian problem and 
anti-Turkey policies of Germany and Austria have caused the skeptic Turks to 
step even further away from the EU (Yılmaz, 2009). But, Turkey’s possible EU 
membership will be an important indicator that intercultural and intercivilization 
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cooperation is possible. On the other hand, according to the report of 
Eurobarometer (November 2013); only 31% of the Europeans have a positive 
image of the European Union, as 28% have a negative one. The image of 
European Union was 50% in 2006, and it dropped back to 31% in the past 7 years. 
On the other hand, Europeans who are optimistic about the future of European 
Union are around 51%, and the pessimistic ones are at 43%. The optimists were 
around 69% in 2006 and dropped to 51% in the past 7 years. One of the main 
reasons of decreasing hopes and loss of image about the European Union is the 
concern after 2008 economic crisis and the fear that the EU integration process 
eventually harms national identities. 
The question “Do you believe that a possible membership of Turkey into the 
European Union would contribute to the alliance of civilizations and intercultural 
dialogue?” was answered 60% (124 people) “Yes” and 40% (81 people) as ‘No’. 
These results clearly indicate that the traditional conservative groups in the West 
that oppose the membership of Turkey into the EU hurt the belief that the people 
originating from Turkey who were raised and trained in their countries could 
contribute a lot to living together and multiculturalism. According to Joscka 
Fischer, if Christianity in Europe is given more social importance than it is today, 
then first the secular branches of the society and then non-Christian minorities 
will be excluded from the society. Any type of axis change on this situation will 
be a dividend action for Europe, rather than being integrative. Muslims are 
counted as millions today and Islam is the second- largest religion in Europe. 
According to Fischer, it will be a great opportunity for them to integrate with the 
Western societies without getting under the effect of radical elements in both 
societies. In case this historical opportunity is missed, this will result with a great 
disaster for both sides (cited by Dinç, 2011: 40-41). Therefore, Turks living in 
Western European countries seem like that they will contribute to the politics, 
public system and dominant cultural life of the countries they are living in a lot. 
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Figure 2. Do you believe that your religious identity or culture prevents your 
integration with the society? 
 
“Do you believe that your religious identity or culture prevents your integration 
with the society?” was replied by the respondents as 20% (42 people) “I believe”, 
23% (47 people) “I partly believe”, 51% (105 people) “I do not believe” and 6% 
(11 people) “I have no idea”. Considering the differences among countries 48% of 
the Turks in Germany (53 people), 60% of Turks in Belgium (33 people) and 48% 
of Turks in the Netherlands (19 people) said “I do not believe” (See Figure 2). We 
can say that the opinion of Western public changed negatively towards the 
Muslims after the terrorist attacks of September 11 (2001) and the murder of film 
producer Theo Van Gogh by a Moroccan radical Islamist. Islam, as a determinant 
factor on the cultural identities of migrants from Turkey, could also be a reason of 
their communitarian separation from the general public. For instance, in Germany 
when someone says foreigner, the first group that comes to mind is the “Turks” 
and when someone says Turk, the first thing that comes to mind is “Islam”. 
Therefore, a certain part of Turks in Germany prefer to revive their religious 
identity when they are discriminated because of their religious life styles and 
practices. The perception of “people who are against the Islam are also against 
Muslims” strengthens the image that religious identity and culture could prevent 
integration among the Turks in Europe. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
The Netherlands (f) 
Belgium (f) 
Germany (f) 
The Netherlands (f) Belgium (f) Germany (f) 
I believe 7 6 29 
I believe partly 11 12 24 
I do not believe 19 33 53 
I have no idea 3 4 4 
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Religious and cultural differences and common universal values which have 
centuries long roots are rich historical heritages for Muslim and Western 
civilizations. Today, pluralist and universal values such as sacredness of life, 
family union, economic welfare, education, peace and security, social justice, 
political participation and democracy, freedom and human rights are strongly 
defended by the majority of Muslims (Esposito, 2002: 7-8). Therefore, it is 
predicted that the universal values resting on mutual understanding and respect, 
accepted by the majority will contribute to permanent and constructivist relations 
in the future instead of tensions and conflict. Within this context, the Turkish 
immigrants who see the socializing and unifying effect of Islam in social life and 
know that Islam is not a discriminative and conflicting belief; also think that their 
religious and cultural identities do not prevent integration at all. 
When we evaluate the religious and cultural identities of the second and third 
generation in Europe, we see three different groups among the youth. First of 
these subgroups is the alienated youth, which is an assimilated or harmonized 
group with the dominant culture. These young people communicate easily with 
the host communities and describe themselves as modern; also they do not go to 
Turkish coffee houses or mosques that much. Another youth group that belongs to 
second and third generations is the Islamic youth, and they appear with their 
opposition to the dominant culture and system along with their external look. This 
youth groups originated from the communitarian structures, and they pursue a 
policy of radical attitudes towards modern life styles and have an ideal of 
developing an alternative life style. Another youth group can be named as 
marginal youth; and they are a group which cannot cope with socio psychological 
and economic problems such as insufficient education, unemployment, financial 
problems and discrimination, therefore alienated. The youth who belong into this 
group experience problems resulting from alcohol, gambling, drugs and burglary 
more often (Canatan, 1995: 75-82). Religious values have an important place in 
the identity search of young generations. But, as a result of modernization, 
religion has greatly lost its aspect of establishing the base of humanitarian 
relations in social life (Kula, 2001). This obvious decrease in the role of religion 
in social life is actually an indicator that cultural Islam started to replace 
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traditional Islam. Especially the current generations experience a cultural Islamic 
rhetoric where beliefs and religious rules are not felt too much in the daily lives. 
According to Turner (2003: 274), Western consumption culture diminishes the 
bases of traditional life styles and therefore weakening the traditional religious 
implementations in terms of habits. 
Tariq Ramadan (2005: 249-251) has mentioned two issues for Muslims to be 
European: First, leaving their non-Islamic habits (Arab and Asian elements) aside 
and second, to enrich their lives with belief, religious service and spirituality. 
Ramadan separates himself from Moroccan politician Ahmed Aboutaleb, who 
claims that by liberalizing Islam, one can become westernized. Ahmed Aboutaleb 
has adopted “New liberalism” and believes that there is a conflict between 
Islamism and liberal values in spite of a possible conflict between Islam and the 
West. Ramadan objects this liberal trend and claims that making Islamic religious 
identity and practices visible will not harm anyone. Ramadan thinks that religious 
identity, as one of the most important belongings that define an individual, will 
revive the psychological and national sentiments. In this sense individuals who 
cannot define themselves in national, religious and cultural ways will eventually 
become isolated, introversive and diffident. Therefore, it is an undeniable fact that 
the individuals who define themselves both as Europeans and as Muslim will 
contribute a lot to living together in a pluralist society. 
Figure 3. Ethnic and Native Press & Media Following Frequencies of the 
Turkish Immigrants 
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The question “How often do you follow the Turkish and local newspapers and TV 
channels in the country you are living?” and the responds given give us important 
hints about the search of belonging and level of consciousness of the Turks. 
According to this, 33% (67 people) of all respondents regularly follow the 
newspapers with local language, and 49% (100 people) follow the Turkish ones. 
Again, 25% (51 people) of the respondents follow local TV channels, as 27% (56 
people) follow the Turkish broadcasting TV channels (See Figure 3). The 
European Turkish society occasionally follows the printed media and TV channels, 
both in the national/local languages where they live and also in Turkish. The 
usage of printed and visual media in local/national languages is one of the most 
important tools that provide the adaptation of Turks in their new environment. On 
the contrary, the news about Muslims provided by the Western media in an 
ideological and biased way diminishes the confidence of Muslim Turk minority to 
the media in general. As the access to mass communication tools has increase, the 
printed and visual media which broadcasts both from Europe and from Turkey has 
increased the dimensions of cultural transmission between Turkey and the 
European Turkish society. The Turkish newspapers and TV channels broadcasting 
in Turkish help the immigrants from Turkey to keep their bounds alive with their 
homeland and cultures. The Turkish immigrants, who visit Turkey at least once in 
every year and strengthen their ethnic religious identities, follow the daily events 
in Turkey mostly from TV channels and lately from intensified internet media. 91% 
(187 people) of the respondents have internet access either in their home or in 
their workplace, which indicates the level of usage of Internet and social media. 
Therefore, the continuing relations with the homeland consolidate the 
acculturation and ethnicity consciousness within the European Turkish society. 
The numerical data on Figure 3 indicates that majority of the Turkish immigrants 
follow the local/national broadcasting newspapers or TV channels less than native 
TV channels and newspapers. One of the most important reasons of these is the 
broadcasting policies of Western European countries’ local and national media 
organs which eventually produce negative perceptions and images about Muslims. 
These biased and subjective media broadcastings in Europe, which encourage the 
polarization and dissociation, have become a global tool in the hands of some 
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certain global capital groups and fanatic politicians. Negative news and comments 
against the Muslims which have begun especially after September 11 have caused 
serious anti-Islamic movements and sensitivities in countries such as Germany 
and England, where Muslims are living intensively. For instance, anti-Islamic 
activities and sensitivities in Germany can be witnessed in magazines, TV screens 
or in petitions against construction of mosques. A radical rightist association in 
Germany, named “Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa (BPE)57” identifies terrorism 
and Islam with each other and considers establishing an Anti-Islamic party against 
the Islamization of Europe. Germany openly objects the European Union 
membership of Turkey, and it is thought that this is the result of the negative 
image constructed by the media against the Turks. 
On the other hand, the reasons why immigrants cannot follow the economic, 
political and cultural developments of the countries they are residing in as a 
German or a British person does, can be counted as socio-economic realities, lack 
of education and social isolation. Lack of language and education in the first 
generation along with unemployment, discontent, identity problem and apathy in 
second and third generations limit the following of national/local language media. 
One of the most important factors is national and ethnic media that effects socio-
cultural and political participation in participant, democratic and modern societies, 
it seems to be lacking the social motives which will integrate the European 
Turkish society into socio-cultural and political life with all its units. 
5.3. Democratic Citizenship and Civil Rights 
Variables such as socio-economic development, education, gender, citizenship, 
understanding of pluralism and intergenerational differences play a very effective 
role in political participation and demand for civil rights. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, participation of Turks in local and national decision-making 
processes is above 50% (sometimes above the national average) is a result of 
“urban citizenship” right given to them. People who have 5 years long of 
residency in the Netherlands (including those from non-EU countries) have the 
                                                             
57
 For more information about the BPE, please see; http://www.paxeuropa.de/ 
(12.05.2014). 
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right to vote, candidacy in local elections and establishing political parties. In 
short, those people who are “urban citizens”, even though they are not Dutch or 
EU citizens, have the right to vote and to be candidate (Benhabib, 2004: 156-157). 
In the Netherlands, foreigners have the right of suffrage since 1984; but in 
Belgium this right was given to non-EU citizens in 2006. Both the Netherlands 
and Belgium have dual citizenship rights, and 73% of the Turks are Dutch citizens, 
whereas 70% of them are Belgian citizens. In Germany, the dual citizenship right 
was given only in July 2014 and 35% of the Turks are German citizens. The 
people whose only citizenship is from the Turkish Republic are those who 
migrated in the early years to Belgium and the Netherlands. Even though many 
EU countries have provided the right of suffrage to citizens of third world 
countries in local elections, Germany has not yet made any legal provisions about 
this. But, Germany gave the right of voting to the citizens of the EU countries 
who are not German citizens in 1992. As a result, the problem that the citizens of 
“third world countries”, which are not members of the EU, cannot participate in 
the elections of EU Parliament damages the social integration and the culture of 
living together. 
Since 1992, citizens of the EU countries can vote in local elections in Germany; 
but the citizens of Turkish Republic still do not have any suffrage rights. Those 
people who have been living in Germany for more than fifty years and who pay 
their tax and insurance have been treated like third class. In Germany, the fourth 
generation got age to vote and stand for elections, dual citizenship became a right 
finally in July 2014. Before the law, immigrant youth, who have 18-23 ages, were 
forced to make a choice between the German citizenship and their home country’s 
citizenship. In other words, the immigrant youth, who were forced to choose only 
one citizenship, could not use dual citizenship right until 2014. With the law in 
July 2014; people born in Germany, over 21 and who lived at least for 8 years in 
Germany, who received at least 6 years education in Germany and the ones with a 
school or vocational diploma, have received the dual citizenship right. As the law 
did not cover all the foreigners backwards and did not give all those people 
residing in Germany a right to vote, we can say that the Germany’s minority 
policy has so many missing points. Therefore; the missing points of dual 
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citizenship, limited election rights for non citizens and other points have negative 
effects on socio-economic and political participation of the foreigners of which 
majority is the Turks. As the citizens of the EU have the right to settle and vote in 
any part of Europe; the Turks and citizens of other non-EU countries do not have 
those rights and this is a serious injustice and double standard. 
Some racist, separatist implementations and policies in Western European 
countries shake the respect and trust of the immigrants to law, public institutions 
and constitution. People who could not use the public services and who could not 
find justice in the constitutional institutions become marginalized, introversive 
and fanaticized. For instance, the “conscience test” or “Muslim test” prepared for 
citizenship in Baden Württemberg state in Germany had very harsh reactions all 
over the world as it was considered as discriminative. This 30 questions length 
“conscience test” written by BW Ministry of Interior bureaucrat Rainer Grell was 
only implemented to the people coming from Muslim countries, which is highly 
controversial with basic human rights and equality before law. This citizenship 
test was implemented between 2006 and 2011 and then was lifted because of the 
nature of the questions. 
 The question “Do you believe that your interests and rights are represented and 
protected in the country you are living?” was replied by 13% (27 people) of the 
respondents as “I completely believe”, 62% (127 people) “I partially believe” and 
25% (51 people) “I do not believe”. 55% (61 people) of Turks in Germany, 69% 
(38 people) of Turks in Belgium and 70% (28 people) of Turks in the Netherlands  
have answered as “I partially believe”. These rates indicate that civil rights are 
better protected in Belgium and the Netherlands when compared with Germany. 
As dual citizenship and suffrage rights were given to the foreigners in Belgium 
and the Netherlands, also Islam was accepted as an official religion in the 
Netherlands and Belgium; which brings these countries upfront comparing with 
Germany. As Islam does not have official membership and representatives as 
other religions do, German constitution does not accept it as an official religion. 
But the third largest group in Germany after the Catholics and the Protestants is 
the Muslim population. On the other hand, the Alevism, a different interpretation 
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of Islam, is recognized as a belief group in Germany and the Alevi students are 
allowed to take courses related with their belief. Even though Islam is not yet 
accepted as a religion, Sunni institutional organizations such as DITIB have been 
accepted as communities in Germany. Religious sects continue their efforts to 
have Islam as a lecture in private and state schools within different federal estates. 
The replies given to the question “Did you make any kind of personal appeal to 
local, regional or national parliaments of the country you are living in for your 
social and legal rights?” were 21% (44 people) “Yes” and 79% (161 people) 
“No”. On the other hand, the replies given to the question “Have you ever been 
involved in any kind of local/regional or national campaign against any law or 
execution concerning your political, social, personal belief or problems?” was 26% 
(53 people) “Yes” and 74% (152 people) “No”. The number of respondents who 
had any kind of demands for their rights either individually or as a community 
from the government is almost one fifth of total respondents; and this indicates 
that Turks can freely demand their democratic rights individually and 
organizationally. In other words, Turks have increased their demands from local 
and national public institutions thereby became a group to be dealt with. Out of 
these 53 people (%26 of all respondents) who have been involved in a campaign 
due to their political, social, personal beliefs and problems or rights against any 
law or implementation are divided as follows: 23 people for religious right, 40 
people for education right, 18 people for inequalities in employment and 
opportunities and 21 people for their political and legal rights. 32 people of the 
respondents have been active at local/state level, 43 people of them at national 
level and 8 of them at EU level (See Table 9). 
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Table 9. Individual and Collective Claims for Civil Rights in Local, National 
and EU Authorities 
 Local 
Authorities 
(f) 
Province 
Authorities 
(f) 
National 
Authorities 
(f) 
European 
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(f) 
 
O
rg
a
n
iz
e 
a
 
C
a
m
p
a
ig
n
 
G
o
 t
o
 L
a
w
 
O
rg
a
n
iz
e 
a
 
C
a
m
p
a
ig
n
 
G
o
 t
o
 L
a
w
 
O
rg
a
n
iz
e 
a
 
C
a
m
p
a
ig
n
 
G
o
 t
o
 L
a
w
 
O
rg
a
n
iz
e 
a
 
C
a
m
p
a
ig
n
 
G
o
 t
o
 L
a
w
 
Religious 8 - 6 - 8 - 1 - 
Education 11 2 14 1 13 1 2 - 
Employment 
or getting a 
profession 
3 4 4 - 8 - 3 - 
Political and 
legal rights 
6 - 3 1 10 2 2 - 
Sports 3 - 4 - 1 - - - 
Others 1 3 1 1 3 2 - - 
Total 32 9 32 3 43 5 8 - 
 
Replies to the question “Have you ever opened a lawsuit at national/local or 
national levels against a law or implementation because of your political, social 
or personal belief and problems or rights?” are 8% (16 people) “Yes” and 92% 
(189 people) “No” (See Table 9). The areas which Turks face with problems are 
education (44 people), political and civil rights (24 people), religion (23 people), 
and inequalities in employment and work opportunities (22 people). According to 
the report published by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)
58
 
in 2009 as a result of the interviews conducted by immigrants in 27 European 
countries, many cases of discrimination and racism were not reported to the police 
                                                             
58
 EU-MIDIS European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey – Main results 
Report 2009 by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), at available 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/663-FRA-2011_EU_MIDIS_EN.pdf 
(21.05.2014). 
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(79% of the respondents did not report the problems they have faced). According 
to FRA, the reason why the victims did not report to the state institutions is that 
they do not know anything about the laws and regulations, and also their distrust 
to these institutions. According to this field research, Muslims consider religion as 
the main reason of the discrimination. 
The majority of those who have demanded their rights from the relevant state 
institutions are from Germany, and this indicates that Germany is behind Belgium 
and the Netherlands in terms of civil rights. Most of the demands on collective 
and individual rights are about education, social services, employment and 
religious issues; which indicate that inequality of opportunities continue. Besides, 
the demands of Muslim religious groups and communities in Germany about 
mosque, minaret, prayer, funeral services, education in native language and 
headscarf is increasing. In some state schools in Germany, the ban on headscarf, 
lack of Islam courses in many states, girl-boy distinction in swimming courses 
increase the individual and collective demands for rights in these areas. In all 
three countries, individual and collective campaigns and lawsuits opened have 
paved the way for freedoms and civil rights in many states. For instance, the 
federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse and Lower Saxony in Germany 
have provided the chance of Islamic religious courses to be taught. 
5.4. Social Integration and Life Satisfaction of the Turkish Immigrants in 
Europe 
With international migrations in the last century, nation-states have turned to 
include many diverse cultures and people. Because of this, it has become a 
necessity to put “diversities and differences” to the forefront instead of “similarity” 
and to continue building social structures which would prevail those diversities 
(Vatandaş, 2002). Starting from this point, the “human” emphasis of Islam which 
is open to social diversity and social participation is very close to the emphasis of 
“individual” in democracy. Since 1980, Turkey has started to supplement the 
democratic process with a liberal and civil culture. As a result of this process, 
Islam in Turkey has started to be harmonized with the democracy and its 
institutions in case of Islamic groups. The Islamic groups in Turkey are the basic, 
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strongest and lively civil society organizations in the areas of education, academy, 
politics and economy both within and outside Turkey (Çaha, 1998). Therefore, 
Turks living in free and democratic societies of Europe today are giving the 
message of Islam towards tolerance, peace, plurality, justice and development 
through the civil society organizations. 
In this section; the active/passive participation and membership of the Turkish 
respondents to associations, foundations, mosque associations, occupational 
entities, women organizations, human rights organizations, cultural and 
educational centers will be evaluated. Also, the social and cultural development of 
Turkish respondents was analyzed in accordance with generations, gender, age, 
socio-economic status, citizenship and country differences. First question was 
“Are you a member of any, Turkish or non-Turkish, foundation in the country you 
are living?” Without any country distinction approximately 60% (124 people) of 
all respondents said they are member to a Turkish association or foundation; 
whereas 39% (80 people) said they were members to a non-Turkish one. When we 
look at the countries, 62% (68 people) of the German Turks, 62% (34 people) of 
the Belgian Turks and 55% (22 people) of the Turks in the Netherlands have 
stated that they are members to a Turkey based association or foundation. Also, 
30% (33 people) of the German Turks, 45% (25 people) of the Belgian Turks and 
55% (22 people) of the Turks in the Netherlands have stated that they are 
members to a non-Turkey based association or foundation (See Figure 4). The 
data shows that Turks in Germany are more tended to connect with a Turkey 
based organization. But, the Turks from Belgium and the Netherlands have more 
relations and connections with non-Turkey based associations, foundations and 
civil society organizations. 
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Figure 4. Membership to the Turkish and Non-Turkish Organizations (%) 
 
An important part of the Turks in the sample countries (60%/124 people) are 
participating in Turkey originated organizations and they are actively contributing. 
67% (73 people) of the male respondents (109 people) have indicated that they are 
members to Turkey origin institutions, whereas 42% (46 people) said they were 
members of non-Turkish ones. 53% (51 people) of the female respondents (96 
people) have indicated that they are members to Turkey origin institutions, 
whereas 35% (34 people) said they were members of non-Turkish ones. Male 
respondents are more interested in both Turkish and non-Turkish associations and 
foundations than the women. In traditional large families, reasons such as keeping 
the woman within the house and the inadequacy of language causes a low level of 
social life for women. But, the “independence” of Turkish woman which has 
increased in the last decade helped them to close the gap with the men. On the 
other hand, 55% (60 people) of the respondents aged 19-35 years (109 people) 
have indicated that they are members of an association or a foundation which is of 
Turkey origin, and 38% (41 people) of the respondents aged 19-35 years (109 
people) have indicated that they are members to a non-Turkish one. On the 
contrary, 67% (55 people) of the respondents aged 36-50 years (82 people) have 
indicated that they are members of an association or a foundation which is of 
Turkey origin, and 40% (33 people) said that they were members to a non-Turkish 
one. About 61% (43 people) of the respondents graduated from a high school at 
most (71 people) had remarked that they are members of an association or a 
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foundation which is of Turkey origin and 23% (16 people) had remarked that they 
are members to a non-Turkish one. On the contrary, about %60 (81 people) of the 
respondents who have at least graduated from high school (134 people) said that 
they were members of an association or a foundation which is of Turkey origin, 
and 48% (64 people) said that they were members to a non-Turkish one.  
In the following years of the migration, the ties with the homeland have been 
weakened due to generational changes and this caused the Turks to organize in 
ethnic and religious groups. The masses with low socio-economic and education 
levels have directed themselves to community associations, mosque associations, 
country organizations, aid organizations and political associations built on the 
Turkish/Kurdish nationalism (Kaya and Kentel, 2005). The Turkish society has 
achieved a lot in constructing their own identity and belonging world; and they 
have also built religious organizations to provide the spiritual and moral 
development of the young generations. Ethnic majority of the European Turkish 
society is consisted of Turks and Kurds, whereas they are mostly Sunni or the 
Alevi by religion. The Alevis have done a very strong organization throughout 
Europe and they work very hard to revive the Alevism belief and culture within 
generations. Kurds are one of the well organized minority groups in Europe and 
they are working hard to revive Kurdish culture and identity and teach Kurdish 
through associations and institutes. Also, some Kurds, who have migrated to 
Europe since 1980s because of oppression and denial, have started political 
organizations in order to keep the ethnic awareness alive in diaspora (Kaya and 
Uğurlu, 2014). 
The membership rates in Figure 4 indicate that almost 1/3 of the Turks in 
Germany are not members to Turkey origin associations and foundations, and 2/3 
are not members to non-Turkish organizations. 1/3 of the Turks in Belgium are 
not members to Turkey origin associations and foundations, and 1/2 is not 
members to non-Turkish organizations. Turks in the Netherlands are 1/2 not 
members of neither of those organizations. According to Kaya and Kentel (2005), 
there are some possible reasons for this situation. First, Turkey origin 
organizations have failed to solve or lighten the problems. Second, Islamic 
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holdings which have collected huge amounts of cash from Turks in Europe with 
the promise of “high profit” were corrupted. Even though some of these Islamic 
holdings were positive and did investments for employment, another part that 
exploited has seriously harmed the religious institutions that helped them. Third, 
certain parts of the society try to stay away from membership to some religious 
and social organizations that teach students and operate aid institutions. These 
parts of the society do not want to have the burden of any material cost through 
membership, so they are acting closer to political party associations which are 
Turkey origin. In other words, this proximity helps them to gain a wide social 
network, and it does not bring any kind of material responsibility and liability to 
them. Fourth, the self-centered understanding of the European culture has affected 
the Turkish society. Self-centered understanding denies any attachment to 
religious, political and ideological groups. One of the sociological results of 
globalization is the diversifying social structures under the effect of self-centered 
culture and civil society organizations (Çaha, 2002). The people and masses 
affected by the reasons mentioned above do not show any interest on Turkey 
origin organizations and do not take any responsibility. 
The most obvious reason of low level of participation to non-Turkish civil society 
organization is because such a membership is perceived as structural 
assimilation/integration. Structural assimilation is one of the seven (7) different 
assimilation/integration models set forth by Gordon (1964:71); and it appears with 
the membership or participation of the minorities to the associations and 
organizations of the host society (cited by Kaya and Kentel, 2005). In other words, 
organizations such as socio-cultural and church associations of which the activity 
agenda is on the adaptation and assimilation of minorities, have taken special and 
structural responsibilities in European societies. Therefore participation and 
membership to these non-Turkish organizations is considered as a tool of 
structural assimilation by vast society and is not favored. Another reason of this is 
the lack of information about the possible benefits or harms of this membership. 
Also, the strong ties with the homeland has developed an introversive and closed 
life style within the masses with inadequate educational and linguistic skills. 
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Table 10. Classifications of Turkish and Non-Turkish Organizations 
 Turkish Organizations (f) Non-Turkish Organizations (f) 
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Environmentalist 
Organization 
10 5 1 7 10 6 
Religious Organization 39 15 11 1 1 1 
Educational Organization 42 20 7 13 11 9 
Women Organization 6 7 3 1 4 2 
Professional Organization 12 4 1 8 11 7 
Culture and Arts 
Organization 
24 15 8 7 8 7 
Political Organization 9 5 3 9 6 5 
Social Organization 17 11 4 9 12 8 
Sports Organization 10 5 2 11 6 5 
Others 5 5 3 4 2 - 
 
Data on Table 10 are acquired from the answers given to the question: “In which 
areas do the association/associations of which you are members of, whether 
Turkish or non-Turkish give services?”. Considering the country differences, 
among the respondents who are the members of Turkey based associations; 52% 
(65 people) are faith-based, 56% (69 people) are education based, 38% (47 people) 
are culture and art based and 26% (32 people) are social based associations. The 
respondents from Germany are members of associations dealing with education 
(42 people), religion (39 people) and culture and arts (24 people). In Belgium, 
most of the interest is on education (20 people) and culture/art (15 people); and in 
the Netherlands these are religion (11 people) and culture/art (8 people). On the 
other hand, 41% (33 people) of the respondents who are members to non-Turkish 
associations are members of organizations dealing with education, 36% (29 
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people) social based and 33% (26 people) occupational ones. The Turkish workers 
have at first organized around “workers’ unions”; but after the September 12 
(1980) military coup, they have experienced a new organizational process with the 
introduction of distinctive religious, political and ideological movements. In the 
following years of migration, the Turkish society has organized in different areas 
such as employer and occupational organizations, countrymen associations, aid 
associations and lobby associations. The Turkish civil society organization in 
Europe is a projection of the political groups, religious and civil communities and 
ethnic/ideological movements in Turkey and they have started to distinguish 
themselves with daycares, private schools, private universities, culture and 
dialogue centers and media and aid organizations. The European civil society 
organizations are products of diversities in Turkey and they contribute a lot to 
social and political participation, integration and intercultural dialogue. 
Table 11. Activities of the Respondents into Daily Life Out of Work/School 
 Generally (f) Sometimes (f) Rarely (f) Never (f) 
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I spent time with my family 85 44 34 17 8 5 5 3 1 3 - - 
I spent time with Turkish 
friends and neighbors 
34 24 20 63 26 16 13 5 3 - - 1 
I spent time with 
German/Belgian/Dutch 
friends 
9 10 8 43 25 14 29 9 12 29 11 6 
Others 3 4 1 8 2 1 3 3 1 2 - 1 
 
Inter group and external social relations of Turkish respondents are considered 
comparatively on Table 11. According to this, 80% (163 people) of all the 
respondents have said that they “generally” spend time with their own family. 51% 
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(105 people) of all respondents said that they “sometimes” hangout with Turkish 
friends and neighbors, whereas 40% (65 people) said that they spend time with 
their German/Belgian/Dutch friends and neighbors. Turks in Belgium (45%/25 
people), Turks in Germany (39%/43 people) and Turks in the Netherlands 
(35%/14 people) said that they are having close relations with the majority. Also, 
as the average age of the respondents decrease, the social relations network 
expands from the family to the periphery; and as the age average increases, the 
social relations network narrows from periphery to center. Another important 
detail here is that the Turks living in Belgium and the Netherlands organize their 
individual and organizational activities open to the participation of the majority. 
Generally, Turks in Germany are organizing such activities more introversive, 
based on family, relatives, community and countrymen, and as closed to the 
participation of the majority. The numerical data about the respondents indicate 
that the Turks living in Western European countries have generally socialized and 
harmonized with the external groups thanks to their relations with intra groups 
and external groups. We can also say that the Turkish society as a part of the 
European societies has learned the urban culture and norms of the Western 
countries and started to accomplish the duties and liabilities of a citizen. 
Figure 5. Satisfaction about General Policies of the Governments (%)  
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Data in Figure 5 and Figure 6 measures the satisfaction of the respondents from 
the general and minority based policies of the governments also indicate the life 
satisfaction of migrants of Turkish origin. According to this, 6% (13 people) of all 
respondents consider the general policies of governments as ‘very good’, 54% 
(111 people) as ‘good’, 25% (52 people) as ‘bad’ and 8% (16 people) as ‘very 
bad’. Also about 4% (8 people) of all respondents consider the minority policies 
of the governments as ‘very good’, 32% (65 people) as ‘good’, 42% (86 people) 
as ‘bad’ and 16% (32 people) as ‘very bad’. 
Figure 6. Satisfaction about Immigrant Policies of the Governments (%) 
 
58% (64 people) of the Turkish respondents in Germany consider the general 
policies of German governments as “good” and 19% (21 people) consider them as 
“bad”. On the other hand, 26% (29 people) of the Turkish respondents in 
Germany consider the minority policies of German governments as “good” and 46% 
(51 people) as “bad”. 55% (30 people) of the Turkish respondents in Belgium 
consider the general policies of the Belgian government as “good” and the 40% 
(22 people) consider the minority policies as “good”; 38% (21 people) consider 
the general policies of the Belgian government as “bad” and 40% (22 people) 
consider the minority policies as “bad”. 43% (17 people) of the Turks in the 
Netherlands consider the general policies of the Dutch government as “good” and 
the 35% (14 people) consider the minority policies as “good”; 25% (10 people) 
consider the general policies of the Dutch government as “bad” and 33% (13 
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Germany are more satisfied with the general policies of German government 
compared with the Turks in Belgium and the Netherlands. But, their satisfaction 
from the minority policies of the government is lower than the Turks in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. One of the most important reasons of this is that Germany 
does not give the right of democratic differences to survive with democratic 
standards. The traditional and conservative German politics has a traditional and 
assimilative approach towards integration and immigrants. The lacks of dual 
citizenship right until mid 2014, hardening the citizenship rights to Turks and 
expectations of harmony only from foreigners are the policies that Turks are most 
discontent of. 
Table 12. Rising Standards of Living, Public Service Standards and Social 
Tolerance  
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In terms of job oppurtunities 10 5 3 60 26 17 36 21 17 4 3 3 
In terms of the functioning 
of the legal system 
23 5 8 64 34 20 18 13 11 5 3 1 
In terms of individual and 
social tolerance 
4 11 2 37 21 20 52 21 16 17 2 2 
In terms of respect to social 
rules 
23 18 10 62 28 17 21 9 11 4 - 2 
In terms of moral values - 6 2 23 23 11 47 21 15 40 5 12 
In terms of respect to 
religious/cultural differences 
6 6 3 35 27 12 50 19 20 19 3 5 
In terms of attitude of 
security forces 
8 9 1 71 28 22 26 15 14 5 3 3 
In terms of basic human 
rights 
6 9 3 43 27 21 47 15 14 14 4 2 
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The respondents were asked to classify the sufficiency of living standards, social 
tolerance and public services of the countries they are living in. According to this, 
36% (74 people) of all the respondents have said that the countries they live in is 
“inadequate” in terms of job opportunities. 43% (89 people) of all respondents 
consider their country as “inadequate” in terms of individual and social tolerance; 
whereas 38% (78 people) consider as “adequate”. When the public services of 
these sample countries are being evaluated, variables such as the execution of the 
legal system, attitude of the security forces and implementation of basic human 
rights were taken into consideration. According to this, 58% of the Turks in 
Germany (64 people), 62% (34 people) in Belgium and 50% (20 people) in the 
Netherlands evaluate the functioning of legal system in their countries as 
“adequate”. Also, 65% (71 people) in Germany have considered the attitude of 
the security forces as “adequate”; more than the Belgium (51%) and the 
Netherlands (55%). In terms of respect to human rights in the public services; 39% 
(43 people) of the Turkish respondents in Germany evaluate as “adequate”; but 43% 
(47 people) of the Turkish respondents in Germany as “inadequate”. In terms of 
respect to human rights in the public services; 49% (27 people) of the Turks in 
Belgium evaluate as “adequate”; but 27% (15 people) of the Turks in Belgium 
evaluate as “inadequate”. In terms of respect to human rights in the public 
services; 53% (21 people) of the Turks in the Netherlands evaluate as “adequate”; 
but 35% (14 people) of the Turks in the Netherlands evaluate as “inadequate” 
(See Table 12). 
“Most adequate” country in terms of respect to social rules was Germany with 56% 
(62 people); the most inadequate countries in terms of moral values were 
Germany with 43% (47 people) and Belgium with 38% (21 people). Equal access 
to job opportunities, equality before law, justice of the law makers, easy access to 
public services, efficient communication with citizens, right of information, 
responsibility to public and sensitivity are the main determinants for the 
development of a tolerant environment. More efficient and productive public 
services of the governments in Western democracies are mostly shaped by the 
reactions of minorities as well. Especially the participant, creative and productive 
social identity of the ethnic/religious new generations is correlated with the 
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characteristic of local and national policies open to feedback and communication. 
According to the data, the top of public service demands by the Turks in Europe 
are abolishing the inequalities in job opportunities, creating necessary 
employment areas, disseminating the freedoms and increasing the life quality. 
Therefore, public services and rights that increase the life standard, quality and 
satisfaction of the immigrants play an important function in protecting their rights 
and their social integration. 
Two important variables were taken into consideration to understand the 
efficiency of sample countries’ societies in terms of pluralism and culture of 
living together. One of the variables chosen for this purpose is “individual/social 
tolerance” towards the foreigners and the second one is “respect to 
religious/cultural differences”. According to this, 47% (52 people) in Germany, 
38% (21 people) in Belgium and 40% (16 people) in the Netherlands have 
considered their countries as “inadequate” in terms of individual/social tolerance. 
In terms of respect to religious/cultural differences, which is one of the most 
important requirements to live together in pluralist societies, 32% (35 people) in 
Germany, 49% (27 people) in Belgium and 30% (12 people) from the Netherlands 
have considered their countries as adequate (See Table 12). The comparative data 
indicates that the expectations of Turks from host societies are individual and 
social respect, not otherizing them and showing them respect. When we look at 
the differences from the country level, we can understand that the Turks in 
Germany have more expectations than the Turks in other countries in terms of 
individual and social tolerance and respect to differences. One of the main reasons 
of this is that Germany is not considered as tolerant and respectful s other two 
countries to multiculturalism and diversity. Another reason is that the Turks were 
very much affected from the xenophobia and racism in Germany after September 
11.  
Another implementation that makes intercultural integration and tolerance 
possible is the execution of public services and policies with respect to the 
traditions, culture and life style of ethnic and religious minorities. For instance, 
the success or failure of the Europe in its test with the “other” inside completely 
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complies with the acceptance of diversity and life style of the “other”. According 
to famous Turkish sociologist Nilüfer Göle (2010: 177-178), there are two 
important public arguments which are determinant in the relation of Europe with 
the Muslim “other”. One of these public debates that crystallize the problem of 
existence of Islam in Europe is the headscarf problem of the Muslim girls, and the 
other one is the debate on Turkey’s place in Europe. These two public debates 
cause the questioning of European identity and universalism and their boundaries, 
and they test the ability of Europe to cope with the Muslim “other”. 
Table 13. How important are public and civil institutions in Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands to you? 
Public and Civil Institutions Very 
important 
(f) 
Important 
(f) 
Less 
important 
(f) 
Not 
important 
(f) 
National Parliaments 109 76 16 4 
Courts  103 78 17 7 
Municipalities 96 93 10 6 
Political parties 43 101 50 11 
Elections 66 97 32 10 
The European Union 73 96 19 17 
European Court of Human Rights 106 63 26 10 
Non-governmental organizations 103 82 19 1 
 
Turks have developed rational relations with the institutional structures of the 
countries they are in, e.g. the political and constitutional institutions and health 
and security system. The data on Table 13 that aims to understand the positive and 
negative views of the Turks in Europe on constitutional institutions of the 
countries where they reside, on European Union and on civil society organizations 
is another indicator of socialization and integration. According to this, 53% (109 
people) of the respondents consider the national parliaments, 50% (103 people) 
the courts and 52% (106 people), the European Court of Human Rights as the 
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“very important” institutions. 50% (103 people) of the Turkish respondents 
consider the civil society organizations as “very important” and the contribution 
of these organizations to socialization and participation of the European Turkish 
society is now better understood. 
On the other hand, 24% (50 people) of the respondents consider the political 
parties as “less important” due to several reasons. Main reason of the negative 
perception of political parties is the existence of conservative and extreme right 
parties that use Islamophobia and xenophobia as a populist tool and thereby gain 
votes from wrong fears. On the other hand, Turkey, which has been accepted as a 
candidate country in 1999, has been put off by the European Union and this 
caused a lack of trust within the European Turkish society. Instead of all these 
problems, 47% (96 people) of the respondents consider European Union as 
“important”. It is a fact that the Turks in Europe support the EU membership of 
Turkey more than the public opinion within Turkey. A reason of this support is 
the perception that the European Union membership of Turkey, which is a soft 
power between the Muslim Eastern societies and the Christian Western societies, 
will strengthen the dialogue between the West and the Islamic world. Another 
reason is that the Turks, who have been excluded as “other” in terms of their 
ethnic and religious belongings, believe that Turkey’s EU membership will help 
them to struggle with the dominant culture. 
The answers to the question “Are you happy of being and living in the country 
where you reside at?” are 72% (147 people) “Yes” and 28% (58 people) “No”. 
Also 70% (77 people) of Turks in Germany, 78% (43 people) of Turks in Belgium 
and 68% (27 people) of Turks in the Netherlands have said that they were happy 
to live in the countries they reside. On the other hand, 75% (75 people) of the 
respondents who have said that they have a maximum of 2.000 Euros as income 
are happy to live where they are, so does 83% (35 people) of the respondents who 
earn more than 2.000 Euros a month. Thus, in general life satisfaction and quality 
of the minorities increase or decrease depending on a few factors. Factors, such as 
inequality in opportunity, unemployment and discrimination towards ethnic and 
religious minorities in the West, are one of the reasons that reduce migrant’s life 
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satisfaction. The inflationist pressure by Euro which is higher than the old 
monetary units and the economic stagnancy after 2008 economic crisis cause 
great concern on the majority of Turks in Europe. As the capital investments and 
savings have started to be directed to Turkey and as the reverse migration to 
homeland has increased, we can call those as reflections of that concern. 
The socio-economic concerns of generations born and educated in Western 
Europe are lower than the first generations. 75% (82 people) of the respondents 
aged 19-35 years are happy to live in the country they live; but this number is 
about 66% (54 people) among the people aged 36-50 years. About 65% (46 
people) of the respondents who have completed high school at most (71 people) 
say that they are happy in the countries they live in, this satisfaction rate is %75 
(101 people) for the respondents who have completed high school at least (134 
people).   Young generations have hopes about the future, but there is also a 
tendency of discontent from the system along with dissatisfaction which is the 
result of inequality in opportunities. On the other hand, the socio-cultural and 
religious islands and the traditional solidarity networks developed by Turks as a 
response to assimilation within the dominant culture where they live in, have 
caused a life quality and satisfaction within their own group borders. According to 
Benmayor and Skotnes (1994); immigrant groups who want to protect their 
diverse cultural identities and values within the dominant culture establish social 
solidarity networks such as associations, schools and religious places, thereby 
trying to keep their cultures and belief alive. The first thing that can be seen in the 
people whom the interview was conducted with is that the self-sufficiency and 
thanking to God for whatever they had. Concept of “thanking” in the Islam which 
is necessary for the moral development of the people can restore the social health 
and psychology of conservative and religious groups to cope with the problems. 
The group belonging, consciousness of ethnicity and socio-economic status of 
Turks in Europe which they own according to their ethnic and religious identity, 
are some of the factors that increase the life satisfaction. 
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Figure 7. Do you feel like a part of the country you are living in? 
 
In parallel with inter-generational developments and the enhancement of the 
education level; socialization and organization developed and transformed, 
thereby making the minority groups an active part and shareholder of the host 
societies. Answers given to the question of “Do you feel like a part of the country 
you are living in?” were 27% (55 people) “I completely do”, 51% (105 people) “I 
partially do” and 21% (42 people) “I don’t”. When country differences are 
considered, 19% of the Turks in Germany (21 people), 38% of the Turks in 
Belgium (21 people) and 33% of Turks in the Netherlands (13 people) completely 
consider themselves as a part of the society they are living in. On the other hand, 
26% of Turks in Germany (29 people), 9% of Turks in Belgium (5 people) and 20% 
of Turks in the Netherlands (8 people) have mentioned that they are not a part of 
the society they are living in (See Figure 7). One of the widely used elements in 
democracy to integrate the minority groups with the public system and to make 
them a part of the host society is the right of citizenship. But in Germany, to 
become a German citizen, the condition of leaving the citizenship of the origin 
country has been put. In spite of the demands that have been going on for years, 
Germany has only signed the dual citizenship law for non-EU foreigners in July 
2014. The citizens of Belgium and Dutch who are Turks in origin are numerically 
double than Turkish-German citizens confirm the data above. In the Netherlands 
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elected and elect other candidates in the city elections, without becoming a part of 
the Dutch national unity (Benhabib, 2004: 157-162). Therefore, the foreigners in 
the Netherlands have better representation rights comparing with the foreigners in 
other countries. Even this situation itself encourages the third world country 
citizens living in the Netherlands both as a voter and as active participants in 
politics. 
When analyzing the data from the respondents, important results are reached 
when the differences between generations is considered. For instance, 39% (28 
people) of the respondents who were born in Germany, Belgium or the 
Netherlands see themselves as a complete part of the countries they live in (71 
people), whereas only 20% (27 people) of the respondents who were born in 
Turkey have the same perception (134 people). These results indicate that the first 
generation of Turks in Europe feel themselves closer to their homeland where 
they were born and spent their childhood or youth. Second and third generations, 
on the other hand, have an equal stance towards their homeland and to the 
countries where they live, taught and work. But especially the young generations 
feel themselves closer to the Western countries where they were born, grown up 
and reside. One of the main reasons of the success of young generations born and 
educated in Western European countries at social and economic life and 
local/national politics is the feeling o belonging. 
Figure 8. Do you think that you have adapted to the country where you are 
living in? 
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The answers given to the question by all respondents “Do you think that you have 
adapted to the country where you are living in?” are 77% (158 people) “Yes” and 
23% (47 people) “No”. When the differences among countries are considered, 70% 
of Turks in Germany (77 people), 84% of Turks in Belgium (46 people) an 88% 
of Turks in the Netherlands (35 people) have said that they have adapted to the 
country they are living at (See Figure 8). Also about 72% (79 people) of the male 
respondents (109 people) think that they have adapted to the countries they are 
living in, this number is 82% (79 people) among the female respondents (96 
people). On the other hand, 70% (94 people) of the respondents who were born in 
Turkey believe that they have adapted to the society where they are living in (134 
people), this rate is 90% (64 people) for the respondents who were born in 
Germany/Belgium/the Netherlands (71 people). In addition, about 69% (49 people) 
of the respondents graduated from a high school at most think that they have 
adapted to the country where they live in (71 people), this rate is 81% (109 people) 
for the respondents who have graduated from high school at least (134 people). 
In the process of international migration, the interaction and harmony of the 
receiving and sending countries is important. Even though assimilation in itself 
includes an adaptation, it is closer to the inconsistency in pluralist democracies. In 
the following years of migration, the weakening of the ties with the origin country 
causes the valued norms and concepts by time become more obvious. The 
European Turkish society could reproduce and generally protect their own ethnic 
and cultural differences, and they could so far resist assimilation and getting lost 
within the dominant culture. Generations who were born and grown in Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands have been adapted better than those who came later 
through family reunion, employment and education. Therefore, comparing the 
countries they are living in with their homeland with standards such as democracy, 
social services, education, employment, life quality and satisfaction; Turks in 
Europe generally think that they have generally adapted with the European 
societies of which they were born and educated. As the Turks in the Netherlands 
and Belgium are more willing in socio-economic and political participation and 
representation than those Turks in Germany, social cohesion in those countries 
was easier. Also, another reason of their efforts of integration is that the Turks 
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living in Belgium and the Netherlands are way forward than the Turks in 
Germany in terms of citizenship, civil society, Turkey’s EU membership and 
culture of coexistence. 
Figure 9. The Basic Problems of Integration of the Turkish Immigrants (%)  
 
 In this section of our field study, some major factors such as the social harmony 
and life satisfaction/quality of the Turks living in Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands have been analyzed. But, some problems and difficulties that prevent 
social harmony and life quality/satisfaction are always there at every process of 
adaptation process for the minority groups. The answers given to the question 
“What are the most important three problems you face in the countries you are 
living in because of your foreignness?”  give us some important hints about the 
problems that still continue after fifty years of migration. According to this, 76% 
(155 people) of the all respondents consider exclusion, racism and prejudice as the 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
All Participants (%) 
Inequality of 
opportunity in 
education 
Inequality of 
opportunity 
(employment, getting a 
job and house) 
Exclusion, racism and 
prejudice 
Legal, bureaucratic 
and political barriers 
Barriers on religious 
and socio-cultural life 
Assimilation 
215 
 
problem faced the most. On the contrary 66% (136 people) of the respondents 
consider the inequality of opportunities in the fields such as finding a job, getting 
an occupation and buying a house as the second biggest problem. 48% (98 people) 
of all the respondents consider the inequalities and discriminations in education as 
the third biggest problem. Problems under the headline “Barriers on religious and 
socio-cultural life” are considered as a problem by 38% (78 people) of the all 
respondents. Problems under the headline “Legal, bureaucratic and political 
barriers” are considered as a problem by 28% (58 people) of the respondents. 
Assimilation is considered as a problem for adaptation by 20% (42 people) of the 
respondents (See Figure 9). On the other hand, majority of the people who faced 
problems in exclusion, racism and prejudice were the Turks in Germany. French 
politics with its assimilation based Republican politics and the German politics 
with traditional conservative policies that do not respect the diversities have 
caused the outbreak of an introversive, defensive, nationalist, traditionalist and 
reactive group among the non-EU minorities. 
The main problems of the Turkish immigrants face in Western European countries 
because of their foreignness are isolation politics, unemployment policies as a 
result of economic crises, discriminative statements of right populism, historical 
prejudices, social and cultural exclusion, extreme and aggressive nationalism, 
discriminations in education, unequal opportunities in occupation and housing and 
legal/bureaucratic barriers. Cultural differences brought by immigrants and Islam 
itself are the targets of negative reactions in Europe towards the existence of 
Muslim immigrants. Racism has appeared with a new version since the Second 
World War, and it shows up as “social/cultural exclusion” today. Islam is 
considered as a threat to liberal and socialist ideologies that belong to West; and is 
also represented as a religion that cannot agree with Western civilization and legal 
norms (Haleber, 2005: 202-203). Therefore, today we see that the ethnic, religious 
and national sensitivities both in Muslim countries and in the West have become 
the source of a possible political polarization and conflict. But, religion and 
ethnicity, which are considered as elements of conflict are also one of the most 
important tools that provide the grounds for the protection of religious, cultural 
and ethnic identities and differences. Ethnic and religious differences are also the 
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sources of diversity and cultural richness; and a respondent’s opinions give us 
important hints about coexistence: 
 ‘… The most important thing to get rid of the prejudices is people with different 
ethnicities living together. In the Netherlands, regions where racist parties have 
received the highest votes are the places where there are not so many or no 
foreigners. People are afraid of others they don’t know….We are teaching 
Europe “the other”, the different. Europe meets different cultures on its soil. That 
is the reason of the problems, but in the long-term everything goes well. If there is 
no accident such as the World War II, Europe will come out of this process as 
stronger and maybe will have multiculturalism as its most important advantage 
against China (This is the advantage of USA to Europe until today.’ (Male, aged 
19-35 years, the Netherlands). 
Other problems of the Turkish respondents as foreigner in the host countries are 
lack of mutual dialogue, ban of headscarf in schools and official institutions, 
hostility to Islam, not having Turkish as an elective course at schools, lack of 
participation and representation, humiliation and rejection of cultural differences. 
Different versions and images of Islam in Europe are being discussed at public 
opinion through media and thereby considered as political and administrative 
problems. For instance, laws about security, ban of religious symbols in public 
schools and the arguments of referendum on European Constitution are indicators 
that Islam is passing to political area from the public sphere. Public sphere is the 
area where the paths of Muslims and host societies converge; and it is the place 
where Muslim existence shows itself and where the European public opinion 
argues in its collective subconscious. Therefore, one of the issues wondered today 
is not the recognition of Islamic diversity; but whether there is a force that could 
bring the parties together on a common ground or not. Does Europe define itself 
as an identity or as a project? The rejection of the European Constitution, 
emphasis on national identity, heritage of the past and the test of democracy with 
the “other” are all indicators that Europe is now in a process of lag (Göle, 2010: 
27-38). Today, Islam is not recognized as a religion in many EU countries and this 
is one of the most important barriers in front of Muslim minorities to take 
advantage of many legal rights.  
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On the other hand, xenophobia and Islamophobia in the lower social classes of 
Western societies have caused an extreme and fanatic nationalism and a potential 
racism. Racism is an ideology that predicts discrimination on race and argues that 
there are superior and inferior races on the earth. The most important issue all 
racist and fascist groups have in common is xenophobia in Europe. According to 
rightist and racist political parties, the existence of foreigners threatens the 
national identity and local culture. According to populist politicians, foreigners 
are in the roots of many problems such as abuse of housing, education and social 
opportunities and cultural dissolution. Racism and xenophobia threatens social 
peace and order in Europe today, and it has increased especially after September 
11. Mosques, cultural centers, educational institutions and houses that belong to 
Muslim minorities had been targeted and sabotaged after the September 11 (2001), 
Madrid (2004) and London (2005) terrorist attacks. According to the report of 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)
59
 from 15 
member countries; there has been a relative less physical violence towards 
Muslims in Europe after September 11, but an increase in verbal attacks and 
harassments. According to the report of EUMC, especially the women with 
headscarves have been targets of verbal attacks and harassments (Canatan, 2007: 
31-32). On the other hand, after the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands 
by a radical Islamist (2004), there have been physical attacks to some religious 
schools and mosques belong to Muslims in the Netherlands. On the other hand, in 
a report published by European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI)
60
 in February 2014 on Germany, it has been emphasized that the tendency 
to racist ideas and extreme rightist institutions among the German policemen was 
very high. The report has emphasized that struggle with racism was not good 
enough and that “secret racism” has become widespread in the country. The report 
has also emphasized that the book “How Germany Abolishes Itself” written by 
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Thilo Sarrazin, the German Federal Bank former executive and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) member and that some parts of this book were 
mentioned by Bild-Zeitung and Spiegel. These kind of emerging developments 
were emphasized as “threatening” in the ECRI report.  
The prejudice and mostly wrong perceptions of Muslims in the West is the most 
important factor that lies in the ground of problems Muslims face. Several 
different resources such as scientific studies, media news, movies, and think-tank 
reports have an important place in dissemination of prejudices and wrong 
information (Yanarışık, 2013: 2911). In the report of European Council ‘Living 
Together – Combining Diversity and Freedom in 21st - Century Europe’ published 
in 2011, it has been advised to develop a comprehensive EU policy to struggle 
with discrimination, racism and xenophobia. According to another report 
‘Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia’ of European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)
61
 published in 2006; 
many Muslims have been discriminated in European countries in terms of 
employment, education and housing. The report has also emphasized that 
Muslims have been exposed to several Islamophobia actions from verbal threats 
to physical attacks. On the other hand, according to the results of the survey  
European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS)
62
 of 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) which is published in 
2009, people who have citizenship and who have been residing for a longer period 
in the country are exposed less to discrimination. According to the report 41% of 
the male respondents with no citizenship are being discriminated, and this rate is 
27% for Muslim male respondents with a citizenship. Even though the Muslims 
were born and grown in European countries, they are still being exposed to 
discrimination in areas such as education, employment and getting property. To 
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help the young generations cope with the disadvantages, they have to have equal 
access to housing, employment, education and health services (Akdemir, 2009). 
Figure 10. Which identity/cultural difference do you think is the reason of 
double standards, discriminative attitude, behavior and policies in the society 
you are living? 
 
The answers given to the question “Which identity/cultural difference do you think 
is the reason of double standards, discriminative attitude, behaviour and policies 
in the society you are living?” were 69% (76 people) by Turks in Germany, 40% 
(22 people) by Turks in Belgium and 83% (33 people) by Turks in the 
Netherlands was “ethnic identity”. The rate of people who think that problems 
Turks face in the societies they are living are because of their religious identities 
is 73% (80 people) by Turks in Germany, 47% (26 people) by Turks in Belgium 
and 75% (30 people) by Turks in the Netherlands. The rate of people who think 
that the problems are because of immigrant identity is 56% (62 people) by Turks 
in Germany, 75% (41 people) by Turks in Belgium and 43% (17 people) by Turks 
in the Netherlands. The rate of people who think that the problems are there 
because of religious and cultural life style and dress code of Turks is 57% (63 
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not considered, 64% (131 people) of all respondents think that problems are 
because of ethnic identity, 66% (136 people) religious identity, 59% (120 people) 
foreigner/immigrant identity and 58% (119 people) religious and cultural life style 
and dress style (See Figure 10). 
In the first years of migration to Europe Muslims were also considered as “guest 
workers” and they were defined by their ethnic and national roots. But in the 
following years, as wives and children have joined, Muslim workers have turned 
into a social group. In the relations of Muslims as a social group and the host 
societies, religious and cultural dimensions became important. As the 
developments in the Islamic world were reflected in the Europe and as 
unemployment has continuously increased; the perception of the Muslims in 
Europe in popular culture was changed. This negative perception gives us the 
hints of an understanding named Islamophobia. Today, we can see a tendency of 
developing an “European Muslim” identity among the Muslim communities in 
Europe (Şenay, 2002: 143-147). This chronological process of the migration 
indicates that the starting point of the problems faced in Western counties today is 
Islam itself and the foreigner himself considered as the “other”. In other words, 
the religious identity and the immigrant identity of the foreigner is more on target 
of racism and discrimination today. German Turks consider their religious identity 
as the most important reason of discrimination and otherization in their society. 
Belgian Turks consider their perception as immigrant/stranger by the majority as 
the biggest problem. And the Turks in the Netherlands think that it is their ethnic 
identity that makes them target for discrimination and racism. 
Toda in Europe we can see problems in living together with the “other” as direct 
results of globalization and intensive migration. European countries are having 
problems by dealing with economic, social and political integration; and they 
started to follow more introversive policies since the breakdown experienced by 
September 11. The fear and threat pumped by September 11 to the whole world 
were redefined on Muslims, foreigners and immigrants in Europe. In other words, 
the fear and introversion in Europe have been reformulated by the attitude towards 
Islam and the behavior towards foreigners (İnanç and Çetin, 2011). Therefore, in a 
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Europe where integrating and harmonizing with different cultural groups gets 
harder every day, it is very normal to have an increase in the concerns on future 
both for the host countries and the foreigners. Social and political problems that 
got deepened in Europe with the current economic crisis should be considered 
from a perspective of dialogue.  
5.5. Political Participation of the Turkish Immigrants in Europe 
The educational and linguistic competency, their socio-economic development 
and generation differences of the Turkish immigrants in Europe have an 
increasing effect on political participation and representation. At the same time, 
legal regulations of the host societies have another important effect on political 
participation and representation of the Turkish immigrants. For instance, the legal 
regulations conducted to increase the political participation of foreigners have 
established the ground for concrete increase in representation and participation 
rate in local and national elections in the Netherlands and Belgium. On the 
contrary, in countries such as France and Germany, which cause problems in 
active political participation and representation of immigrants, there is a huge rate 
of distrust and apathy towards political parties and political institutions. One of 
the most important dynamics of coexistence with participation and unity 
contributes positively to political participation and representation and social and 
public sphere. Sociologist Tribalat (1996) has conducted a comparative field study 
about the minorities in France and concluded that Turks were the groups that 
showed the biggest resistance to integration and assimilation among te ethnic 
and/or religious minorities (cited by Kaya and Kentel, 2005). The “assimilation 
based integration” in France has shaken the dynamism of Turkish society in 
France, including their political participation, and caused the experience of 
introversive integration. 
Development of a political culture that supports the cultural pluralism in European 
societies where ethnic and religious minorities are permanent is one of the most 
privileged issues. In the report of European Council named ‘Living Together as 
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Equals in Dignity’,63 it has been emphasized that the political culture can only 
develop with critical thinking, a new education system and participation. The 
report also argued that the active political participation and representation of all 
sections will contribute to the welfare of European societies and increase the level 
of integration. Reports of the European Council have emphasized that 
participation and democratic citizenship are important requirements in the 
development of intercultural dialogue. According to Badawia (2005: 206-207), 
participation to the political processes, representation, interest in public issues, 
freedom of thinking and struggle with radicalism in the countries where people 
reside is only possible with the functionality of democratic society (cited by 
Yıldız, 2008: 65). As a result, all differences in Western democratic societies 
could easily and freely speak only with the help of multiculturalism and cultural 
pluralism. This is the reason why all social sections directly participate in decision 
making processes of all pluralist societies. 
This field study also analyzes the participation in decision making processes, 
representation and political choices of Turks in the sampling countries. This 
analysis was conducted by the data acquired from survey and interviews done in 
Cologne in Germany, Brussels in Belgium and Amsterdam in the Netherlands. 
Political choices of the Turks which have become diversified since 1990s, gives 
us a chance to make broad analyses in issues such as European Union, integration 
and assimilation, “European” identity and European citizenship. According to 
this, one of the two big political parties of Germany, the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD) is supported by 42% (46 people) of Turks in Germany. 
Another big party the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian 
Social Union (CSU) in the same category are being supported by 30% (33 people) 
of the Turks in Germany. On the other hand, Alliance’99/The Greens (GRÜNE) is 
the second political party supported with Turks in Germany with 35% (38 people) 
(See Figure 11). The changing political choices of the respondents in different 
periods provided the support of several parties and diversification of political 
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choices. The conservative the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of the 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in the Federal Republic of Germany has a 
discriminative approach towards the Muslim-Turkish minority and rejects the 
membership of Turkey into the European Union; these resulted with 
disappointment among the Turkish voters. The policies of liberal parties such as 
the Social Democrats and the Greens, which do not exclude the Turkish identity, 
their support for Turkey’s membership to the EU and acceptance of 
ethnic/religious differences seem to have had a positive effect on the Turkish 
voters. The preferences of the respondents to liberal, socialist and social democrat 
parties reflects the interest and conscious choice of Turks to the politics within the 
country they are living. Yet, until the beginning of 1990s, the Turkish immigrants 
have continued their rightist and conservative political preferences from their 
homeland in diaspora (Kaya, 2000). In the passing years of the migration, we can 
see a more participant, conscious and oppressive image of voters along with the 
change of generation in Germany. On the other hand, the civil society 
organizations established to fulfill the social, cultural and religious needs of the 
Turkish society in Germany have taken promoting and informative liabilities 
about the issues of political participation and representation both in national and 
local arena. 
Figure 11. Political Preferences of the Respondents in Germany, Belgium and 
the Netherlands 
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About 78% (43 people) of the respondents in Belgium have mentioned their 
political preference as Socialist Party Differently (Sp.a) and Socialist Party (PS). 
18% (10 people) of Turks in Belgium have preferred Christian 
Democratic&Flemish (CD&V), and 20% (11 people) Open Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats (Open Vld) and Green (Groen) (See Figure 11). The Turkish voters in 
Belgium generally tend to prefer the Turkish candidates in their election areas. In 
other words, the Turkish voters do not generally make a rational choice in 
accordance with the programs, principles and election policies of the political 
parties; but in accordance with the Turkish candidates in those parties. The 
Turkish voters in Belgium do not prefer extreme rightist Flemish Interest (Vlaams 
Belang) and a nationalist and rightist party New Flemish Alliance (N-VA). In the 
national elections conducted at May 25, 2014; 6 representatives of Turkish origin 
have achieved to become a member in Federal Parliament and 5 candidates have 
become members of Regional parliaments (Parliaments of Wallon, Brussels and 
Flaman). In 2010 elections, only 3 Turkish Belgian deputies have made it to 150-
seated the Federal Parliament. In the elections of the European Parliament on May 
25, 2014 none of the Turkish deputies have made it. The political awareness level 
of the Turks in Belgium has been increasing recently and it is in parallel with the 
increasing participation rate, council memberships and deputies. 
45% (18 people) of the respondents in the Netherlands have voted for Labor Party 
(PvdA) and 18% (7 people) for Christian Democratic Appeal. On the other hand, 
45% (18 people) of Turks in the Netherlands have voted or liberal parties such as 
Democrats 66 (D66), GreenLeft (GroenLinks) and People’s Party for Freedom 
and Democracy (VVD) (See Figure 11). Last elections in the Netherlands have 
indicated that central leftist parties (Labor Party-PvdA) integrated with the 
immigrants have been replaced. Young generations have started to prefer more 
liberal and environmentalist parties instead of central right and left parties their 
parents had supported. Still, majority of approximately 230 thousand Turkish 
voters in the Netherlands continue voting for central parties. But, following the 
2008 economic crisis, vast masses in the Netherlands, including the immigrants, 
have tended to vote for local parties instead of central parties which have been in 
government since long years. Democrats 66 (D66) party has received support 
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from Turks and Moroccans as it stood against the extreme rightist parties, 
supported equal citizenship and requested educational reform.  
In the elections of the Netherlands, the Turkish voters are supporting the Turkish 
candidates, just like in Belgium. High unemployment rates among Turks, Turkey-
EU relations, adaptation policies, discrimination and inequalities in opportunities 
have directed the Turkish voters to political parties which are not centrist. Turks 
in the Netherlands have been expressing more participatory, liberal and a less 
traditionalist voter behavior thanks to the changes in generations, institutionalized 
civil society organizations, increasing citizenship consciousness and socio-
economic developments. On the other hand, Geert Wilders’ political party Party 
for Freedom (PVV), which is anti-Islam and anti-immigrant, has lost a lot of votes 
lately. PVV, which has done several mistakes in the previous government as a 
partner, harmed the image of the country in international arena and developed an 
anti-immigrant and radical discourse, has only received 13,3% of the votes in 
2014 European Parliament elections, and only had 4 deputies. 
70% (144 people) of all respondents have indicated that they have the right to vote 
at local, national and the European Parliament in the countries they live. When 
country differences are considered, 48% (53 people) of Turks in Germany, 95% 
(52 people) of Turks in Belgium and 98% (39 people) of Turks in the Netherlands 
have the right to vote in their countries. When we think that 32% of a total of 2,7 
million Turks living in Europe are residing in Germany and have the German 
citizenship status, the low level of voting for the respondents in Germany will be 
better understood. In other words, 64% of 1,1 million Turkish-German citizens are 
above voting age (700 thousand people). As the non-German citizens do not 
receive a right to vote and as dual citizenship law came so late, we can say that 
Turks have a low level of representation in German politics. About 16% (32 
people) of all respondents have indicated that they are member of a political party 
in the country they live. 25% (10 people) of Turks in the Netherlands, 11% (6 
people) of Turks in Belgium and 15% (16 people) of Turks in Germany are 
members of a political party. Political party membership is an important indicator 
of political participation. Within this context, it can be understood that Turks in 
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the Netherlands, where the right elect and being elected is not bound to be a 
citizen, are involved in local organizations of political parties. Another reason of 
this is that the Turks in the Netherlands have accepted the democratic norms and 
values more than the Turks in Germany. 
To understand the level of political participation of Turkish immigrants, 
respondents were asked what kind of activities of the political party they support 
they are participating. According to this, 13% (26 people) of all respondents have 
said they participated in a meeting or protest of the political party they support, 
and 17% (34 people) said they did not. On the other hand, 8% (16 people) of all 
respondents have said that they have distributed the hand brochures and 
pamphlets of the political party they support, and 10% (20 people) have said that 
they have made the propaganda of the political party they support in written and 
verbal ways. Political participation is one of the active dimensions of citizenship, 
and it means conducting political activities in active or passive ways at different 
grounds. Therefore, the Turkish voters actively participate with the principle of 
social responsibility and awareness of citizenship; which provides them important 
advantages for adaptation. As a result, majority of European Turkish population, 
have developed in the first two parts of Robert Dahl’s (1963: 56-57) our different 
political participation levels: to be interested, to care, to get informed and action. 
In other words, Turkish voters are basically interested in politics at the most 
limited and pure dimension of political participation and they go one step forward 
and care about political issues that directly interest them. European Turkish 
society is distant to getting informed and action, the most active dimensions of 
political participation, and they try to effect and direct the political decision 
makers with their preferred votes. Turkish society is a part of Germany, Belgium 
and the Netherlands and we can say that they have started to understand the 
importance of the belief in political participation and trust in politicians lately. 
5.6. The Turkish-Islamic Organizations and Intercultural and Interfaith 
Dialogue 
 
The Anatolian people, who have migrated from Turkey, which has been the cradle 
of many cultures and civilizations, can easily transfer the historical experience and 
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heritage of Turkey to host societies through intercultural and inter-religious 
members’ dialogue. Along with this, the cultural heritage of Europe such as 
democratic citizenship, human rights, freedoms, supremacy of law and pluralism 
can be transferred to Turks and other ethnic/religious minorities through 
intercultural dialogue only. Starting from this point we can say that clash of 
civilizations is not the destiny of mankind and cultural diversity cannot be shown 
as the root of any conflict. The Turkish immigrants are the representatives of 
Turkish-Islamic culture in Europe, and they have remained distant to radical 
Islamist groups after September 11 and separated them from radical groups. The 
European Turkish society has generally resisted the radical and fanatic groupings; 
and one of their most dynamic organs is the Turkish Islamic organizations, which 
are open to intercultural dialogue and pluralism. The Turkish-Islamic 
organizations have aimed to protect the traditional Turkish family structure and 
generations against the assimilation, radicalism and bad habits. These movements 
are belief based, and they are the most dynamic and civil organizations that have 
the ability to decide for the establishment of social peace and sustainable dialogue.  
One of the theories used while building the theoretical framework of this study is 
the Organizational Commitment Theory. The voluntary and participant behaviors 
of the followers of religious and social movements which are the strongest actors 
of the European Turkish diaspora support the Organizational Commitment Theory. 
Religious and social movements support the positive relationship Turkey 
developed in the democratization process; and it is predicted that they will have 
an important role in the understanding of liberal and democratic values within 
Turkish diaspora in Europe. These religious and social movements do not have a 
hierarchical organization, but they provide a very successful network of solidarity 
through the networks they have developed within. Intra-group solidarity networks 
and local networks in belief based movements within Europe strengthen the social 
relations and increase the feeling of responsibility. Objective and projects of 
social and religious movements in Europe, which have adapted the pluralist and 
multicultural culture of living together, in order to establish a participatory and 
responsible citizenship model is very important. The message carried out by these 
movements on participation, democracy, citizenship, human rights and freedoms 
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can be very effective. Group members share the target and vision of the 
movement, take liabilities and act accordingly. The European-Turkish diaspora 
has belief based movements with strong intra-group solidarity; and those are the 
biggest barrier on radical movements. 
The faith-based movements grow up from below to top, depending on voluntary 
work and establish solidarity networks; and they have taken roles of transferring 
the basic religious and moral principles, economic and political participation, 
education, humanitarian aid, diplomacy and intercultural dialogue. A part of the 
faith-based movements that existed since the first years of migration give 
moderate, liberal and modern messages to their base; whereas another part carries 
out more traditional, political and radical messages. The faith-based movements in 
Europe can categorically be classified as traditional Islam, cultural Islam, 
moderate Islam, Sufism and radical Islam. Non-political faith-based Gülen 
Movement and the Risale-i Nur Movement (Nurcular) that represent the Turkish 
Sunni Islam, political Islamist National Viewpoint Movement (Milli Görüş), statist 
DITIB (the Turkish Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs Directorate), more 
traditionalist Süleymancılar and revolutionary and radical Islamist Kaplan 
Community are some of the Islamic communities organized in Europe (Yükleyen, 
2012).
 64
 The Turkish community and Turkish Islamic movements in Europe have 
witnessed a political, cultural and social transformation in response to 
globalization, modernization and Westernization. 
The Gülen Movement, a social movement inspired by Turkish Islamic scholar 
Fethullah Gülen, has developed a modern/secularist education and dialogue model 
among the Turkish-Islamic movements in Europe. The Gülen Movement, in 
Germany and other places where the Turkish diaspora is very strong, is the only 
Muslim-Turkish organization that does not aim to pursue a policy to make Islam 
recognizable. In other words, this movement is not interested in building a 
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mosque or Islamic education; but is interested in the teaching of secular 
knowledge which will eventually help the appearance of educated Muslim elite. 
This practical attitude goes together with internalization of religious and moral 
values (Seufert, 2014: 6-7). As transnational Islamic civic society movement, the 
Gülen Movement is executing a human focused work in Western European 
countries with a common message that synthesizes science, moral and dialogue. 
The common goal of intercultural dialogue institutions both in Europe and in 
other parts of the world is to serve the humanity and contribute to world peace. 
Dialoog Academie (Dialogue Academy) in the Netherlands is one of these 
institutions and it focuses on academic studies about tolerance and dialogue and 
researches on interreligious and intercultural issues. Also, Platform INS
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conducts studies for the coherence and coexistence of different elements in the 
Netherlands and also shares the ideas of Fethullah Gülen with the public. 
On the other hand, Federation of Active Associations of Belgium (Fedactio)
66
, was 
established with the coherence of 25 associations in 2010 and it is known with its 
close relations with the Gülen Movement. One of the aims of the federation that 
operates in three administrative regions of Belgium is to promote and support the 
activities that contribute peaceful coexistence and emphasize the cultural diversity. 
Brussels centered Intercultural Dialogue Platform (IDP),
67
 whose honorary 
president is Fethullah Gülen, has been conducting international organizations 
those contribute to intercultural dialogue since its establishment (2010). In 2010, 
as a result of the involvement of IDP, in Catholic University of Leuven (KU 
Leuven), Fethullah Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies (GCIS)68 was founded. 
GCIS is conducting academic research in order to develop the intercultural and 
interreligious dialogue in Belgium and Europe. On the other hand, Golden Rose 
Brussels, an association bound to Federation of Active Associations of Belgium 
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(Fedactio) has been conducting colorful and comprehensive perform works on 
personal development, cultural and social adaptation and participation. The 
exhibition of personal stuff of Flamans and Turks in Belgium in a photography 
exhibition in 2014, is only one of the most interesting events of Golden Rose 
Brussels. In terms of the modern contribution of photography into social 
communication and dialogue, this exhibition has played the role as an important 
social project. 
In almost all federal states of Germany, there are dialogue centers, educational 
centers and businessmen associations close to the Gülen Movement. Alliance of 
German Dialogue Institutions (BDDI), is led by Fethullah Gülen as the honorary 
president, and is an upper institution of 14 dialogue centers and associations. One 
of these 14 dialogue centers, Intercultural Dialogue Forum (FID e.V.)
69
, has 
contributed a lot to the adaptation process of Turkish society in Berlin in terms of 
organizational efficiency and productivity. Intercultural Dialogue Forum (FID 
e.V.), is one of the three partners of a groundbreaking project in intercultural 
dialogue. The project called “House of One”70 is a collaborative work that aims to 
gather church, mosque and synagogue under the same roof. An educational and 
prayer complex, in which the members and believers of three religions can pray 
and organize training activities, will be actualized with donations. In spite of the 
harsh reactions by some Islamic groups, Intercultural Dialogue Forum (FID e.V.), 
concentrates on the project and showed that prejudices can be left aside and new 
beginnings can be made. It is a concrete reality that the goal of these projects is 
not to unite the religions, but to provide the contribution of religions to dialogue 
and peace. 
The Gülen Movement has established very strong ties with Jews and Armenians 
and other Christian groups, thereby setting the grounds for intercultural cohesion; 
and they also make a voluntary lobbying for Turkey and the Turkish culture. A 
similar project to “House of One” is has implemented between Hacı Bektaş Veli 
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Foundation and Cem Foundation, two prominent organizations of the Turkish 
Alevi community and the Gülen Movement, in order to provide the close ties 
between the Sunnis and the Alevi community in Turkey. The name of the project 
is “Mosque-Djemevi and Cultural Center” and a campus will be built in which a 
mosque, a djemevi and food house will be together. On the other hand, Akzente 
für den Dialog (AKDIA e.V.) that operates in Nürnberg, Germany and 
Intercultural Dialogue Centre Munich (IDIZEM e.V.) that operates in Munich 
have been conducting dialogue and feast dinners, dialogue awards, Turkey trips, 
academic symposiums and conferences in order to provide the adaptation of the 
Turkish society. Intercultural Dialogue Centre Munich (IDIZEM e.V.), has been 
giving dialog awards to people and institutions who have contributed to the 
development of dialogue and tolerance in German society since 2006. 
On the other hand, the “Turkish schools” of the Gülen Movement are organized in 
160 countries around the world, and they are very important in articulating the 
movement into the global process. This great educational movement at global 
scale is being financed with the resources of Turkey (Turkish businessmen). 
Therefore, this educational mobilization is a civil and original model within its 
framework (Bulaç, 2007: 288-289). Gülen Movement contributes to permanent 
peace and unities in Germany, where 24 state-approved private schools and 
around 150 extracurricular education centers (Seufert, 2014: 5). The Gülen 
Movement is sustaining its educational activities in Belgium since 2005 under the 
name E’coles des e’toiles (Yildiz Okullari)71 at Brussels and Valon regions. The 
education model of the educational institutions, also known as ‘the Cosmicus 
Schools’72  in the Netherlands, use the global citizenship as subject and many 
Dutch parents also send their kids to these institutions (Zaman USA, 2011)
73
. New 
Turkish generations in Europe will have a chance to resist assimilation and 
fanaticism only with the help of education and teachers. As the distance of youth 
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from streets and criminal events important, so is the education of the teachers who 
will teach these youth. Within this context, the Gülen Movement has established 
schools, universities, kindergartens, education centers and student dormitories all 
around Europe and we can say that this social network is a “sample experience” in 
case of its contribution to education, educator and harmony.  
Fethullah Gülen argues that Muslims have should free themselves from Bin 
Laden’s distorted understanding and believes that the outlook of Islam, which is 
darkened by terror, suicide bombs, robotized people without any feelings; can 
change with the effort of believers. In his interview with Mehmet Gündem from 
Milliyet Newspaper in the last days of December 2004, Gülen said: “My Master 
(Prophet of Islam)’s recognition as the founder of a religion to which terrorists 
believe is a serious unjust done to him” (Gündem, 2005: 201-202). In short, Gülen 
advises the volunteers of his movement to work for correct explanation of Prophet 
of Islam, to establish dialogue with the representatives of all beliefs and cultures, 
and to challenge the ignorance with a moral and quality education. Hundreds of 
educational institutions constituted after Gülen’s advises are building the social 
grounds of dialogue and tolerance and fulfill the requirement of “model individual” 
which is the deepest problem of modern civilization (Ergene, 2005: 270). Gülen’s 
model of a moderate, soft, pluralist and peaceful society which he practiced 
through education has the dynamics to reduce the polarization and prejudice in the 
Western and all over the world. According to a field study conducted among the 
educators and institutions of the Gülen Movement in Indonesia and Singapore, the 
Turkish schools in Indonesia have disseminated the discourse of a moderate and 
tolerant Islam throughout the country. In Singapore, where Muslims are a 
minority, the friendly ties between the Muslims and non-Muslims strengthened 
and the mutual dialogue has increased with the contribution of Turkish schools 
and dialogue associations (Osman, 2014: 369-370). 
What are the dynamics of social and belief based movements such as the Gülen 
Movement that mobilizes people and keeps the intra-group solidarity and group 
belonging alive? We can explain the answer of this question by Organizational 
Commitment Theory used by Robert Kanter in 1960s and 1970s in his study 
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conducted on devotion in American community. Organizational Commitment 
Theory was used by Helen R. Ebaugh (2010: 26) to explain the devotion of the 
people serving for the Gülen Movement all around the world. Groups that take 
religion as a reference, whether it is the Gülen Movement or the Risale-i Nur 
Movement (Nurcular), Milli Görüş (National Viewpoint) Movement or 
Süleymancılar; have always needed volunteers and devoted people to make their 
beliefs and ideas reach people. These groups have also recruited those devotees 
they have trained with their own methods in order to serve within the areas needed 
and targeted. According to American sociologist Ebaugh, the basic structure in 
Gülen Movement that creates and revives the feeling of devotion is the local 
networks. According to Ebaugh, these local networks consist of people regularly 
coming together in order to support for the implementation of Gülen Movement’s 
projects on education, health, humanitarian aid and other areas. The Gülen 
Movement does not officially adopt a hierarchical organizational model, and 
distributes the liabilities to local units with a decentralized understanding of 
bureaucracy, thereby providing intra-group belonging and commitment. Devotees 
in the Gülen Movement act with the feelings of responsibility and belonging, and 
they consider themselves as successful or not just like the players of a team. 
Therefore, the Gülen Movement has a group identity that embraces the targets 
both in local and global levels and acts in a harmonious and cooperative way 
(Ebaugh, 2010: 161-162). As a result, belief based groups organized within the 
European Turkish society socialize with intra or extra group relations and 
communication networks and grow up devoted generations that have taken 
responsibility around a common goal. 
The Turkish-Islamic movements and communities are modern civil organizations 
and social actors in its real sense. Devotion, sharing, helping and sacrifice are 
basic behavior codes in faith-based communities. According to F. Fukuyama, 
these characteristics of community members are a social capital that the Western 
welfare societies do not have in spite of their high level of scientific accumulation, 
technological dominance and economic richness. Therefore this capital is the 
warranty for the peaceful and orderly sustaining of the social life (Bulaç, 2007: 
36). Bourdieu (1983, 1986) sees social capital as the whole of social networks that 
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provide common interest for individuals; Coleman (1988) considers that both with 
a functional and pragmatist approach and Putnam (1993) sees it as the whole of 
social organizations, networks, trust and social norms. In democratic and pluralist 
societies, civil society organizations and the social solidarity networks established 
by these institutions within themselves are the forerunning elements of social 
capital (Balkanlıoğlu and Irmak, 2014: 140-142). The European Turkish-Islamic 
movements and civil society organizations as a type of social capital are 
functional social organizations that fulfill the social, cultural and religious 
necessities of individuals. The socio-cultural and religious activities of Turkish-
Islamic communities in Europe contribute to intra-group solidarity, strengthening 
of social networks and building of mutual trust.  
Individuals in Western societies have the characteristic to get into action by 
themselves, independent from their environment. But, the people of East can 
sacrifice their individual choices and expectations for the sake of their group and 
social environment. Therefore, as the ego of Eastern people is reshaped under the 
effect of collective consciousness, it is open to dialogue and in harmony with 
group decisions of family and social environment (Aydın, 2006). According to 
Hui and Triandis (1986), Turks are in principle a collectivist community. 
According to Triandis (2001), individuals of a group focused culture define 
themselves with their belonging to a group and act in accordance with the targets 
and aims of the group they belong to (cited by Akıncı, 2014: 35). On the other 
hand, in traditional or conservative societies, it is more important for individuals 
to be successful as part of a collective whole, a social environment rather than 
their individual success. Social Identity Theory of psychologist Henri Tajfel (1978) 
points out that as individuals have the identity of a collective group their social 
relations will develop and this will turn them into individuals with advantageous 
social identities. One of the most important elements European Turks have is 
ethnic belonging and another one is Islam. Turks in Europe have a profile which 
is strongly bound to their collective religious and cultural identities (Faist, 2003: 
317). As the associations that serve as mosques by time turn into social spheres, 
we can say that religious and cultural identities have been restored. Group focused 
culture/belonging and devotion/solidarity is the most important dynamic that 
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makes the Turkish immigrants, who are excluded in economy, education and 
politics, resistant and strong. The most concrete structures that make the Turks 
stronger against cultural assimilation and injustice are the institutional services 
that can be seen at every level. The mosque, mosque associations, culture and 
dialog centers, school, dormitories, kindergartens, university, humanitarian aid 
organizations and media organs (newspaper, journal, TV, radio etc.) are the social 
networks that provide intra and extra group socialization and solidarity. These 
institutional and social networks also establish the base of social capital and they 
strengthen the social relations and intra group solidarity of Turkish community in 
Europe. One of the respondents who emphasized the importance of faith-based 
movements to harmony and intercultural dialogue underlined these: 
 ‘In recent years, the social, cultural and academic activities exercised by civil 
society increase the cohesion. The activities integrate different cultures and bring 
people together. There are associations and institutions that take important parts 
about this…Bringing people together, uniting them around a table and helping 
them to communicate is important in terms of mutual trust.’ (Male, aged 19-35 
years, the Netherlands). 
According to Amenta (2006: 14-17), one of the most obvious characteristics of all 
social movements today is their appearance with a demand for change and 
executing common action campaigns for this purpose. The effort of volunteers 
coming together around the campaign for common action strengthen the intra 
group ties and motivates those people who are out of the group to participate in 
order to life the inequalities (cited by Achenbaum, 2009: 16-17). According to W. 
Andrew Achenbaum, there are five basic criteria that make the Gülen Movement a 
social one. These are; the suggestion of Gülen’s tolerance message of a vision for 
change, Gülen Movement’s network that passes the local and national levels, 
Gülen Movement’s media network that transfers its messages, Gülen Movement’s 
mission and activities’ promotion of participation and the “identity policy” of the 
Gülen Movement that insists on tolerance and civil (Achenbaum, 2009: 19-24). 
Media is very important for Gülen Movement and that contributes for the 
promotion and dissemination of activities around tolerance and dialogue. 
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Fethullah Gülen openly supports the European Union membership of Turkey in 
order to become an open and democratic society and to use the empirical sciences 
of Europe. But, the Islamic communities and dominant secular elites of Turkey 
criticize this approach of Gülen (Ünal and Williams, 2000: 36-38; Yılmaz, 2000: 
399). According to some political Islamists in Turkey and Europe, European 
Union is a Christian club and a threat both for the Turkish national and Muslim 
identity. But, Gülen is against the “use of religion as a tool in politics” and 
“creation of a negative Islamic understanding by turning it into an ideology”; 
thereby clearly underlining the difference between Islam and Islamism (Williams, 
2009: 59-60; Yılmaz, 2005: 397). The reason of the specific emphasis of Gülen 
Movement under certain titles in this study is that the movement is a belief 
movement based on civil society, that it clearly supports interreligious and 
intercultural dialogue and has a cultural understanding that gives importance to 
mutual respect and compromise. The Foundation of Journalists and Authors 
(GYV), of which Gülen is the honorary president, has guided the public sphere by 
producing solutions on tensions and conflicts in Turkey for years (Williams, 2009: 
64). It has been predicted that the Gülen Movement will play an active role in the 
future vision of European Turkish society in terms of pluralism, open society 
model and a modern and civil religious understanding. Besides, it is also predicted 
that the steps taken by Gülen Movement in order to build a bridge between Islam 
and Western civilizations and between the Islamic culture and the democratic and 
modern values of the West will contribute to the understanding of pluralism 
within the Turkish community in Europe. 
According to Landman (2005: 118-128), the institutionalization of Islam in the 
Netherlands was completed in four stages. The first steps of organizations among 
the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims were taken by establishing mosques. Since 
the beginning of 1990s, many Muslim communities in Europe have built their 
own mosques. Today, the tendency is to physically enhance the existing ones and 
to carry them to better locations; instead of opening up new mosques. Second 
stage is the Islamic organizations established around the existing mosques. At this 
stage mosques were reshaped according to the requirements and have become the 
centers of social and cultural activities as well. At the third stage, mosque 
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associations have become national and even international with a network and a 
hierarchical structure. For instance, the Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations 
Federation (TIKDF) which collaborates with Presidency of Religious Affairs in 
Turkey and the Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands (HDV) are the first Islamic 
organizations established in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Islamic Federation 
(HIF) which represents Milli Görüş (National Viewpoint) Movement and the 
Netherlands Islamic Center Foundation (HIMV) established by the students of 
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan are the other two importanr religious organizations. 
Last stage of institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands is the organizations 
that appear on areas such as education, culture and media. According to Richard 
W. Bulliet (2007: 185), previously all types of diasporas tended to create 
introversive communities; but today, the diaspora communities in Europe and 
America are in search for economic participation and social normalization. 
On the other hand, the groupings and polarization among the Turkish Islamic 
groups causes the waste of resources and labor. The polarizations, usually 
originate from protecting group base, are one of the most obvious disadvantages 
in front of the Islamic communities which are “the parts of a whole”. Religious 
communities have mobilized their base through mosque associations until the 
beginning of 1990s; but they have lost the material support and the number of 
members after the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey has made a 
movement towards the whole of European Turkish society. The Presidency of 
Religious Affairs sends imams to each mosque association that demand and 
complies with the physical conditions. The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Religious 
Affairs Directorate (DITIB) which tries to establish an efficient and professional 
governance network throughout Europe and the private enterprises such as the 
Islamic Council of Germany (IGMG) and the Association of Islamic Cultural 
Centers (VIKZ) the biggest organizations that fulfill the need for prayer of the 
Turkish community in Europe. Therefore, the religious organizations, which will 
contribute to the solution of existing problems, will embrace all of the Turkish 
population and educate the young people in accordance with the necessities of 
current time, have a promising future in Europe. Another important point is the 
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establishment of institutional structures that would represent all Muslims from 
different origins in front of the governments in Europe. 
Approximately 3 thousand mosque associations (at least 100 of them with 
minarets) in Germany have gathered under a roof organization in 2007, which is 
named the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Şahinöz, 2013: 46-48). 
The Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM) represents majority of 
the mosque associations (80%) in Germany and it was established by the 
participation of four (4) big Islamic organizations which are the Turkish-Islamic 
Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB), the Islamic Council of Germany (Islamrat-
IGMG), the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD) and the Association 
of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ). KRM is the official representative of Islamic 
communities in Germany and has filled an important gap in name of religious 
courses in schools, educating Islamic scientists in universities, increasing the 
solidarity and becoming stronger (Yeneroğlu, 2007: 5-6). KRM has taken a 
concrete step in order to prevent the exploitation of religions which is shown as 
the reason of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and to contribute the dialogue between 
the religions and members of religions. “Dialogue Guide” (German: 
Dialogratgaber)
74
 which is conducted in partnership with Evangelical Church in 
Germany (EKD) is a written text where the contribution of religions to peace is 
explained and the bases and difficulties of the dialogue is reminded. 
The Alevism sect of Islam has always been centered on human and dialogue as 
well. The Alevis have started to organize under the name of the ‘Alevism’ in the 
diaspora as a cultural and social movement even before Turkey, and today they 
have a very strong organization in Europe. More than 200 the Alevi cultural 
centers have gathered under a common roof named the Federations of Alevi 
Organizations in Europe (AABF) in 2002. The Federations of Alevi Organizations 
in Germany (AABF) is the most effective member of this organization and it is 
accepted as a legal belief organization in Germany, organizing the teaching of the 
Alevi belief and culture in many schools. The answers given by Baykal 
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Arslanbuğa, the Executive Board member of the Federations of Alevi 
Organizations in Germany (AABF) to our questions on cultural diversity, 
intercultural dialogue and radicalism give important hints about the Alevis as a 
religious and cultural community. He answered our question “As AABF in 
Germany, which areas of communication are important for you with the host 
society? Do you believe in the necessity of communication?”;  
 ‘We definitely give importance to communication. The Alevi organizations 
conduct open door days in the cities where they are located, there are good 
relations with other belief organizations, civil society organizations, media and 
politics. Mutual visits are being implemented. We execute common projects and 
works in the areas of education, youth, social and cultural issues, and religion…’ 
Arslanbuğa said that the European Turkish society has achieved a lot in terms of 
coexistence, and relates this success with democracy and the culture of 
argumentation. Arslanbuğa also believes that the authorities in Germany have 
contributed a lot by establishing working groups about many problems, inviting 
the parties and trying to find solutions. Arslanbuğa also thinks that mutual respect 
and pluralist cultural understanding will play important roles in the solution of the 
problems and said that he was hopeful for the future. On the other hand, to our 
question “What is your attitude towards the existing or future radical and extreme 
tendencies within the European Turkish society? What kind of precautions do you 
take against the radical tendencies?”, Arslanbuğa answered:  
 ‘We make informative activities for our people. And we receive professional help 
from the institutions that work on this area. Also, we do not face with many 
problems as long as we tell the humanitarian values of the Alevism to our people. 
These problems usually occur in the people whom we cannot reach. But 
especially the Sunni institutions have to work more on this area…’ 
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Figure 12. Do you believe that religious groups and communities in your 
society which are of Turkey origin contribute to intercultural dialogue and 
harmony? 
 
Answers given to the question “Do you believe that religious groups and 
communities in your society which are of Turkey origin contribute to intercultural 
dialogue and harmony?” are 40% (83 people) “I definitely believe”, 37% (75 
people) “I partially believe” and 19% (38 people) “I don’t”. When country 
differences are considered, 43% (47 people) of Turks in Germany, 44% (24 
people) of Turks in Belgium and 30% (12 people) of Turks in the Netherlands 
have answered as “I definitely believe”. The rate of the people who partially 
believe that the Turkish-Islamic organizations partially contribute to intercultural 
dialogue and mutual harmony is %37 in Germany, 29% in Belgium and 45% in 
the Netherlands. The rate of people who do not believe in this is 15% in Germany, 
25% in Belgium and 20% in the Netherlands (See Figure 12). The Turkish 
religious groups and communities are the sources of intra group socialization in 
host societies and also help the dialogue with the majority. Turks have a group 
focused social identity and psychology, and have tried to protect themselves with 
social and religious networks. Today, dialogue with other religious groups, like 
the Christian Western societies, are being implemented with the social networks 
established by belief based movements. Feast dinners, mutual celebrations in 
religious and national days, visits, openings, academic organizations and cultural 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
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The Netherlands Belgium Germany 
I definitely believe 30 44 43 
I partly believe 45 29 37 
I do not believe 20 25 15 
I have no idea 5 2 5 
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programs are conducted by these institutional foundations and associations. 
Different people sharing same table and environment get used to each other. 
Institutions that see these actions and organizations have fruitful results for future, 
are motivated even more. It has been predicted that many institutional structures 
in the future will establish dialogues with their own societies.  
The Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands (HDV) has been serving all the 
Muslims in the Netherlands with its 150 mosque associations since 1982 is 
contributing to the dialogue with the projects in different areas. Prof. Dr. Mustafa 
Ünver, the Executive Board President of the Islamic Foundation of the 
Netherlands (HDV) - The Hague Religious Services Consultant has summarized 
some of the projects as follows: 
“As the Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands (HDV) we believe in being open, 
sharing and recognition processes. “Open door organizations” and a movie 
about “Islam and mosque” prepared in Turkish and Dutch are some of the ways 
we apply to introduce ourselves. We act together with the Dutch society in 
national holidays, send Christmas messages to Dutch society, Queen messages 
etc. to build a healthy communication with the host society. Also, we officially 
collaborate with charity organizations such as Dutch Blood Bank and Food 
Bank…” 
To sum up, the Turkish-Islamic movements and organizations are the most 
dynamic structures that contribute to the harmony, socialization, participation and 
dialogue with host societies of the Turkish community in Europe. To continue 
with their dynamism and getting accepted by mass groups of people depend on 
their strong ideal and intellectual capacity. The Turkish-Islamic movements do 
not have radicalization in their roots and are a safe haven for the young 
generations not to become members of radical fractions. The Turkish-Islamic 
organizations and civil society organizations are also considered as important 
bridges between the host societies and the minorities to establish permanent 
relations and deep friendships. 
 
242 
 
5.7. The Role of the Turkish Community on Intercultural and Interfaith 
Dialogue  
 
Dialogue is the communication and exchange of idea between a group of people; 
their discussion and speaking with one another. Interreligious or intercultural 
dialogue is the building up of communication among people from different beliefs, 
cultures and religions within the boundaries of goodwill and mutual tolerance. 
The meeting of each religion and belief on common grounds by being loyal to the 
essence and spirit of their schools and of them acting together is the stemming 
point of interreligious and intercultural dialogue. As these definitions point out, 
dialogue plays a key role in the solution of every problem, conflict and biases 
from local ones to global. The contribution of religions and members of religion 
to the solution of problems such as moral corruption, environmental problems, 
AIDS and HIV, poverty, abortion, gay marriages, caste system, social exclusion, 
racism, terror, war and exploitation cannot be neglected (Kurucan, 2006: 16-17). 
Therefore, it should not be forgotten that interreligious and intercultural dialogue 
will prepare the legitimate grounds for the search of common solutions and 
contribute an ability of movement.  
There are several proofs in Qur’an and Sunna of Prophet about dialogue and 
alliance being legitimate and necessary. In Ankabut we can see (Al-Ankabut/The 
Spider, 29/46), ‘Do not argue with those who were given the Book save in the best 
way, unless it be those of them who are given to wrongdoing (and therefore not 
accessible to courteous argument). Say (to them): ‘We believe in what has been 
sent down to us and what was sent down to you, and your God and our God is one 
and the same. We are Muslims wholly submitted to Him’ (Ünal, 2008: 830). 
Qur’an has referred to The Book many times, which means the members of holy 
religions such as Christians and the Jews. In this verse, it has been ordered to 
struggle with the sane members of The Book in the best possible way. Besides, 
this verse emphasizes the common grounds as the basic belief principles of Islam 
and draws attention to the method and manners while dealing with the members 
of The Book (Aydüz, 2005; Kurucan, 2006: 32). Civil society organizations, 
referring to the orders in the Qur’an about establishing humanitarian relations 
with the members of The Book and doing good things to them, have given 
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importance to the activities of dialogue among religions and members of religions. 
On the contrary, some groups (especially the political Islamists and marginal 
groups in Turkey), who reject the interfaith and intercultural dialogue, argue 
against dialogue activities that aim to combine religions, missionary and 
compensate from faith principals. Activities of dialogue among the members of 
religions and the religions have first started with the Foundation of Journalists 
and Authors (GYV) in Turkey, of which Fethullah Gülen is the honorary 
president. The foundation has brought people from all over Turkey without 
making any discrimination and has started dialogue with many religious members 
outside of the Turkey as well. These steps of dialogue have by time been accepted 
by the Religious Affairs Directorate and civil society organizations in Turkey. The 
practice of interreligious dialogue is a very important duty in front of the 
humanity in order to institutionalize the dialogue of civilizations. 
Christians also believe in the necessity of a tolerance and dialogue ground and 
getting closer with the Muslims. Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) has opened 
the first gate of dialogue for Christians to establish dialogue with other religions, 
and it focused on the importance of relations between The Book and the Muslims; 
emphasizing the similarities of understanding and beliefs in many areas (Yılmaz, 
2004: 113). Current spiritual leader of Christian world, Pope Francisco Bergoglio 
has shared with the public his will to develop the dialogue with the Islamic 
countries is an important step in intercultural dialogue. Dialogue studies have 
been conceptualized and implemented after the Second Vatican Council are 
important even though they had a missionary tendency.  
Islam is one of the basic social motives for the Muslims and it is also one of the 
main determinants for the Turkish society in Europe. The suggestion of the 
Prophet of Islam and Qur’an to have humanitarian relations with The Book 
(Christians and Jews) and to help them, is the basic reference for the European 
Turkish society. The rights and freedoms given by the prophet of Islam to the 
believers in Medina and to secure their safety is another experience for the 
Muslims. Therefore, the European Turkish society has no problems in adapting to 
pluralism and democracy. Islam shapes the cultural identity of Turkish European 
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society and it also helps the individuals to shape their relations with others along 
with their behaviors.  
Figure 13. Do you think that it correct to establish tolerance and dialogue 
between the members of different religions and cultures? 
 
The answers given to the question “Do you think that it correct to establish 
tolerance and dialogue between the members of different religions and cultures?” 
is 79% (161 people) “I do” 12% (25 people) “I partially consider it right/wrong” 
and 5% (10 people) “I don’t” (See Figure 13). 78% (75 people) of the female 
respondents (96 people) and 79% (86 people) of the male respondents (109 people) 
think that mutual tolerance and dialogue efforts are correct. On the other hand, 84% 
(92 people) of the respondents aged 19-35 years (109 people) and 72% (59 people) 
of the respondents aged 36-50 years (82 people) think that mutual tolerance and 
dialogue efforts are correct. The Turkish male and female respondents are very 
closely in the same opinion about mutual tolerance and dialogue, and also the new 
generations are more supportive more than their families in mutual tolerance and 
dialogue efforts. Turks are open to dialogue at intercultural and interreligious 
levels and they support all the dialogue efforts which would eventually contribute 
to coexistence. Dialogue is an important dynamic to establish social peace and 
prosperity, at the same time dialogue is seen as an opportunity for the solution of 
many problems that influence the Turkish community in Europe. One of the 
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opportunities is available a dialogue platform today to remove prejudice and bias 
are coming from the depth of history. It has become an indispensable fact that the 
Turkish society has to turn dialogue in a free, participant and democratic social 
ground. Therefore, it is a necessity for the Turks to try to find out the ways of 
dialogue with Christians, Jews and all other religions and cultures. It is expected 
in this study that the European Turkish society could be one of the major players 
in the tolerance and dialogue process.  
We start to witness that the Turkish associations have started to give the necessary 
importance to dialogue in European societies. European Union of Turkish-Islamic 
Cultural Associations (ATIB) President’s Main Consultant and Foreign Affairs 
Director Mahmut Aşkar summarize this: 
“European Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations (ATIB) has preserved 
its own culture and cultural identity since the first day it was founded and acted 
according to the principle of communicating with local nations at every level of 
life. We give importance to cooperation in terms of cultural level and acceptance 
of the member of different religions the mutual dialogue and differences. In 
addition to this, we promote the new generations to get interested in participate 
in German politics.”  
The answers given to the question: “Please list the steps you think would increase 
the atmosphere of dialogue and tolerance among the members of different 
religions and cultures” are important to analyze. First of these steps that the 
respondents said as “very important” is 83% (171 people) the publications by 
media in which they make unifying and peaceful news. Second one is the usage of 
tolerance language in the educational curriculum by 76% (156 people). Third step 
is the ending of the legal, bureaucratic and political discriminations by official and 
civil organizations at a rate of 72% (148 people). Other steps mentioned as “very 
important” by the respondents are the usage of a unifying attitude by the 
politicians and the religious groups to be more into dialogue by 68% (139 people). 
About 57% (116 people) of the respondents requested the civil society 
organizations to conduct more policies for mutual dialogue and 52% (107 people) 
consider the official institutions’ support of the dialogue “very important”. About 
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50% (103 people) of all respondents have mentioned not to compromise from 
dialogue and tolerance individually as “very important”. Islam world did not yet 
take any initiative so far for global and intercultural/interreligious dialogue. Some 
groups which dared to interreligious and intercultural dialogue were criticized by 
other groups very harshly. But, coexistence has become indispensable today with 
the help of international migrations and it is a must for the members of each belief 
to take an active and strong initiative and establish a ground for dialogue. In our 
current world where all social relations became interactive, the European Turkish 
society seems to have realized the necessity of an intercultural and interreligious 
dialogue. 
Table 14. Main Objectives on Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue and 
Understanding 
 
 
Main Objectives 
Very 
important 
(f) 
Important 
(f) 
Not 
important 
(f) 
 I have no 
idea (f) 
Knowing each other and having 
the correct information 
174 27 2 2 
Adding people to one side’s life 
style by convincing the others 
34 33 128 10 
Solving common problems 141 56 4 4 
Increasing friendship relations 169 28 4 3 
Increasing the ‘mutual self-
interests’ 
43 40 110 12 
Preventing radicalism and 
extremism 
156 37 7 5 
 
The answers given to the question: “Please list in an order some statements that 
could be counted as the aims of dialogue between the members of different 
cultures and religions” are by 85% (174 people) knowing each other and having 
the correct information as “very important” for dialogue. 82% (169 people) of all 
respondents have said that increasing the friendship, love and respect is very 
important for dialogue. 76% (156) said that “preventing the extreme right and 
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nationalist groups”, and 69% (141 people) said that “solving the existing common 
problems” are “very important”. 62% (128 people) did not find “adding people to 
one side’s life style by convincing the others” and “to increase the mutual 
personal interests” by 54% (110 people) as “not correct” (See Table 14). 
Therefore, each individual, group and member of religions understanding of each 
other is more important for mutual dialogue. “Knowing each other and having the 
correct information about the others” is a very important goal of dialogue and it 
points out what parties might learn from each other and know each other in the 
best way.  
The understanding of “how can we know the others with the most accurate or 
correct information and how can we learn something with mutual information 
share” seems that has been internalized by the majority of Turkish community in 
Europe. On the other hand, another important point for the respondents is the 
development of mutual love, respect and friendship through dialogue. Living 
together, respect and trust will make it possible to live in peace. Therefore, the 
most important aim of intercultural and interreligious dialogue is to build the 
peace in every area. “Being a human” it is the starting point dialogue and 
communication. The organization of many groups in the European Turkish 
society under dialogue and cultural centers indicates that the Turkish society 
wants to meet, recognize and cooperate. In 2012, in Speyer, Germany 
Interreligious Dialogue Forum (Germany: Interreligiösen Forums Speyer) was 
established among the representatives of Muslim, Christian and Jewish 
communities in order to promote the interreligious cooperation and to develop 
coexistence. 
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Table 15. The Role of the Turkish Community on Alliance of Civilization and 
Intercultural Dialogue 
 
 
Main Roles 
True 
(f) 
False 
(f) 
 I have no 
idea (f) 
The Turkish society has a role to decrease the 
prejudice and polarization in Europe 
140 44 21 
The Turkish society has a role to develop peace 
and cooperation in Europe 
161 31 13 
The Turkish society remains distant to radical 
political, religious and ideological groups within 
itself 
119 56 30 
The Turkish society supports Turkey’s 
membership to European Union 
133 49 23 
The Turkish society is marginalizing each year 46 113 45 
The distinction between the Turkish and Western 
societies is increasing 
51 132 22 
The Turkish society cannot act together because of 
different religious, political, ethnic and ideological 
groups within it 
91 89 25 
The Turkish society is not possible to take an 
active role in ‘alliance of civilization and 
intercultural dialogue’  
30 139 34 
 
The answers given to the question: “Which ones of the following statements are 
right or wrong in terms of the role of the European Turkish society in Alliance of 
Civilizations an Intercultural Dialogue?” are on Table 15. About 79% (161 
people) of all respondents think that the European Turkish society has a role to 
develop peace and cooperation in Europe. About 68% (140 people) think that the 
Turkish society has a role to decrease the prejudice and polarization in Europe 
which is shaped by religion and culture. 65% (133 people) of all the respondents 
think that the European Turkish society supports Turkey’s membership to 
European Union and 58% (119 people) think that the Turkish society remains 
distant to radical political, religious and ideological groups within itself.  On the 
other hand, 55% (113 people) of the respondents do not think that the European 
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Turkish society is marginalizing each year, but 22% (46 people) consider it as 
correct. 25% (51 people) think that the statement “the distinction between the 
Turkish and Western societies is increasing” is correct, but 64% (132) think it is 
not. Approximately 44% (91 people) of the respondents think that “Turkish 
society can’t act together because of different religious, political, ethnic and 
ideological groups within it” is correct, as 42% (89 people) consider it as wrong. 
Lastly %15 (30 people) of respondents believe that Turkish society is not possible 
to take an active role in ‘alliance of civilization and intercultural dialogue’, 
but %68 (139 people) is not belive the idea. In other words, a significat mojority 
of the Turkish society believe to take an active role in ‘alliance of civilization and 
intercultural dialogue’ in Europe. Generally, a great majority of the respondents 
are very moderate and open in terms of dialogue with the members of other 
religions and cultures. European Turkish society does not accept a solid, 
monolithic and radical religious understanding and they are very optimistic about 
the synthesis of numerous points between Islam and the modern Western ideals. 
Statements below summarize the belief of Turks in democratic pluralism: 
 ‘Turkish society has the biggest majority among the foreigners and it provides an 
important diversity. Our people are used to live together and open to it; and also 
have the dynamics to strengthen this unity. Our people have come to Europe from 
different corners of Anatolia and they have an experience of living together with 
diverse ethnic and religious people for centuries. Coexistence is not a new thing 
for us, but our exclusion in the countries we live is a different thing… Europe did 
not have a problem of integration, but a problem of acceptance…And foreigners 
are not guilty about this.” (Male, aged 36-50 years, Germany)  
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Figure 14. Do you think it is appropriate to have a German/Belgian/Dutch 
partner, business associate, boyfriend/girlfriend or neighbor? 
 
The answers given to the question: “Do you think it is appropriate to have a 
German/Belgian/Dutch partner, business associate, boyfriend/girlfriend or 
neighbour?” is “No, I do not consider it as a problem. On the contrary, I think it is 
useful” by 82% (90 people) of Turks in Germany, 82% (45 people) by Turks in 
Belgium and 85% (34 people) by Turks in the Netherlands. On the other hand, 18% 
(20 people) of Turks in Germany, 14% (8 people) of Turks in Belgium and 13% 
(5 people) of Turks in the Netherlands do not see any positive or negative thing in 
this (See Figure 14). There are differences on the behavior of having a social 
environment and choosing spouse or friend depending on variables such as 
education, language, average of age, differences in generations, country and 
socio-economic status. Among the respondents with high level of socio-economic 
and education, we see the will and courage to have a social environment except 
own ethnic and religious group. Freedom of choice in spouse and friends indicate 
that there is a change of traditional family and belonging culture in the new 
generations. On the other hand, it is understood that the Turks in the Netherlands 
are more willing to communicate and develop social relations with the host 
society more than the Turks in Belgium and Germany. As the pluralist tradition of 
the Netherlands did not emphasize the racial and religious differences, this helped 
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the Turkish society to have a place in social and public sphere. In Germany, we 
cannot see any institutionalized multicultural understanding (Tol, 2012: 305-309). 
Within new generations, new friendships and relationships usually occur out of 
household; whereas the friendship and neighbourly relationships of elder 
participants occur among the household. Besides, the level of interest of Turks in 
Belgium and Netherlands to the local news and policies makes it easy for them to 
have a social environment. Individuals with higher levels of self-confidence and 
who are aware of their environment are more capable in terms of building 
friendships and good relations with people from different cultures. The statements 
below summarize this situation and also reveal the natural dimensions of the 
communication skill: 
 ‘… Even though I had lack in language and that our neighbours remained 
distant to us in the first days, we currently are very sympathetic towards 
each other. They take care of our children, and we celebrate their feasts, 
give them gifts, and receive gifts from them. So, the prejudices and 
conflicts have shifted with dialogue and mutual understanding.’ (Female, 
aged 19-35 ages, Belgium). 
Table 16. What do you think are the most important dynamics of European 
Turkish society has in terms of tolerance and dialogue? 
 
 
Dynamics 
Very 
important 
(f) 
Important 
(f) 
Not 
important 
(f) 
 I have no 
idea (f) 
The culture of tolerance 153 37 11 4 
Culture of coexistence 144 52 6 3 
Respect to religions and members 
of religion 
140 44 13 7 
Politicians of Turkish origin are 
favour of tolerance and dialogue 
91 89 13 12 
Religious leaders of Turkish 
origin are favour of tolerance and 
dialogue 
93 88 16 8 
Civil society organizations of 
Turkish origin are favour of 
tolerance and dialogue 
102 85 9 8 
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The answers given to the question: “What do you think are the most important 
dynamics of European Turkish society has in terms of tolerance and dialogue?” 
are listed on Table 16. According to this, the rate of people who think that the 
culture of tolerance by European Turkish society (loving the created because of 
the Creator) is a very important dynamic is 75% (153 people). Approximately 70% 
(144 people) consider the “culture of coexistence” and 68% (143 people) “respect 
to religions and members of religion” which the European Turkish society have as 
important dynamics. Politicians and religious leaders of Turkish origin are in 
favour of tolerance and dialogue and that they play an important role in mutual 
understanding and friendship is 44% (91 people) and 45% (93 people). The 
Turkish civil society organizations have the culture of tolerance and dialogue that 
is another important dynamic in providing the social peace and living together. 
According to this, 50% (102 people) of the respondents believe that the Turkish 
civil society organizations have an important role in providing the social peace 
and order. European Turkish society has a population over 5 million within the 
multicultural European nations and it has a culture of tolerance and coexistence, 
which is one of the basic dynamics of dialogue. Turkish-Islamic thinker and poet 
Yunus Emre’s (1240-1321) important saying “We love the created for the 
Creator’s sake” in his poem is far beyond today’s individual centered humanist 
discourses. “Discourse of love” by Yunus Emre which suggests an approach with 
love and compassion to all living and dead things is nourished from the life of 
Prophet of Islam and Qur’an.  
Another important dynamic is the ability of belief based movements within the 
Turkish society to organize and mobilize their people around common values. 
Belief based movements try to put the spiritual side and worldview of intra group 
individuals on a solid ground; and they also protect their base against individual 
and social problems. The existence of Turkish Islamic movements which are open 
to democracy, human rights, pluralism and dialogue within Europe is an important 
barrier in front of the radical understandings that find September 11 correct. On 
the other hand, the promotion of the religious leaders of Turkish Islamic 
movements for establishing dialogue with the members of other religions and to 
cooperate for the solution of common problems is another important dynamic. 
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Figure 15. Which community or communities are more open and willing to 
intercultural dialogue and integration where you live in? 
 
The answers given to the question; ‘Which community or communities are more 
open and willing to intercultural dialogue and integration in your country where 
you live in?’ is replied ‘Turkish community’ by %48 (53 people) of German-
Turks, %29 (16 people) of Belgian-Turks and %25 (10 people) Dutch-Turks. On 
the contrary, ‘the host communities are seen more open and willing to intercultural 
dialogue and integration by %7 (8 people) of Turkish respondents in 
Germany, %16 (9 people) of Turkish respondents in Belgium and %25 (10 people) 
of Turkish respondents in the Netherlands. When selected country differences are 
not considered, about %39 (79 people) of all respondents see ‘Turkish 
community’, %33 (67 people) of all respondents see ‘both Turkish community and 
host communities’ and %13 (27 people) of all respondents see ‘the host 
communities’ more open and willing to intercultural dialogue and integration (See 
Figure 15). On the other hand, about %35 (25 people) of the Turkish respondents 
who were born in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (71 people) and %40 
(54 people) of the Turkish respondents who were born in Turkey (134 people) see 
‘Turkish community’ more open and willing to intercultural dialogue and 
integration. About %39 (52 people) of the Turkish respondents who have at least 
college or university level (134 people) see ‘Turkish community’ and %31 (41 
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people) of the respondents who have at least college or university level see ‘both 
communities’ more open and willing to intercultural dialogue and integration in 
Europe.  
Why the Turkish immigrants in Germany consider themselves more open and 
tending to dialogue and harmony than the host society? The most important 
reason is the adaptation policies in Germany that include institutional exclusion 
and discrimination. In Germany, tolerance about diversity is not so well 
developed and the foreigners are excluded from the political processes and the 
public sphere. But, today, as cultural diversity is increasing, pluralism, dialogue 
and open mindedness have become indispensable facts in almost all Western 
societies. Intercultural dialogue is one of the main tools for permanent freedoms, 
social welfare and tolerance; and it is also indispensable for the minorities which 
are a part of the Western societies. Lack of dialogue with the host societies will 
turn the doubts and prejudices about Muslims permanent and increase the 
introversive socialization. But, strengthening and sustaining the acquisitions in the 
fiftieth year of migration through intercultural dialogue will be in benefit of the 
Turkish society. Also, if both parties understand and recognize each other with 
open minded, unprejudiced and dialogue based approaches and thereby solving 
the problems is the result of common sense. On the other hand, intercultural 
dialogue and being open and willing to harmony also contribute to the struggle of 
Turkish society and the host societies with extremism and fanaticism.  
According to the observation of Thranhardt (1999), the Netherlands is accepted as 
a multicultural, tolerant and respectful country to diversity (cited by Tol, 2012: 
305). The Netherlands promotes the coexistence of different ethnic/religious 
groups by democratic and pluralist policies and regulations. Also, the criteria to 
become a citizen in Belgium and the Netherlands are much easier than Germany, 
which helps the Turkish immigrants in those countries to socialize more and give 
more importance to communication and dialogue. On contrary, the introversive 
tendency of European governments, their protective economy policies, unjust 
social security policies and aim to establish more homogenous cultures by 
strengthened national identity building harm the culture of coexistence. The 
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statements of a respondent in Germany about the stance of Turkish society on 
understanding each other show another problem: 
 ‘I don’t think that the Turks in Europe can adequately express themselves. They 
hide behind problems such as xenophobia and discrimination and pull themselves 
out in the first opportunity. This is not relevant for everyone, but unfortunately 
more than half is doing this. Therefore none of the sides take a step to know each 
other… For instance, we keep ourselves distant due to the linguistic problems. If 
you decide to live in a country, you have to know to speak the language of that 
country at least to express yourself. We keep on blaming the other side and do not 
question ourselves.’ (Male, aged 36-50 years, Germany). 
Table 17. What do you think is correct or wrong of the statements about 
coexistence below? 
 
 
Temel Tespitler 
Correct 
(f) 
Wrong (f) No idea (f) 
Whatever my religion and culture means to 
me is the same for the religions and cultures 
of others to them 
196 4 5 
If the things I value are worthy, so others’ 
values are worth to respect 
198 4 3 
My ideas are as true and valuable as his/her 
ideas 
175 21 9 
Everyone should think in the same way, live 
in the same way, there should be no 
diversities and we should not have any 
opposition 
16 184 5 
An ethnic or religious identity or ideology 
should not be imposed for European 
Turkish society, and also their diversities 
should not be neglected 
161 25 19 
To live together, before everything, there 
should be a common ground to live and agree 
195 5 5 
We should accept that anything we want, 
think or consider as a right for ourselves 
should also be possessed by others 
192 8 5 
We have to abide to Western style cohesion in 
order to succeed the coexistence in Europe 
21 169 15 
Living together is only possible with 
combination on equal and equivalent 
conditions in Europe 
164 26 15 
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Western societies have been invaded nearly 
by foreigners 
20 159 26 
Purpose of live together is assimilating 
foreigners in eyes of the European 
98 76 31 
Discrimination is increasing and becoming 
normal every day in Europe 
153 31 21 
 
The question of “What do you think is correct or wrong of the statements about 
coexistence below?” has been analyzed without country differences are not 
considered. The statements that the respondents consider as correct or wrong 
sheds light about future predictions for the enhancement and sustaining of the 
culture of coexistence. 96% (196 people) of the all respondents have considered 
the statement “whatever my religion and culture means to me is the same for the 
religions and cultures of others to them” as a must for coexistence. And also 
about 97% (198 people) comment that “if the things I value are worthy, so others’ 
values are worth to respect” and 85% (175 people) comment that “my ideas are 
as true and valuable as his/her ideas” are as “correct”. On the other hand, 
statements such as “everyone should think in the same way, live in the same way, 
there should be no diversities and we should not have any opposition” was 
considered as “wrong” by 90% (184 people) and “we have to abide to a Western 
style cohesion in order to succeed the coexistence in Europe” was considered as 
wrong by 82 % (169 people). The following statements “Western societies have 
been invaded nearly by foreigners” and “purpose of live together is assimilate 
foreigners in eyes of the European” are interpreted as “wrong” by 
approximately %78 (159 people) and %37 (76 people) of all respondents (See 
Table 17). 
The respondents have supported the statements below with very high rates. “An 
ethnic or religious identity or ideology should not be imposed for European 
Turkish society, and also their diversities should not be neglected” (79%, 161 
people); “To live together, before everything, there should be a common ground to 
live and agree” (95%, 195 people). Both approaches above comply with the 
understanding “to be aware of the differences without imposing them on anyone”. 
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Approximately 94% (192 people) of all respondents has thought that it was 
“correct” to say “we should accept that anything we want, think or consider as a 
right for ourselves should also be possessed by others”. About 80% (164 people) 
have thought that saying “Living together in Europe is only possible with 
combination on equal and equivalent conditions” is correct and 75% (153 people) 
have thought the same thing about “discrimination in Europe is increasing and 
becoming normal every day” (See Table 17). A common point for the Turkish 
respondents is that they see the culture of coexistence as an opportunity to 
diminish the possible conflicts, tensions and polarizations in the future. A 
common point of these evaluations is having respect to an individual’s idea and 
honor, providing coexistence as equal individuals, respecting the freedom of 
religion and conscience and developing the culture of tolerance. Mahinur Özdemir 
is the first representative with a headscarf who has been elected for the Belgian 
Parliament, and she is a perfect example that differences in Europe can exist in 
harmony.  
The respondents have contributed to with their own ideas a lot while answering 
the question “Do you think that Turks living in Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands have a role to disable the thesis of Clash of Civilizations at least in 
Western societies?”. We have to say that only a few of the respondents have said 
that this role was “much exaggerated”. And another part of them have said that 
the role mentioned might have a decreasing effect on discrimination and 
polarization between the societies, but it does not have an effect that would totally 
diminish it. On the other hand, majority of the respondents think that the Turkish 
society has such a role more than other ethnic and religious minority groups. 
Answers to his question can be put as follows, considering the variables such as 
gender, age and country: 
 ‘Definitely yes, I believe that mutual tolerance and understanding in my 
environment is very strong. I think that both societies have passed through 
adapting to each other and now they are at the process of understanding each 
other. I do not know how long (how many centuries) this process would last but it 
is sure that in the end of this process the other society will not be considered as 
“other one” but as “one of us”, “a society that makes us as we are”. Today, this 
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is only partial and still not adapted by the majority. The side that adapts this 
understanding is the mass that sees “individual of the globe” and who has a 
positive attitude towards cultural enrichment.” (Male, aged 36-50 years, the 
Netherlands)   
Dialogue between cultures and religions is an indispensable requirement for 
societies today. The peaceful and harmonious coexistence of ethnic and religious 
diversities and differences is the guarantee of transfer of historical and cultural 
enrichments to the new generations. In pluralist societies, where differences have 
a unifying factor, the borders drawn to define the “other” will also be passed 
through. Therefore, Turks in Europe require the dialogue and cooperation in 
Europe and they are candidates to be the representatives of social harmony and 
dialogue at least in the societies they live. On the other hand, being superior or 
inferior to the others in democratic pluralist societies is not a result of an 
understanding of diversity. Instead of this, the opinion of a respondent who thinks 
that respect to every opinion and just treatment is an important element of 
coexistence is very crucial: 
 ‘European countries consider themselves as superior in many aspects and they 
don’t accept that dialogue with developing and undeveloped countries would 
contribute. But I believe that the Turkish society in Europe has a great 
significance to diminish the thesis of clash of civilizations. Dialogue activities are 
the results of this’ (Female, aged 36-50 years, Belgium). 
According to Tariq Ramadan (2005), European Muslims with Islamic values 
should defend the democratic values, human rights and supremacy of law, which 
will eventually help the development of pluralist society. Active participant 
Muslims who cope with democratic rules and have self confidence will contribute 
to the development of dissemination of Islamic culture of tolerance throughout 
Europe. The development and dissemination of Islamic culture of tolerance in 
Europe depends on successful examples Muslims will show in socio-cultural, 
economic, educational and political areas. The existence of ethnic and religious 
groups in USA, Canada and many Western European countries is the indicator 
that unifying common value is stronger than discriminative differences. In the 
study published by the European Council, ‘Living Together as Equals in Dignity’ 
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concepts such as democracy, human rights, basic freedoms, supremacy of law, 
pluralism, tolerance, indiscrimination and mutual respect are counted as the 
common values that develop the culture of diversity. The richness of ethnic and 
religious minorities plays an important role in acquiring and continuing these 
common values. A respondent says: 
‘There are things that the Turks in Europe have to do. They have to prepare the 
ground for the Western civilization to rebuild the values it had lost a long time 
ago. Help, “service without any expectations” and “loving the created because of 
the Creator” are some contributions of Turks can do. In this process, it will be 
more efficient to work with Europeans who are against the clash of civilizations.’ 
(Male, aged 51-65 years, the Netherlands). 
Some respondents who think that the European Turkish society has a role to 
contribute to interreligious and intercultural dialogue at least in the societies they 
reside, but with some conditions remind these: 
 ‘It is impossible to completely disable the Clash of Civilizations thesis. But, with 
the developments and transformations we can show by self-criticizing, we can 
provide the social unity… On the other hand, as long as the perception of “other” 
by Europeans continues to be ethnocentric, there will be no fruitful results.’ 
(Male, aged 36-50 years, Germany). 
‘Yes, I do. But this needs time and it cannot be solved by one side only. But I 
believe that the Turks in Europe have an important mission. It is another problem 
how much they are aware of this, or how much they own this as a mission.’ 
(Female, aged 19-35 years, Germany). 
 ‘… Maybe not today, but the physical conditions in the future will force the 
European societies for inter-civilization and cultural dialogue. Increasing 
immigrant population, aging European population and decreasing workforce, 
developing communications and the rise of qualification in the next generations 
will force the Europeans for coexistence.’ (Male, aged 51-65 years, the 
Netherlands).  
Helping the both parties to get rid of prejudices and a struggle for supremacy, 
developing a culture of self-criticism, accepting that dialogue is a long-term and 
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multi-sided action, creating awareness, and making the Western societies 
understand that the interreligious and intercultural difference is a necessity are the 
points emphasized by all three respondents. It is predicted that, if a permanent and 
common attitude is developed, both the Western and the European Turkish society 
might struggle together against clash of civilizations, fanaticism, radicalism, 
intolerance, racism and Islamophobia. 
5.8. Radicalism 
Especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks, we know that the Western 
countries and public opinion have acted with prejudice and problematic attitudes 
towards the Muslim minorities. Western societies and states have evaluated Islam 
in a monolithic framework and perceived it as a threat to the Western civilization 
(Kaya and Kentel, 2005). How realistic is the Western public opinion’s threat 
perception and fear? Do the Western societies have no responsibility in the 
appearance of global terror today, which also threatens Islam and Islamic tradition? 
How will the prejudice and fear in the West shape the adaptation or otherization 
of Muslim minorities? In what level do Xenophobia, racism and Islamophobia in 
Western societies affect the radical tendencies among the Muslim minorities? The 
data acquired from the respondents indicate that European Turkish society has 
internalized the Turkish-Islamic tradition and Islamic understanding, and they 
remain distant to radical and fanatic ideas in general. During the process of 
adaptation which has been going on for the last fifty years, the search for an 
identity by the European Turkish diaspora has an intergenerational diversity. 
Radical, ethnic and religious movements tended to violence are not accepted by 
the majority of Turkish Diaspora (Perşembe, 2005: 284). In this part, the analysis 
of the specific point among the European Turkish society in terms of radical 
tendencies and the processes that nourish these radical tendencies will be 
conducted with the data from the respondents. On the other hand, one of the 
points that make this study unique is that it takes the pulse of European Turkish 
society in a time when sectarian wars are intensified in Syria and Iraq. 
Fanaticism and radical tendencies, even though they are effective only on a small 
part of the Muslim minorities in the West, are seriously harming the social 
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compromise and living together. The most astonishing result of this is the 
participation of hundreds of voluntary warriors from European capitals and other 
parts of the world to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) which appeared in 
Syria and threatens the Middle East. According to the intelligence reports of 
European countries and Turkish National Police, hundreds of volunteers from 
Turkey and from European Turkish society have joined ISIS. The militants 
joining the ISIS from England, France and Germany have religious sensitivities 
and a search for “injustice”, which highly motivates their decision to become a 
warrior. The reactions of these militants to the policies of Western countries and 
to the Islamic regimes in the Middle East are very effective in their decision to 
join ISIS. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the visions of Muslim women and 
children who die in these conflicts and the attitudes and policies of Muslim 
countries that do not react to these events increase the fanaticism and radicalism 
among the Muslims. According to the report prepared in June 2014 by “Soufan 
Group”, one of the prominent security research companies in USA, majority of 
the militants who have joined ISIS are the young people aged 18-29 years and 
people who have later became Muslims (Barrett, 2014). So, the return of those 
militants to the EU countries and the potential existence of the radicals who have 
not fought yet are threat for the security. 
In Germany, there are approximately 3 million Turks and there is a sample and 
projection of Turkish religious communities. DITIB is bound to official state 
institution of Turkey, the Turkish Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs 
Directorate, and is organized around mosque associations; also political Islamist 
Milli Görüş (National Viewpoint) Movement and Suleymancılar (the Association 
of Islamic Cultural Centers/VIKZ) with their Qur’an courses and education 
activities are some examples in Germany. One of them is official and the other 
two private; and the speeches, Friday speeches and religious conversations are 
always in Turkish. As the average of age who attends the mosque is high, the 
religious officials prefer Turkish; which causes a lack of communication between 
the young generations and their religion. Young generations, who cannot receive a 
real and correct religious education, are easily affected by marginal and fanatic 
groups. These young people join the Wahhabi and Selafi organizations with a 
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conservative and solid Islamic understanding and they experience a cultural clash 
with their families and friends by time. Children of low income families, who 
could not complete their socialization process and experiencing a cultural clash 
with their families, join groups in which they can easily express themselves and 
have an identity. Intra family violence, murders, violence at schools, ethnic or 
cultural ghettos, fanaticism, alienation and isolation, gambling, alcohol an drugs 
appear as a result of radicalization and threaten Turkish family structure, 
democratic pluralism and peace. Mahmut Aşkar, Main Advisor to the ATIB 
President and Foreign Affairs Director, voices his concerns: 
 ‘Religion based cultures and civilizations after the Cold War have resulted with 
a clash of civilizations whenever it is needed. In such a period, we are very 
concerned with some extreme “Islamic” ideas such as Salafism or Wahhabism to 
find participants among the Turkish youth. The exclusion of the host societies 
also increases the chance of radical groups. We always try to tell people the 
dangers of this and emphasize the importance of families’ and civil society 
organizations’ role in taking care of these young people.” 
Radical Salafism and Wahhabi groups are giving religious education in German, 
French and Dutch, being active in various fields. The Sunni Islam and the 
moderate Muslim youth are under the threat of Salafi radicalism. Interestingly, the 
representatives of radical Salafi and Wahhabi ideologies appear on local and 
national TV channels and radios very frequently. This ideology which tries to 
spread the fundamentalist, conservative and traditionalist Islam through mass 
media, harms the real and enlightened aspect of Islam. According to researcher 
Cemil Şahinöz, newly Muslims (Germans and other Europeans) are affected from 
the messages of these marginal and fanatic groups and turn into conservative and 
radical ideas. In 2012, as a part of “Read” campaign conducted by Salafis in 
Germany, their initiative to distribute Qur’an for free every weekend had reactions 
from the majority of Muslims and the prominent communities of the Islamic 
tradition. This provocative activity began with the slogan of “Making every 
German have a Quran in his house”, which was top of the agenda in Germany for 
weeks and put the Muslims under suspicion. According to Şahinöz (2013: 46-48), 
the polarization of the country with projects that require high amount of resources 
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in Germany where only 5.000 Salafis are living, brings into mind that there are 
other plans and scenarios. 
All the great civilizations and cultures have struggled with radicalism in every 
period. But especially, the radicalism which appeared in Muslim countries 
recently and effected the world at global level, has been exploited by those who 
have predicted the clash of civilizations. But, the polarizations in our world do not 
stem from religious and cultural reasons, but mainly from economic and political 
ones. When S. Huntington (2006: 33) defines civilizations, he separated the 
Western civilization into two variants such as Europe and North America; but 
separated the civilization of Islam into subdivisions such as Arabic, Turkish and 
Malaysian. Huntington referred to the historical interaction between West and 
Islam, and claimed that the search for Western democracy in Arab counties has 
strengthened the political powers that are completely against the West. 
Huntington also claimed that the migration from North Africa to Western Europe 
has sharpened the political sensitivities in Western societies. He also emphasized 
that racism increased in some of the Western countries, and the reaction and 
violence against Arabs and Turks have become very intensive since 1990s. 
According to Huntington, interactions among different civilizations strengthen the 
memory and knowledge of the humanity in terms of different civilizations, but it 
will also revive the historical conflicts and hatred. In his article “The Clash of 
Civilizations?”, which was published in 1993, Huntington warned that; 
 ‘I assume that the real source of struggle in this new world will not be 
ideological nor economic. Great divisions within the humanity and the dominant 
source struggle will be culture. Nation-states will still be the strongest actors in 
the events of the world, but the real clash in global politics will appear among 
groups and nations from different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will 
dominate the global politics’ (Huntington, 2006: 23).  
According to Huntington (1996: 217), “The real problem for the West is not 
Islamic fundamentalism. It is a civilization which made the people believe he 
superiority of their own culture and inadequacy of their power, Islam.” According 
to John Esposito (2003: 156-159), this prejudice of Huntington has targeted Islam 
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itself. Neither the Islamic world nor West are solid. As the history of Islam clearly 
indicates, mainstream Islam has always rejected the radicals and terrorists. 
Attacks of September 11 and the global threat by Al-Qaeda have revived the 
reflex of “clash of civilizations”. According to Kirman (2005: 78-81), in the 
background of violence and terror, there are some dependent variables such as 
religion, politics, social structure and economics. 
Figure 16. Do you generally believe the truth of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
thesis? 
 
Answers given to the question “Do you generally believe the truth of the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ thesis?” was “No” by 54% (59 people) of Turks in Germany, 55% 
(30 people) by Turks in Belgium and 48% (19 people) by Turks in the 
Netherlands. About 53% (108 people) of the Turks living in Europe do not believe 
the thesis of “clash of civilization” by S. Huntington (See Figure 16). On the other  
hand, 33% (32 people) of the female respondents (96 people) believe in “Clash of 
Civilizations” thesis, and 49% (47 people) do not. On the contrary, approximately 
34% (37 people) of the male respondents (109 people) think that the concept of 
clash is realistic, and 56% (61 people) of the male respondents do not think so. 
And also 37% (26 people) of the respondents (71 people) who were born and 
grown up in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands believe in the reality o 
“Clash of Civilizations”, but 55% (39 people) do not. About 32% (43 people) of 
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the respondents (134 people) who were born in Turkey think that the concept of 
clash is realistic, but about 52% (69 people) do not. 
As the opportunities of education and communication have increased, Turks had 
more chance to acquire the correct information and they do not foresee any clash 
between the Islam and Western civilizations in the near future. As a response to 
the reaction towards the appearance and visibility of Muslims in the West, 
accepting the differences and respect also increases in those same societies. On 
the other hand, the understanding by the Western world that Islamic radicalism 
and fanaticism is not accepted by the majority of Muslims, is a result of correct 
information. The building peace and dialogue in the world can only be moved 
forward with education, interreligious and intercultural dialogue, democratic 
citizenship, social organization and pluralism. Common view about the relation 
between Islam and pluralism, secularism and civil society is that there is no 
controversy between these two concepts (Hefner, 2005: 2-4, Esposito and Yılmaz, 
2014: 29-33). Therefore, the existence of Muslims in Western societies as equal 
citizens contributes to a pluralist and democratic environment. Muslims, with their 
unique characteristics, enrich the pluralist and democratic life of the West. The 
answer given by ATIB Main Advisor to President and Foreign Affairs Director 
Mahmut Aşkar to our interview question indicates that the European Turkish 
society has permanent relations: 
 “Clash of Civilizations” as predicted by S. Huntington will never happen 
between the European Turks and the societies of the host countries! Turks, 
throughout the history, have considered the land they settled as their home and 
never betrayed to the countries where they fed from. The idea of being from here 
is more relevant since the third generation of Turks…”  
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Figure 17. Do you believe that there is a clash of culture and religion between 
the European Turkish society and the Western societies? 
 
Approximately 23% (25 people) of the Turks in Germany, 27% (15 people) of 
Turks in Belgium and 14% (6 people) of Turks in the Netherlands have answered 
“I do not believe” to the question; “Do you believe that there is a clash of culture 
and religion between the European Turkish society and the Western societies?”. 
The people who believed that there was a clash between two societies is 28% (31 
people) in Germany, 33% (18 people) in Belgium and 38% (15 people) in the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, the percentage of the people who could not yet 
decide whether there is a clash of culture and religion in all three countries is 
almost about half of the respondents (See Figure 17). Many people today, who are 
aware of the real sources and messages of the religions, think those regional and 
ethnic conflicts that have happened before and today do not stem from religious 
and cultural differences; but from “non-religious” and “anti-religious” cultures 
and understandings. Both Western societies and the Muslims living in the West 
look very enthusiastic about a social life where dialogue and sustainable peace are 
possible. Therefore, religions should take responsibilities upon the common 
grounds that would help people to cooperate both in humanitarian and moral 
terms, and this will prevent the possible conflicts (Bulaç, 2007: 235-236). Besides, 
the idea of pluralism, which states that religion, culture, belief and opinions 
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should be together freely and equally, is rapidly developing within the Western 
societies as a result of the rising opportunities in education and communication. 
Respect to “other”, being aware of the differences and accepting those differences 
is the definition of pluralism and multiculturalism; and those ideas are the social 
grounds to prevent the distinctions between Islam and the West to turn into 
conflict. 
Figure 18. Do you agree with the thesis that extreme nationalism, xenophobia 
and fear of Islam have increased in the European societies lately? 
 
Another question was “Do you agree with the thesis that extreme nationalism, 
xenophobia and fear of Islam have increased in the European societies lately?”. 
Turks in Germany have responded 42% (46 people) “I completely agree”; 
whereas the Turks in Belgium 40% (22 people) and Turks in the Netherland by 50% 
(20 people). Rate of people who have partially agreed with this is 47% (52 people) 
of the respondents in Germany, 53% (29 people) of the respondents in Belgium 
and 40% (16 people) of the respondents in the Netherlands. On the other hand, 90% 
(185 people) of all of the respondents completely or partially agree that there is 
extreme nationalism, xenophobia and fear of Islam within the European societies 
(See Figure 18). Abolishment of the national borders and making the European 
integration permanent, seeing Brussels as the solution to all the problems have 
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turned the extreme rightist parties and movements an indispensable part of the 
continental Europe. Extreme right aims to reunite their countries culturally and 
politically and seems to have a common idea about the issues such as 
Islamophobia and sending back the immigrants. The xenophobia and fear of Islam 
that can mostly be seen in the lower social classes of the Western societies has 
caused an aggressive and extreme nationalism and a potential racism. Extreme 
right groups and parties are trying to create their social basis by social messages 
such as “strangers who are not from us”, “foreigners who take our jobs” and 
“dirty/disordered/lazy foreigners”. It is not a coincidence for the Europeans to 
direct their xenophobia after the end of the Cold War, when their historical enemy 
communism and Soviet Union was gone (Çevik, 1992). With the extreme efforts 
of the racist and radical movements in Europe, September 11 attacks have caused 
the image of Muslims in the West to be diminished. Therefore, Islam has long 
been misunderstood and misinterpreted in the West. In spite of the educational 
and technological developments of the West, Islam is the least known and most 
misunderstood religion in the West (Ahmed, 2011: 18). 
Table 18. The Reasons/Situations below that Effect the Increase of 
Nationalism, Xenophobia and Islamophobia in European Nations 
 
The Reasons/Situations 
Very 
effective 
(f) 
Effective 
(f) 
Less 
effective 
or no 
effective 
(f) 
Economic problems and worries about 
unemployment 
94 82 29 
Media publications and disinformation 165 33 7 
September 11 (2001) and similar terror events 147 38 20 
Lack of self-expression of Muslims after the 
terror events 
97 52 56 
Propaganda and campaigns on social media 
and internet 
78 73 54 
Nationalist or discriminative attitudes or 
behaviour of politics or religious figures 
140 51 14 
Spread of Islam in Western nations 41 113 51 
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Increase of the foreign population by births 
and immigrating 
34 127 44 
Problems about integration of the immigrants 
to society and lack of communication 
118 64 23 
Oppressive behaviours of strict regimes in 
Islam world 
63 58 84 
Loss of status and worry of security by the 
host nations 
72 103 30 
The answers given by the respondents are in Table 18 to the question;‘ Which 
reasons/situations below that effect the increase of nationalism, xenophobia and 
Islamophobia in European nations by the order of its importance?’. In fact the 
main object of this question of this question is the citizens of the host 
communities, but the sample group of this study is European Turkish community. 
The opinions in Table 18 are the opinions of the people from Turkey and the 
objects of the racism and discrimination or so-called ‘the other’ (there are some 
who does not see them as others). The respondents answered as ‘very effective’ 
with 80% (165 people) the ‘media publications and disinformation’, with 72% 
(147 people) the ‘September 11 and similar terror events’, with 68% (140 people) 
‘nationalist or discriminative attitudes or behavior of politics or religious figures’ 
and with 58% (118 people) the ‘problems about integration of the immigrants to 
society and lack of communication’. On the other hand 62% (127 people) of the 
respondents answered as ‘effective’ to ‘the increase of the foreign population by 
births and immigrating’, 55% (113 people) answered as ‘spread of Islam in 
Western nations’ and 50% (103 people) answered as ‘loss of status and worry of 
security by the host nations’ to the question about the reasons of racism, hostility 
and fear.  
We can sequence the reasons of increasing xenophobia, racism, Islamophobia and 
nationalism especially after September 11 terror events such as: 47% (97 people) 
of the respondents answered as ‘lack of self-expression of Muslims after the terror 
event’, 46% (94 people) of the respondents answered as ‘economic problems and 
worries about unemployment’, 38% (78 people) answered as ‘propagandas and 
campaigns on social media and internet’ and 31% (63 people) answered as 
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‘oppressive behaviors of strict regimes in Islam world’ . These are the ‘very 
effective’ reasons of discrimination and alienation was indicated by the 
participants. As a result, reasons of why the householders see minorities as the 
‘other’ can be sequenced as the increasing of Muslim population, increasing 
unemployment rates due to the global economic crises, consisted ghettos, 
coherence problems and ethnical or religious radicalizations. 
Ayten Kılıçarslan, who is a Teaching Assistant in Essen University Germany, 
expresses the Turks’ attitude and behavior against increasing nationalism, hostility 
to foreigners and Islam phobia in Europe with this statement;  
‘…  During this period, there are some radical groups which prefers to 
stay controlled and expressive but also there are some specific people and 
companies tries to create a new public opinion and a new paradigm and 
not to leave the area to those radical groups. This new way is not going to 
be an eastern way but will be completely arisen in Europe and has a 
European comprehension and brings explanation to the events in these 
frames. Muslims will create their own terminology, will create ‘you’ 
before me perception and by the time they will create a self-esteemed 
generation who does not react aggressive and tries to make a public 
opinion can make contribution and react offensive but not defensive… 
Hostility against Muslims will help them to create a self-esteemed Muslim 
identity…’ 
According to Kılıçarslan, especially hostility against Muslims, will react opposite 
way and help Muslims to create self-esteemed personalities and give direction to 
the society to they live in and a basic perception which give them collective 
personalities. On the other hand, for the last half century, Muslims from Turkish 
origin who lives in Western societies already began to show these characteristics. 
Even though reduction on birth rates, increasing divorce rates, increasing 
education levels and skilled working class and such data are similar to household 
nations, there no significant positive change about discrimination and alienation 
behaviors. Even though the nations or the minority groups differ, some habits 
continue.  But especially the third and the fourth generation of immigrants 
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improve their language, education and economic levels so they seem to force the 
Western nations to live in equal standards with them. Even though some politics 
and media organs make populist speech against immigrants and keep on cliché, 
we can say that mutual tolerance and understanding is getting stronger and people 
are not in the getting used to each other anymore but in understanding each other 
level.  
In Europe today, Western people think that their own identities will stay in strict 
blockage and they can look forward to a bright future through a new social 
identity the ‘other’ which was given to the foreigners. Even though European 
nations differ between them, they all think that their own identities are so fragile 
and vulnerable against other cultural identities. Western societies try to reinforce 
their so-called fragile and vulnerable identities by creating an ‘other’ image. 
Therefore any kind of ‘national identity’ or ‘European identity’ takes place against 
this other ethnic/religious identity. (Budak, 2008:59-60) The reason that European 
Union doesn’t end our appliance is that Turkey’s Muslim identity is an ‘other’ for 
them. On the other hand, the ‘other’ concept which exists in the European popular 
culture and also in its orientalist past is an ‘other’ concept that they created in 
their own minds (Said, 1979). Today, the main danger of putting Islam in to an 
‘other’ concept is actually about being careless about dividing societies in to 
opponent groups. The minority ‘other’ is not only a socially correct and natural 
concept but also source of the cultural creativity. September 11 tragedy shouldn’t 
bet a reason for concrete Islamophobia but should be a chance to show 
‘embracing’ in American tradition. Those who use the term ‘clash of civilizations’  
must get away from public speech before they begin to believe it (Bulliet, 
2007:18).  
On the other hand, in Europe general, extreme right and nationalist parties are 
using statements against immigrants and immigration and mobilize people against 
new immigrants and immigrations.  And also these parties support the idea of 
existing immigrants to leave their own cultures and get assimilated in to theirs or 
leave their country. (Wets, 2006: 85-86). Between 1917 and 1990s, the Soviet 
Union and communism were the ‘other’, buy by the collapse of these ideas; 
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Western world began to search for new fear and danger points. Capitalist system 
tried to fill the space of ‘other’ after the collapse of communism, with Islam 
hatred and hostility. Henry Kissinger and Samuel Huntington wrote thesis about 
Islam and put it in to ‘opposite civilization’ concept and placed in a different 
category. After the Cold War, S. Huntington’s thesis ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
which was an analyze of Islam, but it was actually a sequel of orientalist paradigm 
(Nişancı and Çaylak, 2010: 230-231). 
Today an important amount of Muslim Population represents Islam for the first 
time in history. If we say it generally, 1/3 of the Muslims live as minority today 
(Roy, 2013: 54-55). The immigration and immigrants problems such as 
integration, assimilation, radicalism are still exist but they are being reshaped 
according to globalism and modernism. Unemployment, discrimination, Islam 
hostility and such conceptual problems come up lately, are causing important 
problems among young generations and will be at the future. Young generations 
appealed to gambling, alcohol, drugs, being introverted and fanaticism instead of 
taking realistic steps about living in harmony. On the other hand, royalty to the 
‘old’ one and willing to have the ‘new’ one caused an unconscious challenge on 
generations and identity. Young ones reacted in different ways related to their 
conditions, such as being marginalize, ethnic awareness and being Islamic. Young 
people, who couldn’t reverse their disadvantages to advantage, choose to break 
the laws or try to force the limits to find a way out. Ethnic and religious alienation 
spared young people from their own nations and because they couldn’t integrate 
even at minimum level to the settled nation, they feel purposeless. Even though 
friends are social and psychological shelter for them, they are also a place to get 
inconvenient behaviors (Canatan, 1990: 42-50). Therefore young people who are 
the object of ‘out casting and non-accepting by society’ psychology, react against 
the dominant culture and getting radical. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Unver, the Islamic 
Foundation of the Netherlands (HDV) President of Executive Board and the 
Hague (Den Haag) Religious Service Counselor, summarized the precautions 
against radicalism in Turkish nation: 
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“We as HDV and religion employees, advice to young people and all 
community to be tolerant, peaceful, being ethical, educated and humanity 
with an good neighborhood and good friendship concept, and advise them 
to stay away any kind of extreme opinion and trend and tell them about the 
reasons. Lately we published a message “Youth against Violence and War” 
in both in Turkish and in Dutch”  
European Turkish nation faced the change in attitude, concept and social relations 
since the first years of immigration. The European-Turkish diaspora, has an 
increasing socio-economic level constantly, developed positive behaviors about 
living together and socio-cultural relations. But after September 11 (2001) and the 
other terrorist attacks in Western, just like the all other Muslims, migrants of 
Turkish origin were also objected as ‘other’ and the source of fear and worry. 
Identifying the Muslims with global terrorism makes a psychological oppression 
on majority and makes the small traditional reaction groups more marginal. The 
mistake of the Western world is that they can’t see the difference between 
violence and terror groups and Muslims (Esposito, 2009). Since Karl Marx, most 
of the social scientists state that religion is a handicap for social change and 
improvement (Thompson, 2004: 52-56). In fact the radicalism that turns religion 
to a social ideology and makes it conservative against improvement is the main 
handicap in front of socio-cultural change and improvement. Therefore some of 
the Muslims reacted protective against ‘other’ concept (Onat, 2001: 9-24), but this 
is because of the some conservative and radical religious groups acting traditional 
ways. ‘Arab- Israel conflict’ and ‘Western world’s imperialist colonial concept’ 
and such as political and cultural factors, can be indicated as the main reason of 
violence of the radical religious groups. (Kirman, 2005: 80-81). Two basic source 
of Islam religion; verses of Quran and words of the Islam’s Prophet, are being 
interpreted in a wrong way and this is a reason of violence those radical religious 
groups. Religious radicalism uses the sources of religion and religious sources to 
direct people to a violent way. Therefore religious radicalism uses religious, 
political and cultural statements to legitimate violence and terror.  
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CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Although there are a lot of efforts in both national and international arena to keep 
a pluralist life style, there are elements every time against pluralist life style and 
democratic pluralism. There are some Islamic radical groups, which doesn’t have 
any tolerance even for the different sects in Islam itself, are killing and 
slaughtering innocent civilians in barbaric ways in Syria and Iraq. Israel is killing 
innocent people and destroying houses in Gaza in front of the world’s eyes.  In 
Myanmar, a country Southeast Asian, Buddhist Priests personally provoke public 
opinion against Muslims. Even though there is peace and banning to kill people in 
the essences of all religions and beliefs, every time there are some illiberal groups 
interpret religion in a narrow minded way and act violent. Narrow mind and 
extreme behaviors which are never stated in the essence of any religion or ancient 
culture, can cause violence and murder and also isolated people can appeal this 
way. The saddest example for isolated people/groups violence is the slaughter in 
Norway in 2011 which is one of the wealthiest countries. Today, the pain or the 
joy of an oppressed one or a victim can be televised by mass communication 
devices all over the world. We may still have hope for humanity if all these pains 
and joys are being shared by all different people. Because there is no language, 
religion or nationality for pain and joy, therefore if the joy and pain is common so 
the future is common. Finally, understanding that we are all first human beings 
before our religion, language, color or ideas, will be a good start point to create a 
mutual understanding and improving dialogue.  
Especially, from the second half of the twentieth century, a global dialogue began 
between religions and cultures. It’s been understood that dialogue is necessary for 
mutual respect and tolerance and therefore a lot of attempts began. One of the 
most important global steps which were taken to make a dialogue between is 
‘Alliance of Civilizations’ project between Turkey and Spain governments. 
‘Alliance of Civilizations’ project was implemented in 2005 and at the same time 
was a United Nations initiative, is being supported by over 100 United Nations 
member countries and international corporations which is called as ‘Friends 
Group’. But it is clear that the steps taken in the name of dialogue between 
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religion/religious people or cultures are not enough yet and path taken so far is not 
at desired level. Although all insufficiencies so far, the optimistic point is that 
awareness of ethnic/religious differences has begun.   
Today many politicians, academician and think-tank in the west stay distant to the 
ideas that may cause violence in short or long term. There is an increasing number 
of the people who think that differences between global human values and 
ideal/religious based cultural living styles are our treasures. In this knowledge and 
technology era increasing number of people began to understand and accept each 
other instead of splitting up in to religious, ethnic and cultural groups. Especially 
in the last century because of transnational immigrations, a lot of nations began to 
have differences in their structure. We can say that statement ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ which states that religious and cultural differences cannot stay 
together, was just an effort to create an anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner public 
opinion in Western public. Therefore, this is a must for the nations to construct a 
national structure that gives priority to ‘difference’ but not ‘homogeneity’ 
(Vatandaş, 2002). This comprehensive study on European Turkish nation foresees 
that ‘Clash of Civilizations’ statement is not valid for the European Turkish 
Nation and the Western nations that their householders.  It’s been foreseen that 
European Turkish Nation which has the inner and outer dynamics for living 
together with the Western nations, also has religion/religious people can take role 
in cultural dialogues. This study also foresees that the Islam which has tolerance, 
peace and compromise in its essence is not a threat to west but a preventing way 
of fanatic and radical stand. Therefore, it’s been foreseen that Turkish-Islamic 
tradition has the dynamics to prevent radical and fanatic behaviors among people 
of Turkish-origin living in Europe.   
According the data gathered from the respondents, people from Turkish origin 
mostly integrated to the host societies in each socio-economic, politic and cultural 
ways. People from Turkish origin, built bridges between homeland and countries 
they live in, integrated to the socio-economic and politic system of the country 
they live in. The year we left behind the fiftieth year of the immigration to Europe, 
we can say that immigrants from turkey are now customers and also new 
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producers and more settled in their host societies. People from Turkish origins, 
settled in West European countries, are social and integrated with the society 
because of their interactions with inner and outer sides of the groups. It’s been 
foreseen that mutual respect and tolerance in social relations, will construct a 
more understanding, fair, humanitarian, harmonic and unprejudiced lifestyle in 
Europe in third millennium. Therefore, it’s been also foreseen that people from 
Turkish origins, who have mutual interactions and dialogues, will help to create a 
mutual awareness and unprejudiced. On the other hand, Muslim Turk society who 
is an important part of Europe will help to create ‘culture of living together’ by 
accepting liberal, equal, democratic values of west. Because people from Turkish 
origins consider themselves both Muslim and European at the same time and it’s 
mostly possible them to make contribute to a pluralist life style.   According to the 
data gathered from the respondents, Europe Turk society is having difficulties to 
accepting the pluralist democracy. In other words, Islam shapes the cultural 
identity of European Turk Society and also shapes the interactions between 
individuals. 
The Turkish-Islamic originated movements and their pluralist values, will help to 
reduce monotony, polarization and prototype that will come in front of European 
Turkish society. Religious based movements in European Turkish society can be 
mobilized around a mutual purpose and can be socialized through the social 
communication connections.  Briefly, the Turkish-Islamic movements are the 
most dynamic structures about the fourth generation European Turkish society’s 
integration, localization, communication and application in ethic and spiritual 
ways. The Turkish-Islamic movements which don’t have radicalism in the essence 
are a safe harbor for the young generations to help them not to attend any kind of 
radical fractions.  On the other hand, the Turkish-Islamic movements and civil 
society organizations help to build a bridge between host societies and create deep 
friendships. Today, the Turkish migrants who are living in free, democratic 
countries of Europe give the message of Islam about tolerance, peace, pluralism, 
justice and improvement by using these civil society organizations. It’s been 
foreseen that Turkish-Islamic movements will make an important effect on the 
future of European Turkish society. They do reference compromising but not 
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violence, pluralism but not conservatism, modern and civil religion but not 
radicalism. Therefore, interreligious and intercultural activities which are made by 
the Turkish-Islamic movements make important contributions for the active and 
democratic pluralism comprehension.  
Today, ethnic, religious and cultural differences are still sources of conflicts 
threatening the future of societies. Accepting ethnical, religious and cultural 
differences as a part of democratic societies can only help to reduce the conflicts 
and separations to a minimum level.  Also, differences of the democratic societies 
can be accepted as the essential part of them and can be added a deep conceptual 
integrity with concepts such as variety, multi-culture and pluralism. On the other 
hand, for a permanent integrity in the pluralist societies of Europe it is a must to 
respect religious, holly and cultural values. Using the freedom of self-expression 
for insulting to the other’s values, is giving damage to self-expression itself. It is a 
democratic responsibility for Muslims to stay calm against insults to Islam and 
Islam’s Prophet. Therefore, before a reaction against anti-Islam and anti-Muslim 
in west, a common lifestyle must be supported.  Bhikhu Parekh (2002), pointed on 
the problems of the multicultural societies and advised a multicultural government 
policy.  Well-known Indian politician, summarize the problems of multicultural 
societies; compromising the various demand for legitimate unity, being inclusive 
without being assimilating, creating a common belonging while respecting to 
cultural differences, creating pluralist identities without giving damage to personal 
identity. B. Parekh, claim that a social incorporation in England can be possible 
through loyalty to the universal values, equality, equity, dialogue, tolerance, 
compromise, giving space, respect to varieties, clearance from foreign hatred and 
racism (cited by Duman, 2011). Briefly, believe to establish an intercultural 
dialogue and communication to solve deep ethical and cultural conflicts in 
multicultural societies.  
However it is wrong to make Muslims other for the Western societies, it is also 
wrong the Muslims introvert and cut communication with the fear of losing belief 
and identity. Because, in today’s democratic and pluralist societies, common 
benefits and uniting politics began to take place instead of creating others 
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depending on beliefs, values and identities. We can consider such applications and 
politics like ‘conscience test’ which was taken for 5 years in Germany, only as a 
handicap in front of the cultural communication and dialogue. This ‘conscience 
test’ was only for citizenship candidates from Muslim countries, and it was 
against human rights and equality. Therefore we can mention about an ‘other’ 
concept in Western European countries foremost in Germany. It is a must to 
accept Islamophobia as a hate-crime like Anti-Semitism and make the necessary 
legal arrangements. As a result, Islamophobia, xenophobia, anti-immigrant 
behaviors create another concept and harm the social texture of pluralism and 
politic statements.  
In the report ‘Living Together as Equals in Dignity’ published by ‘the White 
Paper on Intercultural Dialogue’75 which is one the European Council’s Dialogue 
Projects, five basic approaches were indicated for intercultural dialogue in Europe. 
Those approaches were; democratic management of cultural variety, democratic 
citizenship and attendance, learning and teaching the intercultural knowledge, 
creating space for intercultural dialogue and prioritizing intercultural dialogue in 
international relations (The Council of Europe, 2008). Therefore, it is important to 
get a wide public support for implementation of these basic approaches of 
European council. European Union and members, national parliaments, local 
administrations, public institutions, civil society and university representatives, 
minority group’s representatives and media representatives and a civil wisdom 
committee can create a public opinion. With a long term work and wide 
attendance, ethnic and religious minorities and members in west can get respect 
that they deserve, mutual dialogue and tolerance can be gained, extreme right and 
racist speeches can be minimize and hatred topics can be handled.  
The increasing of life satisfactions of disadvantageous minorities is a necessity for 
an understanding of justice that takes rights and freedoms to the center and social 
state as well. The European Turkish society is predicted to be the keepers of the 
constitutions, laws and public security of the countries they are living in. West has 
                                                             
75
 For more information about the White Paper Report, please see; 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf 
(13.05.2014). 
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to move away from its polarizing, discriminating and exclusive behavior. The 
European societies have to quit the otherizing and categorizing social engineering 
and discriminative reflexes immediately. Also, the minority groups have to find a 
way to communicate without prejudices. A change of logic is needed for the 
European Turkish society. The understanding that sees cultural exchange as 
corruption and loss of identity must be forgotten. It is seen that the individuals 
with low level of socio-economic status and low education levels pull themselves 
away from the social and public spheres of the countries they live in. Those 
individuals who move away from the dominant society become introversive and 
then turn into supporters of radical organizations. Both the institutions of host 
countries and the Turkish civil society organizations struggle with the radical and 
fanatic organizations through the social networks they have created. Especially the 
belief based movements develop many alternative projects to prevent the youth 
from bad habits such as drugs and alcohol. International organizations such as 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab Union should conduct 
more coordinated works with Western organizations about radicalism and 
fanaticism. 
Western perception of Islamic world as a geography with diversities has an 
important role in disabling the historical prejudices and hostilities. On the other 
hand, Islamic world should also stop seeing the West as an enemy, which would 
help the development of humanitarian and social relations eventually. The 
religious sources and universal traditions of these two ancient civilizations carry 
on messages about dialogue rather than conflict. European continent is the place 
where Muslims and Christians are geographically living as close as possible; and 
this is the land where a culture of coexistence should be dominant. To seize this 
opportunity, a model of existence should be implemented where different cultures 
and identities accept each other with tolerance. We predict that different 
cultures/identities can live together by establishing a synthesis. In other words, 
transforming an identity in the multicultural Europe by oppression and 
assimilation is against the democratic culture and human rights. In short, the real 
richness of Europe’s developed pluralist democracies is that they have multiple 
identities and cultures. Living in peace with those different sections of the society 
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depends on each party’s recognition of the other and the implementation of 
communicative rationality. All of the differences in the Western democratic states 
can only speak freely with the help of multiculturalism and an understanding of 
cultural pluralism.  
All the ethnic/religious minority groups today, including the millions of Muslims 
from Turkey, are the key actors in the test of Europe with the “other”. Therefore, 
the coexistence of cultural, ethnic and religious differences will be a very 
important advantage for the future of the European societies. The future of the 
understanding of “Europe” and “Europeanism” which constantly constructs itself 
and has a dynamic structure will be shaped in accordance with its permission to 
“other” and its differences. It is an undeniable fact that the policies and attitudes 
built upon “Xenophobia” and “anti-Islamism” will eliminate the differences and 
cause assimilation. We can say that the Turkish immigrants, who are used and 
open to living together with differences, have the potential to accept the pluralist 
life and enhance it. The Turkish society has represented the understanding of 
“Loving the created because of the Creator” and it is predicted that they can take 
this liability again. The interreligious and intercultural activities implemented by 
religious and social groups lately indicate that the European Turkish society has 
the historical and cultural equipment open to dialogue. As a result, we believe that 
the European Turkish society can show the sample and practice that the 
similarities and differences can be lived together. 
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM IN TURKISH 
Bu anket, Porto Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü’nde ‘Almanya, Belçika ve 
Hollanda Türk Toplumunun ‘Medeniyetler İttifakı’ndaki Rolü’ konulu 
doktora tezinin alan çalışmasına veri toplamak için hazırlanmıştır. Katılımcıların 
isim belirtmeden verecekleri yanıtlar gizli tutulacak olup bu çalışma dışında başka 
hiçbir amaçla kullanılmayacaktır. Sadece bilimsel amaçlı kullanılacak anket 
sorularına doğru cevap verilmesi ve ilgili bütün soruların cevaplandırılması 
çalışmanın sağlıklı sonuçlanması açısından önem taşımaktadır.   
Anketimize katıldığınız için teşekkür eder, çalışmalarınızda başarılar dileriz. 
                                                                    
                                               Dinçer Özer, Porto Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü 
1. Cinsiyetiniz:                              (  ) Bay                      (  ) Bayan 
2. Doğum yeriniz:   (  ) Türkiye   (  ) Almanya    (  ) Belçika   (  ) Hollanda      (  ) 
Diğer            
3. Yaşınız:    (  ) 18 Yaşından küçük   (  ) 19-35 Yaş aralığı   (  ) 36-50 Yaş aralığı  
                      (  ) 51-65 Yaş aralığı      (  ) 65-üstü 
4. Eğitiminizi nerede ve hangi seviyede tamamladınız/sürdürüyorsunuz?  
 
Eğitim Seviyesi Türkiye Almanya Belçika  Hollanda 
Okuma-yazma bilmiyor     
İlköğretim     
Lise veya Meslek Lisesi     
Üniversite veya Yüksek Okul     
Yüksek Lisans veya Doktora     
5. Kaç yıldır Almanya/Belçika/Hollanda’da bulunuyorsunuz? 
6. Hangi ülke vatandaşınız? 
(  ) Türkiye     ( ) Almanya      (  ) Belçika      (  ) Hollanda      (  ) Çifte 
Vatandaşlık                   (  ) Herhangi bir ülkeye ait vatandaşlığım yok 
7. Almanya/Belçika/Hollanda’ya hangi amaçla geldiniz? Lütfen size uyan 
seçeneği işaretleyiniz. 
(  ) Almanya/Belçika/Hollanda’da doğdum                                                                                
(  ) Aile birleşimi/Evlilik                                                                                
(  ) Çalışmak için 
(  ) Eğitim için                                                                                
(  ) Siyasi nedenler                                                                                
(  ) Diğer 
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8. Şu anda herhangi bir işte çalışıyor musunuz? 
 (  ) Evet        (  ) Hayır    
 
9. Herhangi bir işte çalışmıyorsanız sebebi nedir? 
(  )İşsizlik 
(  ) Emeklilik 
(  ) Ev hanımı 
(  ) Doğum izni 
(  ) Öğrencilik 
(  ) Sakatlık 
(  ) Diğer 
 
10. Herhangi bir işte çalışıyorsanız lütfen çalıştığınız sektörün ismini Türkçe 
olarak belirtiniz. (                          ) 
 
11. Çalıştığınız işten aylık ne kadar ücret alıyorsunuz? 
 
(  ) 500 Euro’dan daha az 
(  ) 500-1.000 Euro                                                            
(  ) 1.000-2.000 Euro 
(  ) 2.000-3.000 Euro 
(  ) 3.000-4.000 Euro 
(  ) 4.000+ 
12. Ek bir geliriniz var mı? (Devletten alınan her türlü yardımı ek gelirinize dâhil 
ediniz) 
(  ) Evet, lütfen ek gelirinizin miktarını ve kaynağını belirtiniz.  
(  ) Hayır        
13. Evlilik (Medeni) durumunuz nedir? 
(  ) Evli   (  ) Bekâr     (  ) Dul      (  ) Boşanmış     (  ) Nişanlı     (  ) Birisiyle 
birlikte veya ayrı yaşıyor    (  ) Diğer     
14. Evli iseniz eşinizle hangi yolla evlendiniz? Hiç evlenmeyenler lütfen 16. 
soruya geçiniz. 
(  ) Türkiye kökenli bir erkek/kadın76 ile Türkiye’de evlendim  
(  ) Türkiye kökenli bir erkek/kadın ile Almanya/Belçika/Hollanda’da evlendim 
(  ) Türkiye kökenli olmayan bir erkek/kadın ile Türkiye’de evlendim  
(  ) Türkiye kökenli olmayan bir erkek/kadın ile Almanya/Belçika/Hollanda’da 
evlendim 
(  ) Diğer 
                                                             
76
 ‘Türkiye kökenli’ terimi etnik bir anlam taşımadığı için bu çalışmada göçmenleri 
tanımlamak için kullanılmıştır. 
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15. Çocuğunuz var mı? 
(  ) Evet, lütfen sayı belirtiniz 
(  ) Hayır  
16. Ev içerisinde ve aile bireyleri arasında devamlı hangi dil veya diller 
konuşulmaktadır? 
(  ) Sadece Türkçe veya Kürtçe       (  ) Sadece Almanca       (  ) Sadece 
Fransızca/Flemenkçe             Hollandaca      (  ) Hem anadilde hem de ikinci bir 
yabancı dilde          
17. Bulunduğunuz ülkenin dilini hangi seviyede konuşabiliyorsunuz? 
(  ) İleri seviye        (  ) Orta seviye        (  ) Temel Seviye          (  ) Hiç bilmiyor 
18. Oturduğunuz ev kime aittir?  
(  ) Kendimize  
(  ) Belediyeye  
(  ) Çalıştığımız kuruma veya şirkete (Lojman) 
(  ) Kiralık konut  
(  ) Diğer 
19. Kendinizi nasıl tarif ediyorsunuz veya hissediyorsunuz? (Lütfen kendinize en 
yakın gördüğünüz ilk üç (3) aidiyeti sırasıyla numaralandırınız)  
(  ) Türk veya Kürt       (  ) Alevi       (  ) Müslüman      (  ) Müslüman olmayan    
(  ) Türkiyeli                (  ) Almanyalı/Belçikalı/Hollandalı        (  ) Avrupalı        (  ) 
Diğer 
20. Kendinizi siyasi görüş olarak nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz? (Lütfen kendinize en 
yakın gördüğünüz ilk üç (3) siyasi görüşü sırasıyla numaralandırınız)   
(  ) Muhafazakâr      (  ) Demokrat        (  ) Sosyal Demokrat      (  ) Sağcı       (  ) 
Solcu          (  ) Milliyetçi           (  ) Liberal             (  ) İslamcı        (  ) Dindar             
(  ) Diğer  
21. İslam dininin şartları sizin hayatınızda ne kadar önemlidir? 
 
(  ) Çok önemli           (  ) Önemli               (  ) Az önemli                 (  ) Önemli 
değil           
22. Yaşadığınız ülkeye ait günlük gazeteleri hangi sıklıkla takip ediyorsunuz? 
(  ) Düzenli       (  ) Sıkça       (  ) Ara sıra        (  ) Nadiren         (  ) Hiç 
okumuyorum                 
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23. Yaşadığınız ülkede Türkçe baskı yapan gazeteleri hangi sıklıkla takip 
ediyorsunuz? 
(  ) Düzenli       (  ) Sıkça        (  ) Ara sıra         (  ) Nadiren        (  ) Hiç 
okumuyorum                 
24. Yaşadığınız ülkeye ait TV kanallarını hangi sıklıkla izliyorsunuz? 
(  ) Düzenli      (  ) Sıkça          (  ) Ara sıra          (  ) Nadiren        (  ) Hiç 
izlemiyorum                 
25. Yaşadığınız ülkede Türkçe yayın yapan TV kanallarını hangi sıklıkla 
izliyorsunuz? 
(  ) Düzenli      (  ) Sıkça           (  ) Ara sıra         (  ) Nadiren         (  ) Hiç 
izlemiyorum                 
26. Evinizde veya iş yerinizde internet erişim imkânınız var mı? 
                     (  ) Evet                                       (  ) Hayır 
27. Yaşadığınız ülkede Türkiye kökenli ve Türkiye kökenli olmayan bir derneğe 
veya vâkıfa / derneklere veya vakıflara üye misiniz? 
            Türkiye Kökenli:                                                               Türkiye Kökenli 
Olmayan: 
  (  ) Evet          (  ) Hayır                                                            (  ) Evet        (  ) 
Hayır   
28. Yaşadığınız ülkede üyesi olduğunuz veya çalışmalarına katıldığınız Türkiye 
kökenli ve Türkiye kökenli olmayan dernek /dernekler aşağıdaki kategorilerden 
hangisine girmektedir? (Birden çok şık işaretleyebilirsiniz) 
Dernek Tipleri Türkiye Kökenli 
Dernek  
Dernek Tipleri Türkiye Kökenli 
Olmayan Dernek  
Çevreci  Çevreci  
Dini  Dini  
Eğitim  Eğitim  
Kadın  Kadın  
Mesleki  Mesleki  
Kültür ve sanat  Kültür ve sanat  
Siyasal  Siyasal  
Sosyal  Sosyal  
Spor  Spor  
Diğer  Diğer  
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29. Günlük yaşamda çalışmanın/eğitimin dışında en çok kimlerle vakit 
geçirirsiniz? 
Sosyal Yaşam Aktiviteleri Genellikle Bazen Nadiren  Hiçbir 
zaman 
Ailemle vakit geçiririm     
Türk arkadaş ve komşularla vakit 
geçiririm  
    
Alman/Belçikalı/Hollandalı 
arkadaşlarla vakit geçiririm  
    
Diğer     
 
30. Yaşadığınız ülkede oy kullanma hakkınız var mı? 
  (  ) Evet                  (  ) Hayır     
 
31. Yaşadığınız ülkede herhangi bir siyasal partiye üye misiniz? 
(  ) Evet                  (  ) Hayır 
32. Yaşadığınız ülkede ilgi duyup desteklediğiniz, sempatizanı olduğunuz veya 
aktif görevde bulunduğunuz siyasi partiyi işaretleyiniz. 
Siyasi 
Partiler 
(Almanya) 
Sempatizan Siyasi 
Partiler 
(Belçika) 
Sempatizan Siyasi 
Partiler 
(Hollanda) 
Sempatizan 
CDU  N-VA  CDA  
CSU  PS  PvdA  
SPD  CD&V  SP  
FDP  MR  VVD  
DIE 
LINKE 
 SP.A  PVV  
GRÜNE  VLD  GroenLinks  
NPD  VB  D66  
-  CDH  -  
33. Desteklediğiniz, sempatizanı olduğunuz veya aktif görevde bulunduğunuz 
siyasi partinin aşağıdaki faaliyetlerinden hangilerine katıldınız? (Birden çok şık 
işaretleyebilirsiniz) 
Faaliyet Alanları Katılım 
Miting  
Pankart asmak  
Yürüyüşe katılmak  
Partinin bir toplantısına veya seminerine katılmak  
El ilanları ve broşür dağıtmak  
Sözlü veya yazılı anlatmak  
Diğer  
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34. Yaşadığınız ülkede çıkarlarınızın ve haklarınızın temsil edilip korunduğuna 
inanıyor musunuz? 
(  ) Tamamen inanıyorum            (  ) Kısmen inanıyorum              (  ) Hiç 
inanmıyorum         
35. Yaşadığınız ülkenin yerel, bölgesel ve ulusal düzeydeki meclislerine 
toplumsal ve yasal haklarınız için herhangi bir kişisel başvuru yaptınız mı? 
  (  ) Evet                        (  ) Hayır  
36. Siyasal, sosyal, kişisel inanç ve sorunlarınızdan veya haklarınızdan dolayı 
herhangi bir kanun maddesi veya uygulamaya karşı yerel/eyalet veya ulusal 
düzeyde bir kampanya içinde yer aldınız mı? 
  (  ) Evet                         (  ) Hayır   
37. Bu kampanyanın/kampanyaların nedeni ve kapsamı aşağıdakilerden 
hangisidir? (Birden çok şık işaretleyebilirsiniz) 
Nedeni Yerel Eyalet Ulusal AB 
Dini     
Eğitim     
Ekonomik     
İstihdam     
Siyasi     
Spor     
Diğer     
38. Siyasal, sosyal, kişisel inanç ve sorunlarınızdan veya haklarınızdan dolayı 
herhangi bir kanun maddesi veya uygulamaya karşı yerel/eyalet veya ulusal 
düzeyde bir dava açtınız mı? 
  (  ) Evet               (  ) Hayır 
39. Bu davanın nedeni veya kapsamı aşağıdakilerden hangisidir? (Birden çok şık 
işaretleyebilirsiniz) 
Nedeni Yerel Eyalet Ulusal/Federal AB 
Dini     
Eğitim     
Ekonomik     
İstihdam     
Siyasi     
Spor     
Diğer     
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40. Yaşadığınız ülkenin anayasal kurumları, seçimleri ve sivil toplum kuruluşları 
sizin için ne kadar önemlidir? 
Kurumsal Yapılar Çok 
önemli                           
Önemli                          Az önemli                        Önemsiz
Parlamento     
Mahkemeler     
Belediyeler     
Siyasal Partiler     
Siyasal Seçimler     
Avrupa Birliği     
Avrupa İnsan Hakları 
Mahkemesi 
    
Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları     
Diğer     
 
41. Yaşadığınız ülkedeki hükümet politikalarını nasıl buluyorsunuz?  
Genel olarak;   
(  ) Çok iyi         (  ) İyi            (  ) Kötü         (  ) Çok kötü         (  ) İlgilenmiyorum 
Azınlıklara karşı; 
(  ) Çok iyi         (  ) İyi            (  ) Kötü          (  ) Çok kötü         (  ) 
İlgilenmiyorum 
42. Yaşadığınız ülkeye ait farklı değerlendirme kriterlerini yeterlilik açısından 
lütfen sınıflandırınız? 
 
Değerlendirme Kriterleri Çok yeterli                           Yeterli                 Yetersiz                        Çok
yetersiz 
İş imkanları açısından     
Hukuk sisteminin işleyişi açısından     
Bireysel ve toplumsal hoşgörü 
açısından 
    
Toplumsal kurallara gösterilen 
saygı açısından 
    
Ahlaki değerler açısından     
Dinlere ve kültürlere saygı 
açısından 
    
Emniyet kuvvetlerinin tutumu 
açısından 
    
Herkes için eşit olan temel insan 
hakları açısından 
    
Diğer     
43. Yaşadığınız ülkede yabancı olmaktan kaynaklanan temel problemlerinizi 
önem sırasına göre 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 olarak numaralandırınız? 
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(  ) Eğitim eşitsizliği 
(  ) Fırsat eşitsizliği (İstihdam, konut edinme, meslek edinme vb.) 
(  ) Dışlanma, ırkçılık ve önyargı 
(  ) Hukuki, bürokratik ve siyasal engeller 
(  ) Dini ve sosyo-kültürel yaşama karşı engeller 
(  ) Asimilasyon 
(  ) Diğer 
 
44. Yaşadığınız ülkeye uyum sağladığınızı (entegre olduğunuzu) düşünüyor 
musunuz? 
(  ) Evet                 (  ) Hayır 
 
45. Yaşadığınız ülkede bulunmaktan ve yaşamaktan memnun musunuz? 
    (  ) Evet                  (  ) Hayır 
 
46. Almanya/Belçika/Hollanda toplumunun bir parçası olduğunuzu hissediyor 
musunuz? 
 
(  ) Tamamen bir parçası gibi hissediyorum 
(  ) Kısmen bir parçası gibi hissediyorum 
(  ) Hiç hissetmiyorum 
(  ) Fikrim yok 
47. Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi olmasını istiyor musunz? 
(  ) Evet                   (  ) Hayır 
48. Türkiye’nin olası Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyeliğinin ‘Medeniyetler İttifakı veya 
Kültürlerarası Diyaloga’ katkı sağlayacağına inanıyor musunuz? 
 
(  ) Evet                    (  ) Hayır 
49. Farklı ‘din ve kültürler /din ve kültür mensupları’ arasındaki hoşgörü ve 
diyalog çalışmalarını doğru buluyor musunuz? 
(  ) Doğru buluyorum 
(  ) Kısmen doğru buluyorum 
(  ) Yanlış buluyorum 
(  ) Fikrim yok 
50. Yaşadığınız ülkede farklı ‘din ve kültürler /din ve kültür mensupları’ 
arasındaki diyalog ve hoşgörü atmosferini artıracak adımları önem sırasına göre 
sıralayınız.  
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Kriterler Çok 
Önemli 
Önemli 
Önemli 
Değil 
Fikrim 
Yok 
Sivil toplum kuruluşlarının karşılıklı diyalog çalışmaları 
yapmaları 
    
Resmi kurumların diyaloğu artırıcı ortam oluşturması ve 
çalışmaları desteklemesi 
    
Siyasetçilerin birleştirici üslup ve tavır kullanmaları     
Medyanın birleştiren, kutuplaştırmayan ve rencide etmeyen 
yayınlar yapması 
    
Din adamlarının diyalog yanlısı tavır sergilemeleri     
Resmi ve sivil kurumların siyasal, hukuki ve bürokratik vb. 
ayrımcılık yapmaması 
    
Bireysel olarak diyalog ve hoşgörüden ödün verilmemesi     
Ders kitapları başta olmak üzere eğitim müfradatında hoşgörü 
dilinin kullanılması 
    
Diğer     
51. Farklı kültür ve din mensupları arasındaki diyaloğun amaçları arasında 
sayılabilecek aşağıdaki tespitleri önem sırasına göre sıralayınız?                                                        
Amaçlar Çok 
Önemli 
Önemli 
Önemli 
Değil 
Fikrim 
Yok 
Birbirini tanımak ve doğru bilgi sahibi olmak     
Diğerini ikna ederek inancına ve hayat tarzına insan kazanmak     
Mevcut ortak problemleri çözmeye çalışmak     
Sevgi, saygı, dostluk ve arkadaşlık ilişkilerini artırmak     
Karşılıklı kişisel çıkarlarını pekiştirmek     
Aşırı milliyetçi akımların veya radikal unsurların önüne geçmek     
Diğer     
52. Avrupa Türk toplumunun ‘Medeniyetler İttifakı veya Kültürlerarası 
Diyalogdaki’ rolüne ait aşağıdaki tespitlerden hangileri sizce doğrudur? (Lütfen 
aşağıdaki sonuçlardan katıldıklarınıza ‘D’, katılmadıklarınıza ‘Y’ işareti koyunuz) 
(  ) Türk toplumu, kültür ve din temelinde şekillenen önyargıları ve 
kutuplaşmaları azaltmaktadır 
(  ) Türk toplumu, karşılıklı barış ve işbirliğini geliştirmektedir 
(  ) Türk toplumu, kendi içindeki radikal siyasi, dini ve ideolojik gruplara karşı 
mesafeli durmaktadır 
(  ) Türk toplumu, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliğini desteklemektedir 
(  ) Türk toplumu, her geçen yıl daha da marjinalleşmektedir 
(  ) Türk toplumu ile Batı toplumları arasındaki ayrışma gittikçe artmaktadır 
(  ) Türk toplumu içindeki dini, siyasi, etnik ve ideolojik gruplar ortak hareket 
edememekte ve ayrışmaktadır 
(  ) Türk toplumunun ‘Medeniyetler İttifakı’ kapsamında etkin rol alması mümkün 
görünmemektedir 
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53. Yaşadığınız toplumda iş ortağınızın, erkek/kız arkadaşlarınızın veya 
komşularınızın Alman/Belçikalı/Hollandalı olmasında bir sakınca görüyor 
musunuz? 
  
(  ) Hayır, hiçbir sakınca görmüyorum. Aksine faydalı olduğunu düşünüyorum 
(  ) Evet, sakıncalı görüyorum.  
(  ) Ne faydalı ne de sakıncalı görüyorum 
54. Avrupa Türk toplumunun sahip olduğu en önemli iç ve dış dinamikler 
hangileridir? Lütfen önem sırasına göre işaretleyiniz.  
İç ve Dış Dinamikler Çok 
Önemli 
Önemli 
Önemli 
Değil 
Fikrim 
Yok 
Hoşgörü kültürü (yaratılanı Yaradan’dan ötürü sevme 
kültürü) 
    
Birlikte yaşama kültürü     
Dinlere ve inananlarına (üç semavi din) karşı saygısı     
Hoşgörü ve diyalog yanlısı devlet adamları     
Hoşgörü ve diyalog yanlısı din adamları     
Hoşgörü ve diyalog yanlısı sivil toplum kuruluşları     
Diğer     
 
55.  Genel olarak ‘Medeniyetler Çatışması’ tezinin gerçekliğine inanıyor 
musunuz? 
 
 (  ) Evet           (  ) Hayır            (  ) Fikrim yok  
56. Avrupa Türk toplumu ile Batı toplumları arasında bir kültür ve din 
çatışmasının olduğuna inanıyor musunuz? 
 
(  ) İnanıyorum          (  ) Kısmen inanıyorum         (  ) İnanmıyorum          (  ) 
Fikrim yok   
 
57. Son zamanlarda Avrupa toplumlarında aşırı milliyetçilik, yabancı düşmanlığı 
ve İslam korkusunun artmaya başladığı tezine katılıyor musunuz? 
(  ) Tamamen katılıyorum           (  ) Kısmen katılıyorum             (  )  
Katılmıyorum     
         
  
58. Avrupa toplumlarında aşırı milliyetçilik, yabancı düşmanlığı ve İslam 
korkusunun artmasında aşağıdaki seçeneklerin etkisini önem sırasına göre 
işaretleyiniz? 
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Sebepler Çok 
etkili 
Etkili 
Etkisi 
yok 
Ekonomik sorunlardan ve işsizlikten kaynaklanan kaygılar    
Medya aracılığıyla yapılan yayınlar ve dezenformasyon    
11 Eylül ve benzeri terör olayları    
Terör olaylarına karşı Müslümanların tepkilerini yeterince 
ifade edememeleri 
   
İnternet ortamında sosyal medya aracılığıyla yapılan 
propaganda ve kampanyalar 
   
Siyasi partilerin ve din adamlarının milliyetçi veya dışlayıcı 
tutum ve söylemleri 
   
Müslümanlığın Avrupa toplumlarında yayılması    
Göç ve doğumla birlikte artan nüfus    
Göçmenlerin toplumla entegrasyonundaki problemler ve 
iletişim eksikliği 
   
İslam dünyasında otoriter rejimlerin baskıcı uygulamaları    
Avrupa vatandaşlarının statü kaybı endişesi ve güvenlik 
kaygısı 
   
Diğer    
 
59. Yaşadığınız toplumda islamafobi veya yabancı düşmanlığı gibi sebeplerden 
dolayı herhangi bir sözlü tacize veya fiziki saldırıya maruz kaldınız mı? 
(  ) Evet                 (  ) Hayır                     
60. Dini kimliğinizin/inancınızın veya kültürünüzün toplumla entagrasyonunuzu 
engellediğine inanıyor musunuz? 
 
(  ) İnanıyorum       (  ) Kısmen inanıyorum        (  ) İnanmıyorum         (  ) Fikrim 
yok   
61. Yaşadığınız toplumda genel olarak karşılaştığınız çifte standart, ayrımcı tavır, 
davranış ve politikaların sizin hangi kimlik/kültür farklılığınızdan 
kaynaklandığını düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen önceliğine göre 1,2,3,4,5 olarak 
numaralandırınız. 
 
(  ) Etnik kimlik (Türk/Kürt vb.) 
(  ) Dini kimlik (Müslümanlık, Alevilik vb.) 
(  ) Göçmen kimliği (Yabancı olmak) 
(  ) Dini ve kültürel yaşam tarzı ve giyim şekli (Başörtüsü, gelenekler, eğlence vb.)  
(  ) Diğer 
 
62. Yaşadığınız toplumda kültürlerarası diyalog ve uyuma hangi 
toplum/toplumlar daha açık ve isteklidir? 
 
(  ) Türk toplumu    (  ) Alman/Belçika/Hollanda toplumu   (  ) Her iki toplum   (  ) 
Fikrim yok 
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63. Yaşadığınız toplumda Türkiye kökenli dini grup ve cemaatlerin kültürlerarası 
diyalog ve uyuma katkı sağladıklarına inanıyor musunuz? 
 
(  ) Kesinlikle inanıyorum      (  ) Kısmen inanıyorum      (  ) İnanmıyorum     (  ) 
Fikrim yok   
64. Birlikte yaşamaya dair aşağıdaki tespitlerin hangileri sizce doğru ve yanlıştır?  
 
Tespitler 
Doğru Yanlış 
Fikrim 
yok 
Benim dinim, kültürüm benim için ne ise onun dini de, 
kültürü de onun için odur 
   
Benim değer verdiklerim kadar onun değer verdikleri 
de saygı değerdir 
   
Benim fikirlerim en fazla onun fikirleri kadar doğru ve 
değerlidir 
   
Herkes aynı şekilde düşünmeli, aynı şekilde yaşamalı, 
farklılıklar olmamalı ve karşımızda muhalif 
bulunmamalıdır 
   
Avrupa Türk toplumuna bir kimlik, bir ideoloji 
dayatılmamalı ve farklılıkları görmezden 
gelinmemelidir 
   
Birlikte yaşamak için her şeyden önce 
anlaşabilemek/anlaşma yapabilecek bir zemine sahip 
olunmalıdır 
   
Kendimiz için istediğimiz, düşündüğümüz, hak olarak 
gördüğümüz her şeye başkalarının da sahip olması 
gerektiği kabul edilmelidir 
   
Avrupa’da birlikte yaşamayı başarmak için Batı tarzı 
bir birlikteliğe razı olunmalıdır 
   
Avrupa’da birlikte yaşamak ancak eşit ve denk 
şartlarda gerçekleşen bir birliktelikle mümkündür 
   
Batı toplumları yabancılar tarafından istila 
edilmişlerdir 
   
Avrupa Avrupalılara aittir    
Batının birlikte yaşamaktan maksadı yabancıların 
asimile olmasıdır 
   
Avrupa’da ayrımcılık giderek yükseliyor ve hatta 
normalleşiyor 
   
 
65. Almanya, Belçika ve Hollanda’da yaşayan Euro-Türklerin ‘Medeniyetler 
Çatışması’ tezini en azından Batı toplumlarında etkisiz kılacak iç ve dış 
dinamiklere sahip olduklarını düşünüyor musunuz? Lütfen bu konudaki 
düşüncelerinizi birkaç cümle ile özetleyiniz. 
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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM IN ENGLISH 
This questionnaire is prepared to collect data for the application part of doctoral 
thesis its title is ‘The Role of Turkish Society in ‘Alliance of Civilization’ in 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands’ at the Department of Sociology, 
University of Porto. Responses of participants without specifying the name will be 
kept confidential and not used with exception of this study for any purpose. These 
questionnaires that will be used for just scientific purposes, so all questions are 
given answer correctly is very important for healthy resulting of this study. 
Thank you for participating in our survey, wish you success in your studies. 
               Dinçer ÖZER 
1. Gender:              (  ) Male                      (  ) Female 
2. Place of birth:    (  ) Turkey       (  ) Germany        (  ) Belgium       (  ) The 
Netherlands              (  ) Others             
3. Age:                   (  ) Less than 18 age        (  ) Aged 19-35 years       (  ) Aged 
36-50 years      (  ) Aged 51-65 years    (  ) Over 65 Age 
4. Where and what level of education did you complete/have keep? Please tick 
the option which is relevant to you. 
Level of Education Turkey Germany Belgium  The 
Netherlands 
Unable to read and write     
Primary and Secondary 
School 
    
High and Technical High 
School 
    
Undergraduate/College     
Master/PhD     
5. Have long have you been living in Germany/ Belgium/ The Netherlands? 
6. Which country citizen are you? 
(  ) Turkey      (  ) Germany       (  ) Belgium      (  ) The Netherlands     (  ) Dual 
nationality                   (  ) No any citizenship 
7. What purpose have you come to Germany/Belgium/The Netherlands? Please 
tick the option which is relevant to you. 
(  ) I was born in Germany/Belgium/The Netherlands 
(  ) Family reunification/Marriage 
(  ) To working 
(  ) Political reasons 
(  ) To education 
(  ) If other, please specify…..  
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8. Do you work currently? 
(  ) Yes      (  ) No    
9. If you are not currently working in any job, why?  
(  ) Unemployment 
(  ) Retirement 
(  ) Housewife 
(  ) Maternal leave 
(  ) Student 
(  ) Disability 
(  ) If other, please specify 
10. What sector do you currently work in? Please specify in Turkish………… 
11. How much do you earn every month? 
(  ) Less than 500         Euro 
(  ) 500-1.000               Euro                                                            
(  ) 1.000-2.000            Euro 
(  ) 2.000-3.000            Euro 
(  ) 3.000-4.000            Euro 
(  ) 4.000  or grater      Euro 
12. Have you an extra income? 
(  ) Yes, please specify amount and source of your extra income…………….. 
 (  ) No       
13. What is marital status? 
(  ) Married      (  ) Single        (  ) Widowed            (  ) Divorced         (  ) 
Engaged               (  ) Separated or living with a person        (  ) Others   
14. How did you get married with your partner? If you are never married, skip to 
question 16. 
(  ) I got married with a man/woman of Turkish origin
77
 in Turkey  
(  ) I got married with a man/woman of Turkish origin in Germany/Belgium/The 
Netherlands 
(  ) I got married with a man/woman of non-Turkish origin in Turkey  
(  ) I got married with a man/woman of non-Turkish origin in 
Germany/Belgium/The Netherlands 
(  ) If other, please specify…………. 
 
                                                             
77
 ‘A man/woman of Turkish origin’ term is used to describe the Turkish migrants in this 
study, because this term does not carry ethnic meaning. 
320 
 
15. Have you children? How many children do you have? 
(  ) Yes, please specify number of child/children……………….. 
(  ) No  
16. What language is spoken at home and among family members constantly? 
(  ) Only Turkish and Kurdish       (  ) Only Germany      (  ) Only French/Belgium 
language   (  ) Only Dutch       (  ) Others    
17. In which level do you speak the language of host country? 
(  ) Advanced level       (  ) Intermediate level      (  ) Basic level         (  ) I do not 
know 
18. Who is the owner of the house you stay?  
(  ) Ourselves  
(  ) Municipal  
(  ) Public housing (provided to employees/workers) 
(  ) Private rental housing 
(  ) If other, please specify 
19. How do you describe yourself or do you feel? (Please rank in order of 
importance)  
(  ) Turkish or Kurdish     (  ) Alevi        (  ) Muslim     (  ) Non-Muslim    (  ) 
Turkish origin          (  ) Germany/Belgian/Dutch   (  ) European    (  ) If other, 
please specify…………….. 
20. How would you describe yourself as a political opinion? 
(  ) Conservative          (  ) Democrat       (  ) Social Democrat         (  ) Right-wing            
(  ) Left-wing       (  ) Nationalist           (  ) Liberal             (  ) Islamist       (  ) 
Religious   (  ) If other, please specify  
 
21. How much is important religion (Islamic practice) in your life? 
 
(  ) Very important      (  ) Important      (  ) Less important      (  ) Not important           
22. How often do you follow daily newspapers of the host country where you 
live? 
 (  ) Regularly   (  ) Frequently   (  ) Occasionally   (  ) Rarely   (  ) I do not read                 
23. How often do you follow newspapers of Turkish origin in the host country 
where you live? 
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 (  ) Regularly    (  ) Frequently (  ) Occasionally      (  ) Rarely     (  ) I do not read                 
24. How often do you watching TV channels in the host country where you live? 
  (  ) Regularly   (  ) Frequently   (  ) Occasionally    (  ) Rarely    (  ) I do not watch                 
25. How often do you watching TV channels of Turkish origin in the host 
country where you live? 
 (  ) Regularly    (  ) Frequently  (  ) Occasionally    (  ) Rarely     (  ) I do not watch                 
26. Do you have internet access in your home and workplace? 
       (  ) Yes        (  ) No 
27. Are you member of any association/associations of Turkish origin and non-
Turkish origin in the host country? 
      Turkish Origin:                                                              Non-Turkish Origin: 
 (  ) Yes            (  ) No                                                    (  ) Yes         (  ) No              
28. Which category does contain association/associations of Turkish origin or 
non-Turkish origin where you are member or join activities in the host country? 
(You can mark more than one response) 
Types of Associations Association 
of Turkish 
Origin 
Types of Associations Association of 
Non-Turkish 
Origin 
Environmentalist  Environmentalist  
Religious  Religious  
Education  Education  
Women  Women  
Professional  Professional  
Culture and art  Culture and art  
Political  Political  
Social  Social  
Sports  Sports  
Others…………………  Others…………………  
29. Where and with whom do you spend the majority of your time in daily life 
outside of work? (Please rank in order of importance) 
  (  ) I spend time with my family 
  (  ) I spend time with Turkish friends and neighbors 
  (  ) I spend time with non-native friends and neighbors 
  (  ) Other, please specify 
 
30. Do you have the right to vote in the host country where you live? 
322 
 
  (  ) Yes                 (  ) No     
 
31. Are you member of a political party in the host country where you live? 
(  ) Yes                 (  ) No 
32. Please mark political party where you are interested, supporting and be 
sympathetic or active member in host country. 
Political Party 
(Germany) 
Sympathizer Political Party 
(Belgium) 
Sympathizer Political Party 
(The Netherlands) 
Sympathizer 
CDU  N-VA  CDA  
CSU  PS  PvdA  
SPD  CD&V  SP  
FDP  MR  VVD  
DIE LINKE  SP.A  PVV  
GRÜNE  VLD  GroenLinks  
-  VB  D66  
-  CDH  -  
33. Which of the following activities have you participated political party where 
you are supporting and be sympathetic or active member? (You can mark more 
than one response)  
Political Practice Areas Participation 
Rally  
Hang banner  
Participate in a walk  
Attend a meeting and seminar of a political party  
Distribute flyers and brochures  
Oral or written explain  
If other, please specify  
 
34. Do you believe that your interests and rights are being protected and 
represented by countries where you live? 
(  ) I believe totally/mainly          (  ) I believe partially            (  ) I do not believe 
35. Did you any personal application to the social and legal rights to the local, 
regional and national councils of the host countries where you live? 
  (  ) Yes               (  ) No  
36. Did you have initiated a campaign to your political and social rights, personal 
beliefs and problem against any the law or practise in the local, regional and 
national level of host country? 
  (  ) Yes                 (  ) No   
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37. Which are the following reason and scope of this campaign/campaigns? (You 
can mark more than one response) 
Reason Local Regional National EU 
Religious     
Education     
Economic     
Employment     
Political     
Sports     
If other, please 
specify 
    
38. Did you get a case to your political and social rights, personal beliefs and 
problem against any the law or practise in the local, regional and national level of 
host country? 
  (  ) Yes                (  ) No 
39. Which are the following reason or scope of this case/cases? (You can mark 
more than one response)  
Reason Local Regional National EU 
Religious     
Education     
Economic     
Employment     
Political     
Sports     
If other, please 
specify 
    
40. How much is important constitutional institutions, elections and civil society 
organizations of the host country to you? 
Constitutional Institutions Very important                           Important                       Less important                        Not
important 
Parliaments     
Courts     
Municipalities     
Political Parties     
Political Elections     
European Union     
European Court of Human 
Rights 
    
Civil Society Organizations     
If other, please specify     
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41. What do you think about the current governmental policies of host country? 
In generally;   
(  ) Very good  
(  ) Good 
(   ) Bad  
(  ) Very bad 
(  ) I am not interested in 
Against minorities; 
(  ) Very good 
(  ) Good  
(  ) Bad 
(  ) Very bad 
(  ) I am not interested in  
 
42. Please classify different evaluation criteria as qualification belongs to host 
country where you live? 
 
Evaluation Criteria Very sufficient Sufficient Insufficient Very 
insufficient 
Employment opportunity     
Functioning of legal system     
Individual and social tolerance     
Showing respect for social 
rules 
    
Moral values     
Respect for religions and 
cultures 
    
Attitudes of police forces     
Basic human rights are equal 
for everyone 
    
If other, please specify     
 
43. What are the most important three problems you face in the countries you are 
living in because of your foreignness? 
(  ) Inequality of oppurtunity in education 
(  ) Inequality of oppurtunity (employment, getting a job and house) 
(  ) Exclusion, racism and prejudice  
(  ) Legal, bureaucratic and political barriers 
(  ) Barriers on religion and socio-economic life  
(  ) Assimilation 
(  ) Other 
44. Do you think that you have adapted to the country where you are living in? 
  (  ) Yes                     (  ) No  
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45. Are you happy of being and living in the country where you reside at? 
  (  ) Yes                      (  ) No 
 
46. Do you feel like a part of the German/Belgium/Dutch society you are living 
in? 
 
       (  ) Yes, I do feel I am completely part of  
       (  ) Yes, I do feel I am partly part of  
  (  ) No, I do not feel part of  
       (  ) I have no idea  
 
47. Do you support the membership of Turkey to European Union? 
  (  ) Yes                                 (  ) No 
48. Do you believe that Turkey’s prospective membership to European Union 
(EU) will contribute to ‘the Alliance of Civilization or intercultural dialogue? 
  (  ) Yes                                  (  ) No 
49. Do you think that it correct to establish tolerance and dialogue between the 
members of different religions and culture? 
  (  ) I do  
  (  ) I partially consider it right/wrong 
  (  ) I do not 
       (  ) I have no idea  
50. Please list the steps you think would increase the atmosphere of dialogue and 
tolerance among the members of different religions and cultures (Please rank in 
order of importance) 
(  ) The civil society organizations to conduct more policies for mutual dialogue 
(  ) the official institutions’ support of the dialogue 
(  ) The politicians’ behaviours to be more into dialogue 
(  ) Publications by media in which they make unifying and peaceful news 
(  ) Religious men’s behaviours to be more into dialogue 
(  ) The ending of the legal, bureaucratic and political discriminations of civil and 
official institutions 
(  ) As individual continue to dialogue and tolerance   
(  ) The usage of tolerance language in the educational curriculum 
(  ) If other, please specify 
51. Please list in an order some statements that could be counted as the aims of 
dialogue between the members of different cultures and religions (Please rank in 
order of importance) 
 (  ) Knowing each other and having the correct information 
(  ) Adding people to one side’s life style by convincing the others 
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(  ) Solving common problems 
(  ) Increasing friendship relations 
(  ) Increasing the ‘mutual self-interests’ 
(  ) Preventing radicalism and extremism 
52. Which ones of the following statements are right or wrong in terms of the role 
of the European Turkish society in Alliance of Civilizations an Intercultural 
Dialogue? 
(  ) The Turkish society has a role to decrease the prejudice and polarization in 
Europe 
(  ) The Turkish society has a role to develop peace and cooperation in Europe 
(  ) The Turkish society remains distant to radical political, religious and 
ideological groups within itself 
(  ) The Turkish society supports Turkey’s membership to European Union 
(  ) The Turkish society is marginalizing each year 
(  ) The distinction between the Turkish and Western societies is increasing 
(  ) The Turkish society cannot act together because of different religious, 
political, ethnic and ideological groups within it 
(  ) The Turkish society is not possible to take an active role in ‘alliance of 
civilization and intercultural dialogue’ 
53. Do you think it is appropriate to have a German/Belgian/Dutch partner, 
business associate, boyfriend/girlfriend or neighbour? 
(  ) No, I do not consider it as a problem. On the contrary, I think it is useful 
(  ) Yes 
(  ) Partly Yes or No 
54. What do you think are the most important dynamics of European Turkish 
society has in terms of tolerance and dialogue? 
(  ) The culture of tolerance 
(  ) Culture of coexistence 
(  ) Respect to religions and members of religion 
(  ) Politicians of Turkish origin are favour of tolerance and dialogue 
(  ) Religious leaders of Turkish origin are favour of tolerance and dialogue 
(  ) Civil society organizations of Turkish origin are favour of tolerance and 
dialogue 
55. Do you generally believe the truth of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis? 
  (  ) Yes                       (  ) No 
56. Do you believe that there is a clash of culture and religion between the 
European Turkish society and the Western societies? 
  (  ) Yes                        (  ) No 
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57. Do you agree with the thesis that extreme nationalism, xenophobia and fear 
of Islam have increased in the European societies lately? 
(  ) I completely agree 
(  ) I partly agree 
(  ) I do not agree 
(  ) I have no idea 
58. Which reasons/situations below that effect the increase of nationalism, 
xenophobia and Islamophobia in European nations by the order of its importance? 
(  ) Economic problems and worries about unemployment 
(  ) Media publications and disinformation 
(  ) September 11 (2001) and similar terror events 
(  ) Lack of self-expression of Muslims after the terror events 
(  ) Propaganda and campaigns on social media and internet 
(  ) Nationalist or discriminative attitudes or behaviour of politics or religious 
figures 
(  ) Spread of Islam in Western nations 
(  ) Increase of the foreign population by births and immigrating 
(  ) Problems about integration of the immigrants to society and lack of 
communication 
(  ) Oppressive behaviours of strict regimes in Islam world 
(  ) Loss of status and worry of security by the host nations 
(  ) Others 
59. Have you been exposed to any verbal abuse or physical attack because of 
reasons such as Islamophobia and xenophobia in the community where you live 
in? 
(  ) Yes        (  ) No 
60. Do you believe that your religious identity or culture prevents your 
integration with the society? 
(  ) I believe 
(  ) I believe partly 
(  ) I do not believe 
(  ) I have no idea 
61. Which identity/cultural difference do you think is the reason of double 
standards, discriminative attitude, behaviour and policies in the society you are 
living? 
(  ) Ethnic identity (Turkish/Kurdish and etc.) 
(  ) Religious identity (be Muslim) 
(  ) Immigrants identity (be foreign) 
(  ) Religious and cultural life and dressing style (headscarf, tradition and etc.) 
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62. Which community or communities are more open and willing to intercultural 
dialogue and integration where you live in? 
(  ) Turkish community 
(  ) German/Belgium/Dutch communities 
(  ) Both communities 
(  ) I have no idea 
63. Do you believe that religious groups and communities in your society which 
are of Turkey origin contribute to intercultural dialogue and harmony? 
(  ) I definitely believe 
(  ) I partly believe 
(  ) I do not believe 
(  ) I have no idea 
64. What do you think is correct or wrong of the statements about coexistence 
below?” 
(  ) Whatever my religion and culture means to me is the same for the religions 
and cultures of others to them 
(  ) If the things I value are worthy, so others’ values are worth to respect 
(  ) My ideas are as true and valuable as his/her ideas 
(  ) Everyone should think in the same way, live in the same way, there should be 
no diversities and we should not have any opposition 
(  ) An ethnic or religious identity or ideology should not be imposed for 
European Turkish society, and also their diversities should not be neglected 
(  ) To live together, before everything, there should be a common ground to live 
and agree 
(  ) We should accept that anything we want, think or consider as a right for 
ourselves should also be possessed by others 
(  ) We have to abide to Western style cohesion in order to succeed the 
coexistence in Europe 
(  ) Living together is only possible with combination on equal and equivalent 
conditions in Europe 
(  ) Western societies have been invaded nearly by foreigners 
(  ) Purpose of live together is assimilating foreigners in eyes of the European 
(  ) Discrimination is increasing and becoming normal every day in Europe 
65. Do you think that Turks living in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands 
have a role to disable the thesis of Clash of Civilizations at least in Western 
societies? Please summarize your thoughts in a few sentences on this topic. 
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN TURKISH AND ENGLISH 
 
Soru 1. Avrupa’da baş gösteren ekonomik krizlerle birlikte daha da artan aşırı 
milliyetçilik, yabancı düşmanlığı ve İslam korkusu karşısında ne tür tedbirler 
alıyorsunuz? Türkiye kökenliler ile ev sahibi toplumlar arasında kutuplaşmayı 
artıran bu üç gelişmeyi sebep ve sonuçları açısından nasıl bir 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
Soru 2.  Ev sahibi toplumla hangi alanlarda iletişime önem 
veriyorsunuz? İletişimin gerekliliğine inanıyor musunuz? Örnekler verebilir 
misiniz? 
Soru 3. S. Huntington, ‘Medeniyetler Çatışması’nın sadece uluslar arası arenada 
değil, farklı kültürlere sahip grupların yaşadığı Batılı toplumlarda da ortaya 
çıkabileceğini iddia etmiştir. Sizce Avrupa Türk toplumu ile Batılı toplumlar 
arasında bu anlamda bir çatışma gerçekleşir mi? Böyle bir gelecek 
öngörmüyorsanız, neden? 
Soru 4. Avrupa Türk toplumunda olan ve olabilecek radikal ve aşırı eğilimlere 
karşı tavrınız nedir? Radikal eğilimlere karşı ne tür tedbirler alıyorsunuz? 
Örnekler verir misiniz? 
Soru 5. Ev sahibi toplumlarla diyalog içerisinde bir arada yaşamanın olmazsa 
olmazları nelerdir? Avrupa Türk toplumu birlikte yaşama konusunda bir mesafe 
almış mıdır? Sizce Avrupa Türk toplumu diyalogun geliştirilmesi adına Batı ile 
Müslüman ülkeler arasında bir köprü vazifesi görebilir mi?  
………………………………… 
Question 1. What type of precautions do you take to deal with extremist 
nationalism, xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe after the economic crises? 
How do you evaluate these three developments that increase the polarization 
between the Turks and the host societies? 
Question 2. In what areas do you communicate with the host society? Do you 
believe in the necessity of communication? Can you give some examples? 
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Question 3. S. Huntington has claimed that “Clash of Civilizations” might appear 
not only at international arena, but also in Western societies where different 
cultural groups coexist. Do you think that such a conflict might happen between 
the European Turkish society and the Western societies? If you do not predict 
such a thing, why? 
Question 4. What is your attitude towards the radical and extremist tendencies 
which exist or might exist in the European Turkish society? What kind of 
precautions do you take against the radical tendencies? Can you give any 
examples? 
Question 5. What are the prerequisites of coexisting with the host societies in a 
dialogue? Did the European Turkish society make any progress about coexistence? 
Do you think that the European Turkish society might act as a bridge between the 
West and Muslim countries in order to develop the dialogue? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
